/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.4865926]

What do you guys think of Kant's idea that the only good thing that is good without qualification is good will, and non-consequentialism in general?

[Anonymous No.4867088]

>>4865926
i think that whatever promotes the greatest overall happiness is what is good. not some insensible, intangible moral guidelines.

[Anonymous No.4867112]

>>4867088

>insensible
>intangible
>greatest overall happiness

>>4865926

I think he's wrong. The will being free is an illusion and, if that's the case, it's hard to make arguments about good/bad motivations.

[Anonymous No.4867120]

i think hes a fag XD

[Anonymous No.4867129]

>>4867088
>utilitarianism

Just fucking kill yourself.

[Anonymous No.4867138]

>non-consequentialism

You must be really detached from the real world to think this is a good concept.

[Anonymous No.4867160]

>>4867112
>pleasure
>intangible
happiness is just pleasure over time

[Anonymous No.4867174]

>>4867160

Even if you define it like that it makes util no less stupid.

[Anonymous No.4867190]

>>4867174
>>4867160

[Anonymous No.4867200]

>>4867190
>thinking the utility monster is an actual critique of utilitarianism

[Anonymous No.4867209]

>>4867200

>thinking that ">thinking the utility monster is an actual critique of utilitarianism" is a critique of the utility monster argument.

[Anonymous No.4867222]

i like kant but it seems kind of an irrelevant distinction to make.

[Anonymous No.4867226]

>>4867088
well the problem is that a man is not god, and can't know what promotes the greatest overall happiness, he or she can only try to do good through intuition.

[Anonymous No.4867227]

>>4867138

>attachment to the world
>good

[Anonymous No.4867229]

>>4867209
it wasn't an argument, it was me raising issue with the fact that someone actually thinks that utility monster is an argument.
If you want an actual argument against the utility monster argument, it goes something like this:
The utility monster (hereby “Umon”) only works in the case of an absurd hypothetical. obviously, amongst real conscious beings, such a thing is impossible because pleasure is subject to the law of diminishing returns. While it is true that Umon is a thought experiment and doesn’t need to be possible, the problem is is that it serves as no -substantive- argument against utilitarianism, only provides a conclusion that we naturally react badly to on an emotional level. An apparently crazy utilitarian could bite the bullet and accept the Umon as good without any harm to utility as a coherent argument (if suffering a loss of intuitive credibility). Because the rejection of utility based on Umon is emotional and not deductive, the fact that it is an impossible thought experiment becomes relevant. People intuitively understand that utility is subject to the law of diminishing returns, and the concept of a being with aggregating rather than diminishing returns makes no sense to us on a human level. Because Umon is impossible, yet rests on an emotional rejection that obviously contains ideas about what and what isn’t possible, it is invalid.

Nozick also said that Umon proved that utilitarianism wasn't egalitarian - yet as established, in the real world, Umon is impossible, pleasure is subject to diminishing returns, and utility is the most equal approach to ethics

[Anonymous No.4867305]

>>4867229

Interesting argument, actually. Suppose that we're capable of producing artificial intelligence capable of feeling pleasure at some point in the future (I think it's plausible that we will), it would be possible to create utility monsters. If that ever happens, would you say that we should shift out of utilitarian thinking and move to a new model of ethics?

[Anonymous No.4867369]

>>4867305
no, because its silly to think that the utility of a machine, basically based on programming, doesn't require outside inputs to create that happiness. Even if it could, by that time we could have one that didn't, rendering the utility monster irrelevant

[Anonymous No.4869429]

>>4867369

So our happiness isn't a product of external inputs? How could you possibly have an ethical code based on happiness if it's supposed to just spontaneously appear? The roots of our pleasure are all externally generated just like in the case of the utility monster. You haven't addressed the problem.

Also, if it's our moral obligation to produce the greatest amount of happiness, wouldn't it follow that we're obligated to create these monsters?

[Anonymous No.4871158]

>>4869429
whats wrong with spontaneous happiness? why should it need to be based on outside input? the fundamental justification of utility finds these things irrelevant, only that they are experienced. would be be obligated to create these monsters - no, we would be obligated to create whatever feels the most pleasure. Does this mean that in the future when we can abolish pain and cause everyone to be in ecstasy always we have an obligation to do so?
yes, and if you think that we shouldn't, you're a moron

[Anonymous No.4871333]

>>4871158

>whats wrong with spontaneous happiness?

That it doesn't exist. Happiness isn't self-caused.

>why should it need to be based on outside input?

What be an example of a human action, thought, emotion, etc. that isn't the product of a cause external to the individual? I don't think there are any. In any case, I don't think it really has any bearing on my criticisms since I only mentioned inputs as a response to YOU mentioning inputs as something relevant.

> the fundamental justification of utility finds these things irrelevant,

Apparently not because you, or the anon who I was responding to, wrote that we wouldn't have to abandon utilitarianism because the utility monsters would require outside inputs (see: >>4867369 )

> would be be obligated to create these monsters - no, we would be obligated to create whatever feels the most pleasure.

Which would be the utility monsters which, by your own admission, we'd be obligated to create.

You claimed that rejection of the utility monster conclusion is based on emotion rather than logic. If we do have an intuitive sense that some arguments our premises lead to are ridiculous, then we have grounds to examine the premises. If we're pretty certain that utility monsters are possible and the only other premise necessary to lead us toward utility monster world is an embrace of utilitarianism, then we have perfectly sane grounds for questioning whether or not the sum total of happiness is the only thing we ought to consider (and many sane philosophers have created systems that aren't utilitarian).

You had also said that utility monsters aren't possible and therefore don't provide a substantive argument against utilitarianism. You went on to say that, a utilitarian could agree that we ought to create utility monsters but it ultimately wouldn't matter because utility monsters are impossible. You went on to repeat in a few different ways that utility monsters are impossible and therefore not to be taken seriously. In fact, they are possible and serious utilitarians will have to make serious arguments dealing with the thoughts experiment. If we believe that we ought to create a world with the most total pleasure, and we're capable of creating utility monsters (which we likely will be able to do), then it follows that we'd be in a better world if every human miserably worked their lives away to create and sustain utility monsters. This is a deductive argument, not an emotional one. You haven't provided any arguments to show that we can't/shouldn't create utility monsters or that we should alter our standards for what is ethical. You have to do one or both of these things if you want to be taken seriously. Or, you can argue that we ought to be utility monster slaves and if you think we should be, you're a moron.