What are his arguments, concretely?

[Anonymous No.17786884]

No need to redirect me to his books, it's unreadable and he talks about the four elements etc., about ether: I don't want to waste my time dissociating culture from philosophy.

When I ask a Thomist for Aquinas' arguments in favor of the existence of God, he doesn't redirect me to the summa: he summarizes them in a few lines in contemporary terms.

So I ask the advaitins: concretely, what are the arguments of Adi Shankara?

In particular, but not only, about the identity between personal phenomenal consciousness and God?

That our consciousnesses participate in the divine consciousness as our existences participate in the divine Being, even Aquinas would agree. But from there to proclaim a strict identity...

[Anonymous No.17786913]

>hey man, just like... whatever lol

[Anonymous No.17787018]

>>17786884
>What are his arguments, concretely?
You are just Atman within Jiva who witnesses but is also an observer superimposed intellect Self because it says in the Brianna Upanishad that "I am that, that I am, you are we, we are He..." but you are God because the Lord is within you and He is within Himself so How can you say He isn't Himself if He isn't Himself but consciousness Brahman Atman is Immutable and Unmanifested Jiva because Maya is Illusion from the Upanishad Verse proclaimed Saguna Nirguna Absolute Conditional reality argumentation of the analogy of the Sun Advaita Vedanta Shankaracharya said this and He wields His power because Brahman Atman upanishad Maya Illusions Saguna Vedanta Eternal.

[Anonymous No.17787035]

>>17787018
What

[Anonymous No.17787050]

>What are his arguments
The Vedas Said So, but only the parts of the Vedas that he takes as authoritative, as he picks-and-chooses lines that he considers valid.

[Anonymous No.17787074]

>>17787050
Are his arguments not valid without the Vedas?

Aquinas' arguments are valid without the Bible.

[Anonymous No.17787075]

>>17787018
ooga booga shit in street we are all fecal matter

[Anonymous No.17787149]

...

[Anonymous No.17787245]

>>17787074
No, in both cases. The truth-value of both thinkers' statements is directly tied to the validity of the texts that they are interpreting. Aquinas is pretty open about this (remember, Thomism is just a counter-thrust against the sinful paganism that is "philosophy", all you need to do is shut up and do what your priest tells you). With Shankara, it's critically necessary due to the gaping holes in this philosophy (in particular the radical anti-empirical stance he takes).

[Anonymous No.17787295]

>>17787245
Uh, no. Even without the Bible the 5 ways of Aquinas remain valid arguments. They are based on metaphysical considerations (the act-power distinction for example), not on biblical verses.

[Anonymous No.17787302]

>>17787295
act-potency*

[Anonymous No.17787306]

>>17787245
Ok, maybe not all of Aquinas' philosophy is independent from the Bible, but many parts of it are. His arguments of the existence of God (and all its properties too!) do not depend on the Bible being true. The same could be said about what he says in De Ente et Essentia. These are all arguments that can be presented without any biblical reference.
Are there arguments of this kind in Shankara's corpus?

[Anonymous No.17787311]

>>17787245
>remember, Thomism is just a counter-thrust against the sinful paganism that is "philosophy", all you need to do is shut up and do what your priest tells you
>has never read Aquinas

[Anonymous No.17787330]

>>17786884
He has none.

[Anonymous No.17787351]

>>17786884
>it's unreadable
No it’s not
>and he talks about the four elements etc., about ether:
That doesn’t really invalidate any of his arguments
> concretely, what are the arguments of Adi Shankara?

Go on lib-gen and download “A Samkara sourcebook” by A.J. Alston. It has most of his various arguments from throughout his works, arranged into sections by what topic they deal with. It allows you to flip to his arguments about the soul, or causation or against opposing schools or whatever and read those arguments without reading through his entire commentaries. Alston also translates his prose smoother than Gambhirananda does.


https://libgen.is/book/index.php?md5=A028BE0E5AB35C4D5B961488DDB4FE3E

[Anonymous No.17787362]

>>17787351
So no vedantins can present his main arguments? I have to read a book of compilations if quotes of 6 volumes?

[Anonymous No.17787415]

>>17787362
>So no vedantins can present his main arguments?
I could spoonfeed you, but if you are generally interested in learning about the topic and evaluating his arguments seriously, you'll have to read some of them yourself, 4chan posts would not do them justice.
>I have to read a book of compilations if quotes of 6 volumes?
No, you just have to use the index to look up whichever section has some of the arguments that you find relevant and then you can only read those arguments.

The identify of the Self and Brahman is accepted in Advaita because the Upanishads say so, it's not something they try to arrive at through deductive reasoning. Taking that as their basis though they succeed in refuting every objection to this doctrine by showing how it contradicts neither logic nor experience, and they point out that all the arguments which attempt to refute it follow a pattern of making logical mistakes or confusing consciousness with the mind and so on.

[Anonymous No.17787448]

>>17787306
>Are there arguments of this kind in Shankara's corpus?
Yes, when Shankara is not arguing against other Hindu schools over how to interpret a certain scriptural verse the vast majority of his arguments don't rely on scriptural authority but they instead use logic to see if the opponents views is illogical or contradicted by our experience.

[Anonymous No.17787479]

>>17787415
>The identify of the Self and Brahman is accepted in Advaita because the Upanishads say so, it's not something they try to arrive at through deductive reasoning.
Oh. I thought Shankara was based on arguments. Because there are positive arguments for this thesis: https://qualiacomputing.com/2020/06/06/mini-series-on-open-individualism/ (part. 3).

I am disappointed. Why do some people compare him with Aquinas then? Aquinas proves the central points of his metaphysics with reason alone.

[Anonymous No.17787486]

>>17787415
>Taking that as their basis though they succeed in refuting every objection to this doctrine
This is normal, solipsism is irrefutable (being a hyper-skepticism).

[Anonymous No.17787516]

>>17787018
this basically

[Anonymous No.17787521]

>>17787415
>Taking that as their basis though they succeed in refuting every objection to this doctrine
Marxism, freudism, etc.. There are many irrefutable philosophical systems, but this does not make them true (on the contrary).

[Anonymous No.17787523]

>>17787362
>>17787415
Specifically, the sections you'd want to read and consult the table of contents of in the sourcebook collection by A.J. Alston are the ones titled, 'Sankara on the soul' and the section titled 'Sankara on the Absolute'. The beginning of the pdf doesn't have the table of contents for the whole book, you can to scroll down and find it a third or so of the way through the 2172 page pdf, or you can ctrl-F 'contents' to find the multiple tables of contents scattered through the pdf.

[Anonymous No.17787534]

what do advaitins propose should be done with the world of the illusion? are they determinists?

[Anonymous No.17787699]

>17786884
His cope is this
>Sanskrit come from brahman so if texts in non-sanskrit are evil!!!!

[Anonymous No.17787717]

>>17787018
wat

[Anonymous No.17787726]

>>17787245
>with Shankara, it's critically necessary due to the gaping holes in this philosophy,
There are none, unlike Buddhist philosophical positions which are largely a giant pile of nihilistic sophisms that collapse under their own logical contradictions.
>>17787311
He has not read Shankara either
>>17787479
>Oh. I thought Shankara was based on arguments.

So, in his works Shankara uses cosmological arguments, teleological arguments, arguments from causation etc for the existence of God; and in doing so he makes some of the same or similar arguments to what western Theologians have said. Shankara departs from them or goes further though in that he examines the process of creation or emanation in his work and according to him there is no way that it can actually take place and have the universe emerge into existence as something which is not God without it violating God's immutability, eternity, infiniteness, etc, according to Shankara the existence of the universe can only be explained by the existence of God, but at the same time the logical impossibility of real creation indicates that really there is just the infinite God alone existing eternally and that this is just the 'virtual' appearance of God's power of maya. He explains why it is logically coherent to view this as the source of the universe and says that this is more logically consistent than the notion of God creating ex-nihilio or emanating or overflowing out of himself, and that this allows one to explain how the appearance of the universe is experienced within the reality of consciousness but without ascribing actions to God which violate Him being unchanging, timeless, not subject to causality etc.

[Anonymous No.17787732]

>>17787726
And if God doesn't ever create anything which is separate from Himself and if He is the only thing that actually exists, then the reality of our consciousness or whatever portion or basis of our conscious experience is real, whatever is that real thing which gives us the undeniable being/existence that we do have regardless of whatever false layers may be added upon it, that reality of consciousness would logically then be inseparable from the reality of God, because if there is only one real thing that never divides itself or creates anything else, then it would logically follow that it would be the consciousness in which everything else takes place, because while we cannot verify the reality or unreality of things which appear within consciousness, the fact that we are conscious and have consciousness in which things take place, i.e. that we exist as consciousness is undeniable. Unlike the outside world consciousness is also completely unchanging as well. It's totally illogical to think that from complete unreality or non-existence would arise false experience of consciousness/sentience, so it wouldn't make sense to say "what if there is just Brahman alone but even our consciousness itself is unreal and caused by his power". So if the existence of our consciousness is undeniable, and if the existence of anything at all can only be accounted for by having an eternal God, but if there is no way that God can produce the world aside from maya without it resulting in logical contradictions that violate what we simultaneously affirm about Him; then that line of thinking is an argument that points to our own unchanging formless self-illumining awareness itself being the eternal God that is the origin of time, space, causation etc since if it has undeniable existence (unlike the intellect and outside world which come and go within consciousness during the transition from waking to dream and sleep etc) then it would have to be the one uncreated existence of God that itself is the basis of maya. This larger argument Shankara talks about in his commentary on the Mandukya-Karika.

[Anonymous No.17787737]

>>17787732
So, as you can see one can use logic to build a case for the Atman being Brahman, and Shankara makes the above points in his works, but at the same time Shankara doesn't hinge the validity of Advaita Vedanta on these arguments holding water, at the end of the day it's something they accept on the basis of the revealed scriptures because Shankara is a Theologian, although he still provides some arguments for it using solely logic; he does it while accepting that human logic is not perfectly infallible and these arguments while important are not essential for him because Shankara already accepts it on faith from the Upanishads already. Shankara provides the above argument using logic to show the likelihood of non-duality in his commentary on the Mandukya Karika, because Gaudapada makes the same point and Shankara elaborates on it further and fully explains the reasoning, Shankara doesn't speak about these same arguments often in his other writings though, what Shankara primarily cares about is demonstrating that the doctrine is internally coherent and free from logical contradictions, which he does. It's an initiatory teaching with an accompanying metaphysics, which is only fully offering and explained to Hindus who become renunciate monks, Advaita doesn't care at all about going out into the world and convincing skeptics and atheists, they consider those people as self-condemned and hopeless, and there would be little value in trying to bring the teaching to those who have the least inclination to grasp it, instead of letting those who are worthy approach it themselves, while defending the doctrine against the attacks of others and demonstrating their own internal consistency. Shankara in his Brahma Sutra Bhasya writes that human reason exercised independently of and without recourse to any revealed scriptures is incapable of arriving at the absolute truth of existence.

[Anonymous No.17787752]

>>17787245
based reader making nerds seethe

[Anonymous No.17787755]

>>17787737
>Advaita doesn't care at all about going out into the world and convincing skeptics and atheists, they consider those people as self-condemned and hopeless, and there would be little value in trying to bring the teaching to those who have the least inclination to grasp it,
I wonder about this
>>17787534

[Anonymous No.17787768]

>>17787726
>but at the same time the logical impossibility of real creation indicates that really there is just the infinite God alone existing eternally and that this is just the 'virtual' appearance of God's power of maya
There are many irrefutable philosophical systems, but this does not make them true (on the contrary).

>And if God doesn't ever create anything which is separate from Himself and if He is the only thing that actually exists

Yes, in the sense that everything that exists participates in the Being, which is God.

But this does not mean that the world is God. See the theology of creation ex nihilo. Created objects participate in God's Being, but are distinct from it (being contingent).

God is the first and last cause of everything: the world is created, distinct is brought together again in the contemplation of God at the end.

>whatever is that real thing which gives us the undeniable being/existence that we do have regardless of whatever false layers may be added upon it, that reality of consciousness would logically then be inseparable from the reality of God

This is being. This part you are talking about is what we receive from God by participating in the being to exist. But it does not allow us to identify ourselves in any way with God as the vedantins do.For God does not fit into any genus. To participate in the classification is to receive from the creator, but it does not allow to go out of the picture to put oneself at his level.

