Peirce

[Anonymous No.21969168]

What can't his philosophy explain? What is it missing? His three categories of experience, built upon the concept of "pure nothing" that enables possibilities in general, seem to cover everything.

[Anonymous No.21969192]

>>21969168
It is missing a theory of what makes a separable concept possible in general, which means his just a bitter Anglo that's resentful at Kant for being so great, like so many were

[Anonymous No.21969350]

>>21969192
Explain.

[Anonymous No.21969504]

>>21969350
Its a stupid schizo diagram retroactively refuted by Kant. Firstness is just a retrogression from, and a failure to understand, Kant. It's not possible withoyt categories of quantity preceding it and further without transcendental space since without limitation, line or point don't exist

[Anonymous No.21969532]

>>21969504
Do you think Secondness fulfills the function of limitation?

[Anonymous No.21969691]

>>21969192
>>21969504
holy shit shut up this debate was already had ad nauseam.
>it's not possible without quantity preceding it
simply wrong
>no line or point without space
yes obviously, doesn't make space transcendental. you literally cannot wrap your head around substances being things perceived through themselves and therefore think that because you can't perceive space without space it must not be empirical. just stop dude, Peirce literally spent hundreds of hours reading Kant and Kant was the biggest single influence on him. He literally learned philosophy by studying Kant. It's time to move on, new philosophy has been done. Kant would think you are an idiot for still harping on his philosophy when it has been far advanced since his time.

[Anonymous No.21969699]

>>21969192
also the three categories explain individuation just fine, and are more abstract than Kant's.

[Anonymous No.21969713]

>>21969168
the only thing that's missing from philosophy is a complete phenomenological logic that allows us to perform an exact metaphysics. "pure nothing" is a non-concept. We have to explain how we got here through analysis of Being because only Being exists. Peirce implicitly grants the realm of hypothetical firstnesses existing in pure potentiality, but in order for these to exist even potentially, they have to be created by Being or form part of the essence of Being.

[Anonymous No.21969745]

>>21969713
Peirce explicitly discarded "Being" and "substance" from his phaneroscopy, leaving us with the three categories.

[Anonymous No.21969796]

>>21969745
Except all qualities of firstness are united by the virtuality of Being qua Being in them. All firstnesses have a common nature, namely, that they are being experienced/can "get represented". But what exactly does it mean to be experienced? That is the same question as what exactly it means to be, and this leads to metaphysics or the study of Being. This is the only thing that can answer the question of "how do qualities exist potentially/hypothetically."

There also is the problem of relations. A second is what it is relative to another, and a third opens up the possibility of relating firsts, seconds, and thirds in infinite combinations of tetradic, pentadic, on to infidy-adic relations. What exactly a relation is isn't self-explanatory. I argue that relations only exist by virtue of participating a medium, such as space and time, which is itself a firstness that exists as a manifold (using Proclean logic, manifolds can become monads in perception, allowing the possibility of relations, and in fact this unity of multiplicities constitutes the very essence of all relations), and therefore all relations must also proceed from Being, meaning Being enables the possibility of the three categories to begin with. The reason you need to say that there is a medium that is a substance which is enabling relations, which is a manifold on itself but is nevertheless a unified substance, is because otherwise you get into infinite regress of asking what exactly is this relation, or you have to say that relations are empty in substance, which leads to nothingness, which is inconceivable and a contradiction, raising the question of how nothingness is differentiated into multiple types of relations, how does nothingness alter our substantive experiences, how does nothingness fit in with non-contradiction, and how it is we have any substantive experience at all if everything is empty? Therefore I have strong reason to believe that all three categories are reducible to Being qua Being, and therefore that the three categories are not universal, but anthropic, and in fact that logic itself is anthropic and not universal, meaning we will have to rely on the univocity of Being, and phenomenology, and on certain quirks I've discovered, to create any metaphysics, because being itself will not be logical but will merely produce logic. anyway these are all ideas I haven't really heard other people talk about, but they are what's missing.

[Anonymous No.21969844]

>>21969796
A few questions: How are you using the word "substance"? It feels a bit idiosyncratic given its history of its use (e.g., how Aristotle uses it ends up being how everybody else uses it, to mean inherence of some kind). Second, do you perceive a strong compatibility between Proclus's hypostases and Peirce's categories? Finally, how does the distinction between universal and anthropic hold if the anthropic must participate in the universal in order to be intelligible?

