/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.16820348]

Okay, this shit slaps

[Anonymous No.16820557]

>>16820348
tell me more anon.

[Anonymous No.16820570]

>>16820348
Lol OOP isn’t even the best programing paradigm, much less theory of everything

[Anonymous No.16820618]

OP give me the redpill about this book thanks

[Anonymous No.16820659]

>>16820348
>we need to go flat and get rid of these neoplatonic hierarchies!
>no, no you can't do that to me, I have human rights!

[Anonymous No.16820885]

>>16820659
This is by Graham Harman, not Morton, but Morton's work is antihumanist so what the fuck are you thinking

[Anonymous No.16820911]

>>16820348
wrong actually

[Anonymous No.16820926]

>>16820570
Stop being 20

[Anonymous No.16820974]

>>16820618

> reject anthropological ontology
> reject correlationism
> define objectual undermining (claiming there is an underlying hidden force behind all objects) and objectual overmining (claiming an object is nothing else but its properties) and consider both faults.
> husserlian finitude; all objects are theoretically inhexaustible in either their qualities and relations, which are both independent and not localised in their objects.

It is essentially an anti-idealist, realist metaphysical theory issued from a relatively crude reading of Husserl and a very selective one of Heidegger.

[Anonymous No.16821057]

this guy got btfod by zizek and fucking NICK LAND lmao

[Anonymous No.16821086]

>>16821057

Him and Zizek where 69ing each other during that entire debate, what are you on?

[Anonymous No.16821090]

>>16820974
this sounds like dogshit what the fuck

[Anonymous No.16821100]

>>16820885
Like all antihumanists he is hysterically concerned with the wellbeing of humans.

[Anonymous No.16821107]

>>16820974
once again

[Anonymous No.16821111]

>>16821090

https://youtu.be/6GHiV4tuRt8

See for yourself.
If anything Zizek btfo the moderator.

[Anonymous No.16821122]

>>16821107

Harman ultimately rejects Heidegger, he just think he represents a good attempt at breaking away from kantian thought, although in the end he failed.

[Anonymous No.16821156]

>>16821100
Based and truthpilled, treat indifference with indifference

[Anonymous No.16821955]

>>16820974
This is so ABSOLUTELY wrong.
It's specifically correlationist, for a start.

[Anonymous No.16821993]

>>16821955
>It's specifically correlationist
You what

[Anonymous No.16822051]

>>16821086
Lol no Zizek was being polite, you clearly missed his subtle criticisms

[Anonymous No.16822180]

>>16820348

Strange coincidence - I've actually been watching quite a few YouTube vids on OOO recently and there are a specific group of pseuds in the comments (yeah I know, reading YT comments blah blah) who make a ridiculous mental leap and equate OOO with Nazism. If you guys want a laugh go check it out.
It just shows that so many people stuck in the rut of humanism seem to think that by reorienting our ontological framework away from subjectivism we'll all end up turning humans into objects and then instantly we'll become Nazis.

[Anonymous No.16822209]

>>16820570
>Lol OOP isn’t even the best programing paradigm
name one that's better

[Anonymous No.16822228]

>>16822180
it's certainly a possibility

[Anonymous No.16822343]

>>16822209
Cellular Automation

[Anonymous No.16822402]

>>16820348
One point i never get is his critique of Kant and subsequent german idealism for being too subject-centered, but how the fuck can you epistemological move past this barrier? how can you say as a subject stuck in the limitations of subjectivity that everything else is stuck in the same limitations? where the fuck does he pull this birds eye view from?