[Anonymous No.17787769]

>>17787486
>This is normal, solipsism is irrefutable (being a hyper-skepticism).
Advaita is not solipsism because it accepts that the outside world of objects and other living beings are empirically real, it also accepts the empirical real existence of other human beings and their minds, it just says that the same consciousness (which is separate from the mind) illumines the minds of all living beings at the same time, that's not the same as solipsism though which says that other people don't exist but they are all just figments of your own mind. In Advaita the consciousness which illumines your mind and body does not belong to your mind and body more than it belongs to others, and the mind and body which appears in your consciousness is not more real than the mind and body of others. Advaita is irrefutable though.
>>17787521
I never said that the truth of Advaita is proven through its refutations of other schools, it's actually the opposite in my opinion, that when you read through and study their essential writings you personally discover that what they say about the nature of consciousness holds true of your own consciousness and that it can induce a radical change in how one regards and experiences one's own consciousness, and this confirms itself as true in our immediate and continuous experience of it. Once it really hits you, one never thinks about consciousness or the mind in the same way ever again.
>>17787699
Shankara refuted Buddhism by pointing out its many logical contradictions, he didn't have to use the argument from grammar like Kumarila Bhatta did, Bhatta also wrote refutations of Buddhist epistemology too that didn't have to do with grammar.

[Anonymous No.17787776]

>>17787769
>Shankara refuted Buddhism by pointing out its many logical contradictions
is this relative to the Pali Canon or to later texts?

[Anonymous No.17787777]

>>17787768
>There are many irrefutable philosophical systems, but this does not make them true (on the contrary).

Wrong paste. Fixed:

>>17787726 #
>but at the same time the logical impossibility of real creation indicates that really there is just the infinite God alone existing eternally and that this is just the 'virtual' appearance of God's power of maya

So far everyone agrees. It is the Islamic wahdat al wujud and the Thomistic ipsum esse: only God really Is, in the full sense of the word: everything else exists depending on, participating in, the Supreme Being.

This is classical theology, Thomism says the same, what interests me is the strict identification of personal intellect = Supreme Intellect.

In the same way that participating to the Being (God) by our existence does not make us the Being itself, why would participating to the consciousness cause a strict identity between our personal consciousness and the Supreme Spirit?

[Anonymous No.17787782]

>>17787018
Let me try to interpret what this anon says in simpler words. I'll try to use literal translation for sanskrit words for ease of understanding.

P.S.- I am not an Advaitain and am merely trying to explain this anons point of view.

So the main points are:

> 1. You are Soul(Atman). What the west calls study of "self", the east calls realisation of Atman(soul). Hence we claim that the self is infact the soul. Identifying yourself with your ego(born out of experiences in mortal world) , material possessions or whatever fuckall you believe in causes a wrong understanding of self.

>2. Soul(Atman) is inside a Jiva(Living creatures like human, ant, your dog etc). This apparent vessel of soul is temporary. Although it is capable of action and observation. The mind( Mann), which is a separate faculty as compared to soul, sometime confuses the body as the real "you". This is called Maya(Illusion).

>3. The soul(Atman) has several characteristics. It is Indivisible (Cannot be cut into pieces), whole(you can never have a 1/2 or 3/4 of soul), Unmanifested(not created by anyone/self existent) and a part of paramatma (the super soul or the soul of universe/creator/God/insert_random_name). This is also sometimes called Brahman.

>4. Your soul(Atman) is the same as Brahman. They are not two different entities but one and same. The soul itself is the creator and observer of the universe. Basically you don't get a personalized custom made soul for you. All souls are infact the part of Brahman. But since soul cannot be divided you must not think that there are different souls for different people.

Example
Think about a pitcher of water. You can extract a single drop of water from the pitcher. As such you manage to create millions of drops of water. You may argue that each individual drop is different from the other. But according to the above explained concept, it all water(from the pitcher) no doubt looking separate/individual but none the less whole.
>>17787330
>>17787362
>>17787035

[Anonymous No.17787793]

>>17787726
Moreover, the fact that we are not fully BEING does not make us illusory, this is a difference between Thomism and Shankara I think. The Thomist is a realist: the existents really exist, but they are contingent, where only the Being is necessary.

[Anonymous No.17787819]

>>17787726
it's boring that Shankara is astika. I'm basing myself on reason, not scripture. I agree with everything in Buddhism (the yogic side, nastika, the recognition of dukkha, the analysis of the phenomenal world, etc.) except the atman-brahman, where I think Shankara is right.

I don't fit anywhere... Maybe neoplatonism?

[Anonymous No.17787839]

>>17787819
>it's boring that Shankara is astika
> I agree with everything in Buddhism.... nastika
>except the atman-brahman, where I think Shankara is right.

Idgi.

[Anonymous No.17787841]

>all this word salad just to say 'all is one bro haha *hits bong* xD'
I'm glad I don't buy into this convoluted mess

[Anonymous No.17787846]

>>17787819
You do realise that Brahman is the eastern concept of God. Thus in a way you are actually Astik

[Anonymous No.17787847]

>>17787351
I recommend this book instead. Guenonfag, /lit/'s Shankara expert, recommended it and speaks highly of it.

[Anonymous No.17787853]

>>17787839
I think Buddhism is right about many things: the nastika position, the importance of yoga, the analysis of the phenomenal world (anicca-dukkha) and the only point where I agree more with Shankara is the atman-brahman.

I think that Buddhists talk about the same absolute (in vajrayana nirvana is described by three terms which literally mean satchitananda) but that their process-based understanding doesn't fit well when mixed with the transcendent.

[Anonymous No.17787859]

>>17787846
>Thus in a way you are actually Astik
That's cope. Astika is not just believing in God, but in the scriptures too (here the vedas).

[Anonymous No.17787861]

>>17787782
Wait, so if Atman is all that there is, why does it create Illusions (Maya) for itself?

If it is perfect and complete already, and can't be divided, why do jivas appear in it? If it is eternal, why do temporary things like jivas appear in it "as illusions" for itself? How could god have illusions?

[Anonymous No.17787862]

Do advaitins consider the Vedas text to be part of Maya?

[Anonymous No.17787876]

>>17787534
it is easy and reasonable to argue for determinism even as relating to the experience of free will. just break down what a choice is. there is a perceived goal, and a perceived state which does not fulfill that goal. both consist of relative reality and are obviously created/given. There is a mode of achieving the goal: this mode also consists of the created. Try to follow in yourself as you make decisions, try to break them down into components. You will find that all the components belong to relative reality, that they are all part of Indras web, and that the idea that there is anything from outside the web that interferes is illogical.
>what if I take as a goal for my actions God Himself? Is God part of the web?
Good question anon. God Himself is not part of the web, as God lacks any qualities which could be relative, but any understanding of Him is a part of it. These are as the raft in buddhist teaching: not useless for getting there, but useless once you are there.
>so there are no decisions?
there are decisions in the same sense that there is grass. but all the terms of the decisions, and all of their realisations, belong to the relative.
>how does the relative relate to God?
Frankly I am not sure, but I can tell you that there is fundamental wisdom in the saying in the Bhagavad Gita "They are in Me, but I am not in them". This much is true- what relationship this implies between Creator and created, inasmuch as they are in any way two, I feel that theology fails to adress it convincingly. What is differentiated is so in the spirit of the Creator, which we correctly understand to be "good", and internal logic of the existence of that spirit is unknowable, does not belong to the knowable realm. It seems relative, but it is prior to relative existence. To the extent that anything at this level can be approached, it can not be through knowing, and therefore there are things that can not be expressed. There comes a point where if anyone says how things are, you can know that they are lying. But what is created somehow manifests this spirit, which somehow links it to the creator on an existential and non-palpable level. It does not seem entirely unfair to say that the created, along with the Creator, is God.

[Anonymous No.17787878]

>>17787768
>Yes, in the sense that everything that exists participates in the Being, which is God.
If the infinite has anything participating in Itself which is not Itself, then It's not the Infinite, because something like God being infinite cannot be the infinite unless there is nothing else existing that is not His infinity, because infinity is all-encompassing. The Infinite doesn't participate with or within Himself either because God is partless and undivided. So unless you want to violate God's infinity, you can't have things participating in God without maya, I'm not aware of any other way.
>But this does not mean that the world is God.
Advaita doesn't say that the world is God either.
>See the theology of creation ex nihilo. Created objects participate in God's Being, but are distinct from it (being contingent).
And how do you propose God created something ex-nihilo? Did it involve a decision or have a beginning that was initiated after having not been initiated? Then it comprises God being immutable. And how did it emerge from nothing? Did God's power cause matter to emerge from nothing? Nothingness doesn't contain things which can emerge from it and so with this option you are asking us to not hold to the meaning of words consistently. Or did God cause the matter to emerge not from nothing, but directly out of His being, in the same spot as where there was nothingness? Then that's an emanation which involves parts of God becoming not God which violates Him being immutable.
>This is being. This part you are talking about is what we receive from God by participating in the being to exist
Consciousness is a light which is beyond being and non-being for the reason that these are distinctions which the intellect imposes onto things, but consciousness is prior to the intellect and illumines it from within. The Muslim Ishraqi philosopher Suhrawardi, like Shankara, also correctly writes about self-awareness being pre-cognitive and prior to any distinction between subject and object.

[Anonymous No.17787882]

>>17787859
Idk anon. Believe in God or higher power is the only qualification required for being Astik. What book you use to understand/explain the concept is irrelevant.

[Anonymous No.17787894]

>>17787861
Yes, Shankara's illusionist position leads to nonsense. Aquinas avoids these absurdities by recognizing that only God is, but by placing the world and God in a distinction of necessary/contingent relationship, thus avoiding irealism and remaining realistic about the world. While keeping a non-dual God (simple, non-compound) and only Being (ipsum esse), without sacrificing the reality of creation.

[Anonymous No.17787911]

>>17787853
I still don't understand how you accept nastika and atman-brahman. It is like saying I am astika and accept nastika.

[Anonymous No.17787952]

>>17787878
>If the infinite has anything participating in Itself which is not Itself, then It's not the Infinite, because something like God being infinite cannot be the infinite unless there is nothing else existing that is not His infinity, because infinity is all-encompassing.
An answer to this argument: https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/christian-doctrines/pantheists-in-spite-of-themselves-pannenberg-clayton-and-shults-on-divine-i/


Excerpt :

(...) we are told that the finite is that which is in distinction from something and is defined by the distinction. Now as the “negation of the finite,” the infinite must lack at least one of these properties of the finite, that is to say, either the infinite is not distinct from anything or the infinite is not defined by the distinction. But we have just seen that the infinite is defined by its distinction from the finite. The infinite is the opposite of the finite. It follows that the infinite must not, therefore, possess the first property of the finite, being in distinction from something. Therefore, the infinite and the finite cannot really be distinct; rather the infinite must be finite, which is a contradiction.

>>17787878
And how do you propose God created something ex-nihilo? Did it involve a decision or have a beginning that was initiated after having not been initiated? Then it comprises God being immutable.
God is outside of time.
>And how did it emerge from nothing? Did God's power cause matter to emerge from nothing? Nothingness doesn't contain things which can emerge from it and so with this option you are asking us to not hold to the meaning of words consistently.
God is the Being, all powerful. He can create from nothing, that is his power.

All these objections were answered by the Thomists centuries ago...

>Consciousness is a light which is beyond being and non-being
Here you are illogical in your own words. When it comes to attacking creatio ex nihilo you say that nothing exists outside of being, because non-being is nothing and nothing can come out of it, but for consciousness you say that it exists outside of being and non-being (which means nothing, unless you redefine being very precisely, like Guénon).

[Anonymous No.17787961]

>>17787911
Astika is believing in the authority of the vedas.

[Anonymous No.17787966]

>>17787819
Shankara is essentially just 'Buddhism but God too' ie Advaita is all a giant cope to preserve traditional Vedic Aryan theism under a more refined philosophy and pea brained traditionalist incels buy that shit hook line and sinker because they think 'God real, old good, we are immaterial'. That's literally the only reason this is being shilled by a single schizo who will never be Hindu himself.

[Anonymous No.17787975]

>>17787966
>Shankara is essentially just 'Buddhism but God too'
Not really
For the example the vedantins don't belive in the importance of yoga

[Anonymous No.17787981]

>>17787961
It means significantly more than that. Perhaps you should use a different word.

[Anonymous No.17788007]

>>17787966
Like Shankara, guenonfag was also a buddhist who turned to vedanta later on and tried to reconcile them.

[Anonymous No.17788046]

>>17787861

>Why Atman creates Maya?
Atman doesn't create Maya anon. Atman for all it's exceptional qualities is still just non physical consciousness/light. In an attempt to expand and examine itself it creates Jivas(living things) and prakriti(nature) and thus starts the cycle of life and death. In the beginning things are all right and Jiva live according to laws of nature. However due to false identification of self (i.e thinking the ego is "you") Jiva starts committing questionable deeds. This continues for a long time untill the Atman decides to purge and a new cycle begins.