[Anonymous No.21969886]

>>21969844
>How are you using the word "substance"?
A substance is something conceived through itself, that is therefore a unity in perception. I basically consider all qualia to be substances, as qualia correspond roughly to Aristotelian "primary substances". the "conceived through itself" part comes from Spinoza, and the fact they are monads is clear from the irreducibility in perception, e.g. the impossibility of dividing up color into several relations that are forming its immediate experience.
>do you perceive a strong compatibility between Proclus's hypostases and Peirce's categories?
Only in the idea of firsts being "ideas" that exist "hypothetically" insofar as they have the potentiality of getting represented. Thirdness is what the neoplatonists would have explained as something like dialectic, which is the movement of the soul in understanding things, since thirdness unifies multiplicities. In actuality they are already unified, but from the perspective of the soul which is below intellect, they begin as multiplicities. This basically leads to what I call duodirectional neoplatonism, which means you can either start from the assumption of the One and get down to multiplicities, or you can take the Hegelian route of starting with multiplicities, or the continuous disjunctions of secondness, and unifying them through rationality. Secondness doesn't really correspond to anything in the neoplatonists because secondness is the most anthropic of all, the idea of secondness assuming primarily some kind of self, and secondarily some kind of medium such as time in which firstnesses can be disjuncted.
>how does the distinction between universal and anthropic hold if the anthropic must participate in the universal in order to be intelligible?
It's not a commutative relationship. Being produces the categories of men, through which they can perceive. Insofar as the categories come from Being, they are a section of Being, a small part of its essence, in which Being is immanent. Therefore we can understand Being because we have access to Being insofar as everything that only exists from the perspective of men also fully participates Being nonetheless. This is basically what lies behind the univocity of Being. The problem is that when we want to form a science of Being, called metaphysics, we do not merely want to form a science of the parts of Being we have access to, but of Being itself as it exists everywhere in the universe and transcendent of any particular categories. Metaphysics is not merely the study of Being, but of Being qua Being, which goes beyond what man can experience. If we want our metaphysical deductions to be truly eternal truths, they can't be truths that have the possibility of evaporating when we die.

[Anonymous No.21969908]

>>21969886
>Secondness doesn't really correspond to anything in the neoplatonists because secondness is the most anthropic of all, the idea of secondness assuming primarily some kind of self, and secondarily some kind of medium such as time in which firstnesses can be disjuncted.
I don't understand this because it sounds like man has some kind of power to fracture Being (through Secondness) unless Secondness were already present in Being somehow.
>Metaphysics is not merely the study of Being, but of Being qua Being, which goes beyond what man can experience. If we want our metaphysical deductions to be truly eternal truths, they can't be truths that have the possibility of evaporating when we die.
... why not? Why do we even have the potential to engage in "duodirectional neoplatonism" in the first place? Why don't we perceive the whole in its whole naturally?

[Anonymous No.21969966]

>>21969908
The question is how Being gives rise to individuation. If only Being is self existent, then the capacity for individuation must exist primordially within Being. But if this is so, how is it that Being is one thing at all? If Being is a multiplicity, then it just becomes a mere name, for "everything" and then there is no science of Being but just sciences of everything. If there weren't this problem then metaphysics would already be complete. I argue that Being is both one and many, that it is precisely in its manyness that its unity consists, that we are able to understand this through logic, the unity of opposites, the univocity of being, etc, that essence of Being qua Being is precisely the unity of all possible forms, that the realm of forms is a unity which is differentiated within itself by the existence of forms within it enabling the possibility of individuation, that every individual qualia is an infinity converging at a single point and therefore the full essence of Being is virtual in each individuation, etc, but this is all inexact, vague, difficult to understand, seemingly contradictory, which is why we must create an exact metaphysics to solve these problems.

Or you could just not create a metaphysics, and take the multiplicity of categories for granted. This may solve a lot of problems, but it only does so by ignoring the most fundamental problems, and by accepting the categories as "given." By what are they given? Where do they come from? Why do they exist rather than not? Being is the only thing that we can understand as self-existent, so if we don't explain these things in terms of Being, we may get a practically useful framework for empirical knowledge, but we will never discover any eternal truths or be truly satisfied, and we will never really know anything since we won't know why these categories exist. We are basically thrown into this world, with a brain that has predetermined categories that doom us to only cognize individuated things, and we may be able to develop an understanding of this world, but that will never answer how we got here in the first place, what happens after we die, and what happened before we were born.

