/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.18606098]

what was he trying to say?

[Anonymous No.18606111]

>>18606098

When you look at stuff you are conscious OF stuff, not just conscious and then see stuff, when you are conscious you are conscious OF something. Descartes did not get that, so he wrote all that schizo stuff about wax and demons.

[Anonymous No.18606184]

>>18606098
you can never step out of consciousness when describing phenomena, because its the only medium trough which you know things, and consciousness has certain a priori structures, so investigating things is inevitably describing them not as they are out there, but how they relate to you, your consciousness. This way it overcomes any kind of epistemological dualism, naive realism.

[Anonymous No.18606218]

>>18606184
>how does it differ from Kant?
Kant said similar things, that we can not know things in themselves, which leads to the same kind of rejection of all naive realisms and epistemological realisms. But Kant thought that experience has to relate to our universal forms of intuition and universal categories of intellect, whereas phenomenology broadly relate experience to the living consciousness of here and now. Thats why phenomenology talks so much about lived body, accents subjectivity that is related to lived experience and temporality (e.g. Heideggers rejection of the notion of subject for da-sein). Knowing is thus not a result of out NPC nature, but of our very existence in the lived world in here and now.

[Anonymous No.18606224]

>>18606218
>epistemological realisms
dualisms*

[Anonymous No.18606305]

>>18606218
Husserl emphasizes the transcendental character of pehnomenology. This is best expressed in the platonic Eide, which are not spatial, but ontological transcendent.

[Anonymous No.18606379]

>>18606184
>you can never step out of consciousness when describing phenomena
What about the people who say that they have occult powers or have seen mystical shit.

[Anonymous No.18606392]

NOTHING. SHIT TO PISS OFF OLD WHITE PEOPLE LIKE YOU.

[Anonymous No.18606478]

>>18606305
well, if you mean transcendental, then yes, but then again, transcendental forms of experience reveal themselves only in experience itself and are not contained in the a priori kantian subject. Eidos are found in experience, so they are transcendental but do not transcend experience/knowing subject.
>>18606379
its not really an exception, is it? They have to experience them, they cant just sit on an armchair and deduce their mystical knowledge out of thin air. I mean, mystical experience IS the material that can be viewed seriously at from phenomenological perspective, thats why many scholars of religious try to take it as a method (e.g. Rudolf Otto).

[Anonymous No.18606512]

>>18606478
Is there any room for Metaphysical speculation?

[Anonymous No.18606541]

>>18606184
>so investigating things is inevitably describing them not as they are out there
This is where you're wrong and where Husserl differs a lot from Kant. I haven't figured Husserl out well enough yet though so don't ask me to elaborate fully. It's not as simple as naive realism though. It basically comes down to the fact that, even though our experience is conditioned by transcendental laws, the objects of experience still must actually have something residing within them which makes them such as they are rather than something else... So Husserl is more or less breaking Kant's dilemma (that the thing-in-itself might be totally different from our perceptions) by stating that, even though things are given to us the only way they can be given to us by our transcendental laws, that there must be an essence in the external object which causes it to appear in the way it is given (and thus not fully hiding the thing-in-itself from us), and so there is a link between reality as it really is and how it is conditioned by our conscious faculties.

[Anonymous No.18606687]

>>18606478
I would say that yes, experience plays a role here, like the proodos-epistrophe platonists, expressed by Aristotle in the natural-difference orders. The rational order starting with experience, experience being the point of departure to the transcendent, the return or platonists, whereas the procession or the natural order being the metaphysical structure and its “development”. The Eide are immanent in experience but they are ontologically transcendental to their instances, the empirical Ego without reduction and the transcendental Ego of post-epoché, post-reductive process. In this way I see phenomena and noumena as interrelated, I think the hegelian Geist expresses this relations well.

[Anonymous No.18606699]

>>18606687
>proodos-epistrophe platonists
Read: proodos-epistrophe of platonists

>in the natural-difference orders
Read: in the natural-rational orders

>the return or platonists
Read: the return of platonists

[Anonymous No.18606719]

Kant and Husserl are so horrifically architectonic they make Buddhist scholastics trying to explain having eight levels of consciousness lucid by comparison.

[Anonymous No.18606861]

>>18606512
Not as usually considered. Once you get to certain parts of Genetic and Constitutive Phenomenology, you end up recuperating a lot that relates to metaphysics however.
Static Phenomenology : Eidetic reduction of objects in experience
Genetic Phenomenology : studies a priori rules governing changes in phenomenological structures. As background knowledge changes in virtue of the learning rule, a cascade of “genetic” changes occurs in other phenomenological structures (partial intentions, adumbrations, the constitution of an object, its horizons, etc.). This is were you can recapture intersubjectivity, history, culture, education, etc.
Constitutive Phenomenology : In this attitude the world can be seen as an object intended to by non-worldly conscious life that, in the technical signification of the word, ‘constitutes’ it. ‘Constitution’ refers to the ways in which types of objects correlate with types of conscious processes.

[Anonymous No.18606913]

>>18606184
>inevitably describing them not as they are out there

Husserl's phenomenology was the opposite. It was famously supposed to 'get to the things themselves'.

[Anonymous No.18606916]

>>18606541
>>18606218
>>18606184
Here's a good post that helped me understand better the differences between Kant and Husserl. Because of Brentano's and his circle's influence, Husserl didn't really engage Kant directly like he did with Hume and Dilthey, for example.

> It should be said that Husserl was philosophically averse to Kant's "creative" transcendental subject, perhaps due to the dominance of absolute idealist interpretations of him at the time, and preferred to derive his lineage from Hume, whom he credits as the principal forerunner of phenomenology. See Mall's Experience and Reason on their connection, which quotes Husserls' 1919 letter to Metzger:"I have learnt incomparably more from Hume than from Kant. I possessed the deepest antipathy against Kant, and he has not (if I judge rightly) influenced me at all".

