Analytic vs Continental Philosophy

[Anonymous No.17939374]

[Anonymous No.17939392]

>>17939374
Basado

[Anonymous No.17939406]

>>17939374
>historical and cultural dept
so, gossips?

[Anonymous No.17939412]

>>17939374
>analytic philosophy
Gay and retarded
>continental philosophy
Gay and retarded
>eastern philosophy
Gay and retarded

[Anonymous No.17939425]

>>17939412
>Post cultural isolation Philosophy
Based

[Anonymous No.17939439]

Don't equate good literature with continental philosophy which is infamous for how badly researched it is historically
Foucault only tried to seriously inquire into his sources towards the end of his life
I don't think Deleuze over opened a history book in his life, the Balinese anthropology he used in ttp was very outdated

[Anonymous No.17939587]

>>17939374
Truth is autistic and sterile indeed, while fiction we all know is exciting and escapist, even poetic, so of course the tradition interested in the real truth ends up nerdy but the excitement of the other tradition proves nothing about its capacity to be correct. When actually subject to such scrutiny it always turns out provably fictional. Really /lit/ needs to be honest with itself and admit they always preferred style over substance.

[Anonymous No.17939694]

>>17939374
guess it reduces down to what you're after. if you want to learn some shit, maybe get closer to answering some questions, clarify your thinking etc then you'd choose more analytic type. if you want to feel exalted about being ubermensch and listening to wagner on mountain tops, impress art thots, get an easy position in academia etc then continental style is better.

[Anonymous No.17939823]

>>17939412
Yes

[Anonymous No.17939862]

>>17939374
Hey im reading em frimbo right now!

[Anonymous No.17940459]

>>17939439
why are you acting like continental philosophy didn't exist before the 20th century?

[Anonymous No.17940651]

i think a lot of it is really abstract and dumb (>>17940381) but there are some good parts of analytic metaphysics. despite my issues with it, quine's ontology isn't wholly worthless. pete wolfendale has redpilled me on robert brandom, and brassier on sellars
i want to construct agi so i really need the powers of both... earlier today i developed a general map of the different conceptions of metaphysics that are shared between the two traditions and also beyond them. all of them when you look carefully can be helpful to the other conceptions. i'll probably need to utilize all of them for my system to be complete

btw redpill me on who are the greatest living analytic metaphysicians

>>17939587
there's nothing true about possible worlds dude. it's simply autistic and sterile

[Anonymous No.17940684]

i am too dumb to understand any philosophy books but I found this picture funny lol

[Anonymous No.17940687]

>>17939374
when it comes to this, why does no one ever talk about British Idealism, or any other movements?
>one side a single strain of philosophy, on the other whole tradition

Talk about Bosenquet, Bradley, Taylor, Mure, McTaggart, Green, Collingwood, Muirhead, Joahim
Talk about James, Pierce, Dewey,
Talk about Hutcheson, Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick

I feel like it's because you need to have at least basic knowledge of logic and maybe some maths to read ANALPHIL. But with continental philosophies, you just pick a book and try to decipher that auhtor's posturing prose.

[Anonymous No.17940688]

>>17939374
Continental is for brainlets that want to bang even dumber roasties interested in liberal arts.

[Anonymous No.17940717]

>>17940684
Lol is that a real quote, pretty based.

[Anonymous No.17940729]

>>17940684
Am I too retarded to know if this is a meme? I say based and trump pilled.

[Anonymous No.17940771]

>>17939374
I don't necessarily disagree but name a single continental philosopher who lived a life that made them as happy as an autistic kid is with his trains

[Anonymous No.17940815]

>>17940651
peter wolfednale is retarded and you should not listen to him about sellars lol

best living analytic philosopher is probably david kaplan

[Anonymous No.17940856]

>>17939412
based retard

[Anonymous No.17940920]

>>17940688
Yes and ANALitacal is for those who don't really care that much about roasties at all, if you know what i mean

[Anonymous No.17941610]

>>17940920
Lel, here in Russia it is common to shorten course names to its first syllables, so for example the Philosophy of Law (Filosofiya Prava) becomes "PhilPrav", or Philosophy of History (Filosofiya Istorii) becomes "PhilHist". You can guess what happens with everything that has "analysis" in its name, and "philo-" at the same time; Calculus, or "mathematical analysis" here, is especially notorious, since Mat also means "obscenity".