[Anonymous No.21971087]

>>21969966
What do you see as the best path forward? Do you have a "toolkit" of thinkers with "layers" of metaphysical heuristics that you operate through? What do you see as the connection between the sophia and phronesis regarding Being?

[Anonymous No.21971102]

>>21969713
>In the context of this reformulation, Peirce was caught between the obvious power of the semiotic realm (hence his commitment to pansemioticism) and the realm of Firstness that is presemiotic. In addition to his repeated analyses of Firstness is his fascination with nothingness, which he divides into two types. There is a kind of 'greater nothingness' that lies outside the realms of the world, and is certainly prior to Firstness. And there is a kind of 'lesser nothingness' that is roughly equivalent to the cosmic soup of possibilities that obtains at the origin of all Firsts, Seconds, and Thirds. What is Peirce moving toward when he speaks of this greater nothingness?

[Anonymous No.21971143]

>>21969796
https://medium.com/@paulaustinmurphy2000/hegel-on-being-nothingness-and-becoming-with-stephen-houlgate-60311ab184e9

[Anonymous No.21971172]

>>21971102
>In the place of necessitarianism, whether mechanical or Hegelian, Peirce offers his own all-inclusive vision of development. As most of the surviving bits and pieces treat logical creation, his story begins in a time before time, setting out from an initial condition of “nothing, pure zero”, which is not the “nothing of negation” but a “germinal nothing” in which the whole universe is “involved or foreshadowed” (CP 6.217, 1897–1898). It is a state of infinite possibility or freedom; yet, somehow underpinning it all is a key synechistic principle, according to which the putative starting point of “the bare Nothing of Possibility” would logically lead to continuity (NEM 4: 127, 1897–1898). Prompted by a veritable “big bang” of hypothetical inference – a leap from the zero of possibility to the unit of some quality (CP 6.220, 1897–1898) – a logically subsequent, but fully arbitrary selection among qualitative possibilities occurs (cf. NEM 4: 135, 1897–8; RLT 260, 1898). By a movement that Peirce clearly finds difficult to explicate in words, the dualistic accidents of reaction are united in a continuum and are thereby generalized (NEM 4: 137, 1897–1898). Here, we would seem to have a basic categorial progression of one-quality, two-reaction, three-generality.

[Anonymous No.21971177]

>>21969699
>more abstract than Kant's
no they aren't, you just don't understand Kant

[Anonymous No.21971189]

>>21969691
I refuted every Peircefag in that thread though. You're just seething because you allow yourself to be fooled by the likes of Peirce, that regressed philosophy from Kant simply because they couldn't cope with Kant's gigantic achievements. Must be irritating that all those "moments of realization" that seemed to come so easily (as if by design) were shown in that thread to be nothing but your pathetic impressionability, which casts a shadow of doubt on any possible reading you will do in the future.

[Anonymous No.21971212]

>>21971189
You couldn't even answer a simple question about what "space" is when confronted about it, nor do you understand the Aristotelian background that Kant was drawing upon when he revised the categories to create "order" in schematization. And we haven't even gotten started on time yet, which is far more fundamental as an organizing principle in Kant's category than space given that it is both internal and external.
>that regressed philosophy from Kant simply because they couldn't cope with Kant's gigantic achievements.
Peirce hardly made an impression on philosophy. American pragmatists did their own thing before getting supplanted by Analytic philosophers and Continental transplants. If only Peirce could have made a greater impact, given that he was one of the few people who understood what Kant was trying to do with his notoriously impenetrable categories (the other being Heidegger and maybe a few more Continental autists).

[Anonymous No.21971213]

>>21969966
>then the capacity for individuation must exist primordially within Being. But if this is so, how is it that Being is one thing at all?
Why even assume in the first place that it fails to remain one and undivided even while having this capacity?

[Anonymous No.21971224]

>>21971212
I started with the hypothesis of space as empirical concept, showed that it's impossible and as such not an empirical appearance but the condition of it. This is what Kant was doing with various concepts. When you treat them as things-in-themselves, it leads to sophistry and the antinomies.

