/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.17547923]

This goblin’s assertion that the thing-in-itself is real contradicts his whole philosophy. There is no thing-in-itself, and what goblin-man is really setting up here is a placeholder for God. He goes outside of his own limits of knowledge when even mentioning such a thing.

[Anonymous No.17548014]

>>17547923
Except the thing-in-itself doesn't send you to eternal suffering if you don't behave like a good goyim.

[Anonymous No.17548035]

>>17548014
You don’t know that. It might send you to an anime world where you spawn as cute girl who is destined to be raped by goblins (Kantians) for all eternity.

[Anonymous No.17548059]

>>17547923
This is why you should actually read the philosophy you are trying to critique

[Anonymous No.17548081]

>>17547923
Imagine only reading the wikipedia page for Kant

[Anonymous No.17548084]

>>17547923
>the noumenon
>not necessary in Kant's philosophy
Anon, at least attempt to make a post asking educated anons to explain it properly before making a post and mocking his philosophy.

[Anonymous No.17548118]

>>17548059
>>17548081
>>17548084
I take your lack of argument as a sign of submission.

[Anonymous No.17548131]

>>17548118
>muh competitive debating
go back to highschool you retard

[Anonymous No.17548134]

>>17548118
You would, you lazy shit

[Anonymous No.17548154]

>>17548131
>>17548134
Your seething only empowers me.

[Anonymous No.17548161]

>>17547923
Kant is a dumb fucking virgin, and if you read him you'll end up just like him. If you want to be a well-respected happy member of society, read Jocko Willink.

[Anonymous No.17548221]

>>17548161

[Anonymous No.17548238]

>>17548154
I've never lost an argument online and I can assure you it is not going to happen today

[Anonymous No.17548263]

>>17548238
If you would like to keep it that way, do not even THINK about engaging me in a debate.

[Anonymous No.17548282]

>>17547923
>There is no thing-in-itself
Appearances dont give rise to themselves, but only from an existing basis such as the thing-in-itself.

[Anonymous No.17548301]

>>17548282
>applying causality to something that is supposedly outside of causality

[Anonymous No.17548306]

>>17548301
>thinking that's causality

[Anonymous No.17548378]

>>17548306
>appearances arise FROM
You are saying that appearances are caused by the thing-in-itself, which is applying causality to the thing-in-itself.

[Anonymous No.17548385]

>>17548378
I'm not that anon, you stupid fucking nigger

[Anonymous No.17548395]

>>17548154
>>17548238
>>17548263

[Anonymous No.17548429]

>>17547923
The Thing in itself isnt real, the thing in itself is a mental abstraction necessarily posited by the unity of apperception.

Dont conflate Fichte and Kant

[Anonymous No.17548437]

>>17548378
>You are saying that appearances are caused by the thing-in-itself
Incorrect, all illusion necessarily involves the superimposition of the unreal onto an existing real thing, the thing itself which is the receptacle for the sight of the appearance to appear in doesn't directly itself cause that but the superimposer does by projecting their mistaken conception onto the thing. The thing in itself doesn't exist in a causal relation with the appearance because that appearance only exists subjectively for its beholder as their projected conception.

[Anonymous No.17548482]

>>17548429
>The Thing in itself isnt real,
Absolutely based.
>all illusion necessarily involves the superimposition of the unreal onto an existing real thing
You are getting this knowledge from the world of phenomena itself.
>the thing itself which is the receptacle for the sight of the appearance to appear in doesn't directly itself cause that but the superimposer does by projecting their mistaken conception onto the thing.
And how do you know this about the thing-in-itself?
>The thing in itself doesn't exist in a causal relation with the appearance because that appearance only exists subjectively for its beholder as their projected conception.
How do you know this?

[Anonymous No.17548528]

Kant isn't even real

[Anonymous No.17548571]

>>17548482
> but the superimposer does by projecting their mistaken conception onto the thing.
>And how do you know this about the thing-in-itself?
Because it reveals itself when the illusion ceases, like when I see that the illusion of a spider is just a piece of balled up string
> because that appearance only exists subjectively for its beholder as their projected conception.
>How do you know this?
Because just like dreams, visual and other illusions dont exist outside of the mind of who beholds them

[Anonymous No.17548596]

>>17548571
>Because it reveals itself when the illusion ceases,
What are you talking about? The “illusion” doesn’t cease in Kant’s philosophy.
>Because just like dreams, visual and other illusions dont exist outside of the mind of who beholds them
Yeah, but that’s not Kant’s philosophy. Kant is saying that the thing-in-itself exists separately from the mind.

