/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.19647757]

What is the most substantial argument against materialism, /lit/? I lost a debate to an atheist scholar of religion today. She managed to refute every appeal to idealism I could think of. What can I read to better understand the problem?

[Anonymous No.19647786]

poo is made out of material. therefore materialism=poo

[Anonymous No.19647801]

>>19647757
>she
bait/10

[Anonymous No.19647804]

>>19647757
I'm not going to do your legwork for you and develop the entire argument for you, but this is the basic argument I would use.

1) Mental states are about things.
2) A material object could never be about something.
3) Mental states are not material.

An eliminative materialist will deny 1), but most materialists will admit to it. Therefore work on defending 2). This is the most effective way to argue for idealism.

[Anonymous No.19647807]

>>19647757
cosmological contingency has never been successfully refuted.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVLKURgfft0

[Anonymous No.19647810]

qualia

[Anonymous No.19647845]

>>19647804
Aren't material objects like books about things? I feel like you're using a fuzzy definition of about here

[Anonymous No.19647865]

>>19647845
it all bumps against the hard problem, indeed books are no more than stacks of paper with squiggly lines printed on it, so how does materialist explain the invocation of imaginative experience caused by these things? If everything is but a physical change, one must establish the surely-complex mechanism by which the squiggly lines reshape the human brain in real time.

[Anonymous No.19647870]

>>19647845
Books are actually a great demonstration of some broader philosophical points. If we break words down into simple sequences of letters, we find that the sequences have no 'aboutness' until they are analyzed by a mind of some sort. Words have no inherent aboutness.

[Anonymous No.19647902]

>>19647870
So you're just saying that material objects cannot contain ideas? I feel like that's just about how you define material but I'm unaware of how idealists and materialists even define what is and isn't material if I'm being honest. Like lets say that scientists find a subatomic particle that basically functions like a soul does that suddenly disprove materialism or is materialism just expanded to contain the soul as a type of matter?

[Anonymous No.19647924]

>>19647902
material is everything in the universe. space, time, matter, energy, electricity, magnetism, gravity.

metaphysical is everything that is not material.

physical can be more narrowly defined than material to potentially exclude energy, time, waves, and other forces.

there is an argument to be made whether consciousness is material or metaphysical but essentially I think its pretty obvious that it is completely or mostly material.

[Anonymous No.19647934]

>>19647924
By your definition is the metaphysical real or just imagined? If the metaphysical is real why isn't it part of the universe?

[Anonymous No.19647936]

>>19647924
>there is an argument to be made whether consciousness is material or metaphysical but essentially I think its pretty obvious that it is completely or mostly material.

I don't understand how you're arriving at this

[Anonymous No.19647940]

>>19647902
I believe that if such a particle was found the term 'materialism' would be even more defunct. But more importantly the current defenders of materialism would shift to incorporate the soul particle.
My greater point is that the sequences of letters do not have any inherent meaning. Suppose for instance that I randomly picked out letters until by sheer luck I generated a sentence that you perceived to have meaning. That sentence wasn't written about anything, and yet when you read it you will think it is about something.

[Anonymous No.19647945]

>>19647757
What were your arguments and how did she refute them?

[Anonymous No.19647958]

>>19647902
>Like lets say that scientists find a subatomic particle that basically functions like a soul
Any moment now. It's funny because every materialist has this deep-rooted belief that once compooters sequence every single particle in a human brain, the human nature shall lay unfolded, perfectly understood and bare in its clearness. This belief is a bigger load of bs than all semitic religions combined. A talking snake is sensible compared to this.

[Anonymous No.19647959]

>>19647940
I understand you're point and I like it because it is novel to me but I don't really feel like you answered how do you define what is material and what isn't. Why couldn't the soul in theory be said to be a material entity?

[Anonymous No.19647961]

>>19647902
>>19647902
If a physicist would find a subatomic particle that functions like a soul it would be a big point for materialism because soul is usually defined as metaphysical, i.e. not of the material or cosmological world.

>>19647934
I say the metaphysical is real but materialist and strict atheists deny its existance.

>I don't understand how you're arriving at this
if the entirety of consciousness can be scientifically measured then its material if not then its metaphysical. There may be an essence of consciousness that is metaphysical (the soul) but I think consciousness just like the rest of the mind has largely a material origin.