[Anonymous No.21971231]

>>21971224
>I started with the hypothesis of space
The hypothesis of what now? I don't know what this "space" is.

[Anonymous No.21971236]

>>21971231
It's where things appear. Hence, it is impossible that it itself appears.

[Anonymous No.21971250]

>>21971236
So, it's an entity?

[Anonymous No.21971252]

>>21971250
No, it's a condition of entities.

[Anonymous No.21971561]

>>21971102
>>21971172
I simply rejecting "nothingness" as a non concept, and if nothingness is a concept, then it is just Being insofar as Being is not itself any of the particulars we observe. And even if you define nothingness as "pure potential" or something rather than nothingness proper, in my opinion that doesn't really explain anything, and you still have to assume that chance can randomly actualize some of these potentialities to get anywhere, but that assumes that the potential of chance is already actual.
>>21971087
I definitely think that it would not be difficult to create an exact metaphysics at this point in history, if someone with the ability was set on the proper path and studied Aristotle, the Neoplatonists, Scotus, Proclus, Peirce, Whitehead, Hegel, Deleuze, etc. In my opinion, the practicality of metaphysics lies in its ability to eliminate false ideas and delusions. Ethically, I basically accept daoism, so to me Ziran is the end goal in all practical affairs. The practicality of metaphysics will lie in the fact that is not practical, and not beautiful or anything, simply the irrefutable knowledge that this is how it is, and there are no other worlds.

[Anonymous No.21971567]

>its another peircefag sperg thread

[Anonymous No.21971682]

>>21969168
I read his essays on the fixation of belief and in the clearness if ideas but I don't get at all where the triad stuff comes in and I cba to read more from him. Anyone here can help connect that stuff with what I read?

[Anonymous No.21971699]

>>21969168
It's missing a rigorous grounding. I like Pierce and mean to read more of him. I love the Logic, which inspired Pierce a good deal. Neither are something equally gifted people would come up with trying to approach the same problems. It's not just that the concepts would have different names, they would be different.

I think there is a very important kernel being grasped, but it's not well grounded.

It's sort of like how Pierce's tripartite semiotics seems to have much of what the main theories in information theory badly lack. A lot of people recognize this. Shannon-Weaver Entropy gives us the scandal of deduction, a prima facie ridiculous conclusion. But it's is formalized well enough to actually put into use. You can use information theory to rigorously describe computation, signals, codes, physical systems, etc. But one uses semiotics for this because it has no workable formalism. At best you get biosemiotics, which itself shows how Pierce's semiotics is fucked. I love Deacon, but biosemiotics generally is pure humanities and not even good humanities. I have seen the individual organism, the species genome, and the species descendents placed in every part of the semiotic triangle in analysis and papers that literally argue this in circles. If any part of the formalism can apply to all parts of the semiotic given some time to think up a good reason for it then the system is useless as is for much work.

[Anonymous No.21971716]

>>21971682
it's kind of scattered all over the place. start with the harvard lectures. you can find them in this pdf https://altexploit.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/charles-s-peirce-nathan-houser-christian-j-w-kloesel-peirce-edition-project-peirce-edition-project-the-essential-peirce_-selected-philosophical-writings-volume-2_-1893-1913-india.pdf pic related

[Anonymous No.21971770]

>>21971252
So it's a place where things can appear, but it's also a property of things? And it's also completely invisible despite being a property. I'm confused.

[Anonymous No.21971771]

>>21971561
>I simply rejecting "nothingness" as a non concept
Why is nothingness a non-concept? Why can't we just negate Being to find it?

[Anonymous No.21971806]

>>21971770
>property of things
It's not just another property in the sense of "being blue" since the property would be "being in space", where again "in" would presuppose the appearance of the thing. Therefore, it's a condition of possible experience. It's something completely new from traditional philosophy which only knew how to deal with objects and did not have transcendental perspective. Kant ended up with this through showing the antinomies that result from space being considered an object. You clearly have no of idea of the extent this revolution and the whole point of CPR has escaped you.

[Anonymous No.21971811]

>>21971699
Wdym? I’m not familiar with semiotics, and whenever I see somebody appropriate Peirce’s work, it’s usually done without all of his metaphysical commitments and ends up looking like a trainwreck of an incomplete insight.