[Anonymous No.17548628]

>>17547923
Kant's position basically collapses into Berkeley if you say we don't have access to things in themselves or suffers from the same critique he applies to scholastic metaphysics if you say that we do, in some way, have access to things in themselves. The fact that this is not clearer is only because of the way he writes and because as a historically important figure there's been a lot of academics working on his stuff. When you pair academics with a notoriously complex syntax you get lots of nonsense that persists through centuries.

[Anonymous No.17548647]

>>17548628
Yeah, I actually prefer Berkeley over the goblin.

[Anonymous No.17548653]

>>17548596
>What are you talking about? The “illusion” doesn’t cease in Kant’s philosophy.
Yes, I know, but from how we experience them in everyday life we can establish how they work in principle, and while living as human beings there are naturally some thing things which are inaccessible to us forever, like the Kantian thing in itself, but that doesn't change that we still know that illusions arise within or on something that exists, so the fact of an illusion implies its that its opposite exists and to suggest otherwise is absurd.
>Yeah, but that’s not Kant’s philosophy. Kant is saying that the thing-in-itself exists separately from the mind.
I know, I'm saying that the individual's inner presentation or appearance of the thing-in-itself exists only for that person, everyone's mind forms its own inner appearance of the world to or for itself, through all of the sense organs. This is their inner representation of things which is different from the thing-in-itself.

[Anonymous No.17548698]

>>17548653
>Yes, I know, but from how we experience them in everyday life we can establish how they work in principle,
You cannot establish anything about something outside of the bounds of knowledge.
>living as human beings there are naturally some thing things which are inaccessible to us forever, like the Kantian thing in itself, but that doesn't change that we still know that illusions arise within or on something that exists,
I’m asking you how you know that it exists. Is it just faith? Saying that an illusion requires something real is phenomenal knowledge, and phenomenal knowledge cannot be applied to a thing-in-itself.
>I know, I'm saying that the individual's inner presentation or appearance of the thing-in-itself exists only for that person,
Now you’re verging into Schopenhauer.
>This is their inner representation of things which is different from the thing-in-itself.
Yes, now I am asking you how you know that the thing-in-itself exists.

[Anonymous No.17548850]

The things-in-themselves aren't things, because the familiar thingness of an object is what you mean if you refer to appearances under the apperception. You can't even try to do that because in the act of going beyond the senses by thinking the concept of an object itself exists outside of the concept-appearance-synthesis under the apperception you project an Erkenntnis that's muddied by your mind outside yourself. You could only do that if you had a direct mind-object relationship without the senses, but we can't even grasp how the concept of an object could begin to form in such a case since we can't do it. I believe the only form to go beyond this is in the case of being something vs. appearance like Schopenhauer did. In any other case I'll wait until someone tells me he can think an object whike bypassing the manifold of the senses, inner or outer. As long as you think of objects as an observer looking at it from a distance, even in your imagination, you are pondering its experience not the essence of the object, the in-itselfness wouldn't have a shape or a color, since for that to be anything you need a distance between yourself and the object.

[Anonymous No.17548866]

>>17548081
it's actually a pretty long page, I don't think most people who post about him here have read it lel

[Anonymous No.17548940]

>>17547923
Hello, I've read Kant, and you're right.

[Anonymous No.17549124]

Now that Kant has been irrevocably refuted, where do I start with Shankara?

[Anonymous No.17549965]

>>17547923
Meh, this was Schopenhauer's critique (which was lifted from Aenesidemus Schulze), and it is severely lacking. For trascendental idealism it's not problematic at all to affirm the existence of noumena, insofar as their existence is immediatly entailed by the trascendental deduction.
I've made this argument on this board many times, dunno if you have read it in the past. If you want I can summarize it again.

[Anonymous No.17549976]

>>17549965
Also noumena are obviously not identical with God. Kant literally never made this argument, and I genuinely don't see how could you derive it from his philosophy. Had this been the case, he could have claimed to have found an a priori ontological proof for the existence of God.

[Anonymous No.17549986]

>>17548647
Yoi should try reading the refutation of Berkeley's philosophy contained in the Refutation of Idealism section in the first critique, then!

[Anonymous No.17550076]

>>17548014
>Implying God wants people to behave like good goyim when he, on a regular basis, BTFO kikes just for fun.
This doesn't even make sense. Don't you guys claim God is the god of Jews all the time? Then why would he want Jews to be good goyim? Cringe
Also the Jewish race were forever cursed and cannot enter into heaven.