Example
Think about drug dealers. How they kill/rob people just for money, power etc. In the end they either go to jail or die themselves but not before perpetuating the cycle of Maya. Youngsters thrilled by the drug life join gangs while family members of those killed seek revenge. All this because they couldn't identify Atman and would rather get short term ego boost or material goods.

>Why do Jivas appear?
As I explained, Jiva(living things) are a way of the Atman to observe itself and all that it has created. Atma constantly creates because it is it's nature to create. What it creates it then observes by the physical method of Jiva. To rephrase it Jiva is the Universes' way of experiencing itself.

>Temporary Nivas
Nature(prakriti) designed them that way. They are merely vessel for Jiva to experience. Since new creation happens every second(It's the nature of Atman to create things) the Jiva cannot be permanent. It only function is to serve as a vessel and then wither away much like how flowers bloom to produce fruits and then wither away.

>God have disillusionment?

Again anon the mind(Mann) and Atman(soul) are separate faculties. The mind is basically a tool to understand. Hence it sometimes makes mistakes. That's what you see happening to Jivas, they make mistakes(usually aided by the ego). The Atman however always knows. It is afterall "God" as we call him.

Ask if something is not clear.

[Anonymous No.17788080]

>>17787894
>>17788046
Read this anon

[Anonymous No.17788188]

>>17787534
>what do advaitins propose should be done with the world of the illusion?
They subscribe to the traditional Hindu world view of castes and ashramas, where some people are driven to become ascetic monks, usually later on in life. These monks can be initiated into Advaita where they gain knowledge of the Self or Brahman, which involves distinguishing consciousness from the phenomena which appear in it, and having the conception of multiplicity, duality etc be sublated as being an illusion within the omnipresent consciousness when one intuitively realizes it, how this takes place is explained in the Advaita commentaries. This is the path of knowledge/renunciation or jnana-yoga which is described in the Upanishads and Gita. Advaita also says that there are indirect paths to Brahman like bhakti-yoga and karma-yoga which are practiced by non-monks, some forms of Hindu tantra would also represent an alternative path that some take. These paths for householders don't always involve the regarding of the appearances within consciousness as illusory and the maintaining of continuous knowledge of the Self like Advaita does. According to Advaita only monasticism leads to liberation in this life, and non-monastics following other paths have to first attain the Brahmaloka after death and then attain liberation from there. Other sects of Hinduism disagree and say that various householder paths lead to liberation in this life. Vishishtadvaita holds that one cannot be liberated before death while still in the body.

> are they determinists?
Advaita says that consciousness is non-volitional, and that volition is like thoughts and memory in that they are all equally insentient things appearing within the light of awareness, and that the egoistic identity of people that appears within awareness seems to have free-will and that the decisions of this ego identity determine how long it takes for it to reach liberation, but that at the ultimate level of reality it's all part of a higher pre-ordained equilibrium or cosmic harmony where everything is under the control of God's power. There is no actual change in the Atman or one's own consciousness as well at the moment of liberation because it's already eternally liberated and free already, but the illusion of bondage and embodiment and the changes of dreaming, waking, and sleeping were only empirically real but were not absolutely real and were superimposed over consciousness out of ignorance. And volition existing as real thing and the idea of our selves or our consciousness itself having volition (it belongs to the mind) is seen as part of the net of false conceptions overlaid over the underlying non-dual consciousness and obscuring it. Someone who attains liberation in Advaita would still be able to walk around, think, write texts etc because their consciousness was already different from volition and the mind to begin with and it continues on as such but without misidentification of them with each other.

[Anonymous No.17788210]

>>17787726
How reconciliate shankara view on consciousness with plato-aristotle metaphsyics?

[Anonymous No.17788281]

>>17787776
Both, you can read his arguments against Buddhism translated to easy and readable prose in this compendium of his arguments by A.J. Alston linked here >>17787351

In his works Shankara attacks mainly the Sarvastivada school of Buddhism and the latter form of Yogachara represented by Dharmakirti and Dinnaga. Some of his criticisms of dependent origination in his criticisms of Sarvastivada extend to and also represent an attack on what the rest of Buddhism holds about dependent origination like Madhyamaka and pre-sectarian Buddhism and so on. Shankara also vociferously attacks the "no-self" position of Buddhism throughout his works and explains how it doesn't make logical sense and doesn't align with our experience of having a continuum of unchanging sentient presence in which everything else comes and goes, while this presence remains which is what allows us to retain our identity from moment to moment and observe change and so on.

[Anonymous No.17788292]

>>17788281
According to guenonfag and his sources, Shankara did not really know much about Buddhism so his criticisms of it are doubtful.

[Anonymous No.17788411]

>>17787777
>So far everyone agrees. It is the Islamic wahdat al wujud and the Thomistic ipsum esse: only God really Is, in the full sense of the word: everything else exists depending on, participating in, the Supreme Being.
Yes, this is something where I also agree that Christian, Hindu and Islamic theology concur, the difference lays in how one classifies the relative and contingent in relation to the Absolute principle or God, I don't know Aquinas's works very well, so I cannot say for sure. But it's my understanding that Aquinas does so in a way that would be regarded by Advaita as not sufficiently negating the contingent in relation to the Absolute, and in trying to ascribe to the relative enough of a degree of reality which would violate and become incompatible with God being completely and absolutely infinite. The book "Christianity and the Doctrine of Non-Dualism" by some lay member of a Trappist order from France says Thomism and Advaita are in agreement and apparently tries to reconcile them but I have not read it.

>what interests me is the strict identification of personal intellect = Supreme Intellect.
Intellect in Advaita is Buddhi, which is different from consciousness or Atman, the Buddhi is an ultimately unreal maya-object and Atman/Brahman is held to just be pure self-revealing consciousness that is free from the limitations of the intellect, the intellect according to Advaita is that which differentiates, discriminates and learns, the intellect and its functions occur within the light of awareness and are separate from it.

>In the same way that participating to the Being (God) by our existence does not make us the Being itself, why would participating to the consciousness cause a strict identity between our personal consciousness and the Supreme Spirit?
Because God is partless and undivided so there are not separate portions of Him participating in Himself, nor is there anything which is not God, who is the infinite, who participates in the infinite as something not already included inside it.

[Anonymous No.17788500]

>>17788281
>doesn't align with our experience of having a continuum of unchanging sentient presence in which everything else comes and goes, while this presence remains which is what allows us to retain our identity from moment to moment and observe change and so on.
That's a big fucking assumption there buddy. What's your earliest memory?

[Anonymous No.17788506]

>>17788046
>a way of the Atman to observe itself and all that it has created.
how does it relate to brahman here?
>Atma constantly creates because it is it's nature to create.
are there any theories as to why this is?

[Anonymous No.17788527]

>>17788411
>The book "Christianity and the Doctrine of Non-Dualism" by some lay member of a Trappist order from France says Thomism and Advaita are in agreement and apparently tries to reconcile them but I have not read it.
I'm french so i might find it interesting
Do u have a link?

[Anonymous No.17788535]

>>17787975
The gist of that comparison is that they are both non-dual, and from a madhyamika pov, advaita vedanta is just a find and replace of sunyata with brahman. Since the high church phase of Buddhism predates Gaudapada and Shankara, and since Buddhism lives rent free in every Hindu bhasya they were obviously aware of emptiness as the ultimate ground of noumena and phenomena.

[Anonymous No.17788542]

>>17788281
>doesn't align with our experience of having a continuum of unchanging sentient presence
Maybe that's why Shankara was so incoherent, he suffered from a really bad case of insomnia.

[Anonymous No.17788545]

>>17787018
If you dont understand everything written in this post exactly you need to step up your game plebs

[Anonymous No.17788559]

>>17788545
"Get in the atmangelion shankara-kun" is more concise but that post is essentially a correct description of the view.

[Anonymous No.17788563]

So are the Self and Brahman supposed to be metaphorical or am I already immortal and going to reincarnate until I achieve Moksha?

[Anonymous No.17788568]

>>17788535
>The gist of that comparison is that they are both non-dual, and from a madhyamika pov, advaita vedanta is just a find and replace of sunyata with brahman.
Not really
>One word that has created great confusion is “non- dualism”. First of all, Hindu Vedanta is Advaita, and Madhyamika, Advaya. Even though they are sometimes used interchangeably by both systems, their meanings are, as used in the two paradigms, different. In Hindu Vedanta, “non dualism” ( advaita) means “one without a second” ( dvitiyam nasti) as interpreted by Sankara Chandogya Upnishad .Also Chandogya 6.2.1 states very clearly ‘Sad eva….Asid ekam eva advitiyam,’ that is ‘the one and only really existent ( sat), the only one, one without a second.’ The Chandogya Upanishad predates the Buddha by a couple of centuries- many scholars place it between 800BC and 1200BC. What does this mean? That there is only Brahman, which really exists and nothing else really exists. In other words, the world does not exist at all, it is only an illusion. The true English word for this is “Monism”, which according to the Webster Dictionary is ‘the view that there is only one kind of ultimate substance.’ Swami Vivekanda himself uses the exact word “Monism” for his Advaita Vedanta (The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Volume 3, Buddhistic India). Since, as we have already seen, there isn’t any kind of ultimate substance according to the Madhyamika Buddhism, the meaning of advaya (non- dualism) cannot be like in Hinduism.

>The Madhyamika scriptures very clearly define Advaya as ‘ dvaya anta mukta’, that is ‘free from the two extremes’ of existing and non-existing. The extremes are the extreme of eternalism ( saswatanta) to which the Hindu Vedantic Atman-Brahman fall (the Buddhist Tathagatagarbha is not a synonym for the Hindu Atman-Brahman and should not fall into this category. Therefore it should not be interpreted as really existing ( sat). On the contrary according to the Pragyaparamita Sutras and in the interpretation of the Mahasiddha Yogeshwar Virupa, Tathagatagarbha is a synonym for emptiness), and Nihilism ( ucchedanta) into which many materialistic systems like Charvak fall. But it goes deeper. Non dual knowledge ( advaya jnana) is the state of mind which is soteriologically free from grasping at the two extremes of knowing in terms of “is” and “is not” and is itself ontologically free from “existing” or “non existing” (which is the same as saying it is empty). Because it is non conceptual ( avikalpa), free from conceptual proliferation ( nisprapancha), beyond thoughts ( acintya), inexpressible ( unabhilapya) and free from the four extremes ( chatuskoti vinirmukta), it is the true meaning of emptiness.
https://www.byomakusuma.org/MadhyamikaBuddhismVisAVisHinduVedanta.html

[Anonymous No.17788572]

>>17786884
I am that
Everything is the same object
Nondualism = material monism

[Anonymous No.17788575]

>>17788563
The Self is Brahman, you don't reincarnate because you don't really exist (alongside things like cats, dogs, chariots, trees, rocks, which are also not Brahman and are just illusions made by Brahman to trick the Jivas) as you're just a Jivas (which, not being Brahman, does not exist).

[Anonymous No.17788582]

>>17788572
Wtf
Interesting

[Anonymous No.17788583]

>>17787295
>Even without the Bible the 5 ways of Aquinas remain valid arguments.
the 5 ways are pure shit bible or not included

[Anonymous No.17788592]

>>17788568
Ah so the non-dualism of madhyamaka is even more advanced than "everything is brahman" since it won't affirm that proposition or its opposite.

[Anonymous No.17788604]

>>17788572
Not really. Advaita Vedanta for example isn't material monism, it's actually a form of dualism (there's Atman, and then there's Nothing, of which everything that isn't Atman, like plants and animals and the human body, is made out of).

The "Non-dualism vs Dualism" debate in Hinduism is in relation to man's relationship to Brahman, not necessarily any sort of materialality. If Brahman and Man are both made of Fire, but there's a world of Darkness out there, then we've postulated a non-dual material dualism.

