/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.16191472]

What actually happens to a thing-in-itself after Kant?
Kant didn't doubt the existence of object outside of outselves, but Schulze's argument stands. How does Fichte fix that? The representations are the work of the Ego, the I, right? But what does he say about the actual objects around us? How do Schelling and Hegel evolve from that?

[Anonymous No.16191522]

[Spoiler]spook[/spoiler]

[Anonymous No.16192005]

>>16191522
That was just sad.

[Anonymous No.16192594]

>>16191472
They just become full idealists. They simply drop the "the ground of our representations is in noumena" and allow our entire representations to be ideally constructed from the ground up

[Anonymous No.16192626]

>>16191472
Read The World as Will and Representation and find out.

[Anonymous No.16193043]

bump

[Anonymous No.16193068]

LOOOOL
can i get a qrd on german idealism???
Xddd Xoxo
cheers trannies!

>delet this thread please @m0ds

[Anonymous No.16194124]

>>16192626
Based Schopenhauerian

[Anonymous No.16194173]

>>16193068
nigga at least tried to have a conversation

[Anonymous No.16195217]

>>16192594
You mean like subjective idealism? That seems far-fetched. Isn't Hegel's idealism the "objective idealism"? How do they explain how the phenomena comes to be from our own I.

I got fucking lost after Kant, excuse my (hopefully more) questions.

[Anonymous No.16196204]

>>16195217

[Anonymous No.16196245]

>>16191472
Fichte agreed with Schulze, so he solves the problem by eliminating the thing in itself. In Kant the synthetic unity of the manifold, objective validity, etc all occurs at the level of the mind: you bring together empirical appearance under pure forms of space and time and concepts including the categories, and Kant says they're all brought together by spontaneity, the 'I think' is fixed to them, and he calls it transcendental apperception, essentially meaning that self-consciousness is necessary for object-consciousness and accompanies it. Fichte basically latches on to all of that and realizes (as did Hegel) that you don't need the thing in itself to do all of these things. So objects are ideal. The difference he's interested in is representations that seem to force themselves to us as if by necessity, and those that come about through our freedom. He spends his time trying to deduce everything from self-consciousness by means of a dialectical process. Schelling was influenced more by the Critique of Judgment where Kant discusses the teleology we perceive (though by imposition) in nature and living things, Schelling made teleology internal to and immanent in things rather than imposed on them by us, and he conceived of that as the objective counterpart to subjective consciousness, that is how he moved past Fichte. Hegel went further more so in his systematicity, because he preserves this aspect of Schelling's. He does shift his focus to realizing the idea at the end of the dialectical progress though, which Kant and Fichte conceived merely as a regulative but never reachable ideal.

[Anonymous No.16196434]

>>16196245
Thank you for such a clear answer, it's a nice change.
How exactly does that differ from, let's say, Berkeley's idealism, or, in extreme case, solipsism? How does it move beyond Kant's refutation of idealism in the first Critique?

[Anonymous No.16196474]

>>16196434
Berkeley isn't a full-blown idealist, since he makes minds themselves non-ideal. He makes everything except minds themselves depend on minds. Fichte is a full-blown idealist, he says the I posits itself, in other words, even mind depends on consciousness (of itself, which is self-consciousness) to exist. Fichte talks as if there exists an 'absolute I' which might be something like the unifying mind we're all part of, but he also talks as if he were speaking more particularly about the developing of a specific individual. I can't really tell you how Fichte moves beyond the refutation of idealism, but bear in mind that the refutation of idealism can itself be read idealistically. In it, Kant doesn't actually want to prove things in themselves exist. Rather he wants to prove that there is an external sense as well as an internal sense, and that is where he brings in space, time, matter, etc. He thinks of Berkeley as someone who says all sense is internal sense. That's probably not accurate. Also, Kant wouldn't have liked what Fichte was doing and probably would see it as still bad idealism. The point is Fichte probably could say he was perfectly in line with the Critique of Pure Reason in spite of his idealism, he actually did see himself that way and saw the Critique as more idealist than Kant intended it to be seen, and for him that was the right and good way to read it. Fichte reading Kant was like Plotinus reading Plato in this creative exegetical way: they attribute their novel ideas to the people they're reading, but these days we would say the originals (Plato, Kant) didn't go as far as the exegetes (Plotinus, Fichte).