[Anonymous No.19647969]

>>19647961
Even assuming a religious worldview couldn't the rules set forth by god that govern the soul be known?

[Anonymous No.19647985]

>>19647757
> argument
You cannot force someone to recognize the content of their originary intuition. If they wish to say that ideas, essences and the transcendental content of your mind is either an illusion or somehow, material, you cannot prove them wrong. You can only restart the explanation of the differences between eidetic sciences and non-eidectic ones, and that these differences themselves are neither eidetic or empirical, and thus leads you to the transcendantal field, the foundational science of transcendantal Phenomenology, and the apodictic truth of phenomenological Idealism.

[Anonymous No.19648001]

>>19647969
That is possible. But epistemology (the methods by which knowledge is obtained) is not limited to the empirical or scientific method. So it does not proof that the soul must be material.

[Anonymous No.19648013]

>>19647959
Sorry I missed that somehow. Anyway, I think that the difference is like this. Materialists take 'matter' i.e. particles or energy to be fundamental, whereas idealists take consciousness or thought to be fundamental. A materialist would say that particles/energy must exist, and any sort of consciousness (whatever that is) exists simply as a consequence of matter. An idealist would say consciousness/thought must exist.

[Anonymous No.19648020]

>>19647902
>particle that basically functions like a soul
Particle that functions like a soul =/= explanation of qualia
You're explaining the mechanism failing to explain the essence.
Physicists fail to explain most of the physics, reminds me of Feynman's lectures where he defines energy through the analogy of a child playing with toy blocks, basically admitting that physicists have no idea what "energy" is. They can measure it, they can describe its behavior, they can store and transfer it, but they can't tell you what energy IS.

[Anonymous No.19648029]

>>19648001
So you're defining the non-material as the things that you can't have empirical knowledge of or can't synthesize knowledge of from prior empirical data?

[Anonymous No.19648042]

Atheist idealism defeats atheist materialism

[Anonymous No.19648057]

>>19648020
I'll grant that the qualia of another person isn't available to direct observation but I'm more talking about how material as a category seems weirdly arbitrary

[Anonymous No.19648066]

>defeated by a woman arguing for atheist material reality

I'm sorry, there is nothing anybody can do. You're NGMI.

[Anonymous No.19648069]

>>19648029
Almost. The first point is correct.

> defining the non-material as the things that you can't have empirical knowledge
Yes, We can theoretically measure everything in the universe with the empirical method. That's empiricism. So everything in the universe is material.

>or can't synthesize knowledge of from prior empirical data
Yes, mostly but there is a small exception: We can interpret objective data and draw from it the neccessary existence of a higher being behind the material world, the cause of the world, and call that God, for example. See cosmological contingency >>19647807

[Anonymous No.19648090]

>>19648069
As an atheist I'd say most atheists would be fine with an argument that you can synthesize knowledge of god from empirical observations as proof of god once they got over their own reservations and assuming the argument is correct

[Anonymous No.19648253]

>>19647902
Essences are in varying degree of purity. The individual essence of red is very obviously something that relates to an experience of the world. The categorical essence of color in general, however, has nothing to do with experience. And it is very much something you use and encounter, yourself, as a being with an Ego-life, but not something a rock or anything without a consciousness will ever handle.

[Anonymous No.19648287]

>>19647757
Frege argues how numbers cannot be substantiated from material objects.
https://youtu.be/UhX1ouUjDHE

[Anonymous No.19648416]

I think materialism and idealism are very limited, it's kind of weird to argue for "a most fundamental substance" like obviously the world is organized by our mind, things clearly "exist" for us human only as long as we have an use for it, so we name and recognize them. To say that only material things "exist" and the categories we apply to specific collections of particles in order to make sense of the WHOLE of reality do not exist is kind of weird. Obviously they do not exist in the same way, but they at least for me seem to be real all the same, without them reality would be absolutely incomprehensible. I guess the problem will always boil down to the consciousness problem: does the mind, it's thoughts and ideas emerge from the material substrate that is the brain? Also It's weird to think about this as ideas and language seem to only make sense and exist as long as we recognize and understand them as a collective. Anyway I don't even understand what it means exactly to call something "the most fundamental", how do you even prove that? I don't even think science is epistemologically equiped to answer such question, I guess in the end I just think this argument can't really be resolved.

