/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.16516904]

Is this why self consciousness will always require two?

Consciousness (subject/circle) perceives object (cube). This object exists “in-itself”, which means it exists as an individual, separate thing, but also exists “for another”. While this object exists in itself it is also solely there for me to relate to it, experience it, know it, etc.

Self consciousness requires two because in order for consciousness to be “Self” an object must first be recognized as being in-itself, and then the consciousness must relate to the fact that there is an object that is in-itself. I must struggle with being a Lord and the fact that there is a Slave that is not under my rule yet, he must do something for me, and this is basis of all, correct? Onward my experiences, inform me on this matter

[Anonymous No.16517870]

>>16516904
The lord never achieves self-consciousness. It is by being an object for the other than one is able to become an object for ones-self.

Hegel also suggests that through the acquisition of material skills (i.e. doing productive labour in a bondsman capacity, whether that's for a lord or not who knows) is also conducive to the achievement of self-consciousness inasmuch as it provides a route to conceptualize the self as something that can be shaped.

The lord doesn't see the world as something that can be worked upon, only appropriated. The bondsman, though in the poor state of servitude, realizes that the world is for working on, that the self can be conceived of as an object. He can see himself initially, as himself immediately, and through the mediation of his masters eyes. The master on the other hand has no such privilege as he only sees the bondsman as an object and not as something that can recognize him.

It's important to note: it is by no means clear that the master gets off better of the two in Hegel's dialectic, though it might seem so at first. Obviously, at first glance we would prefer to be the lord, but then that's the driving force of the dialectic in the first place: that any unrealized consciousness *would* prefer to subsume another and consume at its own expense.

[Anonymous No.16518284]

Just read Peirce

[Anonymous No.16518579]

asking why self-conciousness requires two is asking why 'and' needs two

[Anonymous No.16518615]

>>16516904
>This object exists “in-itself”
Bitch please, unless you're talking about the forms.
Also get with the times, self knowledge is dual inherently because to think yourself is to realize yourself as an object.
All real objects are subjects, thus you can only ever truly know another, objects in becoming are phantoms not real particulars.

[Anonymous No.16518648]

>>16516904
>>16518615
§5.6.1. There is one type of thinking which is by a subject that is other
than its object and another which is by a subject of itself, and the latter,
as a result, avoids duality more. The former type also wants to think
itself, but it is less able to do so, for though it has within itself that which
it sees, it remains something other than it. By contrast, the latter is not
separated from its object in substantiality, but being together with itself, 5
it sees itself.1 It becomes two while remaining one.
It thinks more truly, then, because it has what it thinks, and thinks
in a primary sense because that which is thinking must be one and two.
For either it is not one [but two], and the subject of thinking will be
other than what is thought – [in this case], it would not be that which is
thinking in the primary sense because receiving the thinking from
something other than it, it will not be that which is thinking in the
primary sense, and this is so because that which thinks does not have 10
what it thinks as its own, so that it does not think itself; or else, it has
what it thinks as itself, so that it thinks in the proper sense, and
that which is two will be one; therefore, subject and object must be
one – or it is one and not two, and it will not have something to think
of. So, it will not be thinking. Thinking, therefore, must be simple and
yet not simple.
One would better grasp the nature of primary thinking if we start our
ascent from the soul. For it is easier to distinguish it there, and someone 15
could easily see its duality. If, then, one supposes a double light, the soul
as the lesser light, and that which thinks as the purer form of it, and next
suppose that the light which sees is equal to that which is seen, since one
is no longer able to separate the two by their difference, one will suppose
the two to be one, thinking that they are two, but by the same token
seeing them as one. It is in this way that one will grasp Intellect and
intelligible.
We have, then, made one out of two in our account, but the contrary
is the case: the two actually come from one because it thinks, making
itself two, or rather, because it thinks it is two, and because it thinks
itself, it is one.