[Anonymous No.17550105]

>>17550076
So Jesus and none of the Apostles are in Heaven? What about the Prophets? Is Moses in Hell?

[Anonymous No.17550157]

>>17549965
>For trascendental idealism it's not problematic at all to affirm the existence of noumena, insofar as their existence is immediatly entailed by the trascendental deduction.
What does this mean? Can we have knowledge about the thing-in-itself or not?
>Also noumena are obviously not identical with God.
You are claiming knowledge about noumena, and I want to know how you can have knowledge of something that is outside of knowledge.
>he could have claimed to have found an a priori ontological proof for the existence of God.
I didn’t say that it was literally God (it might as well be), I’m saying that Kant is overstepping the limitations he himself put on knowledge.

[Anonymous No.17550199]

>>17549965
I disagree offhand that transcendental deduction enables you to affirm the existence of noumena, as opposed to phenomena and categories, but I'm open to reading the argument

[Anonymous No.17550295]

>>17550157
>You are claiming knowledge about noumena, and I want to know how you can have knowledge of something that is outside of knowledge.
In the scope of the first critique, the identity between noumena and God is simply speculative, as in, it is an unjustified synthetic judgement. You can affirm that it is, but you have no way of confirming this without abandoning Kantian philosophy.
From the second critique on, Kant proves that we are noumenical causes, while still affirming the existence of external noumena, which means that there is at least one noumena that is not God.
In Kantian philosophy we can have knowledge of noumena only in those cases in which a certain noumenical activity must exist in order for me to have an item of knowledge that I already possess (read the last part of this post to see an example of what I mean). The noumena is always indeterminate, as in, it is always taken according the negative definition: it is always something that we know that must exist, without specifically knowing what it is or what positive properties it possesses.
>What does this mean? Can we have knowledge about the thing-in-itself or not?
Take the case of the existence of noumena. Why can Kant affirm that they exist? Because he has an argument which claims that had there been no noumena, we could not have an experience; but we have an experience; so noumena must exist.
The argument can be easily derived from the trascendental deduction. There it is claimed that the synthetic unity of apperception, and with it our entire intellectual faculty, is purely synthetic (Kant argues this by using Hume's critique of personal identity as a starting point). One of the immediate consequences of this claim is that intellectual intuition is impossible: the intellect does not produce any content out of thin air, rather it merely synthetize or separate contents that are given to it from another source. This source is our sensibility (or receptivity). Before our fsculty of sensibility has offered some content to the intellectual faculty, the intellectual faculty is contentless, and as such it cannot determine sensibility itself, as it would do in an act of imagination (which, again, always require a content to be modified - think about the talk about chimeras in Dezcartes' Meditations).
So, the intellect by itself is contentless, and it cannot determine sensibility. But our sensibility IS determined, insofar as we have an experience. So, I can be apodictically sure that something outside my intellect has determined it (this determination then lead to the formation of sensible intuitions, which are then synthetized by the intellect into an experience). But this "something outside my intellect" is literally Kant's negative definition of noumena. So, to conclude, it must be that external noumena exists, otherwise I could not have an experience.
1/

[Anonymous No.17550311]

>>17550295
2/
This attribution of causality and existence to noumena is also justified insofar as it is analitically identical to a judgement that is permissible in trascendental logic, namely the negation of "causality" and "its being the totality of existence" of my intellectual faculties and their products (my phenomenical experience). To be clearer, to say that "noumena are a necessary cause of my experience" is analitically identical to saying that "my intellect and its products are not sufficient causes for my experience". Similarly, to say that noumena exists, is to say that "my intellect and its products is not all that exist" (and this follows from the previous case, since there we discover that there must be a necessary cause for my experience that is different from my intellect and its products).

[Anonymous No.17550393]

>>17548647
He was kinda cute

[Anonymous No.17550397]