[Anonymous No.21971831]

>>21971771
because you can't negate being. particular things can be absent, but Being can't. it is common to everything. if you try to "negate being" you will just get something that you might think has no being but still does.

[Anonymous No.21971843]

>>21971831
>if you try to "negate being" you will just get something that you might think has no being but still does.
Explain.

[Anonymous No.21971874]

>>21971843
\for example, suppose you imagine a sphere that encompasses "all beings" and then you imagine something outside of this sphere and say that that is non-being. it's therefore possible to think you have "negated being" without actually having done so, because you mistake Being for something that it is not, namely, something which has an outside. if there is something that is outside Being, then it relates to Being by being outside of it. But in order to relate to Being at all, it has to be capable of entering into a relation, and therefore it has Being, because only things that are can relate to other things that are. now of course I can't logically prove that all things have to be to relate, because this is the ground of logic itself, but you can observe that this is true by experiencing the fact yourself, by observing your experience.

[Anonymous No.21971927]

>>21971874
What if we negated every possible attempt to relate non-being to Being?

[Anonymous No.21971936]

>>21971927
assuming you could actually carry out such a task, then either you're still relating non-being to being by virtue of doing so, or you are eliminating all logical processes going on in your brain relating to the ideas of being and non-being altogether, and so you would be absorbed in something entirely different than metaphysics. but you are not cognizing nothingness when you are absorbed in some activity, you are just dwelling in being without the knowledge that you are doing so.

[Anonymous No.21971941]

>>21971936
Why can't we simply negate all perception to contemplate nothingness?

[Anonymous No.21971944]

>>21971941
the best you can do is die, and that indeed eliminates all the particular perceptions that you as your particular self experience, but I argue that Being goes on after death.

[Anonymous No.21971955]

>>21971561
Not a big fan of the being/nothing correspondence, huh?

[Anonymous No.21971962]

>>21971955
I agree pure Being is experienced as something that can be described like "nothing" or "emptiness" but I don't think nothingness or non-being in any other sense is a thing.

[Anonymous No.21971968]

>>21971962
It kind of seems like an equivocation there. We want to describe it as similar to nothing but nothing isn't a thing. So what is Being? What is "emptiness"?

[Anonymous No.21971976]

>>21971968
the problem is that it is prior to knowledge. I cant tell you what Being is. It isn't anything but itself. You are experiencing it every moment. the only questions we can answer are what in Being is eternal and how did we get to this point from it.

[Anonymous No.21971984]

>>21971976
Is there anything in Being you suspect is eternal?

[Anonymous No.21971996]

>>21971984
It's possible that the universe we occupy is the only universe that exists, or its possible that certain logical truths are not true only from a human epistemic standpoint but actualize themselves everywhere, the ideas of growth, time, chance, etc, all have to be determined if they are absolute or not. It's possible that the reason triads keep turning up is because they enforce themselves on everything, or it could just be because of chthonic religious concepts keep working their way into philosophers brains. everything is trivially eternal in the sense that if time isn't real from an ultimate perspective, then everything exists all at once, but not everything is eternal in the sense that one thing might not be true for another thing. I personally don't think that anything will turn out to be eternal in the latter sense.

[Anonymous No.21972011]

>>21971996
>triads
There's a reason why Peirce is emphatic on triadism. Have you heard of his reduction thesis?

[Anonymous No.21972019]

>>21972011
are you talking about the fact that any number of relations can be built from triads? this is just a logical truth, the problem is that other things might not operate according to logic despite the fact that we can't comprehend such a thing occurring. like how schopenhauer says causality doesn't apply to the will.

[Anonymous No.21972100]

>>21972019
I see your point, but it's worth pointing out that logic is prior to causality, and causality implies a certain kind of existential relation with time. And also, if it's beyond logic, then it wouldn't be comprehensible at all.

[Anonymous No.21972127]

>>21971944
What's second best? Sensory deprivation chamber?

[Anonymous No.21973172]

bump

[Anonymous No.21973721]

bump

[Anonymous No.21973733]

>>21971806
>he doesn't know about non-Euclidean geometry

[Anonymous No.21975228]

bump

[Anonymous No.21976014]

bumperino

[Anonymous No.21977549]

bumpa