[Anonymous No.16518656]

>>16518648
§5.6.2. If there is indeed primary thinking, and next there is thinking in
a different way, then that which transcends primary thinking would no
longer think. For an intellect must be generated in order to think, and
being an intellect, and having that which is intelligible, and thinking
5 primarily, it must have the intelligible in itself. But it is not necessary for
everything that is intelligible to have thinking in itself or to think. For it
will in that case not be only intelligible but also thinking, and it will not
be first since it is two. And intellect which has the intelligible would not
be realized unless there is a purely intelligible Substance;4 this will be
intelligible for intellect, but in itself it will neither be thinking nor
10 principally intelligible. For the intelligible, which is the purveyor of
content to the act of intellection, is so for something different from it,
namely, intellect, and its thinking is empty unless it grasps and seizes the
intelligible which it thinks. For it has no thinking without the
intelligible.
Is the One, then, perfect when it has it? But before it was thinking, it
had to be perfect in its own substantiality. That, therefore, in which
15 perfection is to exist will be like this prior to thinking. It is, therefore,
not necessary for it to think. For it is self-sufficient before this occurs.
It will, therefore, not think. There is, therefore, that which does not
think, and that which primarily thinks, and that which thinks secondarily.
Further, if that which is first thinks, something will exist in it, and therefore
it will not be first, but second, and not one, but many, and
20 thereby all the things that it thinks. For even if it thinks itself, it will be
many.

[Anonymous No.16518660]

>>16518656
>>16518648
§5.6.3. But if they will say that nothing prevents that which is self-
identical from being many, there will be one substrate for these. For it is
not able to be many if there does not exist a one from which the many are
derived or which is constituted of the many or, generally, a one which is
counted first among all the rest, which we must grasp alone in itself. But 5
if this one is to exist at the same time as the rest, and we must take it
together with them, though it is nevertheless different from them, we
must let it go with the others, and seek that which underlies them, no
longer being with the others, but itself by itself. For if it were among the
others, it would be the same as the One, but it would not be this. 10
It should, however, be isolated if it is also going to be seen among the
others; that is, unless someone were to say of it that its being consists in
having its real existence along with the others. It will not, therefore, be
simple; but neither will it be something composed of many parts, for
that which is not able to be simple will have no real existence, and that
which is composed of many parts will not exist either, since that which is 15
simple will not exist. For if no simple individual can have real existence,
since there is no one simple that has real existence by itself, then neither
can a composite made out of many of them exist, since none of them can
have real existence of their own, or make itself available to exist in
conjunction with something else, since it does not exist at all. How
could that which is composed of many come to be put together from 20
things that do not exist – not from that which is not a particular existent
but from that which is absolutely non-existent?
If, therefore, there is some many, there must be a one prior to the
many. If, then, there is a multiplicity in thinking, there must be no
thinking in that which is not a multiplicity. But this was what is first. 25
Thinking and intellect, therefore, will be in the things that are posterior.

[Anonymous No.16518673]

>>16518648
>>16518656
>>16518660
§5.6.4. Further, if the Good is simple and must lack nothing, it would
have no need for thinking. But that which it does not need will not be
present to it. And since, generally, nothing is present to it, therefore,
thinking is not present to it. And it thinks nothing because there is
nothing other than it to think. Further, Intellect is other than the 5
Good, and it is Good-like by thinking the Good. Further, as in
a duality there is a one and another one, and it is not possible for this
one which is with another to be the number one, but rather the number
one in itself must be prior to that one which is with another, so it must be
in the case of something that has simplicity in it which is with another
thing that has simplicity in it. There must be something that is simple in
itself, not having in itself anything which is found in things that are 10
joined with other things. For how can it be that there is one thing in
another if that thing did not come from something that existed
separately beforehand? What is simple could not arise from some-
thing else – but what is many, or even just two, must itself depend on
something else.
And so, one should compare the first principle to light, the second to
15 the sun, and the third to the heavenly body of the moon to which light
is provided by the sun. For Soul has Intellect added to it, which colours
it when it is intellectual, whereas Intellect has what belongs to itself, not
being only light, but something illuminated in its own substantiality
while that which provides the light to Intellect is not something else, but
20 simply light, providing to Intellect the power to be what it is. What,
then, would it be in need of? For it is not identical with that which is in
another thing. For what is in another thing is other than that which is
what it is due to itself.