In case of the Analytics it's either PhiloAnal or AnalFeel, pick your chair.

[Anonymous No.17941638]

>>17940684
based antichrist

[Anonymous No.17942099]

>>17939374
Hmm that trainset looks comfy af
that shit on the other side looks cold, sterile, oldfashioned and dull

[Anonymous No.17942166]

>>17940651
>Quine
>Sellars
>Brandom
That's the thing, these new continentals like Badiou, the Speculative Realists, and the new Realists (Markus Gabriel or whatever) are so burnt out with their own continental forefathers that now they're recreating analytic philosophy ideas and sometimes recognizing it and turning directly to it for additional new inspiration. But it's sad we have to wait for continentals doing that for you people to finally think "Wow there's value in Quine or Sellars." Actually Rorty tried to tell continentals that (and likewise tell analytics that there's value in Heidegger, Derrida, etc).
>earlier today i developed a general map of the different conceptions of metaphysics that are shared between the two traditions and also beyond them. all of them when you look carefully can be helpful to the other conceptions. i'll probably need to utilize all of them for my system to be complete
Yes dude and that should be a no-brainer. I operate on the same conception. Post what you've got if you can.
>there's nothing true about possible worlds dude. it's simply autistic and sterile
Do you understand what the debate is even about? Just curious. For one, "possible worlds" in the most neutral sense is just a logical device used to provide a semantics for modal logic. That semantics role is important enough and Quinean inspired metaphysicians like David Lewis (Quine's student) thus thought: Look, let's commit to them ontologically because we use them in our best current modal logic. The people who disagree with his concrete modal realism provide alternate devices, ersatz possible worlds as he calls them, which are more or less maximal and consistent sets of sentences or propositions or whatever. One way or another we at least should admit a modal logic, because modal speech is inevitable and thinking like that's stupid is itself more-stupid. But then getting into the metaphysics of modality just follows after. What the fuck do you propose instead? Well whatever you do, it better not be a return to Wittgensteinian era conventionalism, much less very outdated medieval understandings. It's sad when I read Meillassoux and Deleuze still using said medieval understandings of modality. Now that's actually sterility.

[Anonymous No.17942390]

>>17942166
>Do you understand what the debate is even about? Just curious. For one, "possible worlds" in the most neutral sense is just a logical device used to provide a semantics for modal logic.
not the anon you're arguing with but a sceptic about the real value of the "possible worlds" approach to modal logic. It seems to lack a robust analysis of the concept of "possibility", and yet that's what is doing all the work.
"Oh, a possible world is just one that's not actual." I've heard answers such as this but they seem to me to be simply assuming what they're supposed to be explaining.
What's your line on that, anon? You seem knowledgeable.

[Anonymous No.17942476]

>>17942390
I feel like the worry here is actually a metaphysics worry rather than the semantics worry. We have some notion (prima facie) of non-actual possibility. We appeal to it with hypotheticals, counterfactuals, and all kinds of speculation about how the past was, how the present might be, how the future could be. Those are sometimes epistemological possibility but the point is we have to be open to modal possibilities in order to even think there could be such epistemological possibilities. And fiction is always non-actual, so there's that too. It's really hard to ignore that we have some pre-philosophical grasp of non-actual possibility. The (neutral not loaded) possible worlds semantics approach just says that sentences like "Possibly P" can be understood as "P is true at some possible world" and "Necessarily P" can be understood as "P is true at all possible worlds," the "actual world" will be one of the possible worlds but determining which or saying what it means for it to be the actual world goes a bit beyond the semantics into metaphysics of actuality.
>It seems to lack a robust analysis of the concept of "possibility", and yet that's what is doing all the work.
To the extent there is any analysis, "possible world" is the primitive and we analyze possibility in terms of the existential quantifier and possible worlds, then necessity in terms of the universal quantifier and possible worlds, and actuality as being one among the possible worlds (but determining which is metaphysics). One popular approach is an indexical one (that was David Lewis' approach), so the possible world you're "in" would be the actual one (for you). A lot of people would say that's not where it bottoms out, that there's really an objective actual world. But that's all metaphysics.
>"Oh, a possible world is just one that's not actual."
So technically this isn't right, the actual world is one of the possible worlds.
> I've heard answers such as this but they seem to me to be simply assuming what they're supposed to be explaining.
I think part of it is that it uses the word "possible" which might suggest the circularity you're talking about. They add the adjective "possible worlds" just to make it obvious that according to the semantic analysis the existential quantifier ranges over all the "worlds" when it's used to define "Possibly P" as "P is true at some possible world." But other than that, these worlds, as logical devices, are supposed to be primitives themselves, summoned axiomatically to do theoretical work. It's like when logicians and arithmeticians introduce the set. Sets are also logical devices.