[Anonymous No.17788654]

>>17787793
>the existents really exist, but they are contingent, where only the Being is necessary.
How does Aquinas explain how the existent particular things being contingent make them no longer violate God being infinite? Because the mere fact of being contingent doesn't itself solve this problem, since contingency itself affirms that they are separate and hence how then can one be infinite?
>>17787819
Have you actually read his works at any length and found stuff you strongly disagree with or are you evaluating it from afar?
>>17787861
>Wait, so if Atman is all that there is, why does it create Illusions (Maya) for itself?
Advaita says that Brahman has an eternal uncreated inherent nature and is omniscient and free, and that out of His own freedom Brahman manifests His own inherent nature without being impelled by anything other than His own eternal nature, and that this nature of Brahman is to always be projecting or wielding maya for the jivas, while remaining outside of time, space, causation etc which only exist within maya. Advaita says that as Brahman is complete, eternally contented and has no desires it cannot have any purpose for doing anything because purposes would presuppose Brahman having a lack or need which cannot be so, and would also presuppose Brahman being subject to a pre-existing causal relation which impels Him to create which cannot also be so since He is the origin of causation and remains outside it, so it's His own eternal uncreated nature which is inseparable from Himself to do so.
>If it is perfect and complete already, and can't be divided, why do jivas appear in it?
Brahman is perfect, to say that the appearance of jivas within it makes it imperfect is ultimately an anthropomorphic view, that from our perspective the appearances of multiplicity would make God imperfect. Someone may alternatively look on it as the act of supreme grace and generosity that instead of always dwelling in Himself Brahman allows beings to know the beauty of the sublime by entering into knowledge of Him, when He dawns in their hearts. Brahman Himself is completely unaffected by and not deluded by maya or ignorance and it has no consequence for Him. Nor is there anyone that really exists for whom it could be a consequence for aside than Brahman.
>why do temporary things like jivas appear in it "as illusions" for itself? How could god have illusions?
Because it's not an abstract eternal substance or force but it is the Supreme Lord or Parameśvara who is sentient, omniscient, omnipotent, and He is eternally everywhere as the omnipresent consciousness manifesting His own inherent nature to project forth His power of maya which presents itself as the world. God or Brahman Himself doesn't actually witness or be fooled by the illusions. They are superimposed on/over the underlying consciousness, but the underlying Consciousness is eternally absorbed in the contemplation or continuous revelation of Itself without noticing maya-objects.

[Anonymous No.17788673]

>>17788575
So my personality, experiences, body, etc. are "not real" - my consciousness which bears witness to Brahman's power of Maya and is of the nature of Brahman (that is, awareness) is "real". The conditioned awareness dissolves into Brahman, but the other elements of what I would consider to be my "soul" is destroyed at death?

[Anonymous No.17788691]

>>17788673
Correct. Everything except the transcendent translucent luminosity is made up of Nothing and does not actually exist. The end result is Atman-That-Is-Brahman unironically enlightened by its own intelligence, engaged in endless self-contemplation.

[Anonymous No.17788699]

>>17787862
Yes, although for them that's not a problem because the Vedas don't have to be absolutely real because they are just intended to eliminate ignorance, this doesn't to the creation of a new knowledge which is product, but when ignorance is eliminated the absolute reality that was its basis shines forth and reveals itself naturally without any additional action or step needing to be taken, just like the sun revealing itself after the clouds in front of it dissipate. One medieval Tamil Advaita text uses the metaphor of a forest of bamboo grating against itself in the wind, which produces a spark that burns down the whole forest.

[Anonymous No.17788749]

>>17788654
>make them no longer violate God being infinite
There are many definitions of infinity
Yours is contradictory, guenon has the same
See >>17787952

[Anonymous No.17788767]

>>17788654
>make them no longer violate God being infinite
There are many definitions of infinity
Yours is contradictory, guenon has the same
See >>17787952

[Anonymous No.17788903]

>>17788691
I see, thanks for explaining things to me anon. Could you elaborate more on the nature of Maya? From my understanding Brahman is complete, Bliss, one. The world is not created because Brahman wants an end out of it, but rather the world exists for it's own sake. It is simply an different expression of Brahman's bliss. So we are Brahman experiencing Itself, in Bliss, and this game It plays occurs eternally.
Also do good and evil breakdown and become trivial upon realization? Like a nightmare becomes trivial upon awakening?

[Anonymous No.17788932]

>>17787894
>Yes, Shankara's illusionist position leads to nonsense.
No it doesn't. It's the reasonable position that allows us to say that God is infinite without contradicting ourselves or without making God identical to the material world.
>Aquinas avoids these absurdities by recognizing that only God is, but by placing the world and God in a distinction of necessary/contingent relationship, thus avoiding irealism and remaining realistic about the world.
Saying that the world is contingent doesn't absolve the world from contradicting God being infinite, contingency still affirms that it exists as not God, you have to go a step further to remove the underlying contradiction.
>>17787952
I read through some of the page you linked but it seemed like WLC mostly just attacking the arguments against Christian doctrine or certain conceptions of the infinite that were advanced by Hegel and Pannenberg, I'm not seeing anything there which explains specifically how Christian doctrine solves that contradiction. I don't have the time to read the whole article right now, maybe another time. If you can pinpoint what it is that you think solves it thought I can respond but as of now I still see the position of Thomsim as involving a contradiction that is more fully dealt with by Advaita.
>It follows that the infinite must not, therefore, possess the first property of the finite, being in distinction from something. Therefore, the infinite and the finite cannot really be distinct; rather the infinite must be finite, which is a contradiction.
This does not solve the contradiction of God being infinite and the world being contingent and non-infinite to say that the infinite is finite.
>And how do you propose God created something ex-nihilo?
The point of the Advaita causation theory or doctrine called Vivartavada is that Brahman doesn't create out of ex-nilihio but He is just there eternally wielding His power that projects forth the unreal experience of the universe for jivas on the conditional level of reality, but not in absolute reality. This is like a beginningless image of Brahman sustained as it were by His own power though and not a separate created thing.
>He can create from nothing, that is his power.
Maybe so, but if the material of creation doesn't emerge directly from God as an emanation of Him then it emerges from nothingness which involves giving nothing a meaning which it doesn't have, it's not being consistent with what words mean, the underlying idea is fundamentally illogical which why it's necessary to say that an all powerful being did so.

[Anonymous No.17788945]

>>17788932
>Here you are illogical in your own words. When it comes to attacking creatio ex nihilo you say that nothing exists outside of being
That's because in that case (talking about the created universe) I'm speaking about the empirical world of objects existing with form and delimited by time and spatial conditions and so on. In this empirical realm constituted by these conditions, things either exist within the universe or as the universe or they don't within/as the universe. When speaking of something which transcends this empirical world of objects and time space, which transcends the universe, then the normal categories of being and non-being don't fully apply anymore in the same manner that they do when speaking of things within the universe, or their lack of existence.

When I'm talking about consciousness, I'm speaking about something which is transcendental to the universe and time and causation, consciousness cannot be located as a visible and measurable object which is within the universe and subject to time and causation; the universe and time+causation are apprehended within consciousness; so there is not a contradiction with my saying that consciousness is beyond being and non-being when I say this, because consciousness is transcendental to everything that appears within it. Within the maya-universe that is sustained by Brahman's power, things either exist or don't exist and this maya-universe gives rise to intellects which produce this dualistic distinctions, but this intellect and its dualistic presuppostions are occurring within a non-dual infinite consciousness which is beyond the dualistic conceptions which the intellect tries to clothe it is, although it can be said in a simplified manner to have a transcendental existence which is beyond our normal conceptions of existence.

[Anonymous No.17788992]

>>17788932
>to say that God is infinite without contradicting ourselves
not that anon but say that there is infinite time and in that time there is infinite sausage. is there a conflict between these infinities?

[Anonymous No.17789136]

>>17787966
>Shankara is essentially just 'Buddhism but God too'
Complete nonsense, Shankara rejects every single premise of Buddhism, even the stuff that appears similar in both schools like the two truths means something very different in Advaita and Buddhism, Advaita holds that absolute reality actually exists and possesses its own existence for one. Shankara so thoroughly refuted Buddhism and pointed how how much it is an illogical teaching that Buddhists can only cope by accusing him of being Buddhist, they don't even both trying to refute his arguments against Buddhism and no-Self because his arguments expose Buddhism as a bunch of sophistry so they're rather try gaslight everyone instead by pretending Advaita is Buddhism as deflection when people mention how Shankara btfo Buddhist doctrines like dependent origination and no-self.
>Advaita is all a giant cope to preserve traditional Vedic Aryan theism under a more refined philosophy and pea brained traditionalist incels buy that shit hook line and sinker
It's talked about in the pre-Buddhist Upanishads, Buddhism is a metaphysically-poor imitation of this pre-existing teaching. In comparison to the Upanishads, Buddhism is largely just vacuous moralism and pointless skepticism.
>>17788210
I have not read him yet but my intuition is that Suhrawardi did, he was steeped both in Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism but he still arrived at an Advaita-like conception of awareness or consciousness being a non-dual light that transcends or is anterior to the distinctions of subject and object. There are some passages of the Enneads where Plotinus speaks about the self or autos as being one with the One, but the general trend of the Enneads does not seem to be an Advaita-style non-dualism, some authors like Coomaraswamy have written about Plotinus as being in agreement with Advaita, although for example in "The Shape of Ancient Thought" by McEvilley he says Plotinus is generally closer to Vishishtadvaita.

[Anonymous No.17789201]

>>17787782
How can one identify with what does not exist?

[Anonymous No.17789322]

>>17788292
That's not true, he accurately describes and critiques the position of Sarvastivada Buddhism in his works, and he does the same of the views of the later Yogachara Buddhists like Dharmakirti and Dinnaga in his works. That's why the Buddhists never tried later to cite or respond to any of his specific arguments, because he BTFO them so irreparably.
>>17788500
>What's your earliest memory?
My earliest memory and me having one doesn't change that memories are things which and come and go as illumined objects within the same span of consciousness. Us not having memories at a certain point says nothing about how long or short the thing has been existing there (consciousness) in which memories were taking place, for the reason that the absence of object A doesn't demonstrate the absence of object B.
>>17788527
I can't find a pdf online, but it was written under a pseudonym as "A monk of the west", apparently his real name is Elie Lemoine, you may be able to find something online in French or find a French copy to buy but I wouldn't know where.

http://www.sophiaperennis.com/books/christianity/christianity-and-the-doctrine-of-non-dualism/

You may want to check this link below as well, judging from the name it's some other French guy who wrote about Advaita and Christianity agreeing,

http://jacquesvigne.com/JV/english/b1p3ch4.html

>>17788535
>The gist of that comparison is that they are both non-dual,
Madhyamaka is epistemic non-dualism, which involves wistfully thinking that basic-bitch skepticism about all conceptions and the existence of anything will magically make you enlightened and liberated. Advaita is ontological non-dualism, which is different from epistemic non-dualism, Advaita actually involves attaining knowledge of Absolute reality instead of just trying to meekly silence ones thoughts and being skeptic about stuff existing.
>and from a madhyamika pov, advaita vedanta is just a find and replace of sunyata with brahman.
That's wrong, because Brahman actually has it's own independent transcendental existence and is eternal as undecaying consciousness. Brahman accounts for the self-evident and undeniable existence of consciousness and explains how the universe can seem to exist, sunyata is a satisfactory explanation for neither, there is no logical way it can give rise to them.

[Anonymous No.17789571]

>>17788592
Advaita Vedanta also teaches and writes in their writings about how dualistic distinctions like existence and non-existence are transcended in immediate spiritual realization of the Atman, but unlike Buddhism they don't consider this to be mutually exclusive with having a metaphysics that can actually satisfactorily account for the existence of our own consciousness etc.
>>17788749
>>17788767
>Yours is contradictory,
My position that the infinite is the unlimited is not a problem, because the infinite doesn't really possess a property of being distinct, because since infinity is all-encompassing there is nothing else which infinity can be considered as distinct from or into relation to, when we speak of infinity as being related to anything like the finite etc, we are already introducing a subtle contradiction-in-terms in what we are saying by speaking of the same thing as being related to itself as though it were different and possessing different parts, since if one of them is infinite then it has to necessarily include the other within itself. And things are not actually qualified by themselves or made distinct in relation to themselves, but only so by other things; and so the infinite cannot really be possess the quality of being distinct from the finite which it already subsumes by definition. This doesn't mean that the finite itself is infinite, it means that there is just the infinite and this infinite is capable of engendering the experience of finiteness within itself.

I don't consider the finite to be that which is distinct, I consider the finite to be that which is subject to limitation. The fact that we can distinguish in our speech the unlimited and unqualified infinite from the idea of something that is finite and distinguish them this way does not mean that the infinite is finite just because our mind conceptualizes it that way.

>>17788992
Advaita says that what we perceive as the infiniteness of time and space belong to the realm of the indeterminate and are not themselves truly infinite, and that they are not real anyway and that Brahman exists transcendentally beyond them and when one attains liberation the Absolute reality which is the origin of the perception of space, causality, time etc reveals itself.
>>17789201
The act of identification arises out of the beginngless ignorance that is inseparable from the beginningless maya that Brahman projects from outside time. It's without beginning because it's an appearance as it were of its source which is also without beginning as the infinite entity who gives rise to the perception of time. People can be afraid of snakes that they superimpose out of ignorance onto the rope despite that snake not really existing, similarly jivas superimpose doership, embodiment etc on consciousness and misidentify with the intellect appears in it, like the snake, out of superimposition, despite that intellect not being absolutely real like the consciousness in which it appears.