[Anonymous No.16823211]

>>16822228
Not really, you stupid faggot

[Anonymous No.16823324]

>>16822402
This will be in a few parts (taken directly from OOO book itself)
Part 1:
>Ortega notes that most of the time we encounter objects from the outside, in third-person perceptions or descriptions. In Kantian terms these experiences are obviously phenomenal, and do not plumb the depths of the things themselves. In Ortega’s words: ‘there is nothing we can make an object of cognition, nothing that can exist for us unless it becomes an image, a concept, an idea – unless, that is, it stops being what it is in order to become a shadow or an outline of itself.’12 Our initial reaction might be to turn from these third-person experiences to the first-person kind, seeking refuge in the direct truths of inner life. Yet this is not really possible, since in introspection we also reduce ourselves to shadows or outlines: after all, there is no direct access to the noumenal self any more than to a noumenal house, dog or horse. Although there are still colossal battles under way in the philosophy of mind between whether first-person or third-person descriptions should have priority, Ortega in 1914 already predicts the futility of this dispute. Neither the first-person nor the third-person standpoint gets us any closer to the true inwardness of things beyond all description: what Ortega seeks instead is something I once called the ‘zero-person’ aspect of things, meaning their reality apart from any observation or introspection.13 In the course of his argument, Ortega gains the important insight that each of us is an ‘I’ not because we each have a special zoological apparatus called ‘consciousness’, but because each of us is something, and that something can never be exhausted by conscious introspection any more than by outward description. It follows that every non-human object can also be called an ‘I’ in the sense of having a definite inwardness that can never fully be grasped. For even if we say that ‘this red leather box that I have before me is not an “I” because it is only an image I have’, the box is not only something phenomenal for me.14 As Ortega puts it, in a truly radical passage:

[Anonymous No.16823335]

>>16822402
Part 2:
>There is the same difference between a pain that someone tells me about and a pain that I feel as there is between the red that I see and the being red of this red leather box. Being red is for it what hurting is for me. Just as there is an I-John Doe, there is also an I-red, an I-water, and an I-star. Everything, from a point of view within itself, is an I.15
But what is so important about this inward ‘I’ of everything if it is merely noumenal and we can never reach it? Are we left with the same ‘facile mysticism’ and ‘negative theology’ against which Johnston warned us? Ortega answers in the negative:
Now then, imagine the importance of a language or system of expressive signs whose function was not to tell us about things but to present them to us in the act of executing themselves. Art is just such a language; this is what art does. The esthetic object is inwardness as such – it is each thing as ‘I’.16
This is a powerful claim. Ortega is effectively saying that Kant’s noumenal realm is not inaccessible, but that art consists precisely in giving us this noumenal realm in person. Yet he adds an important qualification: ‘Notice I am not saying that a work of art reveals the secret of life and being to us; what I do say is that a work of art affords the peculiar pleasure we call esthetic by making it seem that the inwardness of things, their executant reality, is opened to us.’17 He goes on to compare scientific discourse unfavourably to this aesthetic contact with inward, executant realities, though his real target is not so much science as what we have called literalism.

[Anonymous No.16823358]

>>16822402
Part 3 (a little further in):
Though I have recommended Ortega’s essay to many acquaintances over the years, some have seen nothing of interest in it whatsoever, and have thanked me for the recommendation with little more than perfunctory politeness. For my part, I find it to be one of the most important philosophical essays ever written, and crucial for ontology no less than aesthetics. What lessons does OOO draw from this forgotten classic forerunner from long-ago 1914? First, Ortega brings Kant’s noumena out of the philosophical wilderness and makes them relevant again. Second, he does this by showing that we have access to noumena in a manner that is not merely facile or negative. Third, he establishes the basic mechanism of metaphor as an inessential likeness that serves to fuse two vastly dissimilar entities into an impossible new one. But there are two crucial points where Ortega comes up short; I say this not as a critic, but as someone who spent years of fascination with this essay before clearly understanding it. The first point, which Ortega gets exactly wrong, can be called the asymmetry of metaphor. The second, on which he is correct but only goes halfway to the goal, can be called the theatricality of metaphor.
We begin with the topic of asymmetry. Ortega’s mistake comes in the following sentence, which details the fusion of the cypress and the flame: ‘we are to see the image of a cypress through the image of a flame; we see it as a flame, and vice versa.’23 But why ‘vice versa’? Here he is too hasty, and fails to think through the consequences of his claim. For if there were really a ‘vice versa’ between the cypress and the flame in the metaphor, then we ought to be able to flip the order of the metaphor without this leading to any change. Here is the original metaphor: ‘a cypress is like the ghost of a dead flame’. And here is its inversion: ‘a flame is like the ghost of a dead cypress’. Though the second example also works as poetry, the metaphor is clearly different. In the first case the metaphorical object is a cypress with flame-qualities; in the second, it is a flame with cypress-qualities. Hence the assumption of a ‘vice versa’ at work in metaphor is a fatal error.