[Anonymous No.17942502]

>>17942390
>>17942476
>Cont'd
Actually would like to add: although the possible worlds show up in the semantics first as a primitive, metaphysicians often ask: What's the analysis of "possible world" itself? And some (the ersatzists) define them as maximal consistent sets of propositions/sentences. So if that's the view, then the possible worlds are themselves reducible to sentences/propositions, and "P is true at w" is understood as P being logically entailed by w, since w itself is a maximal consistent sentence/proposition, or set of sentences/propositions. But then the Lewisian modal realists say the possible worlds should be more like concrete worlds. Basically, given what we mean by "actual world," multiply that character for each of the other worlds. The ersatzist and Lewisian approaches are the main two theories of possible worlds. Despite Lewis' influence and intelligent defense of modal realism it's actually quite a minority view, I feel.

[Anonymous No.17942528]

>>17939587
Abstractions are nice, until you step into the real world and see how much of it you failed to grasp.

[Anonymous No.17942541]

>>17940687
>analphil

[Anonymous No.17942577]

>>17942541
>cuntphil

[Anonymous No.17942651]

>>17942476
thanks anon, that is a useful and interesting post
>these worlds, as logical devices, are supposed to be primitives themselves, summoned axiomatically to do theoretical work
This puts it very well; it just seems to me a little ontologically extravagant and while it allows us to account for certain features of our speech and reasoning the notion of "possibility" itself remains opaque. But I agree it is a superior approach to anything else currently (or previously) on offer.

[Anonymous No.17943225]

>>17941610
One AnalFeel por favor

[Anonymous No.17943466]

>>17939374
Analytical philosophy is based and the only reason for the endless bitching on this board is the fact that most of the people here can't into math.

[Anonymous No.17943629]

>>17943466
Some of them even go as far as to character assassinate LOGIC. It's insane. They think "wow it uses logic?!? WOW YOU CAN PROVE ANYTHING RIGHT THAT WAY!" Meanwhile they're ok with all the mutually incompatible continental philosophers because it has Soul or something.

[Anonymous No.17943670]

>>17942166
>>17942476
>>17942502
Meinong finished philosophy

[Anonymous No.17943739]

>>17943629
The "people" here read books for the sake of filling their shelves, analysis takes time and effort and although you end up with more knowledge, your book shelve wont be as full and colorful so /lit/ isnt interested.

[Anonymous No.17943777]

>>17943629
Masculine logic was destroyed by Nye

[Anonymous No.17944083]

>>17943670
>Meinong
Refuted by Husserl and Russell

[Anonymous No.17944338]

>>17942166
What's wrong with the Scholastic understanding of modality? Who have you read on this matter?

[Anonymous No.17944570]

>>17944338
The main issue is that sometimes people think like possibility/necessity is a matter of temporal matters like existing at all times vs. existing only at some times, rather than starting from counterfactuals. With the old understanding, contingency is basically defined as corruptibility (having a beginning and end in time). There's just a lot of stuff run together and not split apart like they should be.