[Anonymous No.16196565]

Where exactly does the subjective subject-object (or, I guess, just identity of subject and object if we're talking strictly about Fichte now) appear and work then? What's the origin of the object in relation to subject?

[Anonymous No.16196576]

>>16196565
Forgot the >>16196474

[Anonymous No.16197080]

>>16196565
The spontaneity of mind doesn't just bring up the "ICH" (the I) (the subject - not the absolute I) but also the "nicht-ICH" (the not-I) (the object).

The problem with Fichtes work is that we dont posses the words to express whats really happening; its something "you just need to get" (intellectual intuition/perception). That's something Hegel didn't like to much. For Hegel real knowledge cant be esoteric like the Fichteian "ICH" but rather completly exoteric and explainable. That's also why Hegel had problems with the philosophical schools of his time (aesthetic platonism, reinhold, etc). These schools taught that you cant fully grasp the absolute with thought but rather get it like an epiphany.

Hegel took Spinozas substance and combined it with Fichtes philosophy of subjectivity. Schelling contributed to this since he was the one who was working out the similarities between Spinozas substance and Fichtes "ICH".

PS.: not a native english speaker

[Anonymous No.16197483]

>>16195217
No, I don't mean subjective idealism, I mean "full idealism" as I said. However plenty have criticized Fichte's idealism for being subjective.

"How do they explain how the phenomena comes to be from our own I?"

For Fichte, there can be nothing in the I which is not posited by the I- in the vein of a monad without windows (without the metaphysical baggage of Leibniz). The I is self-determining (self-consciousness) which is necessarily a limitation or negation of itself, as all determining is a limitation. What you perceive as phenomena is your perception of your own limitations, which are ultimately self-imposed.

For Schelling (from middle schelling on) we drop the subjective nature of the absolute self- that is, the self which stands as a ground for the emperical self and nature, or the original unity of subject and object. Because, as Holderlin pointed out, such a being loses any distinction of being an I at all, and can only really be called being in general. This is Schelling's "absolute subject-object".

For Hegel, phenomena can be taken as absolute basically in itself, already, and the idea of a subject and the idea of a thing-in-itself are both dialectical viewpoints of appearances which shift the responsibility for it back and forth in attempts to reconcile its contradictions. The end result of this process is the knowledge that phenomena is already rational, and so rather than beginning with the Absolute (unity of subject and object) we end with it as a result.

[Anonymous No.16197518]

>>16197080
Sorry but this is wrong. "Intuition" for Fichte doesn't mean "something intuitive" in the colloquial sense. Read Fichte's response to Schulz for a simple explanation of intellectual intuition. He means it in the Kantian sense as outlined in the third Critique, or better as outlines by Maimon in his Essays on Transcendental Idealism. Intellectual intuition only means that the objective existence of a thing is not a different thing than the subject. If God were to think of a chair, because his knowledge is perfect and complete, his thought would at the same time be a real chair. There is no difference here between God's concept of a chair and an intuition of a chair. That is intellectual intuition. For Fichte, we posses such a talent in a particular sense, which is self-consciousness, because there can be no self exiting independently of consciousness of it- our consciousness of the self is at the same time the self. The self is nothing other than a process of self-consciousness, and hence, an intellectual intuition. There is nothing esoteric about it.

[Anonymous No.16197535]

>>16191472
No one relevant cares about your german idealist lunacy read actual philosophy

[Frater Asemlen !XS8vrClKs2 No.16197570]

Tldr, Hegel and so forth believe there is no noumena, only Phenomena. The question and problem is the unfolding of knowledge/phenomena, the more as time goes on, the more knowledge we gain of objects and thus more and more phenomena expands into itself. There is nothing but phenomena.

[Anonymous No.16197600]

>>16197483 here

>>16196565
The origin of the object in relation to the subject is this- the original absolute self, which is infinite, attempts to determine itself. Such a determination must presuppose something which is not the self, as there can be no determination without negation (something which is not the infinite positivity of the absolute self). In the beginning of the Wissenschaftslehre he begins with the I, then from this self determining we have the Not-I. These would cancel themselves out so now to reconcile the I must posit some original categories- namely, limitation, in which the unity of the I and Not-I results in the concept of degrees- to cancel the reality thereof not altogether but in part. Through this final step things are posited as divisible. Now that we have some basic categories, Fichte goes on to derive the rest of the Kantian categories from these relationships in like manner.