[Anonymous No.16823378]

>>16822402
Part 4:
What does Ortega lose by missing out on the asymmetry between cypress and flame in his example? He misses one of the pillars of OOO: the deep divide or tension between an object and its qualities. As we will see later in this chapter, the difference between an object and its own qualities is something that comes to the forefront in many situations, but especially in art and philosophy. For under most circumstances, we do not distinguish between an object and its qualities. In science, for instance, the whole point is to replace a proper name like ‘RX J185635-3754’ (a real neutron star in the constellation Corona Australis) with a more tangible list of definite properties of this object. As long as one has only the proper name, one has little to offer. But the more you do your job as a scientist, the more you are able to replace the vague, place-holding name of this neutron star with the fruit of definite qualities proven to belong to it: such as being roughly 400 light years from Earth, and having a diameter of somewhere between 4 and 8 kilometres and a surface temperature of around 434,000 degrees Celsius. We saw earlier that the search for knowledge is a literalist enterprise that identifies an object with all of the components and effects that truly belong to it, and also noted that OOO rejects this literalism while denying that either art or philosophy are forms of knowledge. There are numerous philosophers today who try to make philosophy a literalist discipline in much the same way as mathematics or natural science, a process that has been under way throughout the four centuries of modernism. Although Hume – for example – is known as a sceptic, he actually defines objects in a way that reduces them to the correlates of possible knowledge: there is no such thing as an ‘apple’, but only a number of palpable qualities such as red, hard, juicy, sweet and cold, all of which seem to appear together so often that we loosely refer to this ‘bundle of qualities’ as an ‘apple’, even though there is supposedly no apple apart from all its qualities.24
This bundle-theory of objects, which is simply taken for granted in philosophy more often than one would expect, was first abandoned by the philosophical school known as phenomenology, founded by Husserl in 1900.25 Husserl’s line of reasoning was powerful and of lasting importance, and owes much to the initial efforts of the Polish philosopher Twardowski.26 Husserl shows that conscious experience is not primarily about its contents, but about its objects. If I turn an apple in my hand, then toss and catch it repeatedly, I see a constantly shifting parade of different qualities. But never do I think to myself that it is a different thing each time its qualities change.

[Anonymous No.16823382]