>>17550295
>From the second critique on, Kant proves that we are noumenical causes, while still affirming the existence of external noumena,
Yes, I want to know how.
>The noumena is always indeterminate, as in, it is always taken according the negative definition: it is always something that we know that must exist, without specifically knowing what it is or what positive properties it possesses.
So, apophatic theology 2.0?
>Why can Kant affirm that they exist? Because he has an argument which claims that had there been no noumena, we could not have an experience; but we have an experience; so noumena must exist.
Yes, and I am rejecting this on account that he is applying causality to something outside of causality.
>Before our fsculty of sensibility has offered some content to the intellectual faculty, the intellectual faculty is contentless, and as such it cannot determine sensibility itself,
His argument is that because the intellectual faculty is empty, a thing-in-itself must be the source of the content?
>But this "something outside my intellect" is literally Kant's negative definition of noumena. So, to conclude, it must be that external noumena exists, otherwise I could not have an experience.
On what ground must it exist? He is using the intellect to determine that it must exist, and he is trying to take a step beyond this intellect in asserting that it does exist. Furthermore, how is asserting the existence of something a negative definition?
>This attribution of causality and existence to noumena is also justified insofar as it is analitically identical to a judgement that is permissible in trascendental logic, namely the negation of "causality" and "its being the totality of existence" of my intellectual faculties and their products (my phenomenical experience).
Are you saying that the thing-in-itself is within the bounds of causality? Is it outside of the bounds of causality? I’m open to the argument, but I’m not sure that I’m understanding you here.

[Anonymous No.17550448]

>>17550397
>Furthermore, how is asserting the existence of something a negative definition?
if i say 'there is a tree' i am negating unfathomable numbers of other possibilities

[Anonymous No.17550458]

>>17550397
>Yes, I want to know how.
That's a totally different argument, I'd rather let it slide, otherwise we might confuse these matters too much. Feel free to ignore what I said about us being a causa noumenon.
>So, apophatic theology 2.0?
Well, since we are not talking specifically about God, it's not theology. Maybe you could call it apophatic ontology?
>Yes, and I am rejecting this on account that he is applying causality to something outside of causality.
For the argument to work he just has to show that what is not external is not a sufficient cause for our experience, so if you want to dismiss the argument you should refute this part, namely that our intellect and its products are not sufficient causes for our experience. But I have shown that doing this entails a rejection of the trascendental deduction. If you want reject that it's fine, just know that that's a whole different discussion (since here we were assuming that the TD is tenable).
>His argument is that because the intellectual faculty is empty, a thing-in-itself must be the source of the content?
It's not the full argument, but that's a fundamental step for sure.
>On what ground must it exist?
On the ground that I have an experience, and its conditions of possibility entails the existence of noumena. Of course, had we not have had an experience (which is to say, had we been unconscious) we would have had no ground to make such an inference (in fact we would not be capable of making any inference in the first place).
>He is using the intellect to determine that it must exist, and he is trying to take a step beyond this intellect in asserting that it does exist.
He is not taking any additional step, as long as he has the datum of experience, and as long as he can claim that the intellect and its products cannot be a sufficient cause for it. Again, his argument is speculative only if you deny that we have an experience (or if you deny the TD, by claiming that the intellect is not a synthetic faculty).
>Furthermore, how is asserting the existence of something a negative definition?
I'm not sure I understand the question.
>Are you saying that the thing-in-itself is within the bounds of causality? Is it outside of the bounds of causality? I’m open to the argument, but I’m not sure that I’m understanding you here.
Sorry, but I'm not sure what you mean here either, especially by "bounds of causality".

Also I'm not this guy >>17550448

[Anonymous No.17550480]

>>17550458
duh, why would you be me, we both answered the same part of his post

[Anonymous No.17550521]

>>17550448
Yes, but you are also making an extremely positive claim. All of Kant’s knowledge was necessarily based on phenomenal things, and now it seems like he is trying to use his phenomenal logic to assert something transcendental. >>17550458
>That's a totally different argument, I'd rather let it slide, otherwise we might confuse these matters too much. Feel free to ignore what I said about us being a causa noumenon.
I will ignore it.
>Well, since we are not talking specifically about God, it's not theology. Maybe you could call it apophatic ontology?
Well, doesn’t it kind of seem like we are? The thing-in-itself seems like him trying to plug a hole in his philosophy by slapping some unknowable thing on it.
>For the argument to work he just has to show that what is not external is not a sufficient cause for our experience
I am not understanding how the leap from “this is not sufficient” to “there is a thing-in-itself” is made. I would actually reject Kant’s whole philosophy at this point.
>On the ground that I have an experience, and its conditions of possibility entails the existence of noumena.
Because I have an experience my experience must be caused by a thing-in-itself?
>He is not taking any additional step, as long as he has the datum of experience, and as long as he can claim that the intellect and its products cannot be a sufficient cause for it.
I don’t understand. It seems to me like he is trying to deduce the existence of a thing-in-itself because of the untenable nature of his philosophy, and I don’t understand how you can deduce something transcendental from the phenomenal.
>I'm not sure I understand the question.
By affirming the existence of the thing-in-itself, he goes from making negative claims to making a positive claim.
>Sorry, but I'm not sure what you mean here either, especially by "bounds of causality".
Because X is insufficient Y must exist. This is a cause and effect argument, which doesn’t make sense to me unless you want to say that the thing-in-itself is within cause and effect.