[Anonymous No.19648470]

>>19647757
You don't. You take the Bakker pill and begin planning to achieve the Absolute Soul.

[Anonymous No.19648479]

>>19647757
Losing to women, who are inherently intellectually inferior, is quite pathetic.

[Anonymous No.19648507]

>all is x
>nuhhh, all is y!

Retarded. Whats it even mean to say everything is mind, or matter or whatever? There's a sink next to me. What's it even mean to say the sink is material? Or the sink is ideal? The sinks fucking broken..

Clearly the sink is material in that I bash your fucking skull in with it. And clearly it's ideal in that sense that I'm perceiving it, and it has a human use and function. Don't know why you need more rhan this..

[Anonymous No.19648562]

>>19648416
>to call something "the most fundamental", how do you even prove that? I don't even think science is epistemologically equiped to answer such question
Science is indeed epistemologically limited to the empiric method and therefore can only detect something like a most fundamental particle or a most fundamental energy if these even exist. But science is just one slice of epistemology. There are other ways we can gain knowledge.

[Anonymous No.19648576]

>>19648562
What would you say to someone arguing that nothing is epistemically valid besides science for anything beyond pragmatic heuristics?

[Anonymous No.19648642]

>>19648576
I would say such a person is out of touch with reality. He is your basic materialist. A hylic.

For example: There are so many things my consciousness can experience; outwardly sense impressions, inwardly the inverse of that as a manifestion of thought, bodily perceptions and subtle feelings; in addition there are so many (i would most of the time say subconscious) subjective properties of mind (thoughts, cognition, reason, will, morality etc.). All of that can just not be objectively scientifically measured and that is the sphere of the subtle world where material and metaphysical intersect. The regular empiric/scientific epistemological method stops working here sooner or later, and we must use our intellect to make progress in gaining knowledge.

[Anonymous No.19648683]

>>/lit/thread/S19431541

[Anonymous No.19648713]

>>19647804
>1) Mental states are about things.
Citation?

[Anonymous No.19648727]

>>19648576
Someone who thinks the Law of Identity is a heuristic will not be able to explain why it is a universal heuristic that is apodictically necessary to the very possibility of knowledge (I.e., a foundation).

[Anonymous No.19648733]

>>19647757
If everything is just one big materiality I don't get how part of that materiality can become conscious and have an incomplete knowledge of only part of it.

Materialism is only able to measure things through the senses, but the organs of the senses themselves are always in flux as pointed out by Heracleitus.

[Anonymous No.19648735]

>>19648713
Choose a book by Husserl, open the page, there you go.

[Anonymous No.19648745]

>>19647801
Yeah now that you think about it it's almost impossible for me to even visualize a complex atheist thinker being a woman.

Women are more religious and even the atheist/nonreligious ones are just because of muh vagina abortion sex shit rather than actually intellectually not believing in a God.

[Anonymous No.19648762]

Just keep asking her 'Why?' for everything until she runs out of 'whys' because her materialist worldview is based on assuming that after enough 'whys' there is eventually a 'why' that all too conveniently and short sightedly changes into a series of 'hows' to distract from the more essential 'why' that continues Ad infinitum until you reach the unmoved mover/prime causality/ which is unmistakably immaterial.

Sprinkle in some disillusion of the "self"/"non-self" "I"/"Not I" veil and reminder her that she herself categorically is as much the system itself as she is within the system.

Then remind her that all her 'facts' are necessarily futile as there is an infinite number of 'facts' and that thus all of the 'facts' needed for any argument using said 'facts' would be necessarily be unnacountable. Remind her that an equal number of contrary 'facts' could be discovered and indeed are likely to be discovered and refute anything worthwhile in any of her arguments. Reminder her that 'facts' topple 'facts' and 'reason' topples 'reason' and 'how' topples 'how' and 'why' topples 'why' ad infinitum and the only reconcile is to percieve them from the outside for their futility and identify that with a prime cause that transcends 'why' and 'how' and can still account for itself and the everything that is within itself. This cause would also necessarily hold primacy over every other cause as it cannot precede itself.

Then she asks you 'why?' hit back with the basic bitch general purposes of everything, first principle of being, knowledge as being, fullfillment, realization, overcoming of antithesis, being + nonbeing = process of becoming, etc. It's really up to you at that point, just make sense of it all in a way that's not cheap and not too vague or too specific.