[Anonymous No.16518682]

>>16518673
§5.6.6. If we have indeed stated these matters correctly, the Good
would not have any sort of room for thinking, for the Good must
be other than that which is thinking. It is, then, without the activity
[of thinking]. And why should activity be additionally active? For
generally, no activity has a further activity. But even if some are able
to attribute to actualities other activities directed to something else, that
which is primary amongst all, that on which everything else depends,
must be allowed to be what it is, with nothing added to it. Such an
activity, then, is not thinking. For it does not have something to think.
For it is first.
Next, it is not thinking that thinks, but that which has the thinking.
Two things, then, again, arise in that which is thinking. But the Good is
in no way two.
Further, one could better see what this is if one grasped more clearly
how in everything which is thinking this dual nature exists. We say
that Beings, both collectively and individually, that is, the Beings that
are truly Beings, are in the ‘intelligible place’. This is not only because
some things stay as they are due to the substantiality they have, while
there are things in the realm of sense-perception that flow and do not
stay as they are – though perhaps there are even things among sensibles
that do stay as they are – rather, it is because they have the perfection of
existence from themselves. For that which is said to be primary
Substantiality must not be the shadow of existence, but rather have the
fullness of existence. And existence is full when it receives the form of
thinking and of life. Thinking, therefore, living, and existence are
together in the realm of Being. If, therefore, there is Being, then there
is Intellect; and if there is Intellect, then the thinking is together with its
existing.

[Anonymous No.16518687]

>>16518682
Thinking, therefore, is many and not one. So, it is necessary for
anything which is not like this not to be thinking. And we must take as
really distinct Human Being and the act of intellection of Human
Being, and the act of intellection of Horse and Horse, and the act of
intellection of Justice and Justice. So, all things are double, and the
one is two, and, again, the two combine into one. But the Good is
not among these, nor is it each one, nor is it the totality of these
twos, nor is it two at all. As for how the two come from the One, this
has been discussed elsewhere. But something which ‘transcends
Substantiality’ must also transcend thinking. So, it is not strange if it
does not know itself. For it does not have within itself something to
learn, being one. Nor must other things know it. For it gives to them
something greater and better than knowing it since it is the Good of
other things; rather, it allows them to get hold of it, insofar as they are
able, by identifying with it.

[Anonymous No.16518898]

>>16516904

One of the major impasses in advancing scientific understanding of consciousness stems from focusing exclusively on phenomenal contents and global states of arousal, instead of also on consciousness itself, or consciousness-as-such (Josipovic, 2014; Josipovic and Baars, 2015).
Whereas consciousness in general can be seen as the capacity for experience and knowledge, consisting of global states and phenomenal contents, consciousness-as- such is its foundational aspect, a non-conceptual nondual awareness, in itself empty of all other phenomenal content, yet reflexively self-aware (Dunne, 2015; Josipovic, 2014; Rabjam, 2007).
The central idea proposed here is that consciousness-as-such knows itself to be conscious or aware, directly, unmediated by conceptual or symbolic representa- tions or re-representations, and without needing to structure this knowing as subject- object duality. This non-representational reflexivity is the essential property of consciousness-as-such that makes it what it is. It is this that fundamentally differen- tiates consciousness-as-such from all other perceptual, affective and cognitive pro- cesses. It makes consciousness-as-such a unique kind, sui generis, and irreducible.
On the other hand, consciousness as ordinarily experienced is based on mental representations, such as concepts and symbols, that operate within the dualistic struc- ture of subject vs. object (Josipovic, 2014). Its reflexivity operates via conceptual representations as well, and can be regarded as an indirect reflexivity, a reflection of the inherent non-conceptual reflexivity of consciousness-as-such in the concep- tual processes. This conceptual reflexivity is, likewise, the main property of ordinary consciousness (Peters, 2013).
The idea presented here is related to both the reflexivity theories as applied to ordinary representational consciousness, and the scientifically informed theories of consciousness-as-such (Metzinger, 2018; Peters, 2013). It thus differs from the the- ories of consciousness as qualia, or as metacognition (Block, 2007; Kriegel and Williford, 2006; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011). Reflexivity theories are well known in the science of consciousness and philosophy of mind, but consciousness-as-such is not, and the implications of its non-representational reflexivity have not yet been explored (Peters, 2013). Conversely, there are recent scientific theories of consciousness-as-such that recognize its non-conceptual nature, but do not under- stand that reflexivity is its essential property (Metzinger, 2018).

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30732841/