[Anonymous No.17789606]

>>17789322
>Brahman actually has it's own independent transcendental existence and is eternal as undecaying consciousness
Indo-thomists believe this actually refutes scepticism!

[Anonymous No.17789608]

>>17789322
>, but it was written under a pseudonym as "A monk of the west", apparently his real name is Elie Lemoine, you may be able to find something online in French or find a French copy to buy but I wouldn't know where.
https://www.amazon.fr/Doctrine-non-dualité-Advaita-Vâda-christianisme-doctrinal/dp/B07KLNHNKB this ?

Do u know Henri le Saux ?

[Anonymous No.17789616]

>>17787952
I must be missing something from that argument because it doesn't make any sense. Why can't the finite just be a subset of the infinite?

[Anonymous No.17789645]

>>17789571
>People can be afraid of snakes that they superimpose out of ignorance onto the rope despite that snake not really existing, similarly jivas superimpose doership
This makes more sense when the Buddhists use it. Mistaking the rope for a snake doesn't mean existence was the power of maya we wielded against ourselves along the way as we exercised our godhood while piloting our bodies, it means (You) are ignorantly responding to phenomena instead of seeing them as empty of an own self-nature. That a rope could even be mistaken for a snake shows there is no rope essence.

[Anonymous No.17789663]

>>17789616
Because someone who thinks thomists answered this or that objection is a theologian and doesn't have to make sense to you so long as he can preserve his notion of god to himself.

[Anonymous No.17789798]

>>17789606
Skeptics are unable to account for or negate the self-evident existence of consciousness, so skepticism refutes itself.
>b-b-but the existence of my consciousness isn't self-evident to myself
that's what a NPC hylic would say

[Anonymous No.17789843]

>>17786884
How does he respond to the accusation that the witnessing consciousness is also not-self, tho? This is my one problem with Advaita, that it doesn't seem to have an explanation for things Buddhism does go deeper into regarding the mind and it just brushes them off as incoherent.

[Anonymous No.17789869]

>>17789843
>How does he respond to the accusation that the witnessing consciousness is also not-self, tho?
What
How?

[Anonymous No.17789896]

>>17789608
>Do u know Henri le Saux ?
I was aware of him and a few other westerners who traveled to India and did similar stuff like Bede Griffiths and so on but I have not read any of their works yet, although I have respect for them and they seem genuine
>>17789616
>Why can't the finite just be a subset of the infinite?
The argument was in the context of creation, if the finite is merely a subset of the eternal infinite, it cannot be created since it already is eternal, so calling the finite a subset of the infinite doesn't solve the problem of how can God create the world (without maya) and still remain infinite while having the created world be non-identical with God.

Furthermore, if you say that God has subsets or parts, does he exist in the parts of outside them? God existing outside the part would imply an additional partless part of God aside from the normal parts which is a clear logical contradiction, so then you can say God only exists in the parts that comprise Him and not outside of them, but then you are saying that God exists both as the complete whole comprised of parts and as the incomplete part at the same time, which violates the law of non-contradiction to say that the same thing exists as both complete and incomplete at the same time, so God or the infinite while remaining without limitation in any form is also without parts or subsets, because to say otherwise results in a contradiction.

>>17789645
>This makes more sense when the Buddhists use it.
The Buddhists have no coherent explanation for why it's occurring at all
>it means (You) are ignorantly responding to phenomena instead of seeing them as empty of an own self-nature.
Empty phenomena don't apprehend themselves, they lack sentience, there is an existing sentience which Buddhism can't account for. If there was only empty phenomena there would be no apprehension of them. There is nothing either which permits the whole gamut of emptiness and pratityasamutpada to exist since they are not self-caused and eternal but nor is there anything admitted which permits them to exist. Absent anything permitting them to exist and absent them being eternal they wouldn't exist. And the chain of dependent origination cannot explain it since it involves things which mutually depend on each other for their own existence which means neither will ever enter into existence.
>That a rope could even be mistaken for a snake shows there is no rope essence.
Non-existing consciousnesses don't even have or observe the mistakes of snakes though

[Anonymous No.17789899]

>>17787894
>While keeping a non-dual God (simple, non-compound)
>The Trinity
How.

[Anonymous No.17789903]

>>17789798
>i'm not an npc i'm just being piloted by brahman

[Anonymous No.17789947]

>>17789899
https://youtu.be/Jcafuc_zoQU

[Anonymous No.17789982]

>>17789869
Most Buddhism flavors say that the "witness" that sees everything else in the mind act out isn't the self either, because it's conditionally arisen and dependant. Dzogchen kinda implies a deeper awareness of it is the real you and it's considered borderline heretical by many sects.

[Anonymous No.17789983]

>>17789896
There is nothing which takes you from "things cause other things" to "there is a first cause" short of you making shit up. Nowhere do we observe this first cause, nor do we observe a permanent consciousness, or any other such eternity beyond the temporal. Since you've already decided there is a first cause (on what basis, which myth?— for it is always a myth), you have to reject explanations from non-origination. Why does some outside, extra-systemic thing have to cause causation? It is like discovering that rocks are made of atoms, only to learn these atoms have atomic particles, but clinging to the reality of atoms, even though we can see neither anyway.

[Anonymous No.17789985]

>>17789843
>How does he respond to the accusation that the witnessing consciousness is also not-self, tho?
Can you give an example of how you would even try to argue this? What would the self be other than that which contains all else within Itself? And Advaita says that the non-dual awareness doesn't even directly witness objects, but subject-object distinctions occur within the intellect and appear from the jivas perspective to be illumined by the Atman, but the Atman itself doesn't have the subject-object distinctions of the jiva's intellect impose upon or interrupt it's non-dual revealing of Itself to Itself. Non-dual consciousness only seems to be the witness of exterior things from the perspective of the outwardly turned mind engrossed with those things, the mind attributes witnessing, hearing etc to consciousness, but from the perspective of someone steadfast in non-duality the underlying consciousness is unconnected with them and instead continually, reveals Itself to, or abides in Itself without having the sensory perceptions and thoughts etc of the mind as its object or content.

[Anonymous No.17790024]

>>17789322
This is a somewhat absurd critique of Madhyamaka. There is great value in silencing the conceptual mind, pointing out no arising and such. Buddhism is ontologically non-dual as well and denying this is silly. Advaita gives names to metaphysical concepts and talks about them, which is wonderful, but Madhyamakins want to perceive reality directly as non-dual by silencing the dualizing mind.

>Brahman accounts for the self-evident and undeniable existence of consciousness and explains how the universe can seem to exist
So does Shentong. Madhyamaka goes beyond existence and non-existence alike so sunyata is not a nihilist view where the universe does not exist. It is that the universe does not exist as anything but ineffable absolute nature.

[Anonymous No.17790031]

>>17789982
>because it's conditionally arisen and dependant.
What
How

[Anonymous No.17790033]

>>17789982
>Most Buddhism flavors say that the "witness" that sees everything else in the mind act out isn't the self either, because it's conditionally arisen and dependant.
Advaita distinguishes "witness-consciousness" consciousness viewed as being the witness of thoughts and sensory perceptions (which really a distinction that inheres in the intellect), and non-dual consciousness as it really is in itself, see >>17789985, in which the Atmans act or status of eternal self-witnessing or self-revealing is eternal, unconditioned and unconnected with the transient instances of witnessing that occur in the mind/intellect.

[Anonymous No.17790071]

>>17790033
>>17789985
I see, it would honestly seem like they're talking about the exact same thing, just coloring it differently according to their metaphysics.

[Anonymous No.17790086]

>>17789983
>There is nothing which takes you from "things cause other things" to "there is a first cause" short of you making shit up
Wrong, this series of things as proposed by Buddhism is unable to account for its own paradoxical existence, there must be something like a first cause which permits them to exist since they are not individually eternal and hence need to originate from somewhere. The series can propagate itself further once it has come into existence already but there is nothing giving the series itself existence which would have to be accounted for before allowing that it can further itself.
>nor do we observe a permanent consciousness,
Nor does consciousness ever observe itself change, only the things and states that appear within it change.

[Anonymous No.17790119]

>>17790086
>there must be something like a first cause which permits them to exist since they are not individually eternal and hence need to originate from somewhere.
Not really, no. Why would the non-eternal need to come from the eternal? That's not very non-dual of you.

[Anonymous No.17790248]

>>17790086
>there must be something like a first cause which permits them to exist
They don't exist. Of course they don't not exist because there are appearances, but their existence is only that of empty appearance. Madhyamaka arguments destroy the ideas of arising and non-arising, causation, result, etc. so this entire causal chain that is giving us problems has no self-existence. It is not like a linear chain of 1 causing 2 which causes 3 and so on. It is a flux of entirely empty appearances which exists within the whole of reality, Dharmadhatu, all at once. They occur within the Ground and I take the shentong position of holding the Ground to be existent but empty of all qualities, while phenomena are empty in a different way which is empty of their own existence. If you want to call that Brahman there is no issue with swapping names. However, don't make the mistake of imposing a casual chain on existence because there isn't one according to Madhyamakin arguments.

Appearances are cognized by an absolutely real primordial mind, but those appearances themselves do not really follow a casual chain and have nothing within them that exists. The false existence of phenomena is not like the true existence of cognizance since phenomena only arises falsely (though karmically) and never truly comes or goes. So it's not like God is objectively creating objective phenomena but rather we are under karmic hallucination.

[Anonymous No.17790284]

>>17787726
>Shankara uses cosmological arguments, teleological arguments, arguments from causation etc for the existence of God

give an example of each.

[Anonymous No.17790319]

>>17787737
>s internally coherent and free from logical contradictions,

Why does atman get trapped in illusion

[Anonymous No.17790357]

>>17790024
>Buddhism is ontologically non-dual as well and denying this is silly.
Not according to the prevailing interpretation of Madhyamaka among Gelugpas and most academics wherein Nagarjuna is definitely NOT admitted to have held the notion that Nirvana or Sunyata is in any way some sort of transcendental Absolute reality that would make it an ontological non-dualism as well. And many of the other Buddhist schools end up admitting this too ultimately but just quibble about some definitions or on a long show and dance about some phenomenology stuff first. The number of existent Buddhist schools who actually hold to some form on ontological non-dualism is very small IMO, maybe Jonang, Shingon and a few others.
>So does Shentong. Madhyamaka goes beyond existence and non-existence alike so sunyata is not a nihilist view where the universe does not exist.
Shentong is taught as non-conditional and non-subservient to rangtong really only in Jonang, which is a small school which the ruling Gelugs worked hard to but failed to fully eradicate. When it appeared in the works of thinkers of other Tibetan schools it tended to get sidelined and was subsumed into an epistemic non-dual view by the larger school, like how for example in the works of early Dzogchen thinkers like Rongzom sunyata and the second turning was only provisionally true, but now the Mipham-style view of accepting sunyata as more than provisionally true is how Dzogchen is taught and presented instead of in any explicitly Shentong way.

To paraphrase Burton, In the context of the Abhidhamma metaphysics in which he was arguing, the implication of Nagarjuna's denial of all entities lacking svabhava, was not merely that no entities originate independently, but also that no entities or existing things originate independently of the conceptual constructing of the mind, with the result that all entities are in the final analysis conceptual constructs. But if there is no existing real basis out of which the constructed and there is no existing absolute reality as their basis then it's just falsehood and illusion all the way down and it results in a nihilism where nothing really exists. This is how the later important commentators on Nagarjuna understood him like Chandrakirti, who intepreted Nagarjuna as attempting to refute the existence of any dravyasat entities, or entities that have more than constructed existence, Chandrakirti does not say that Nagarjuna is only trying to refute the Vaibhashika theory that dharmas exist permanently which would be the alternative explanation but which is contradicted by multiple lines of evidence. The idea of Nagarjuna as escaping from the charge of nihilism by becoming an ontological non-dualist or Absolutist was popularized in such works as Murti's "the central philosophy of Buddhism" but it doesn't seem to be the position of most Tibetan schools or most academics nowadays. Maybe you can explain where I'm wrong but that's my reading of the situation.