> This is likely exaggerated, Kant was in the air of the times, and Husserl did draw parallels with him already in Logical Investigations (1901), while reinterpreting his "synthetic" notion of a priori into intuitive one, and adopted the label and terminology of transcendental idealism around 1915, apparently at Natorp's prompting. There are also undeniable parallels between his approach and that of contemporary neo-Kantians, especially in the early works. The Crisis, on the other hand, is a late work, not completed in Husserl's lifetime, and written under pronounced influence of existentialism, in particular Heidegger's. One has to keep in mind though that what appears to be Kantian framework in Husserl may be at least partly attributable to their common root in Hume. I recently came across a very nice summary of Husserl's theory of cognition in Zhok's Ontological Status of Essences in Husserl’s Thought, which makes Husserl's affinities and breaks with Kant more transparent.

> What Husserl kept and developed beyond Hume was the recognition of the creative role of mind in cognition. Productive imagination (term shared with Kant) plays a dual role of aiding apprehension in perception, producing perceptual unities like objects, and engages in "free play" to produce what Kant called synthetic a priori intuitions in arithmetic and geometry. In fact, Husserl expands its role even further, it is responsible for memory recalls and "eidetic variation" of acquired perceptual proto-concepts that sharpens their boundaries, and forges them into full fledged essences ("eidoses"). As a result, Husserl gives a more satisfying account of empirical concept formation, which was a major unresolved problem for Kant, see Pippin's Kant on Empirical Concepts. He could not explain how exactly definitive concepts are formed from the undifferentiated "manifold of sensation", and his German idealist successors turned it into "construction of reality" from mental categories.

[Anonymous No.18606926]

>>18606916
> And here we come to a major break with the Kantian theory of sensibility, Husserl rejects the undifferentiated manifold, and the idea that percepts are synthesized from "sense data". The latter is seen as ex post facto extraction from what is originally given to consciousness as already partially structured and unified, if obscurely (this was later confirmed by empirical cognitive science). In other words, rather than having two determinates, "sensibility" and "manifold" interacting, Husserl insists that all determinacy is only forged in the act of perception itsel. No determinates can be presented as "interacting" prior to it, dissolving the question of whether the content of perception "pre-exists" in reality, or is generated by mind. This aspect of perception, which apprehends idealities as immediate unities, Husserl terms categorical intuition, and together with eidetic variation, which shapes concepts into definitional maturity, it forms the process of ideation. Thus, Husserl sails between the Scylla of passive reception of impressions à la Hume, and the Charybdis of German idealist "construction of reality" by the mind.

> Categorical intuition releases Husserl from the need to keep perhaps the most implausible part of Kantian picture, the forever immutable a priori categories and forms of intuition. But it is not the intellectual intuition of Spinoza and Fichte, it captures invariances of sensuous experience, not "glimpses" of things in themselves. But with it Husserl can be more generous on what is almost a vanishing point in Kant, the unknowable X. The transcendence, as Husserl calls it, is that content of consciousness that "points beyond" consciousness itself, given to it as not its own but foreign, subject to pre-cognitive awareness as the "raw matter" of sensuous experience. The limited creative ability to perceive wholes, however weak and partial, ability that Kant denied us completely as "intellectus archetypus", allowed Husserl to remove some of the other-worldliness surrounding Kantian "supersensible substrate of experience", although as for Kant it remains beyond the reach of knowledge.

[Anonymous No.18606932]

>>18606926

> There are many other divergences, I'll mention one of particular interest to me. In the Second Analogy Kant gives a notorious transcendental argument for the a priori status of strict causality as condition of the possibility of our forming temporal succession of events (since they come with no time labels attached). Husserl's analysis of perception shows instead that the "now", like "sense data", is an ex post facto abstraction. In perception we instead encounter the "specious present" (the idea likely coming from James, along with the "stream of consciousness"), a short but dynamic duration with markers that explicitly link it to neighboring durations in the time succession, like coming and going notes in the apprehension of a melody (this was also confirmed by empirical psychology). Thus Husserl again grants us an immediately holistic grasp, however obscure and fleeting, this time of becoming. This removes another issue that caused Kant much grief (in his theory of free will), the necessity of unbreakable causal chains.

[Anonymous No.18607687]

>>18606916
Bro this is complex

[Anonymous No.18608294]

>>18607687
What are you, a midwit?

[Anonymous No.18608731]

>>18606098
Intentionality: A rose to you might be just a flower but to someone else it might be a gift, a botanical speciment or something else etc.
Phenomenology: We know how we see the world but not how the world truly is, for example Newtons theory of gravity explains differnet phenomens but not things themselves

[Anonymous No.18608908]

>>18608731
You posted this only to trigger me, right? And

[Anonymous No.18608935]

>>18606098
Every time someone mentions Husserl i get reminded of pic related

[Anonymous No.18609263]

>>18608731
Intentionality is the property of conscious or psychic acts to be about something. Brentano, Husserl's teacher, held that this was the defining character of the psychic as opposed to the physical.
Intentionality in Brentano implies a form of representationalism, in that all psychic acts are various forms of a very specific concatenation of psychic acts regarding an object. At its basis, all acts are founded on a presentation or a representation, which leads to judgements, which then lead to emotion (in the sense of a disposition yo act). This led him to define the ontological status of mental objects as being "intentionally in-existent" (to be understood not as not existing, but as existing inside).
Husserl reworked the concept in part because he did not accept that the idea of this specific ontological status, as to him it was clear that depending on the mental act in question the object may transcend us. He was also at odds with the representationalism of Brentano, as for him, only some mental acts are properly understood as re-presentation (memory recall, for example), or representation (symbolic association, cor example).