[Anonymous No.17550534]

>>17547923
The thing-in-itself was an addition made by Kant to distinguish his philosophy from the absolute idealism posited by Berkeley.

[Anonymous No.17550603]

>>17550521
>Well, doesn’t it [...]some unknowable thing on it.
"Plug" or not, it is not evident at all that it is a God, so it is not evident at all that this is mere theology. The argument works even if you (somehow) deny the existence of God.
>I am not understanding [...] philosophy at this point
To simplify that jump:
We have an x; we know that x has not been fully caused by y and z; but x is; so there must be something other than y and z.
Regarding abandoning Kant's philosophy, sure, you could do that. There has certainly been critiques of Kant's trascendental deduction. I was mostly concerned with proving that claiming that noumena exist does not contradict the TD, I wasn't concerned with proving that the TD is tenable in the first place (on that I have my own doubts).
>Because I have an experience my experience must be caused by a thing-in-itself?
Again, this is not the whole argument, but this is a fundamental step too. More in general, yes, because you have an experience (and this is a datum), and because the intellect and its products are not a sufficient cause for it, noumena (as in, something external that is subject-independent) must exist.
>I don’t understand. It seems to me like he is trying to deduce the [...] how you can deduce something transcendental from the phenomenal.
Maybe you meant "trascendent". Anyway, he can "deduce the trascendent from the phenomenal" insofar as the phenomenal is not self-sufficient. Saying that this is a sign of the untenability of his philosophy seems weird to me, unless you're an idealist who think that the whole of reality can be deduced from a phenomenical (or intellectual) intuition (a la Fichte or Plotinus). Whatever philosophy grants that the human mind is finite will have to make claims similar to the ones you're denying.
>By affirming the existence of the thing-in-itself, he goes from making negative claims to making a positive claim
But no positive quality of noumena is affirmed, only negative properties are attributed to it. Properly speaking, after the TD, noumena are just something indeterminate that must exist outside of us, and which somehow (in ways we cannot concieve) determine our receptivity. And again, saying that they exist or that they have this causal power is also only defined negatively, insofar as we are just saying that our intellect and its products are a) not all that exist, and b) not a sufficient cause for my experience. A positive determination would instead be something like "this house is red", "this sphere is heavy", etc, but all these positive determination are still denied by Kant when it comes to noumena.
>Because X is insufficient Y must exist.
Then yes, noumena are in those bounds, but only insofar as they are one of the conditions of possibility of our experience (as such, we will never have an intuition of them, and we won't ever be able to attribute to them positive properties like the ones I've mentioned earlier).

[Anonymous No.17550707]

>>17550603
>”Plug" or not, it is not evident at all that it is a God, so it is not evident at all that this is mere theology. The argument works even if you (somehow) deny the existence of God.
Kant himself said that the reason he placed limitations on knowledge was to make room for faith, so, unless you think he was lying, I wouldn’t be too sure about that. Also—and this might seem subjective—you have not shown that the argument works.
>We have an x; we know that x has not been fully caused by y and z; but x is; so there must be something other than y and z.
I would agree with you here if we were talking about something that escapes knowledge altogether. Will you concede that through this deduction that we gain knowledge about the thing-in-itself? Even being able to say that something is not something implies that you have some knowledge about it.
>Regarding abandoning Kant's philosophy, sure, you could do that. There has certainly been critiques of Kant's trascendental deduction. I was mostly concerned with proving that claiming that noumena exist does not contradict the TD, I wasn't concerned with proving that the TD is tenable in the first place (on that I have my own doubts).
Yeah, I would reject all of it, so we might be disagreeing because we are working in different frameworks.
>Again, this is not the whole argument, but this is a fundamental step too. More in general, yes, because you have an experience (and this is a datum), and because the intellect and its products are not a sufficient cause for it, noumena (as in, something external that is subject-independent) must exist.
Do you think that the thing-in-itself is within causality? If it is, I would say that you are correct. If it is not, you are using cause and effect to try to deduce something outside of cause and effect.
>Maybe you meant "trascendent". Anyway, he can "deduce the trascendent from the phenomenal" insofar as the phenomenal is not self-sufficient.
Wouldn’t you have to deduce that phenomenally? It is like he is trying to say (and I’m only using this as an example) “logic is bad” and using logic to deduce that.
>Saying that this is a sign of the untenability of his philosophy seems weird to me, unless you're an idealist who think that the whole of reality can be deduced from a phenomenical (or intellectual) intuition (a la Fichte or Plotinus). Whatever philosophy grants that the human mind is finite will have to make claims similar to the ones you're denying.
I am a non-dualist.
>But no positive quality of noumena is affirmed, only negative properties are attributed to it.
Is existence not a positive quality?
>Then yes, noumena are in those bounds, but only insofar as they are one of the conditions of possibility of our experience (as such, we will never have an intuition of them, and we won't ever be able to attribute to them positive properties like the ones I've mentioned earlier).
But would you agree that you are applying (comment too long)