Now, what is the origin of the self's original drive to self-determining? Why did it not stop at being infinite, and initially direct its energies inward (so to speak)?

Here Fichte is guilty of his own thing-in-itself. Fichte's "check" or Anstoß is described as a "feeling" that the I has which it feels is alien to it, which causes its original drive to determine itself. This makes no sense but it's what he said. In his original Wissenschaftslehre the reader is left to imagine this original calling as something from God or something. Later on Fichte revises this to be something imposed by other rational beings, thus "transcendentally" proving the existence of other rational beings outside yourself, e.g, as a condition for the possibility of experience, thus relieving himself of his solipsistic accusations &c

[Anonymous No.16198168]

>>16197600
this is what i meant by esoteric (its literal translation) lmao

[Anonymous No.16198174]

>>16197535
get off this board you are the kind of person who made this board become shit

[Anonymous No.16198189]

>>16197535
>relevant
I just wanted to let you know that I took the time out of my day to read your post, and urgently need to tell you that you are a complete and total faggot.

[Anonymous No.16198212]

>>16197570
> there is no noumena, only Phenomena

in itself there are no noumena but as a moment in a dialectical movement there can be noumena

[Anonymous No.16198353]

>>16197535
what is actual philosophy?

[Anonymous No.16198641]

>>16197535
Become the dirt beneath my feet, coward.

[Anonymous No.16199269]

>>16197600
Holy fuck, I somehow forgot about the Not-I as the limit.
Thank you, you're great at explaining these ideas. I never found such clear explanations of German idealism, either here on in general. I'd like to see you explain Hegel, though.

[Anonymous No.16200905]

>>16199269
Thank you.
I think I could explain Hegel but it would be easier to explain sections of him (e.g the transition of quality to quantity, the chapter on force and understanding, etc) than to give a broad overview. At the end of the day I'm not even really sure exactly what Hegel is thinking with many things, for example his transition from the Logic to phil of Nature - but everyone else (Feurbach for example) is equally confused by it so..

[Anonymous No.16201236]

What's Schulze's argument?

[Anonymous No.16201243]

>>16200905
>that screenshot
Pic related, it's Kant.
>that penguin of Jena
Based.

[Anonymous No.16201342]

Daily reminder that the judgement for which noumena exist do not contraddict Kant's philosophy, since it is immediatly derived from a negative judgement of the causal powers of our intellect in relationship to our experience.

[Anonymous No.16201369]

Can I get a rundown on how Nagarjuna's philosophy and Kant's relate to each other? I've seen them compared and I can see some resemblance but I don't really understand Kant's (or probably Nagarjuna's) stance well enough to know exactly how they compare. How significant is Nagarjuna's totally apophatic stance of absolute truth compared to Kant's seemingly more direct concern with "things in themselves"?

Sorry if this is a dumb question but I'm curious how much east and west really intersect here.

[Anonymous No.16201375]

>>16201342
in contradicts Kant in the letter, but not in the spirit. By the letter particularly in the B version (refutation of idealism etc)

[Anonymous No.16201427]

>>16201369
every thought of Nagarjuna can be found in platonic philosophy. it belongs to an earlier metaphysics than modern philosophy

[Anonymous No.16201471]

>>16201375
I don't think it does. Tell me what you think, I'd like to discuss it with someone.

Kant's argument can be easily derived from the trascendental deduction, and it is imho pretty straightforward: since the intellect is a synthetic faculty, it is not sufficient for the production of an experience. To put it more bluntly: intellect cannot "kickstart" an experience by creating a first representation, which can then be reassembled by reproductive imagination, leading to the richness of contents we can find in our experience.
Since the intellect deals with every phenomena I can represent (because our trascendental schemes requires pure concepts), I can extend this causal insufficiency to phenomena too. So I end up with a judgement that might sound like "phenomena are not causally sufficient for the presence of my experience", then add a second premise "I have an experience" and reach the conclusion "phenomena are not the totality of what exists/are not the totality of causes" (which is, as I've said in my previous post, a determinate judgement on phenomena, and we are entitled to those). But what is both existent and not a phenomenon, is a noumenon (in the negative sense): which means that the judgement "noumena exist" is analitically identical to the previously mentioned conclusion. Also notice that, as he says in the logic section, negations do not determinate any concept. For example, "not-dog" does not represent any determinate object that is not a dog. This means that even given this conclusion, we have not assigned any determinate quality to noumena.