Be sure to call out any 'whys' that are actually 'hows'.

>>19647998

[Anonymous No.19648774]

>>19648713
You can deny it, as I said in my post. However, if you say that a mental state is not about anything, then you can’t be said to think about anything. You can’t even be said to be thinking about whether mental states are about anything. This presents obvious problems for any further philosophical endeavour.

[Anonymous No.19648792]

>>19647757
If materialism is true, our ideas can only be the product of an empirical process. Empiricists holds that mental processes and concepts are a same type of entity. However this implies that abstraction from empirical experiences itself is both a process and a concept. How can we have the concept before we have the process,if they are both the same thing, and must be founded empirically?
It is impossible. Ideas are not empirical in nature, they are obtained through transcendental ideation, which is the result of categorical intuition and free variation.

[Anonymous No.19648793]

>>19648774
>You can deny it
Okay so it isn't a very good argument. The babe OP was arguing with will just be confused by your verbal pedantics.
>>19648735
I opened up a page and it says, "lol bruh don't take anything I say seriously I'm high af right now writing this bruh like whaaaaat?"

[Anonymous No.19648818]

>>19648762
>Sprinkle in some disillusion of the "self"/"non-self" "I"/"Not I" veil and reminder her that she herself categorically is as much the system itself as she is within the system.

[Anonymous No.19648820]

>>19648066
To be fair she probably has a list of 'gotchas' and anon was unprepared to discuss things in a setting where quick and witty replies are needed.

[Anonymous No.19648838]

>>19648793

[Anonymous No.19648841]

>>19648793
You can deny any axiom. Your standard of proof results in the rejection of every single philosophical argument. Do you think about things? Let us say you are looking at some object and you ponder it’s shape, are you thinking about that object? If you can accept that you never think about anything, then you shouldn’t accept the argument. But I don’t think you actually could.

[Anonymous No.19648848]

>>19648683
interesting feet. There is one level of materiality that the scientific method ("the vulgar materialist") can not account for - the simplest layer ("the true materialist") - but beyond that is the metaphysical where the properties of the 'soul' or whatever you want to call it originate and from there then materially manifest as functions of the mind (thoughts, cognition, reason, will, morality, sense of self etc.).

[Anonymous No.19648872]

>>19648820
This

It was a lot to process and respond with a counterargument in good faith. Also, she was unfamiliar with Kant, Schopenhauer, etc. It was difficult to summarize an entire system if metaphysics in the moment.

[Anonymous No.19648882]

>>19648841
>You can deny any axiom
Your philosophical "axiom" is a bit of meaningless verbiage relying on the obscurity of complex higher brain functions. Not exactly as substantial an axiom as addition and subtraction.

[Anonymous No.19648897]

>>19648882
Hilarious, given that addition and subtraction relies in everyday life on the abstraction of reality and the thus reveals its purely eidetic nature.

[Anonymous No.19648904]

>>19648882
You seem to be completely mistaken about how my argument even works. The vast majority of materialists argue that mental states are about things I.e they have intentionality. They would accept premise 1) as I stated in my first post. They would not accept premise 2), which I clearly stated was the premise which required a more substantial defence. If you think that obscure, complex brain functions provide intentionality then you have an issue with premise 2). Premise 1) has no obvious metaphysical commitments.

[Anonymous No.19648925]

>>19648904
My Theory of Action teacher was very adamant that pain in particular was a mental state without an object, regardless of how I tried to explain the diffuse nature of it didn't matter, he wouldn't hear anything about it.

[Anonymous No.19648935]

>>19648925
or that pain isn't really a mental state either...

[Anonymous No.19648938]

>>19648904
So why can't it be the case that qualia are an emergent property of life? (I'm not committed to that as a position but I'm curious about counter arguments)

[Anonymous No.19648946]

>>19648897
>1 coconut
that this coconut is singular is "abstraction" according to you?
>a second coconut rolls over
that there are now 2 coconuts is "ABSTRACTION" to you?
>>19648904
>are about things
What does that even mean? "mental states are about things" insofar as thoughts relate to senses and concepts. Just because the property of being "about" something needs to be in relation to an organism doesn't mean that property needs to be immaterial. You might as well say "I think therefore I am" and spare us the quibbling. Of course if you've noticed the threads that one anon has been making about "Consciousness Explained" you know that Descartes' principle relies heavily on our ignorance of neurological processes.