[Anonymous No.17944615]

>>17944570
But how do worlds fix this understanding of modality

[Anonymous No.17944740]

>>17944615
You can fix it before bringing in the worlds. The possible worlds like I said earlier are just a little device, like sets, that logicians use to get things done and explain some stuff. But the work in modal logic before possible worlds came in was already able to disentangle the things those medievals kept tangled up, just by setting forth clear rules of inference about modality. What the current modal logic (even pre-worlds) allows is for the following two possible combinations:
1. Something which exists eternally or through all time, but is contingent.
2. Something which has a beginning and end in our time, but is necessary.
With the possible world semantics you could spell out 1 as: Something eternal might not exist in all possible worlds, while something with a beginning and end (within a world, at least our world) might exist in all possible worlds. Modal logic alone won't rule 1 and 2 our, but the medievals seem to have ruled at least 2 out. Another thing: Modal logic today allows contingencies which are not or don't have to be caused to exist by anything. But the medievals would have thought that's wrong.

[Anonymous No.17944768]

>>17939374
I can't stand people that believe there is something special about thinking about stem vs humanities. Your precious identities will be cleansed in fire as you return to the nothing you always were.

[Anonymous No.17944803]

>>17943739
Get a load of this guy, you wouldn't even be able to get out of bed without Dasein. I bet your mother still puts your logos before your mythos lmao.

[Anonymous No.17944826]

transcend the divide

[Anonymous No.17945507]

>>17944826
Fuck you, you keep dangling these books and refuse to give a summary.

[Anonymous No.17945671]

Systematic attempts at solving philosophical problems will always be better than dramatic rhetorical paradigm shifts that never really amount to anything. That being said, I have no issue with most pre-Heideggerian associated with the continental tradition.
I should also say that the claim of historical depth made by the continentals is exaggerated. Their inability to engage with the history of thought. Outside of the Franco German tradition makes the the whole “historicist” tradition suspect.

[Anonymous No.17945939]

>>17943629
They have no interest in really engaging with analytic thought at all (he’ll, I remember a clip of Zizek having to admit that he was clueless when a student asked him about Wittgenstein, which the one analytic thinker they try to claim as one of their own and are only able to do by ignoring the existence of ordinary language philosophy). You just have to look at the way the talk about here. They assert that all analytic philosophy amounts to nothing more than positivism and that positivism was nothing other than Humean empiricism. The manner in which they confuse highly selective and limited readings of history, especially the history of thought, with “historical depth” makes the the whole tradition questionable.
The other way they justify their tradition is even worse. Much in the same scientists and science educators often claim that their field has value because of its usefulness, continentals proclaim value by asserting that relative usefulness when compared to the analytic tradition. When asked I what ways this is the case, they’ll tell you it’s because they’ve become handmaidens to the social sciences, politics, and art criticism. Imstead of seriously engaging with the sciences and philosophical problems therein, the continentals responded by saying, “see our discipline can be instrumentalists much in the same way yours can.” It’s such a sad and cynical way of looking at philosophy that it’s just kind of sad.

[Anonymous No.17945973]

>>17939374
>Throws self in front of train
You could have excluded the rest and just had Anna Karenina.

[Anonymous No.17946029]

>>17945671
>I have no issue with most pre-Heideggerian
so you're the manchild who dismissed Heidegger because he "unrightfully eclipsed" Carnap in European philosophy

seek help

[Anonymous No.17946037]

>>17944826
anon i don't think these exist. it's like that odysseus weeps book from a couple years ago

[Anonymous No.17946042]

>Continental Philosophy

[Anonymous No.17946099]

>>17944740
>Modal logic today allows contingencies which are not or don't have to be caused to exist by anything
How is this possible? Do you mean an instance of volition or something like that?

[Anonymous No.17946142]

>>17943466
>>17943629
I work with formal methods for a living so it is not like analytical philosophy is particularly inaccessible to me. And I believe there is quite a few STEMtards on this board who are not interested in analytical readings. There is just nothing interesting there and it is woefully dry to read. It just seems to have the foul stench of academic ivory tower ramblings that circulate around themselves. As jaded academic I have a personal distaste for that. Overall, Rawls seems to be the only mildly interesting writer there? Russell sniffs his own farts.