Kant would have incurred in a contradiction had he made this assessment through the use of determinate judgements concerning noumena, but he didn't: rather he obtained it through a negative judgement of the causal power of phenomena, and that is perfectly compatibile with his trascendental philosophy.

I'm sure this argument could be phrased more elegantly than I did, hopefully you'll still be able to get the gist of it.

[Anonymous No.16201795]

>>16201471
1. We get the content from without, because the intellect is just a synthetic (formal) faculty.
2. I can extend this insufficiency to phenomena too.
3. Therefore phenomena are not sufficient for my experience.

Is this your argument? Which insufficiency are you extending to phenomena, and how? A "phenomena" is already an experience, which means it has already been synthesized with the forms of intuition by the time we have it. The insufficiency of perception is its lack of form, which it gains by the intellect. Kant had always insisted that we get the content, or pure quality, from raw sensation. Did you mean that this raw sensation or perception is what is insufficient, or did you mean phenomena, which I take to mean representation/experience?

What is both existent and not a phenomenon is the subject, which makes up for the "causal insufficiency". Did I misunderstand you somewhere?

[Anonymous No.16201902]

>>16198174
>get off this board you are the kind of person who made this board become shit
Tell that to Schopenhhauer then since he makes the same point in The World as Will and Representation

[Anonymous No.16201918]

>>16198189
your opinion isn't relevant

[Anonymous No.16201998]

>>16201471
I don't completely understand your post but
>So I end up with a judgement that might sound like "phenomena are not causally sufficient for the presence of my experience", then add a second premise "I have an experience" and reach the conclusion "phenomena are not the totality of what exists/are not the totality of causes"
Phenomena are not causes in the Kantian scheme, causality is part of the phenomena. A phenomenon doesn't cause anything, it's a just a bundle of sense data which the mind imposes the concept of causality upon.
>But what is both existent and not a phenomenon, is a noumenon (in the negative sense): which means that the judgement "noumena exist" is analitically identical to the previously mentioned conclusion. Also notice that, as he says in the logic section, negations do not determinate any concept. For example, "not-dog" does not represent any determinate object that is not a dog. This means that even given this conclusion, we have not assigned any determinate quality to noumena.
But you ascribed existence to the noumenon, which is a positive determination.

[Anonymous No.16202010]

>>16201236
his Aenesidemus where he does these criticisms is only like 10 pages long. It's a good read you can read it in just a few min

[Anonymous No.16202062]

>>16191472
It's recognized but essentially dropped: all focus then shifted to 'phenomena'.
Schopenhauer does instance music as an instance of palpable thing-in-itselfhood (relative to something like Hegelian 'spirit,' which isn't) and of course the early Nietzsche picked this up and associated it with 'the Dionysian,' i.e. the super real.

[Anonymous No.16202085]

>>16202062
Nietzsche was essentially a monist who preached pluralism

[Anonymous No.16202104]

biology

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ii1aLFfKP8

[Anonymous No.16202180]

>>16191522
press ctrl+s for the proper spoiler

[Anonymous No.16202841]

>>16200905
Let's test that on single ideas (I still have trouble with a lot of concepts despite using two Hegel dictionaries).
How about Concept and Idea, since I already mentioned them? Is his explanation of identity same as Fichte's? What exactly is essence?

[Anonymous No.16204129]

>>16200905
The Encyclopedia Nature is perhaps his most beautiful book; the lectures on the History of Philosophy, Art, and Religion (compiled from notes students took when in his classes) are by far and away his clearest works, i.e. very easy to understand. Hegel could be clear when he wanted to be but simultaneously felt that philosophy *itself* should speak a certain language, the legacy of Kant, Fichte, and his younger buddy Schelling.