[Anonymous No.17550711]

>>17550707
Continuation: But would you agree that you are applying the positive property of existence to the thing-in-itself?

[Anonymous No.17550712]

>line by line
i read your posts
>disagreeing at every step
letting no point go by or be developed
>disputing everything
to look more intelligent
>not sure where I picked up this habit
but i'll keep it forever
>you might call it tedious
you might call it insubstantive
>you might find it better to just address the main point
but as for me
>i am autistic
and i will never stop

[Anonymous No.17550774]

>>17547923
Thats the joke of Kant

[Anonymous No.17550778]

>>17548647
>Le nothing is real

[Anonymous No.17550781]

>>17547923
>There is no thing-in-itself
yes there fucking is.

[Anonymous No.17550783]

>>17550781
No its all pretty much a dream

[Anonymous No.17550786]

>>17550603
>and because the intellect and its products are not a sufficient cause for it, noumena (as in, something external that is subject-independent) must exist.
Not him, but you say 'must exist' as if it's an axiom. In this case, is the 'must exist' grounded in the insufficient causa?

[Anonymous No.17550787]

>>17550076
it's either that or Christianity was invented by Romans to make the people submit, sometimes both in the same thread/argument.
The fact that both Romans and Jews persecuted Christians and got BTFO'd is completely outside the scope of their reasoning.

[Anonymous No.17550790]

>>17550105
>completely unsupported claim taken for granted
how does anything like that follow you little Kantian kunt?

[Anonymous No.17550796]

>>17550783
no it's not

[Anonymous No.17550867]

>>17550707
>Kant himself said [...] I wouldn’t be too sure about that.
The room for faith does not entail that God exists, nor that noumena must be God. Furthermore, that faith has no place in theoretical philosophy, and it only refers to Kant's moral philosophy (there he gives some practical arguments for the belief in God, but he is still adamant that they do not constitute a proof for its existence)
>Also you have not shown that the argument works.
I think I did, honestly, unless you also expected a justification for the TD, which I have not given because I'm not sure there is one (on this one, I think that I agree with Schulze's critique of trascendental logic).
>you concede that through this deduction that we gain knowledge about the thing-in-itself?
I would concexe that we have knowledge of noumena in general. So, for example, I still cannot formilate a judgement like "this noumena exists", because I still have no way to determine and single out any individual noumenon.
>Wouldn’t you have to deduce it phenomenally?
Kant deduces it trascendentally (again, don't confuse "trascendental" with "trascendent"). So, for example, to "deduce it phenomenally", I would have to find a specific intuition (some observed sensible datum) that could specifically tell me that noumena exist and have this or that property. Kant doesn't think we can do that. Rather, he deduces it from the fact that we have intuitions in the first place, and then he works out what are the conditions that make such a thing possible. As such, the specific content of the intuition is irrelevant. I could be looking at a ball, or at the sea: what is relevant is that I am having visual representations in the first place. This is the real starting point.
>Is existence not a positive quality?
No, this is one of Kant's most famous mottos: existence is not a predicate. But even if it was, the argument would work the same. A positive quality is something that determines an object: but when I say that noumena exist and are necessary causes of my experience, I have not determined any specific noumena (as in, "this specific noumenon exists). This is because what I am really doing is negating certain predicates of my intellect and its products, rather than attributing them to some noumenon I've intuited: so, for example, in the case of causality, I only know that noumena are necessary causes of my experience, but I don't know what these causes are or what qualities they possess: all I know is that these noumena are neither my intellect nor its products. I hope I clarified a bit the concept of "negative" in Kantian philosophy.
>>17550786
Yes, and we can do it because we know experience is already taking place. As I've said in another post, without this datum we could not make this inference (I mean it at a logical level, I'm not referring to the fact that without an experience we would not be conscious, and that as such we could not make any mental operation in the first place).