>>16822402
Part 5:
Nor do I ever say or think: ‘This bundle of applish qualities is 87 per cent similar to what I was seeing three seconds ago, and therefore I conclude that the family resemblances between them are sufficient to refer to all of these images loosely as “the same apple”.’ In fact, as phenomenology has seen, the vaunted ‘bundle of qualities’ is really just a bundle of shifting accidental appearances. The apple itself remains the same throughout all my varying efforts to spin and toss it.
In this respect, Ortega merely ratifies the important distinction between objects and qualities found in Husserl, whom he admired with certain qualifications. Yet there is a crucial difference between them, and here I must side with the Spaniard. Unlike Ortega, who spent ten early years as an adherent of neo-Kantian philosophy, Husserl has no patience at all for Kant’s noumena. For the mathematically trained Husserl, it is absurd to think that there could be objects that are not, in principle, the correlate of some consciousness that observes them. Husserl would thus have no use for the following passage in Ortega, which I quoted earlier in an admiring spirit: ‘Just as there is an I-John Doe, there is also an I-red, an I-water, and an I-star. Everything, from a point of view within itself, is an I.’27 For Husserl there is certainly an ‘I-John Doe’, but only because John Doe is a thinking mind. As for the red, the water and the star, their only role is to be objects for the consciousness of John Doe and his fellows, and to say otherwise would mark a slip into the controversial ‘panpsychist’ view that even inanimate objects can feel and think. Of course, Ortega does not wish to claim that inanimate objects can feel and think. Rather, he anticipates and refutes this objection in advance by saying that an object is an ‘I’ not because it is conscious, but simply because it is. In any case, Husserl’s distinction between the object and its qualities, such a crucial blow against Hume’s bundle-theory, belongs solely on the level of what Ortega calls images. Why so? Because for Husserl, if a thing is observed lucidly enough, we can eventually gain a direct vision of its essential features. This is no mystical claim, but a thoroughly rationalist one: Husserl is simply telling us that there is no impenetrable inwardness of things, since the proper intellectual attitude can give us their inwardness directly. The opposite holds for Ortega, just as for Heidegger, the quasi-rival to whom he is sometimes compared. For Ortega, any sort of looking at things or use of them automatically turns them into mere shadows and outlines of themselves. Aesthetics is so important for him precisely because neither theoretical nor practical work can ever give us the inwardness of things. In short, the Kantian notion of the concealed noumena is still active in Ortega and Heidegger, despite Husserl’s intervening attempt to kill it off completely.

[Anonymous No.16823395]

>>16822402
Part 6:
As a result, Husserl and Ortega actually give us two entirely different discoveries when it comes to objects and their qualities. The terminology of Ortega’s essay distinguishes between the images of things as seen or used from the outside, and the executant reality of things in their own right, quite apart from how they are seen or used. But let’s use instead the later terminology of OOO, which has roughly the same meaning as Ortega’s own words. When speaking of objects in their own right, let’s speak of real objects. But when speaking instead of the realm in which objects have no inwardness but are nothing more than correlates of our experience, let’s speak of sensual objects. Consider the example of a snowmobile. What Husserl gives us is the new insight that the snowmobile is not just a bundle of snowmobile-qualities, but an enduring object that is different from the relatively small array of profiles or features that it shows in any given moment or any sum of moments. We see the snowmobile from one side or another, at a greater or lesser distance, speeding towards us or away from us, standing motionless or spinning wildly in a dangerous jump over a perilous crevice. In all of these cases, we consider the snowmobile to be the same thing, unless something happens to suggest that we have misidentified or confused it with a similar vehicle. In OOO terminology, Husserl splits the sensual object snowmobile from the sensual qualities of the snowmobile, since the former does not change but the latter change constantly.

And that's all I feel like copying.
Go download the fucking book on libgen

[Anonymous No.16823670]

>>16821955

How about a fucking quote to support your position, cunt?

[Anonymous No.16823691]