[Anonymous No.16204675]

>>16201795
>Kant had always insisted that we get the content, or pure quality, from raw sensation. Did you mean that this raw sensation or perception is what is insufficient, or did you mean phenomena, which I take to mean representation/experience?
What I mean is that said raw sensation cannot be derived from the rearrangement of phenomenic representations (through the faculty of reproductive imagination), rather, said phenomenic representations already presuppose that raw sensation (obtained through the passive faculty of sensibility).
>What is both existent and not a phenomenon is the subject, which makes up for the "causal insufficiency". Did I misunderstand you somewhere?
Phenomena are excluded insofar as the subject's intellect is excluded too. This argument proves, if it attains, that a) my intellectual faculties are not enough for my experience to take place (causal insufficiency) and b) obviously, neither are his products (my representations, including objective phenomena).
>>16201998
>Phenomena are not causes in the Kantian scheme, causality is part of the phenomena. A phenomenon doesn't cause anything, it's a just a bundle of sense data which the mind imposes the concept of causality upon.
Phenomena can absolutely be causes in the logical sense. For example, if, through my reproductive imagination, I recombine two representation of mine into one, those two representations are properly speaking causes of the third, insofar as thr third representation could have not been represented by me without the first two. In my argument, phenomena cannot be the cause of my experience, since their representation already requires an experience (and also because intellect is a synthetic faculty which cannot manifacture purely by itself a representation).
>But you ascribed existence to the noumenon, which is a positive determination.
Existence is not a positive detetmination. It is not a predicate, and it doesn't determine a concept in any shape or form. The negation of the phenomenon is not determined, in this argument.
>>16202010
I cannot find it, do you have a link?

[Anonymous No.16205732]

>>16202085
Much like the Jews who are nationalists but preach globalism

[Anonymous No.16205976]

>>16200905
Have you ever read any Beiser? I thought he was a great source for exposition of German Idealism

[Anonymous No.16205988]

glad to see the thread was still here in the morning

>>16204129
Yeah I don't have any problem reading Hegel really, my issue was with his transition from the Logic to Nature. Many individual parts of Hegel's system can be made sense of, but, you know, the Logic is not Hegel's system, or PoS is not Hegel's system- only the whole is.

At the end of the Logic we have climbed to the Idea in and for itself, the completed Idea. Now, suddenly, we are to make a transition to Nature who's basis is the Logic. The Idea in its infinite freedom, in the "truth of itself, resolves to release itself as nature, or in the form of being-other, from itself". So after the concept has climbed to its highest point as the absolute Idea in the Logic, it now "resolves" to make itself subjectless again, to degrade itself into mere being, to throw itself into the bad externality of space and time, and the goal of this? To walk off this degraded position into once again being Spirit for itself. I understand the motive of Hegel doing it this way, but, without a necessary reason for this initial transition from Logic to Nature - I can't think of any - Hegel remains for me an inspired theosophy.

But really throughout Hegel it is his transitions (as many others have noted) that are the most problematic. PoS is notoriously bad for this, but, in the Logic too there are some very ambitious leaps. An example off the top of my head is the transition from copulation in Life to Cognition. The transition only works in the most abstract formal way, only according to the system as presupposed. In the final process of Life we retrace our steps through the forms of the concept - universal, particular, singular - and having worked through this we must be at a higher vantage point, which he has proclaimed to be cognition. In terms of content there is no necessity here. There is infinite other content which could assume this form. This kind of thing happens frequently enough that I think

Schelling's criticism here is correct:
"I myself believe that one could easily produce this so-called Logic in ten different ways. Yet I do not for this reason underestimate the value of many uncommonly clever, particularly methodological remarks which are to be found in Hegel’s Logic."

[Anonymous No.16205997]

>>16205988 (cont.)

Unfortunately the transitions aren't a small issue, because the dialectic being valid rests entirely on the transitions. The thesis is that the categories which have hitherto been considered distinct irreconcilable categories actually permeate and contain eachother as a negatively propelled movement - the concept. Simply describing the phenomenological or internal logic of every gestalt is interesting but the last judgement is in the transitions.

Kierkegaard echos Schelling and is equally right when he says,
"If Hegel had written the whole of his logic and then said, in the preface or some other place, that it was merely an experiment in thought in which he had even begged the question in many places, then he would certainly have been the greatest thinker who had ever lived. As it is, he is merely comic.”

[Anonymous No.16206124]

>>16204675
A pedantic point but you are mixing up cause and ground. The transcendental category of cause has its basis in the understanding, for the purpose of synthesizing the order of events in time. It does not make any sense to be employed to talk about anything outside of phenomena. Ground otoh has its basis in reason.