[Anonymous No.17550954]

>>17550867
>The room for faith does not entail that God exists, nor that noumena must be God.
I absolutely agree with you here. My qualm with the thing-in-itself is that it is often treated as though it were one, and the arguments for its existence do not diverge too radically from something you would read in Aquinas.
>I would concexe that we have knowledge of noumena in general.
If you think that general knowledge of the thing-in-itself is possible, then the debate is over. I only pressed you on it because usually the thing-in-itself is treated as though it were completely outside of the bounds of knowledge.
>Rather, he deduces it from the fact that we have intuitions in the first place,
Isn’t the intuition of intuitions also an intuition? Is the knowledge of knowledge not phenomenal?
>No, this is one of Kant's most famous mottos: existence is not a predicate.
How do you assert that something exists without applying qualities to that thing? If it has no qualities, it would be equally sufficient to just say that it does not exist.
>A positive quality is something that determines an object: but when I say that noumena exist and are necessary causes of my experience, I have not determined any specific noumena (as in, "this specific noumenon exists).
I would disagree with you here. Saying that any noumena is exists necessarily contaminates the noumena with the phenomenal quality of existence. If existence didn’t have qualities, we would would be unable to distinguish between anything on a phenomenal level. But maybe I am misunderstanding what Kant means by existence.
>This is because what I am really doing is negating certain predicates of my intellect and its products, rather than attributing them to some noumenon I've intuited:
Does Kant think things work purely in binaries, i.e., “the light is off so it must be on”?
>so, for example, in the case of causality, I only know that noumena are necessary causes of my experience, but I don't know what these causes are or what qualities they possess: all I know is that these noumena are neither my intellect nor its products.
Yeah, I would have to disagree with the logic Kant is using here. I do not think that experience necessitates noumena, but that is probably because I am rejecting the whole Kantian framework.
>I hope I clarified a bit the concept of "negative" in Kantian philosophy.
I think you have done a pretty good job.

[Anonymous No.17550959]

>>17550954
>Does Kant think things work purely in binaries, i.e., “the light is off so it must be on”?
Sorry, meant to say “the light is off so it cannot be on”

[Anonymous No.17550989]

>I would concede that we have knowledge of noumena in general.

[Anonymous No.17551016]

>>17548035
BUT THATS WHAT I WANT AAAA IM GONNA COOOOM

[Anonymous No.17551030]

>>17548014
>act evil
>thinks he shouldn't be punished

[Anonymous No.17551045]

>>17550989
Does this seem so extraordinary? With that sentence I am just affirming that we can be sure that the intellect and its products are not all that exist. I am not permitting any positive knowledge about any specific noumenon.
>>17550954
>If you think that [...] treated as though it were completely outside of the bounds of knowledge.
As above, this is nothing extraordinary, dunno why it should be such a game-stopper (especially if you're not an idealist). Do you take that the claim "our intellect and its products is all that exist" to be evident to such an extent that any philosophy that rejects it is to be deemed untenable?
>Isn’t the intuition of intuitions also an intuition? Is the knowledge of knowledge not phenomenal?
No, it is trascendental, and it is to be treated with trascendental logic. The fact that there is an intuition merely authorizes me to use the presence of an intuition (and with it, of an experience) as a possible premise for an argument of mine.
>How do you assert that something exists without applying qualities to that thing?
By discovering that what has "positive qualities" cannot be the totality of existence. At that point I can just say "something else exist", without ever being able to know what that something else specifically is.
>I would disagree with you here. Saying that any noumena is exists necessarily contaminates the noumena with the phenomenal quality of existence. If existence didn’t have qualities, we would would be unable to distinguish between anything on a phenomenal level. But maybe I am misunderstanding what Kant means by existence.
You should check that section, it is not that long (it is somewhere in his refutation of the ontological argument, if you can't find it I'll look it up for you). Kant would deny that existence has phenomenal qualities, insofar as it adds no determinate characteristics to a concept, rather, it only tells you its modality (wether it exists or not, wether it is possible or not, wether it is necessary or not - but the concept remains the same).
>Does Kant think things work purely in binaries, i.e., “the light is off so it must be on”?
Honestly I don't know of many philosophers who do not think in these terms, at least in cases in which a third alternative is logically impossible. Kant takes this to be the case: there must be a ground for my experience (as it is established in the TD), and if it's not my intellect and its products, then it is something else. The two propositions are exclusive.
>I think you have done a pretty good job.
I'm glad that was the case. Summarizing Kant is always hard for me.