>>16823670
"I am myself a correlationist, by which I mean that I accept Kant’s basic argument that when I try to find the thing in itself, what I find are thing data, not the thing in itself. And I grasp that data in such a way that a thing does not (meaningfully) exist (for me) outside the way I (or history or economic relations or will or Dasein) correlate that data. I believe that there is a drastic finitude that restricts my access to things in themselves. The finitude is drastic because it is irreducible. I can’t bust through it. This marks the difference between some speculative realists, who think you can puncture the finitude and enter a world of direct access, for instance via science, and those who don’t think so, for instance the object-oriented ontologists.
Object-oriented ontology, or OOO, developed from a deep consideration of the implications of Martin Heidegger’s version of modern Kantian correlationism. These implications would have seemed bizarre to Kant and Heidegger themselves, who in their different ways (transcendental idealism and fascism) tried to contain the explosive vision that their thinking unleashed. Ontology doesn’t tell you exactly what exists but how things exist. If things exist, they exist in this way rather than that. Object-oriented ontology holds that things exist in a profoundly “withdrawn” way: they cannot be splayed open and totally grasped by anything whatsoever, including themselves. You can’t know a thing fully by thinking it or by eating it or by measuring it or by painting it…This means that the way things affect one another (causality) cannot be direct (mechanical), but rather indirect or vicarious: causality is aesthetic. As strange as this sounds, the idea that causality is aesthetic is congruent with the most powerful causality theories (the Humean ones), and the most powerful theories of causality in physical science: relativity theory and (to an even greater extent) quantum theory. In a way that profoundly differs from the demystification most popular in humanistic accounts of culture, politics, and philosophy (and so on), OOO believes that reality is mysterious and magical, because beings withdraw and because beings influence each other aesthetically, which is to say at a distance."
—Timothy Morton, Dark Ecology

[Anonymous No.16823706]

>>16820348
Never read this but I like his introduction to Heidegger a lot

[Anonymous No.16823711]

>>16823691

Ok, now one by Harman, you know, the author of the book discussed?

[Anonymous No.16823766]

>>16823711
Why would the burden of proof be on me when it is you that has made the initial (incorrect) claim?
I used Morton specifically because you tried to use him to distract from Harman earlier.
Fuck you

[Anonymous No.16823791]

>>16820974
In ENGLISH, please!

[Anonymous No.16823844]

>>16823791
From ppl burger came from

[Anonymous No.16823872]

>>16823766

I've never read Morton, only Harman and Bogost.... and I haven't mentionned him in here once. So take your pills schizo.

" [...]A notion that Quentin Meissalloux attacked justly as 'correlationism'"

OOO, p. 56-57

[Anonymous No.16823965]

>>16820974
Sounds fucking gay

[Anonymous No.16824044]

>>16820348
anyone who is discussing ooo after pic related btfo is fucking subhuman

[Anonymous No.16824050]

>>16823872
Thou doth protest too much

[Anonymous No.16824057]

object oriented ontology is fucking retarded

[Anonymous No.16824083]

>>16824057
Shill detected

[Anonymous No.16824135]

>>16824083
>Shill detected

[Anonymous No.16824202]

>>16824135
Thanks for bumping my thread

[Anonymous No.16824248]

>>16824202
faggot please read this >>16824044 one time. but if you want to keep sucking hackman's peepee then don't.

[Anonymous No.16824278]

>>16823691
>dude nature doesn't exist because muh data

[Anonymous No.16824303]

>>16824248
I don't need to read that to know he's wrong: he's a self-identifying Platonist

[Anonymous No.16824313]

>>16822209
> NNNNNOOOO YOU CAN'T JUST SAY FUNCTIONAL PROGRAMMING IS A GIMMICK FOR PSEUDS YOU HAVE TO USE LAMBDA CALCULUS FOR ALL YOUR FUNCTIONS OR YOU HAVE A SMALL PP

[Anonymous No.16824321]

>>16824278
You have an actual black hole of reading comprehension, it's not that you didn't understand what you read, you completely inverted it somehow

[Anonymous No.16824388]

>>16824303

Platonist, kantian and hegelian.
You can clearly see the madness in his eyes.

[Anonymous No.16824426]

>>16824388
He looks like a fucking school shooter

[Anonymous No.16824437]

>>16824426
we have all shot the school in our minds

[Anonymous No.16824454]

>>16824437

True, but most, if not nearly all of us have also decided it wasn't exactly a good look, you know?
Anyways, suffice to say that no one looking like that ever said anything of value.

[Anonymous No.16825530]

A thing I really like about OOO is the avoidance of Physicalism, Literalism, Smallism, and Anti-fictionalism.
It reminds me of the bullshit notion from Indian Philosophy that that which does not change is that which is real.
Why would that ever be so?