[Anonymous No.19648961]

>>19648946
Deciding that a coconut is a singular object vs many atoms is an abstraction

[Anonymous No.19648966]

>>19648961
Tell that to the coconut tree.

[Anonymous No.19648978]

>>19648966
is a forrest of coconut trees a single object or many individual coconut trees?

[Anonymous No.19648996]

>>19648978
It's both. The division of the two is the abstraction, not the unity.

[Anonymous No.19649000]

>>19647786
But anon, cunny is also made out of material.

[Anonymous No.19649006]

>>19648946
I would advise you to look up ‘intentionality’ for I fear I will not do such a complex topic justice, but my understanding is that ‘aboutness’ is the property of a mental state to be able to be in some sense directed at another object or event external to the mental state, for example ‘I am thinking ABOUT Descartes’, ‘I am feeling sad ABOUT the death of my father.’
Secondly, I purposefully avoid all Dennett threads because they are invariably cesspools, and I would advise you to do likewise. I am not particularly committed to either Descartes’ arguments nor his conclusions.

>>19648938
I don’t have firm metaphysical commitments currently, so I won’t say that it’s impossible. If I had to defend idealism I would develop the argument I posted. First place to start is to become familiar with intentionality as I mentioned in my other reply above. In particular I would investigate the philosophical debates between eliminative materialists and reductive materialists.

[Anonymous No.19649007]

>>19647757
>She managed to refute every appeal to idealism
(x) doubt

[Anonymous No.19649008]

>>19648996
Everything except the most fundamental building blocks of reality is abstractions

[Anonymous No.19649009]

>>19647804
This sort of linguistic gymnastics is exactly why the fucking analytical philosophy happened and managed to look so fucking smartypants.

[Anonymous No.19649012]

>>19647804
I feel like being a materialist who acknowledges things like value, emotion, principles, ideas, and such psychological phenomena are not necessarily material doesn’t make you an idealist..

[Anonymous No.19649016]

>>19647870
>Words have no inherent aboutness.
Do mental states have any inherent aboutness?

[Anonymous No.19649017]

>>19649008
Incorrect.

[Anonymous No.19649019]

>>19649012
Depending on how you categorize them it does but that hasn't really been addressed in the thread

[Anonymous No.19649021]

>>19648793
>Okay so it isn't a very good argument.
You can deny literally anything. That's where most of the confusion in modern philosophy stems from. "Can deny" seems to imply "is plausible" to a lot of people.

[Anonymous No.19649022]

>>19647958
>every materialist has this deep-rooted belief that once compooters sequence every single particle in a human brain, the human nature shall lay unfolded, perfectly understood and bare in its clearness
No, not really.

[Anonymous No.19649025]

>>19649007
Well, she used "science!"

You can't disagree with "science!" in front of normies. They would cancel me

[Anonymous No.19649027]

>>19649017
how?

[Anonymous No.19649029]

>>19649027
Eh, interactions and emergent qualities, I guess?

[Anonymous No.19649034]

>>19649019
I still am saying material reality exists but that some psychological phenomena can arguably be considered not material. If we don’t have a word for that small deviation from materialism that’s a flaw of the constraints of current philosophical vocabulary.
I’m not an idealist, I’m a materialist who is fine with saying principles and emotions aren’t necessarily material.

[Anonymous No.19649037]

>>19649029
emergent properties don't inherently make these larger things not abstractions but I guess that would depend on the emergent property

[Anonymous No.19649040]

>>19649027
Ultimately the "fundamental building blocks of reality" slip through your fingers as "energy" or weird warbly bits of empty space. Regardless of what they're made of patterns are patterns and math is math. The manifest pattern of a coconut tree (expressible via mathematics) is objectively there and not subjective. Our experience of the coconut tree of course is subjective but there is a coconut tree and while it is made up of particles the arrangement of them is a valid and independent things.

[Anonymous No.19649041]

>>19649025
If you're being serious, to refute materialism you do not even need to engage in any discussion of science. Science needs to be put aside for any serious discussion of this topic.

[Anonymous No.19649042]

>>19649034
That's dualism

[Anonymous No.19649046]

>>19649037
>emergent properties don't inherently make these larger things
Duh - but they are capable of it. As soon as there is something to the whole other than the sum of it's parts, this whole is not entirely an abstraction.