[Anonymous No.17946162]

>>17946042
>communism.jpg
no, CHADtinental philosophy is nazi/fascist/rightist philosophy

Jünger
Heidegger
Blanchot
de Man
Koselleck
Schmitt
Spengler
Sorel
Pareto
Kuhn
Strauss
Cioran
Eliade
Klages
Dumezil
Wittgenstein (admirer of Hitler)


meanwhile

>the Vienna Circle
bunch of Austrian socialists and Marxists
>Karl Popper
Marxist/social democrat
>Bertrand Russell
Socialist cuck

You still see this divide today when analytic liberal/marxist academics literally lose their minds and have a tantrum over politics whenever Heidegger is mentioned

[Anonymous No.17946171]

>>17946029
It’s pretty to do that when you have an authoritarian regime supporting you and chasing other guy other out of the country. But that’s beside the point. There’s a meaningful stylistic change (could be more accurately described as a decline) between the likes of Husserl and Cassirer and that of Heidegger and Sartre and those who followed them that dragged the whole tradition down.

[Anonymous No.17946546]

>>17939412
Based. Come home to illiteracy, white man.

[Anonymous No.17946939]

>>17940815
why is he retarded anon? he's my husbando, sorta
>>17942166
you need to commit to paraconsistent objects in your ontology. for instance, "what if the riemann hypothesis was false?". this is an intelligible counterfactual, as even if it was true you can say something about it. i dont know you'd formalize it in an information system, and even then it seems to be missing the point. you don't need an entire world. maybe modal chunks which would be like ersatz possible worlds. but meh... say i want to speculate about what would happen to our society's technology if P=NP. you will get a contradiction there. really it's also too bloated. i dont want to commit to an exact replica of the universe. all of this also connects to my more scholastic (??) sensibilities here. i'd prefer there to be an actual world which would be a substance (or more generally a cognitive invariant). as opposed to possible worlds, what i am really interested is a slight modification of the underlying invariant. when speculating about how things would be in a hypothetical universe where X was possible, obviously such a universe would not exist so it is unimaginable the literal world which was surely determined by different laws in the case of X. at the very least i am interested in trying to see how things change in my near vicinity, like with the world we have now, but changed a bit. i do admit i am being a little harsh on it, but in some sense i am not being harsh (as these things are really applicable to cases where paraconsistency isn't an issue, say in physics... the many-worlds interpretation, though im not sure how related to this, can die for all i care btw) enough, since in designing a hypothetical intelligent system, it's modal cognition isn't going to use possible worlds as could be utilized for some abstract theoretical system. maybe what's needed here instead is more of a modality schema? like the counterfactual statement has a pragmatic import in directing a system to construct a particular picture of reality based off of a mix of deductive (like you might use some of the consequences of P=NP) and abductive (which is necessary as the deduction is only possible for some modal chunk)

at least you guys don't necessarily treat it as a real thing (which i admittedly forgot lol, im retarded). ontological commitment language trips me up sometimes
>>17944083
>and Russell
redpill me on this
>>17945939
idk stuff like deleuze (esp difference and repetition) does try to solve some outstanding problems. also i think i am a bit weird because the main philosopher ive inadvertently taken influence himself is from analytic philosophy, but odd
>>17946162
why do you fill your head with garbage. if it isn't i want you to tell me how any of those thinkers (save wittgenstein as he is being synthesized into my larger system as we speak) can help me construct agi (btw this is the main criteria i judge all philosophies by now). otherwise afaic it is edificatory garbage

[Anonymous No.17946946]

>>17946162
>>Karl Popper
>Marxist/social democrat
LOL

[Anonymous No.17946948]

>>17946939
>i dont know you'd formalize
*i don't know if you could
anyways, thanks guys. this thread gave me opportunity to make a daily post complaining about analytic metaphysics
>>17943670
redpill me on zalta

[Anonymous No.17947213]