[Anonymous No.17790634]

>>17790119
>Why would the non-eternal need to come from the eternal?
1) Because if it's non-eternal that means it had a beginning which has to be accounted for, or even if it's a beginningless illusion it needs to have its existence as such sustained by something aside from itself since it cannot cause itself.
2) If there is just a series of non-eternal things arising off one another, it's not a logical explanation unless you explain what is it what allows the chain itself of these things to exist, since non of its parts nor the chain as a whole are uncreated and eternal things which suffice as a source of the chain and its parts.
>>17790248
>Of course they don't not exist because there are appearances, but their existence is only that of empty appearance.
Okay, but since you don't admit that these are eternal uncreated entities that means their existence *even as* empty appearances must be contingent upon something other than themselves, since by their lack of eternal existence they cannot be self-caused. But Buddhism doesn't have a coherent explanation of what this something else is.
>Madhyamaka arguments destroy the ideas of arising and non-arising, causation, result, etc. so this entire causal chain that is giving us problems has no self-existence.
That doesn't change that our consciousness still has self-evident existence, and that fundamentally it is a logically-incoherent worldview to say that this consciousness is unreal or that its a false appearance, this demands an explanation for the source of that appearance in order for it to be coherent.
>It is a flux of entirely empty appearances which exists within the whole of reality, Dharmadhatu, all at once. They occur within the Ground and I take the shentong position of holding the Ground to be existent but empty of all qualities, while phenomena are empty in a different way which is empty of their own existence. If you want to call that Brahman there is no issue with swapping names.
I agree that this Shentong position is actually quite close to Advaita, if not describing the same position on consciousness from different angles, but this is unfortunately not what the vast majority of authors, Buddhist speakers and people online are talking about what they talk about Madhyamaka, which they generally interpret via rangtong view as a rule unless they specify otherwise.

[Anonymous No.17790650]

>>17790634
>However, don't make the mistake of imposing a casual chain on existence because there isn't one according to Madhyamakin arguments.
Okay, but it's an inherent contradiction to say that there is no casual chain and also to say that pratityasamutpada functions as a satisfactory explanation for why we experience samsara and the universe. So whoever abandons the latter (not that it was satisfactory to begin with) arrives at a position which is less coherent than doctrines which can explain the existence of consciousness etc.
>Appearances are cognized by an absolutely real primordial mind, but those appearances themselves do not really follow a casual chain and have nothing within them that exists.
If they ever arise spontaneously as false things without being contingent upon or caused by the Absolute then they will continue to always do so since it is their nature and then liberation would be impossible.
>The false existence of phenomena is not like the true existence of cognizance since phenomena only arises falsely (though karmically) and never truly comes or goes. So it's not like God is objectively creating objective phenomena but rather we are under karmic hallucination.
This is roughly similar to what Advaita says about samsara, although it's not the exact same, but the point is it's logically incoherent to just say that this occurs on its own spontaneously even as illusion for no reason and without anything permitting it to be such. Things and illusions don't exist as real or unreal illusions unless they are either already eternally existent or they have their existence or appearance caused by something else.

[Anonymous No.17791115]

>>17790634
>even if it's a beginningless illusion it needs to have its existence as such sustained by something aside from itself since it cannot cause itself
Again just because something is caused does not mean there is an identifiable, absolute first cause which itself has no cause but just causes other things because its nature is to be uncaused. That doesn't follow from the notion of things causing other things.
>it's not a logical explanation unless you explain what is it what allows the chain itself of these things to exist, since non of its parts nor the chain as a whole are uncreated and eternal things which suffice as a source of the chain and its parts.
You are asking what causes causation. So you already believe in causation; what need is there to hypostatize an outside agency for causation to appear? The chain and its parts are interdependent, c.p. a chariot broken into parts lacking any chariot-ness among these parts.

[Anonymous No.17791213]

>>17787819
>I'm basing myself on reason, not scripture
Brahman can’t be comprehended through reason alone.

[Anonymous No.17791375]

>>17791213
I know, but we don't need the scriptures. Yogis, Buddhists as well as Hindus, śramaṇas can do it without.

[Anonymous No.17791439]

>>17787018

[Anonymous No.17791558]

>>17790284
I should have said that he uses them against alternative explanations for the universe aside from God, not that he tries to prove that God exists through them. For Shankara God/Brahman is the only reasonable explanation for the universe that withstands logical scrutiny, although he doesn't think that the human intellect and its logic is infallible enough to irrefutably prove the existence of God, but for him Brahman ultimately transcends the intellect and logic which are a part of maya. Shankara doesn't think that human logic independent of revealed scriptures can guide one to the absolute truth of things. Similarly, Aquinas didn't try to prove the trinity using deductive logic.

Shankara uses teleological arguments against the atheistic Samkhya school when he argues in his Brahma Sutra Bhasya that the insentient Pradhana which they regard as the cause of the world cannot account for the vast amount of order or pre-ordained harmony within the world, which indicates an intelligence behind it, and he extends this to other forms of primal matter like eternal atoms as well. You can see that discussed in this article here.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40343828

Shankara also uses an argument from motion against the Samkhya doctrine that the 3 gunas exist in an equilibrium and are then disturbed by saying that there is nothing which can account for the initial disturbance of the gunas (that give rise to complexity) since Prakriti or primordial matter is insentient and cannot take action, but if motion is inherent in Prakriti in the form of rajas then there will be no dissolution of it and no liberation of the Purusa

[Anonymous No.17791569]

>>17791558
Shankara also uses a type of cosmological argument involving causation or contingency when he argues in his Brahma Sutra Bhasya that the Buddhist explanation of dependent origination as the source of the universe instead of God or Brahman doesn't satisfactorily account for the existence of the universe, Shankara points out that there is nothing permitting the chain of pratityasamutpada and the aggregation of its constituent parts into a united and organized whole to exist, and that pre-existing order cannot be caused by pratityasamutpada because then it would be a situation in which A depends on B for its existence and B depends on A for its existence and so neither would ever exist because the conditions which must be fulfilled for them to exist never will.

>"No one, they claim, can possibly deny this chain of causation (Pratītyasamutpāda) beginning with nescience. And once the whole causal chain beginning with nescience is admitted to exist, and to be revolving continually like a wheel with buckets at a well, it is found to imply that the formation of aggregates must be possible. But this is not right, as the causes so far mentioned lead to production (of the next effect in the series) only (and not to aggregation of any kind). An aggregate could be admitted if an intelligible cause were assigned for it. But it is not. Nescience and the rest may cause one another mutually in your cycle, but they only cause the rise of the next link in the chain. There is nothing to show that anything could be the cause of an aggregate. True, you claimed that if nescience and the rest were admitted, an aggregate was necessarily implied.

>To this, however, we reply as follows. If you mean that nescience and the rest cannot arise except in the presence of some aggregate and so are dependent on it, then you still have to explain what could be the cause of the aggregate. Now, we have already shown in the course of our criticism of the Vaisesikas that aggregation is unintelligible even when supported by such assumptions as that of the existence of eternal atoms along with eternal individual experiencers who serve as permanent loci for the conservation of the effects of past action. So it will be all the less intelligible in a theory in which only atoms of momentary existence are admitted, without any permanent experiencer or any permanent locus for anything. If the Buddhist now claims that it is this causal chain beginning with nescience that is the cause of aggregation, we ask how this causal chain could ever be the cause of aggregation when it depends on aggregation for its own existence?

[Anonymous No.17791591]

>>17791375
>Yogis, Buddhists as well as Hindus, śramaṇas can do it without.
That's not what the Upanishads say, if you are talking about ideas like Hindu non-dualism which come from them then in order to ever have a chance of grasping the real thing you might as well stay true to the source material, which say that Brahman is "to be known only from the Upanishads" - (Brihadaranyaka Up. 3.9.26)

[Anonymous No.17791700]

>>17791115
>Again just because something is caused does not mean there is an identifiable, absolute first cause which itself has no cause but just causes other things because its nature is to be uncaused.
That is the logical implication, because the indefinite series of things are incapable of accounting for their own existence, they only account for the next one transient product in the series, but to admit that there is this series at all is to introduce an effect and pre-ordained order which has their origin magically unaccounted for.
>You are asking what causes causation. So you already believe in causation;
For Advaita causation is only conditionally real, but anyone for anyone positing something that is only conditionally real it is still incumbent upon them to explain how that arises and what its relation is to the absolutely real for it to be logically coherent.
>what need is there to hypostatize an outside agency for causation to appear?
Because causation is not an eternal immortal entity which has endured forever as the source of everything else, nor can a causal chain comprised of a series of cause and effects themselves account for the existence of the chain at all since they only produce the next link in the chain and don't account for the chains existence itself, being unaccounted for and not an eternal entity, it wouldn't exist at all unless there was something permitting it to, like God/Brahman.
>The chain and its parts are interdependent,
Which only emphasizes how they are incapable of being their own mutual beginningless cause, like a daughter giving birth to her own mother.

[Anonymous No.17791752]

>>17791700
>it wouldn't exist at all
You may be on to something

[Anonymous No.17791808]

>>17791752
*It wouldn't exist at all and wouldn't be perceived at all, but it is perceived in consciousness despite its unreality so its appearance must be accounted for, which Buddhism doesn't

[Anonymous No.17791888]

>>17790319
It's not, whatever you can identify as trapped is not the Atman

[Anonymous No.17791898]

>>17791808
>it is perceived in consciousness despite its unreality so its appearance must be accounted for, which Buddhism doesn't
No this problem of phenomenal appearance vs ultimate reality is covered extensively in madhyamaka/mahayana lit. You just don't agree with it.

[Anonymous No.17792066]

>>17791898
>You just don't agree with it
No, it's just that they try to use sophistic sleight of hand and pawn off responsibility for it to beginningless co-dependent origination which doesn't actually explain the existence of the appearance for the reason that that it results in the same contradiction as the analogy of a daughter giving birth to her own mother, or of neither A nor B being able to ever enter into existence from non-existence because they both require that the other be first existing before they can and so they remain forever inactive and not a part of existence.

Most Tibetan schools follow the Prasangika Madhyamaka reading of Nagarjuna, which is suppose to mean that they don't take any position or view and hence don't claim to know what causes the appearance of samsara and why it exists etc, if they were actually consistent in following their doctrine they would openly admit this, but when pressed in debates they usually default to saying its origin is beginningless dependent co-origination, but as Shankara explains in his works this is completely nonsensical.

[Anonymous No.17792129]

>>17792066
>but as Shankara explains in his works this is completely nonsensical.
I find it preferable to "God did it, but you are also God wielding his/your power of Ignorance so he/you doesn't remember everything appearing is just him/you"

[Anonymous No.17792341]

>>17792129
thats not what Advaita says, Advaita says that which is bound and forgets and which is ignorant is not you

[Anonymous No.17792574]

>>17792341
Right the jiva isn't really brahman piloting the atmangelion. It's some other thing

[Anonymous No.17792622]

>>17792574
the jiva is not the Atman-Brahman

[Anonymous No.17792627]

>>17792622
Wasn't everything Brahman?

[Anonymous No.17792717]

>>17792627
Everything in absolute reality is Brahman because Brahman is the only thing that there is or that exists in absolute reality, according to Advaita, maya and the jivas only exist within conditional reality and not absolute reality so they are not Brahman Himself.

[Anonymous No.17792770]

>>17787726
https://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/5899403d40452.pdf

[Anonymous No.17792795]

>>17792717
>two truths doctrine, but Brahman
Yeah no wonder this gets compared to Buddhism all the time

[Anonymous No.17792799]

>>17792770
>dna is the source of consciousness
major cringe

[Anonymous No.17792829]

>>17792795
>Buddhists cant explain what causes the conditional truth
>the absolute reality in Buddhism doesn’t even exist as a supreme reality that has its own existence
unlike the Buddhist version the Advaita position on absolute vs contingent reality actually makes sense, and the same idea of a transcendent reality using its power to project forth a contingent and unreal appearance is already talked about in the pre-Buddhist Upanishads anyway.

[Anonymous No.17792844]

>>17789896
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gwWYBEW7cg4 might interest you

[Anonymous No.17792918]

>>17792829
>distinction between absolute reality and illusion already talked about in the pre-Buddhist Upanishads anyway.
In fact, the analogy which Buddha gives of the blind men each describing a different aspect of the elephant and not perceiving the whole elephant in the Pali Canon may have been taken from the usage of the same metaphor centuries earlier in the pre-Buddhist Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, when its says that the Self has entered into the body up to the tip of the nails and that when known under the various aspects in the body that it sustains the Self is only identified with those particular aspects (like the blind man grasping the tusk and saying the elephant is hard and curved) instead of being known in Its complete nature.