[Anonymous No.19649050]

>>19649046
>that would depend on the emergent property
That's what I'm saying

[Anonymous No.19649055]

>>19649021
I fucked your mum last night. That's an axiom buddy, how's it feel?

[Anonymous No.19649058]

>>19649050
So you're an Aristotelian then? The entelechy was just the Aristotelian way of saying "emergent property", which was equated with "soul."

[Anonymous No.19649064]

>>19649040
I guess I would agree with the stipulation that people are very selective about the patterns they bother to assign concepts to in their mind. In theory every possible set of things in the universe is an object but we only give the useful ones the honor of being seen as such

[Anonymous No.19649076]

>>19648946
> "I have one apple. I add one appel to that. How many apples do I now have"
The answer is neither
> "Bitch you had two apples all along you just didn't tell me"
nor
> "However you want, babe, I've got apples for you all day."
Understanding the proper eidetic context requires a specific intuition, that of an abstract essence, quantity.

[Anonymous No.19649085]

>>19649042
No no I still know the mind is a product of the brains circuitry, I’m just saying since there is probably inconsistency across brains as to how exactly things like principles take physical structure in the brain they the concept occupies some vaguely non-material category.
Maybe no one has come up with this yet, though it seems clear to me.

[Anonymous No.19649089]

>>19649076
How about you just not be retarded. The tree makes an apple. The tree does not make "a collection of particles". If the tree makes another apple then you have 2 apples.

[Anonymous No.19649093]

>>19649085
That's just called nominalism.

[Anonymous No.19649095]

>>19649058
There's a bunch of different people in the thread so I'm worried about you misattributing what I say to others or what others say to me but if I had to give an explanation on my thoughts on consciousness I guess I'm of the opinion that the mind is deeply rooted in material reality since I don't know how it could be otherwise considering the effects of things like drugs, brain damage ect. I just don't know if that then necessitates a strictly materialist viewpoint since there are plently of explanations that I could come up with the explain how consciousness works that are possible but unverifiable

[Anonymous No.19649107]

>>19649089
Ever seen a kind growing on a tree?

[Anonymous No.19649110]

>>19649095
Yeah, I'm not the person you responded to just before but I was just making that observation. Aristotle receives a lot of bad reputation, but he's actually very similar to modern physicalists in a certain way. He does his best not to simply eliminate certain aspects of "ideality" where it is not warranted, and maintains a holistic view of reality without going off the deep end, like Plato, Parmenides, Pythagoras, etc., did. His view of the "soul" (which was Greek psyche or entelechy in his De Anima) was extremely similar to modern neuroscience, in that it is the principle of the human body which unites it into an organic whole, but is not separate from the matter or the form itself, yet is still something "separate" and unique in its own way, in that the human organism is not simply the sum of its collected matter.

[Anonymous No.19649117]

>>19649093
Interesting, that looks right. Thanks man.

[Anonymous No.19649126]

Best I ever read on the subject was A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism (foster, 2008).

[Anonymous No.19649127]

>>19649110
I guess for me to be an aristotilian you'd have to show me proof that consciousnesses is an emergent property of matter and not caused by some other mechanism. Like I could imagine a world in which the soul exists as a separate entity from the mind aware of all the moments the mind forgets while blackout drunk and unimpaired by brain damage and it's just that we're the minds and not the souls so we're unaware of this while the soul watches on in silence but I don't know how I could know this to be the case and I don't see a reason to believe in it either

[Anonymous No.19649140]

>>19649127
To clarify I'm not saying my example is aristotilian I'm just saying there are multiple possible explanations of what consciousness is and I'm unaware of how to decide between at least some of them

[Anonymous No.19649229]

>>19647757
You came into this world naked and helpless with nothing and you will leave it naked and helpless with nothing.

There you go. Argument won.

[Anonymous No.19649506]

>>19647757
You need to learn from presocratics and Spinoza's

[Anonymous No.19649512]

>>19647757
Idealism might be untenable, but we definitely don't know how or why conscious experience happens.

[Anonymous No.19650359]

>>19647757
You find material appealing because there is certain ideals that you feel like it promises you, there is no escaping idealism. You need it to have any sort of satisfaction.