>>17946099
It just has to be something that exists at some worlds but not all the worlds, to be contingent per modal logic. The semantics of modal logic don't demand any further explanation for why the thing in question exists where it exists and not where it doesn't.
>>17946142
What have you read? And what are your interests, philosophy-wise?
>>17946162
>Popper
>Marxist/social democrat
lol
>>17946939
>you need to commit to paraconsistent objects in your ontology. for instance, "what if the riemann hypothesis was false?". this is an intelligible counterfactual, as even if it was true you can say something about it. i dont know you'd formalize it in an information system, and even then it seems to be missing the point.
I agree it's intelligible but that's usually what people call a counterpossible and if they do provide a semantics for it they do use paraconsistent impossible worlds to do so. But a lot of modal logicians and even some metaphysicians probably are okay saying that since mathematical facts are necessary facts, there isn't a counterfactual situation where they're false.
>at least you guys don't necessarily treat it as a real thing
Yeah it's a bit tricky. As logical devices I think everyone does well to use them. But most philosophers do go an extra step and commit to something metaphysical. Usually it's the ersatz worlds which are just sets of sentences/propositions, not too terrible to accept that. But people like Lewis go with the concrete worlds. To have the logic itself work though you don't need such commitments.
>and Russell
>redpill me on this
So Russell was actually a Meinongian in the very early 1900s. Like when he wrote The Principles of Mathematics (not to be confused with Principia Mathematica). But shortly after, by the time he wrote "On Denoting," he shifted to a view where sentences of the form "S does not exist" get paraphrased as "It is not the case that there is an x such that it is S" and that avoids the Meinongian need to say there are entities which subsist but don't exist (normally done to account for the ontological commitment of having a subject in a true sentence at all).

[Anonymous No.17947292]

>>17946142
>Overall, Rawls seems to be the only mildly interesting writer there? Russell sniffs his own farts.
pure kek.
>attempt at appearing erudite: FAILED
kill yourself.

[Anonymous No.17947313]

>>17946939
>anime
>agi
Holy shit you’re a fucking tranny

The utter state of analytics

[Anonymous No.17947331]

>>17947313
What is agi? Adjusted gross income?

[Anonymous No.17947346]

>>17947331
Artificial general intelligence

[Anonymous No.17947376]

>>17939412
>“So, when on one side you hoist in Locke's head, you go over that way; but now, on the other side, hoist in Kant's and you come back again; but in very poor plight. Thus, some minds for ever keep trimming boat. Oh, ye foolish! throw all these thunder-heads overboard, and then you will float light and right.”

[Anonymous No.17947401]

>>17943225
Topkek

[Anonymous No.17947407]

>>17947213
ahh yeah, i forgot that about Russel. why are there some people that are still Meinongians then? because of Lewis?
>I agree it's intelligible but that's usually what people call a counterpossible and if they do provide a semantics for it they do use paraconsistent impossible worlds to do so
hmm. i was just browsing john perry (i recall an anon recommending him before) and the wiki article mentions situation semantics. does that work at all?
>>17947313
im not really an analytic. i don't read too much analytic philosophy currently and trying to go through the continental stuff (just started reading hegel actually... btw he's not trash because negarestani demonstrates he can be connected back to agi). also there are way more continental trannies than analytics (at least from my experience). that isn't surprising since it is generally more popular on the internet (i guess analytic stuff just doesn't sound very fashionable. you can barely get a phil. of mind discussion going on around here sometimes... unless it's bait about qualia or something)

[Anonymous No.17947645]

>>17944570
This is not how modality was conceived in medieval philosophy. Modality was seen as degree of intensity of a predicate (c.f. Scotus especially). The disjunctive necessary-possible was seen as a disfunction between the transcendent (metaphysically) and the categorical along with the other disjunctives (e.g. finite-infinite). For Scotus this grounded the distinction between the transcendentals and the categorical predicates. For someone like Ockham this distinction grounded the equivocal use of being in logic and metaphysics.

[Anonymous No.17947649]

>>17947645
>disfunction = distinction
Fucking autocorrect

[Anonymous No.17947741]

>>17946037
Not him but
https://www.amazon.com/Thinking-Being-Irad-Kimhi/dp/0674967895

https://www.amazon.com/Categories-Temporal-Inquiry-Finite-Intellect/dp/0674047753

https://www.amazon.com/Essay-Negation-Linguistic-Anthropology-Italian/dp/0857424386

Whoever made the image seems like a European grad student studying Frege.

[Anonymous No.17947797]

>>17944826
Not this autist again

[Anonymous No.17948461]

What should I start with to approach analytical philosophy? The opinions in this thread convinced me that it's useful.