This was then undifferentiated. It differentiated only into name and form—it was called such and such, and was of such and such form. So to this day it is differentiated only into name and form—it is called such and such, and is of such and such form. This Self has entered into these bodies up to the tip of the nails—as a razor may be put in its case, or as fire, which sustains the world, may be in its source. People do not see It, for (viewed in Its aspects) It is incomplete. When It does the function of living, It is called the vital force; when It speaks, the organ of speech; when It sees, the eye; when It hears, the ear; and when It thinks, the mind. These are merely Its names according to functions. He who meditates upon each of this totality of aspects does not know, for It is incomplete, (being divided) from this totality by possessing a single characteristic. The Self alone is to be meditated upon, for all these are unified in It. Of all these, this Self alone should be realised, for one knows all these through It, just as one may get (an animal) through its footprints. He who knows It as such obtains fame and association (with his relatives).
Brihadaranyaka Upanishad - Verse 1.4.7

https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/the-brihadaranyaka-upanishad/d/doc117939.html

[Anonymous No.17792943]

>>17792844
thank you, I'll give it a listen later

[Anonymous No.17793001]

>>17786884
What are the differences between Ravi Shankar's position and the buddhist position? It looks to me like the same philosophy with different terms. If the self is really the indivisible self of the entire universe, and you just call that "self" Śūnyatā instead of atman then you basically have buddhism.

[Anonymous No.17793018]

>>17787878
>And how do you propose God created something ex-nihilo?
Pic related

[Anonymous No.17793126]

>>17793001
The Vedantists say that this Self possesses its own inherent nature and independent/transcendental difference, and among Buddhist schools this is seen as going too far even though it is the natural meaning of saying there is an ‘Absolute reality’. The small amount of Buddhists schools who say that the absolute actually has its own independent/transcendental existence are typically seen by the rest as having a view that is much more fringe or even heretical to Buddhism.

[Anonymous No.17793199]

>>17793126
*independent/transcendental existence

[Anonymous No.17793340]

>>17788506
>How does it relate to Brahman?
As explained earlier Atman/Brahman are the same entity. The soul is infact indivisible. Hence when I say that Atman constantly creates it, by extension, means that Brahman always creates. In fact there is a God in Hindu pantheon named Brahma whose function is, you guessed it, to create the universe.

>Theory as to why Atman constantly creates?

I really do not know anon. What I like to believe( mind you I do not have any source for this) is since Atman(soul) is pure consciousness it naturally indulges in creation. I like to think of it as kind of force, say entropy, for example, always expanding because that's just it's nature.

Maybe a more knowledgeable Advaitain can help us.

[Anonymous No.17793344]

>>17786884
>SHITkaracharya
no thanks, I prefer CHADDHA (pbuh)

[Anonymous No.17793379]

>>17788903
Read this anon
>>17787782
>>17788046

[Anonymous No.17793408]

>>17793340
>What I like to believe( mind you I do not have any source for this) is since Atman(soul) is pure consciousness it naturally indulges in creation
Gaudapada in his Mandukya Karika and in Shankara’s commentary on that text, they both affirm that it is Brahman’s uncreated inherent nature to always create or to give life to maya effortlessly and endlessly, like it is the nature of the sun to constantly emit light.

[Anonymous No.17793478]

>>17786884
Does anyone here ever had a mystical experience or are you all just hoping that just by copiously reading religious books and learning a trillion hindu words you will be able to become enlightened?

[Anonymous No.17794071]

>>17793408
Thanks for pointing out anon. Much appreciated.

[Anonymous No.17794274]

>>17793478
The latter

[Anonymous No.17794970]

>>17793379
Thank you for these resources anon, they've answered some of my questions and helped form my own beliefs

[Anonymous No.17795014]

>>17793478
false dichotomy

[Anonymous No.17795176]

Bump

[Anonymous No.17795341]

>>17793001
>Śūnyatā instead of atman then you basically have buddhism.
you have mahayana, whose sole purpose is rejecting buddhism and making emptiness the true self

[Anonymous No.17795790]

>>17793408
So platonic emanationism but indian and a few hundreds of years later?

[Anonymous No.17795807]

>>17795790
Plato don't talk about consciousness

[Anonymous No.17795834]

>>17793408
The problems with this, from a Thomist (and more generally, classical theist) perspective, should be obvious. Space is extended. God is not. Time entails change. God is changeless. And if space and time are divine attributes, then we have to take a pantheist or at least panentheist view of the natural world. For the most general features of nature would then be aspects of God.

For if time and space are “concomitant effects” or “the immediate consequence” of “God's very being,” then their existence follows of necessity from his. And there are several problems with this thesis.

First, it would entail that the act of creation was not free (or at least that the creation of space and time was not free). For according to this thesis, God cannot not create time and space. But freedom is one of the divine attributes, knowable even by way of purely philosophical argumentation. (See e.g. Summa Theologiae I.19.10; Summa Contra Gentiles I.81, I.88 and II.23; Five Proofs of the Existence of God, pp. 224-228.)

Second, for God to create of necessity would detract from his perfection. As Aquinas argues in Summa Theologiae I.19.3:

>God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary.

End quote. So, if this is correct, then if God is perfect, his willing of things other than himself is not necessary. But then, if his willing of things other than himself (in particular, time and space) is necessary, then by modus tollens he is not perfect.

Similarly, in Summa Contra Gentiles II.23.8, Aquinas argues that since “agents which act by will are obviously more perfect than those whose actions are determined by natural necessity,” God must be free.

A third problem is that if the existence of time and space follows necessarily from God’s existence, then not only did they have no beginning but they in principle could not have had a beginning. This would not conflict with classical theism per se, but it would conflict with any version of classical theism which incorporates biblical revelation, and with modern science ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4658 + Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem ).

[Anonymous No.17795842]

>>17793408
>>17795834
Fourth, this position is not really a coherent one, at least not on a Thomistic metaphysical analysis. For the position in question essentially holds that time and space cannot not exist and yet are not divine attributes. But if they cannot not exist, then time and space must be purely actual and there must be in them no distinction between essence and existence. But in that case they are divine attributes, since only of God can these things be said. On the other hand, if they are not divine attributes, then they must not be purely actual and there must be in them a distinction between essence and existence. In that case, though, it is false to say that they cannot not exist, since anything that is less than pure actuality, and anything in which there is a distinction between essence and existence, can in principle fail to exist.

So, there just is no sense to be made of the idea that there is something distinct from God that he cannot not create. If he cannot not create it then that is only because it cannot not exist, in which case it is purely actual and subsistent being itself and thus really identical with God. If it is really distinct from God, then it is not purely actual or subsistent being itself, and thus it can fail to exist and God can refrain from creating it. The supposed middle ground position between pantheism on the one hand, and affirming the contingency of time and space on the other, is an illusion.

>>17793018
Based.

[Anonymous No.17796374]

>>17795807
Nothing to do with the matter but neither do hindus since the terms have no fixed monolithic sense, consciousness, nous, being, ousia, vijnana, mind, intellect all refer to one and same ontological ground. And I was not referring to Plato since in his works emanationism is not explicit, but to the other platonists.

[Anonymous No.17796493]

>>17796374
>but neither do hindus
Atman-brahman is satchitananda.

sat (सत्): In Sanskrit sat means "being, existence", "real, actual", "true, good, right", or "that which really is, existence, essence, true being, really existent, good, true".

chit (चित्): means "consciousness".

ānanda (आनन्द): means "happiness, joy, bliss", "pure happiness, one of three attributes of Atman or Brahman in the Vedanta philosophy". Loctefeld and other scholars translate ananda as "bliss".

[Anonymous No.17796568]

>>17796493
Are you even the same person? Stop moving the goalpoasts. Cit can also mean perception, sensual perception, to observe, even to desire. This is just what I said about mind being sometimes synonymous with intellect, consciousness, spirit with consciousness, intellect.

Also, satcitananda refers more to a state than to an essence, substance.

[Anonymous No.17796580]

>>17796568
>>17796493
Oh anyway just realized you did not understand what I meant at all. I did not mean they did’t have no symbol to refer to consciousness. Try reading my posts again.

[Anonymous No.17796605]

>>17796374
>but neither do hindus since the terms have no fixed monolithic sense, consciousness

>chit (चित्): means "consciousness".

>>17796568
>Cit can also mean perception, sensual perception, to observ

Like, consciousness ?

[Anonymous No.17796638]

>>17796605
Again, reading comprehension is lacking. Cit can be consciousness just like it can refer to desire, observation, understanding. This is the same as Mind, Intellect. Now how did Plato never talk about Cit? Retard.

[Anonymous No.17796662]

>>17796638
i'm kindly trollin you anon
god bless you

[Anonymous No.17796775]

>>17793018
>>17795834
>>17795842
b-b-b-b-b-based

[Anonymous No.17796886]

>>17796662
I stopped giving the benefit of the doubt to people here since they were most of the time being serious, thus my impatience. Sorry for calling you that, then!

[Anonymous No.17796924]

>>17795341
>he hasn't thus heard in front of forty billion quadrillion bodhisattvas directly from Vairocana Buddha
ngmi

[Anonymous No.17796960]

>>17796374
>but neither do hindus since the terms have no fixed monolithic sense, consciousness, nous, being, ousia, vijnana, mind, intellect all refer to one and same ontological ground.
That’s incorrect, the pre-Buddhist (i.e. pre-Platonic ) Upanishads as well as the later Upanishads both speak about consciousness (caitanya, prajnanam or chit) and distinguish it from the mind (manas) and intellect (buddhi), and the later Vedantic literature speaks at length about consciousness and its difference from and relation to thoughts, memory, sensory perceptions, the intellect etc. Consciousness does not refer to the same thing or ground as the mind and intellect, at least according to Advaita Vedanta which says that consciousness is sentient, unproduced, changeless and free of the subject-object duality whereas the intellect and its activity involve dualistic conceptions, change, and the intellect/thoughts are insentient, the intellect’s thoughts and the minds feelings and so forth are all illumined by the light of consciousness which is different from them.

>>17795790
It’s not Platonic since they dont have an intermediate world of forms, nor is it emanationism because the Vivartavada causation doctrine means that nothing is ever created or emanated but there is just a beginningless appearance of such sustained by Brahman’s beginningless power. Emanationism would correspond to the Parinamavada or Svatantryavada causation theory. Shankara is post-Plato but the early Upanishads that he derives his ideas from predate the pre-Socratics.

[Anonymous No.17796968]

>>17796960
>but there is just a beginningless appearance
so there is change
so there is time
so there is a form of creation
the appareance of my table was born at time x
but god don't change

[Anonymous No.17797130]

>>17796968
>so there is change
>so there is time
Yes, these are admitted to exist within the conditional reality of maya that is the ‘appearance’ of Brahman, but it’s held that they don’t exist in absolute reality where there is Brahman alone. This is not denying their empirical reality though.
>so there is a form of creation
>the appareance of my table was born at time x
Vedanta says that within the conditional reality there is an infinite cycle of the universe emerging from an unmanifested state, being sustained by Brahman and then undergoing dissolution during the mahapralaya where the universe is withdrawn back in an unmanifest state until the start of the next cycle. For the creatures within these universes, from their perspective it seems like each time the universe emerges into manifestation it’s a new creation of the universe, although the cycle was going on forever and had no original creation.
>but god don't change
Yes, all the while this is going on Brahman remains unchanging according to Advaita, some other schools of Hinduism admit a form of change or modification that Brahman undergoes, but not Advaita.

[Anonymous No.17797143]

>>17797130
how can there be no change in brahman but change and time in his manifested part

this makes no sense

each time advaita is contradictory it uses the joker card "maya, illusion !!!"

[Anonymous No.17797218]

>>17797143
>how can there be no change in brahman but change and time in his manifested part
What is manifested is not Brahman, Brahman is partless and undivided, nothing about Brahman is modified or changed. While remaining in absolute reality as changeless, Brahman out of His omniscience/omnipotence projects the maya at the level of conditional reality. Nothing within Absolute reality in Advaita contradicts anything else in Absolute reality. Things appear to exist in conditional reality which contradict what is affirmed about Absolute reality, but this is not really a contradiction since the conditional reality and everything we affirm about it is sublated in enlightenment and its revealed that there was just the absolute reality existing all along, like how dreams are sublated when you awake.
>this makes no sense
only if you don’t understand it
>each time advaita is contradictory it uses the joker card "maya, illusion !!!"
Things affirmed about conditional reality dont contradict absolute reality, similarly affirming that I seem to be able to fly when dreaming doesn’t contradict that I cant fly unaided while awake.