[Anonymous No.17551217]

>>17551045
>Do you take that the claim "our intellect and its products is all that exist" to be evident to such an extent that any philosophy that rejects it is to be deemed untenable?
I see the intellect as a secondary function to consciousness and also phenomenal, but if we start debating over that I will be awake until six in the morning.
>No, it is trascendental, and it is to be treated with trascendental logic.
I don’t see how you make the jump from phenomenal to transcendental.
>By discovering that what has "positive qualities" cannot be the totality of existence. At that point I can just say "something else exist", without ever being able to know what that something else specifically is.
I’m interested in how you discover that positive qualities are not the totality of existence. Do negative qualities exist?
>Kant would deny that existence has phenomenal qualities, insofar as it adds no determinate characteristics to a concept, rather, it only tells you its modality (wether it exists or not, wether it is possible or not, wether it is necessary or not - but the concept remains the same).
I would say that “existence” is nothing but its positive qualities. Something only exists insofar as it can be differentiated from something else.
>Honestly I don't know of many philosophers who do not think in these terms, at least in cases in which a third alternative is logically impossible. Kant takes this to be the case: there must be a ground for my experience (as it is established in the TD), and if it's not my intellect and its products, then it is something else. The two propositions are exclusive.
I only brought it up because of superposition, but denouncing the law of noncontradiction would lead us into all kind of absurdities, so it is probably better that we work within it.

[Anonymous No.17551662]

>>17548482
The thing in itself is not a self subsistent object that exists, it is a limit concept

[Anonymous No.17551678]

>>17551662
>The thing in itself is not a object that exists,
Based.
>it is a concept
Also based.

[Anonymous No.17551879]

I am going to bed. I’ll read the replies to the thread in the morning (or afternoon). Overall, I think this was a pretty good discussion, and I learned a lot of things about Kant that I didn’t originally know. I am still skeptical about a thing-in-itself because of its shaky ontological grounding, but it might be able to stand if you accept the axioms postulated in his transcendental reduction—which is a whole separate argument, like the other anon stated.

[Anonymous No.17551888]

>>17551879
Deduction*

[Anonymous No.17553013]

>>17548035
A Kant-goblin would never do such a thing, it does not fulfill the categorical imperative. Thus, the cute anime girl would be quite safe in such a world. Besides, they're probably shorter than she is.

[Anonymous No.17553274]

>>17550778
Just God :)

[Anonymous No.17553364]

>>17548014
The Christian God doesn't work that way either.

[Anonymous No.17553367]

>>17548378
Causation means one state of things necessarily follwing another state of things IN TIME AND SPACE. That's not how the thing-in-itself is a pre-requisite of phenomena you imbecile.

[Anonymous No.17553400]

Does anyone think schrodingers cat scales from micro to macro?

[Anonymous No.17553420]

>>17547923
Stop trying to pretend you understand him or are smarter than him. You're not fooling anyone.

[Anonymous No.17553668]

for me Kant never said that the Noumena have actual hard existence as objects and the criticism of the Noumena being ascribed as a cause is totally unfounded, because Kant does consider it. The key passages are on B307 and the corresponding A section. The whole phaenomena/noumena distinction is laid out in "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." The term things-in-themselves that he uses refers to the misuse of thought without sensibility, not to the cause of phenomena. Things are phenomena as far as we know and noumena exist due to the fallacious abstraction:
>We know objects as a synthesis of our mind's a priori concepts + sensibility
>we know the pure contents of thought a priori, because we can juggle concepts outside of sensibility (which doesn't lead to any synthetic knowledge)
>now we can do the following
>if we abstract from thought, appearances are blind/nothing for us, since without thought we can't synthesize the manifold in relation to the apperception. A manifold isn't anything without a unifying concept
>we can however, abstract from the senses, since we have categories a priori
>we are left with the concept of an "Objekt überhaupt" that we normally use to understand appearances as something unified in an objective synthesis.
>now comes the fallacy: we project that concept of an object in itself independently into time and space outside ourselves, even though the concept is purely our own and can not be used on anything other than appearances.
We can only do this, if somehow our mind was able to relate itself directly to presynthesized particulars without the senses, since in that case, the objects would BE the concepts. Here you see that Kant's primary task with this distinction was to do away with monads, that are non-sensual things, directly grasped in thought.