[Anonymous No.17948657]

>>17947645
I'm sure your response isn't inaccurate but the facts are, I go and read people like Meillassoux and Deleuze and see them still think of the contingent as the dependent AND the corruptible, whereas those three notions merit being pulled apart. But where else do I find those notions combined? In various classical theological arguments for the existence of God. "Medieval" includes Jewish and Islamic philosophy as well as stuff other than Scotus or Ockham. Whatever it is, I don't think I'm being inaccurate saying that often times contingency, dependence, and corruptibility are treated as one notion. Usually people will say something like: X has an end and a beginning (= is corruptible), therefore it must be contingent, therefore a necessary being must have grounded it (= the contingent thing is also dependent). And this is just running together lots of things and calling the mixture "contingency" when it's three separate notions. If you know that the medievals recognized three concepts and separated them, feel free to tell us how they put it.
>>17947741
For what it's worth I'm reading a review of the Irad Kimhi book right now. Apparently Kimhi dislikes Fregean propositions, but his AMAZING insight is...LITERALLY the Russellian theory of propositions. Namely: That there are no eternal Fregean abstract propositions which we grasp, but instead, we grab the objects and properties with our thought and manage to combine them or keep them uncombined and this explains how we generate our basic judgments. See here, from the review I'm reading:
>For Kimhi, to be a thinker is first and foremost to be able to represent how things are by combining elements of a particular language—names like “Antarctica” and predicates like “is frozen”—in a simple judgment. By combining such elements, as in “Antarctica is frozen,” I can think how things are. But, Kimhi argues, that very capacity to combine a name and a verb to say how things are is also a capacity to think of those same combined elements as torn asunder, and thus to think how things aren’t.
So I'd like to hear >>17944826 say something now. Russell had a really interesting idea about the nature of belief (assertive thought) in his fourth lecture in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. I wonder what Irad Kimhi and the Kimhianon have to say about it.

[Anonymous No.17948662]

Con't from >>17948657
This is the conclusion of the Kimhi review:
>Kimhi obtained his Ph.D. at the University of Pittsburgh and has taught at Yale, Leipzig and the University of Chicago, but he has never held a tenured job in philosophy, has published nothing before this book and was until recently known only amongst a somewhat avant-garde set connected through the Universities of Chicago, Leipzig and Pittsburgh. Thinking and Being was more than twenty years in the thinking and writing, composed in a liminal space accessible to almost none, both inside and outside of the university. Whatever one thinks of the book, its heterodox nature is plain. Could it have come, straightforwardly, out of a university nowadays? In precluding a thorough inspection of analytic philosophy’s very foundations, the pressure to publish perpetually, which takes hold even in graduate school and suffuses one’s professional life, may have already foreclosed such possibilities.
Why couldn't he get tenured jobs? Well when people wanting to be original (nothing wrong with that) end up recreating wheels they should know about already, one starts thinking maybe that reflects something about their capabilities as professional philosophers in general...

[Anonymous No.17948674]

>>17948461
Do you want a historical angle, a top-most metaphysics/metametaphysics angle, or some kind of holistic best-of angle, or do you perhaps have some more specific interests?

[Anonymous No.17948847]

Well the left side has all but won nowadays. Modern continental tradition has been all but subsumed in universities the world over. It still influences things, but outgrowths of analytical philosopht have won alongside the Anglos more broadly.

[Anonymous No.17948856]

>>17940729
It's a meme. It was something he said about republicans lol.

[Anonymous No.17948879]

>>17945939
You do realize the whole point of continental philosophy is NOT to be instrumental to economic and political systems right? Could it be that you were massively filtered and/or brainwashed by the current system?

[Anonymous No.17948930]

>>17944768
/thread

[Anonymous No.17948952]

>>17948879
I'm saying that it isn't and that it';s claims that analytic philosophy is amount to nothing more than projection. Every major continental thinker has their work utilized in such a way that if that were their goal, they failed. I don't think it was their goal at all.

[Anonymous No.17949008]

>>17948657
My points about Scotus and Ockham were merely illustrative not exhaustive. But more importantly the conflations of modern thinkers between distinct concepts in medieval thought should not be (wrongly) attributed to medieval thinkers. Some philosophers thought that possibility implied contingency/corruptibility, many didn't. But to view medieval philosophy as a logical, let alone metaphysical, monolith of this sort is disingenuous to the work those philosophers did. Not to mention they were well aware of the Islamic and Jewish traditions in the High Middle Ages.