[Anonymous No.17797232]

the true I is the knower
the knower is an aspect of God, not God. It is created, in spite of there being nothing that coul conceivably have created it. true revelation points to this unattainable-through-knowledge-level. the One consciousness is not God, it is an aspect of God.
>but anon, how could God be separated into qualities?
we're at a level where logic fails anon. All I can tell you is that the true I is the knower, but that doesn't explain why the known is what it is.

discuss

[Anonymous No.17797249]

>>17797218
>What is manifested is not Brahman, Brahman is partless and undivided,
what about saguna
also, see

>>17793018
>>17795834
>>17795842

[Anonymous No.17797277]

>>17787952
>https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/christian-doctrines/pantheists-in-spite-of-themselves-pannenberg-clayton-and-shults-on-divine-i/
>Excerpt :
>(...) we are told that the finite is that which is in distinction from something and is defined by the distinction. Now as the “negation of the finite,” the infinite must lack at least one of these properties of the finite, that is to say, either the infinite is not distinct from anything or the infinite is not defined by the distinction. But we have just seen that the infinite is defined by its distinction from the finite. The infinite is the opposite of the finite. It follows that the infinite must not, therefore, possess the first property of the finite, being in distinction from something. Therefore, the infinite and the finite cannot really be distinct; rather the infinite must be finite, which is a contradiction.

actually very interesting

this clearly shows that the definition "finite = delimited = defined" leads to contradictions. this is interesting because it is Guénon's, and i imagine Shankara's, understanding of the infinite: the idea that the infinite is that which is not defined, contrary to the finite, and is therefore all-encompassing

[Anonymous No.17797355]

>>17797249
>what about saguna
Saguna Brahman is a maya-caused appearance of the Supreme Brahman

[Anonymous No.17797505]

Bump

[Anonymous No.17797518]

>>17797277
Infinite and indefinite are not the same thing. That's like saying a theist and an agnostic are the same thing.

[Anonymous No.17797567]

>>17797518
Guénon defines the metaphysical infinite as that which has no limit, even conceptual, and is therefore indefinite. In this vision, to determine is to delimit, therefore to limit. That's what I'm talking about, and that's what the quote refers to. Do you understand, you retard?

[Anonymous No.17797860]

>>17795341
The Tathagathagarba, Rigpa and similar interpretations are basically a thinly veiled atman.

[Anonymous No.17797898]

Related. Is this worth getting? I've read the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita. Should this be the next read?

[Anonymous No.17797989]

>>17797860
??

[Anonymous No.17798174]

>>17797898
That depends, if you have already read most or all of Shankara’s Upanishad commentaries then you should be fine. If you have only read modern editions of the Upanishads with the notes/commentary of modern scholars, then you might find Shankara’s Brahma Sutra Bhasya to be too advanced or obscure. You could try it out and if you are feeling confused you can take a break and read through Shankara’s Upanishad commentaries and then come back to his Brahma Sutra Bhasya.

[Anonymous No.17798189]

>>17798174
It is worth reading by the way, if you find the Upanishads interesting you’ll probably enjoy it as it further systematizes or refines into a theology the teachings of the Upanishads

[Anonymous No.17798225]

he didn't understand the vedas, not many did, nor did buddha, ie sacrificial practices are taken literally when intended metaphysically, but his bhavani ashtakam is one of the most beautiful shloks ever written

[Anonymous No.17798242]

where does the idea of selfhood come from? I mean even an atman, what kind of a function is an atman? why does it... what even is a "self"? is it literally only a delusion of activity brought on by desire? or maybe not even an delusion but just an idea among others for a discerning intellect. And then is causes discerning desire? Because without desire there is no reason to be discerning?

[Anonymous No.17798256]

>>17798242
>And then is causes discerning desire?
is what causes*

[Anonymous No.17798454]

>>17798242
>where does the idea of selfhood come from?
It follows naturally from the existence of consciousness as a unity. We always abide as this unity of consciousness while disparate things flash through it. So, it’s quite natural and indeed correct to take consciousness as our self or being.
>I mean even an atman, what kind of a function is an atman?
consciousness
>why does it... what even is a "self"?
consciousness
>is it literally only a delusion of activity brought on by desire?
No, consciousness is unchanging and doesn’t act, nor is consciousness a delusion, delusions appear within consciousness
>or maybe not even an delusion but just an idea among others for a discerning intellect.
consciousness is not an idea but it’s that in which ideas appear

[Anonymous No.17798795]

>>17797277
>this clearly shows that the definition "finite = delimited = defined" leads to contradictions
No, it has already been explained here in this post >>17789571 why that's wrong

[Anonymous No.17798905]

>>17795014
of course le principle of non-duality xd

[Anonymous No.17799597]

>>17786884
>it's unreadable
give me one (1) example

[Anonymous No.17800154]

>>17795834
>And if space and time are divine attributes, then we have to take a pantheist or at least panentheist view of the natural world.
They are not Brahman's attributes in Advaita for the reason that He remains distinct from them. They exist only in the conditional reality and not in Absolute reality where Brahman is to be found, and where He dwells by Himself as the infinite without anything else, without time, space or causation.

>For if time and space are “concomitant effects” or “the immediate consequence” of “God's very being,” then their existence follows of necessity from his. And there are several problems with this thesis.
>First, it would entail that the act of creation was not free (or at least that the creation of space and time was not free). For according to this thesis, God cannot not create time and space. But freedom is one of the divine attributes, knowable even by way of purely philosophical argumentation.
The problem with this argument is that it conflates being free with having volition, those are actually two separate things with different meanings. Freedom itself just means not being subject to confinement, eternal and infinite Awareness that never possessed volition as Its characteristic to begin with is not confined by Its lack of volition, so it's wrong to say that this impedes the freedom of (i.e. subjects to confinement) this Awareness, because not having a volition doesn't prevent it from perpetually accomplishing and fulfilling Its own inherent nature without any obstacle presenting itself. God is not confined by His freedom to eternally accomplish and fulfill His own nature forever without being subject to deviation, change or decay.

>Second, for God to create of necessity would detract from his perfection.
>But then, if his willing of things other than himself (in particular, time and space) is necessary, then by modus tollens he is not perfect.
Advaita says that good and evil are dualistic distinctions which don't exist in absolute reality, so reasoning that Aquinas uses like "hence, since the goodness of God is perfect" wouldn't be seen as convincing by them. You'd first have to argue that Good and Evil exist as fully real things outside human perception of them and that God or Absolute reality isn't non-dual and beyond good/evil, but this is not something which can be demonstrated with logic IMO. It seems an arbitrary and subjective judgement to say that creation following as a necessity of God's existence makes him less perfect, I don't see Aquinas offering a strong argument for it there.

[Anonymous No.17800166]

>>17800154
>Similarly, in Summa Contra Gentiles II.23.8, Aquinas argues that since “agents which act by will are obviously more perfect than those whose actions are determined by natural necessity,” God must be free.
Here is what he says:

>[8] A further argument. To the first agent belongs the first action, even as the first motion pertains to the first thing movable. But the will’s action is naturally prior to that of nature. For that which is more perfect is prior in nature, though in one and the same particular thing it be temporally posterior. Now, voluntary action is more perfect than natural action; in the realm of our own experience, agents which act by will are obviously more perfect than those whose actions are determined by natural necessity. Action by way of the will is, therefore, proper to God, the first agent.
The argument that will or volition is the most prior thing that precedes the action and is therefore superior and more perfect to something which accomplishes its nature without will, is an argument that is not true without exception because awareness is prior to will and is different from it but it still accomplishes its nature as awareness and continually knows itself without relying on will in order to make itself as awareness aware of itself.

Volition or our will is just one of the various things that characterize our conscious experience of the world, the awareness or consciousness in which sentience takes place is prior to that sentience, consciousness itself is the light which allows everything else to be known, and will or volition is a mental conception which occurs within the intellect that relates consciousness to the things that occur within consciousness. If the more perfect are always more prior than Consciousness is certainly more perfect than will. Only a conscious being can exercise will but the essential quality of them being sentient and conscious is prior to the exercise of the will. Advaita also says that Brahman never "acts" or takes action but He omniscience allows him for manifest maya for the jivas without ever moving, acting or otherwise expending effort, while remaining transcendental to time and space as the origin of their false perception within consciousness, from our perspective within time God would be eternal and immutable as the foundation of time, all this accomplished without any action taken ever, simply out of it being the Lord's very nature to sustain the appearance of images within His infinity because of who He is.

[Anonymous No.17800172]

>>17800166
In the next two passages he says:

>This is likewise evident from the fact that when both actions are found together, the power which acts by will is superior to that which acts by nature,
and uses the latter as an instrument; thus in man the intellect, which acts by means of the will, is superior to the vegetative soul, which acts by natural necessity.
If God sustains the universe without acting and without volition then the example of the man and the vegetative soul would be contradicted, it's not an ironclad argument that demonstrates that God creates via will.
>[10] Again, the will has for its object a good considered precisely as such, whereas nature does not attain to goodness in its universal aspect, but only to this particular good which is its perfection.
To which I would ask, do you consider that God's nature which constitutes Him does attain to universal goodness, right? If so then the axiom that nature does not attain to goodness in its universal aspect wouldn't be true of God, and so it wouldn't be valid to argue anymore then that God must create by will in order to be more perfect than if by nature.

>A third problem is that if the existence of time and space follows necessarily from God’s existence, then not only did they have no beginning but they in principle could not have had a beginning. This would not conflict with classical theism per se, but it would conflict with any version of classical theism which incorporates biblical revelation, and with modern science
Vedanta says that time and space are not self-contained realities which need to have their beginning established even in the presence of God because for Vedanta they are ultimately unreal illusions which are sustained by God's power, they never emerged as fully existent and created entities to begin with but it's just God unswervingly wielding His own power from outside time etc. That's the whole point of the Vivartavada causation theory which is held to by Advaita, so this argument wouldn't be something that demonstrates that it's wrong or illogical.

[Anonymous No.17800316]

>>17787782
Thank you so much for this breakdown, but help me go further:

Imagine all my experiences laid out in a line of images like a film roll. And all yours laid out next to them.

Is the content of those experiences Mann or Atman? Because if its Mann then you seem to be saying that all the ups and downs and peculiarities and mnemonic content that we think of as constituting our Selves is not buddhist 'Self' at all, in which case many Western piggus are going to have a seriously hard time buying into the idea that Atman gets at what is ethically/metaphysically significant about human life.

On the other hand, if both of the film rolls are Atman (ie the film rolls are connected at the ends to a mutual string of universal conscious experience, Brahman) then how can we not say that human experience is full of important, high stakes interactions and the idea of escaping Samsara is flawed by the very fact that we have important and ontologically valid ethical work to do in the world on behalf of our fellow Brahman-fragments (ie humans)?

I hope this didn't come out too garbled. Thanks again for your massive effort post.

[Anonymous No.17800325]

>>17798174
>>17798189
I see, thanks. I'll look into his commentaries on the Upanishads.

[Anonymous No.17800373]

>>17800172
>Fourth, this position is not really a coherent one, at least not on a Thomistic metaphysical analysis. For the position in question essentially holds that time and space cannot not exist and yet are not divine attributes. But if they cannot not exist, then time and space must be purely actual and there must be in them no distinction between essence and existence. But in that case they are divine attributes, since only of God can these things be said.
Just as the universe cannot be produced and sustained except by God because it's impossible, similarly there is no reality or existence where God's inherent nature is impeded in any way or not eternally fulfilled effortlessly. In that sense, the appearance of time and space for the jivas follows from God's existence for Advaita. Nothing in maya possesses its own real essence, time does not possess its own real essence, space or the ether/akasha and matter do not have their own real essence, the essence that sustains all these things isn't an object of awareness within maya, because awareness itself is the essence that sustains maya for the jivas, it's not one of the maya-objects denoted by name and/or form like space, time and matter, name and form are things which occur within awareness, they are comprehended and revealed in its light.

>On the other hand, if they are not divine attributes, then they must not be purely actual and there must be in them a distinction between essence and existence. In that case, though, it is false to say that they cannot not exist, since anything that is less than pure actuality, and anything in which there is a distinction between essence and existence, can in principle fail to exist.
The Vivartavada causation doctrine of Advaita removes the need to account for whether the objects within maya possess a distinction between essence and existence or not because they are nothing more than a false superimposition upon or a false image of the Lord, the perception of this being sustained for the mind by Him.
>So, there just is no sense to be made of the idea that there is something distinct from God that he cannot not create. If he cannot not create it then that is only because it cannot not exist, in which case it is purely actual and subsistent being itself and thus really identical with God.
This argument wouldn't apply against Advaita because as an ultimately unreal thing that is sustained as a mistaken perception for the jivas by God or Brahman's power, it doesn't have actual existence itself. There is just the omniscient and infinite God, the consequences of this in the form of the varied contents of subjective experience that we have (i.e. maya), is not identical with the fact of God himself that this experience is contingent upon.
>If it is really distinct from God, then .... thus it can fail to exist and God can refrain from creating it.
This relies on the assumption that God possesses volition, which was contested earlier