[Anonymous No.17949066]

>>17948674
holistic best-of angle.
My interest are mainly to learn the vocabulary of philosophers and be able to sketch my arguments that way.
In terms of metaphysics and all that, I've made my peace with the Revelation Christianity brings about, I ground logic, mathematics in the Aion God created (spiritual heaven) or in the mind of God or the mind of angels which are eternal.
I just want to grasp the best framework for commanding logic, and it's not this thread alone that sparked my interest, I came to a strong curiosity through my chaotic readings.
Sorry anon, I'm new to all this but I'm willing to work it.

[Anonymous No.17950239]

Language doesn't exist in a vacuum

[Anonymous No.17950249]

>>17939374

[Anonymous No.17950776]

>>17949008
You're right. I'm sorry if I implied a monolithic generalization. It was more of a "This seems to hold true of some stuff I've read." Thanks for sharing your knowledge on Scotus/Ockham.

[Anonymous No.17950955]

>>17947407
How can Hegel be connected to AGI?

[Anonymous No.17951259]

>>17948856
The quote about the republicans was fake though.

[Anonymous No.17951424]

>>17949066
Hm, if you want to get up to speed with stuff then you could do the following very minimal history for starters:
>Frege, "Sense and Reference"
>Russell, "On Denoting"
>Kripke, Naming and Necessity
The third of those is also a first introduction to a lot of debates and arguments for and against certain positions. Then for a basic introduction to a lot of metaphysics debates and arguments after Kripke, I recommend
>Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds
Now what you're looking for is holism on the one hand, and logic on the other hand. So for the holism, I think it would help to check out what people say about philosophy of mind at the very least. There's some readers for this that I could recommend:
>Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
As for logic, I don't know what to recommend. But I think it would help to understand the underlying semantics for sentential connectives, quantifiers, and modal operators. In this thread I've talked about possible world semantics. For the sentential connectives, the semantic account is one that sees them as truth functions. They are functions, monadic or dyadic, which take in arguments and spit out a value given the input combination. The possible input arguments are the True and the False, and the output values are also the True and the False. Hence: truth functions. For the quantifiers, Barcan's semantics for the quantifiers helps as a heuristic. The idea is that the universal quantifier can be approximated with an infinite conjunction analysis, and the existential quantifier with an infinite disjunction analysis, and evaluated for truth as they are. It's not a true analysis (for reasons), but it's a very useful approximation, and more or less true when dealing with a finite or countably infinite domain. If anyone knows a book that would cover these semantics accounts in an easy way, let us know, would help our anon friend here. I sort of learned them from various sources in specific university courses so it wasn't one source.

[Anonymous No.17951580]

>>17950955
geist is basically the self-evolution of a diffuse (i.e, composed of multiple subsystem) intelligence. each stage in geist is one of a new functional integration

[Anonymous No.17951729]

>>17939412
holy mother of based

[Anonymous No.17953245]

bumpy

[Anonymous No.17954087]

>>17939412
>greek philosophy
gay and redpilled

[Anonymous No.17955062]

>>17951424
Transferred that to a reading list, thank you anon.
The way you responded produced a realization either by chance or shrewdness on your part about the topic that fascinated me since I can remember, that is the problem of mind, it became central to what you replied.
I am sold even more now.

I'll refresh the basics of logic with a textbook just to be sure, then approach the developments in the field.

[Anonymous No.17955486]

>>17939439
>the Balinese anthropology he used in ttp was very outdated
Anthropology is hardly a science, so citing Bateson or Geertz or whoever is perfectly acceptable.

[Anonymous No.17955831]

>>17940815
what did he say that's retarded? he completely btfo'd the OOO charlatans

[Anonymous No.17955861]

>>17939374
This thread doest deserve to exist

[Anonymous No.17955872]

>>17940815
This guy?

[Anonymous No.17956031]

>>17955831
What's that about? I've never heard of Wolfendale. What did he say about OOO?