>Phenomena cannot be the cause of my experience, since their representation already requires an experience
Phenomena is experience, these two terms are interchangeable. That one representation already requires an earlier representation is an a priori requirement, this defect exists in the subject, you can't extend it to something outside the subject, e.g metaphysics. This is all covered in the antinomies, no?

>I cannot find it, do you have a link?
Search libgen for "Between Kant & Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism", isbn 0872205045, translations by the excellent Giovanni & Harris

[Anonymous No.16206871]

Thank you for this thread. Neoplatonist threads and the even rarer German idealism threads are the only good philosophy threads on this board anymore, maybe only good threads at all anymore and I feel lucky to catch them.

[Anonymous No.16206967]

>>16206871
weird, this post didn't bump the thread

[Anonymous No.16207232]

>>16206871
Rare are those who truly understand what is worth understanding. I don't and that's why I made the thread.

[Anonymous No.16207399]

>>16206124
>The transcendental category of cause has its basis in the understanding, for the purpose of synthesizing the order of events in time. It does not make any sense to be employed to talk about anything outside of phenomena. Ground otoh has its basis in reason.
If I have to be pedant too, Kant calls them both "cause", the distinction he refers to is "cause in the logical sense/trascendental sense" (check the chapter dedicated to the anphibolies for a reerence). Feel free to reread my previous argument by substituting the word "ground" to "cause"
>Phenomena is experience, these two terms are interchangeable
This is not how Kant uses these terms, a phenomenon is properly a content of experience. I'm using here the term "experience" to denote the group including all the representations accompanying my "I think".
>That one representation already requires an earlier representation is an a priori requirement, this defect exists in the subject, you can't extend it to something outside the subject, e.g metaphysics. This is all covered in the antinomies, no?
What I cannot do is using that insufficiency to determine an Idea of pure reason (like it happens with he world-Idea in the antinomies). But this is not what happens here. Furthermore, the existence of noumena can be proved insofar as only they (given my previous argument) make any representation possible (for, without them, no experience could be kickstarted), and as a criterion of validity, this is accepted and established from the TD onwards. The antinomies would not take place, had this criterion be satisfied too by them (i.e. if it was proven apodictically that for me to have an experience, the world had to be infinite in size)

[Anonymous No.16207472]

>>16207399
this just sounds like a cosmological proof

[Anonymous No.16207531]

>>16207472
Substantiate please

[Anonymous No.16208274]

>>16205997
To me the transition from Logic to Nature (in the Encyclopedia) seemed both 'logical and natural' because it coordinated with actually coming 'alive' as it were and the only possible middle ground between Logic and the concluding volume Spirit (not the POS, obviously): it also serves to place what coordinates with the natural sciences along with all the substantiality to think metaphorically in a middle ground (soft and hard science-poetry/religion) that will conclude 'philosophically' with the coming Spirit volume, when the concept returns 'loaded up' with all it gets from Nature. Using Kant as a foil the Logic is Hegel's (far more active) 'pure reason' analogue- and where else has the fully loaded mind to go but outside itself, i.e. Nature, once it's primed and ready for use? Something like this, at any rate.
Yeah, the jumps or transitions you mention are often awkward, and the Schelling quotation especially valid. The insights throughout in the Zusätze and text itself are however invaluable (and are still being mined!) so I'm glad I read it.
It's weird to be most interested in poetry and the literary essay with a fuckton of philosophy under one's belt; not being fully committed to any philosophical project makes me less inclined to be so critically exact when reading an early 19th c philosopher (I mean, he did what he could)- enough simply to have gained a sense of what Hegel was ftmp 'about'.
Very glad I tackled him though (and Kant). A major lacuna for me is Leibniz whom one day I hope to 'get' as well!

[Anonymous No.16208836]

>>16208274
You read Kant and Hegel without Leibniz? Crazy. Read his New Essays on Human Understanding after you read the Monadology, it's one of my favorite works ever

[Anonymous No.16209524]

>>16208836
Thanks, m8- will do when the time comes and it definitely approaches. Reading stuff now reflective of my current writing project, iow's doing research, mostly historical stuff, which is always a pleasure.
Weird that I never even thought to read Leibniz!

[Anonymous No.16210228]

>>16205976
Who?

[Anonymous No.16211377]

>>16202085
Filtered

[Anonymous No.16211505]

>>16210228
Not him and I don't know, but I'd say Frederick Beiser.

[Anonymous No.16211737]

>>16205988

Schelling was so far ahead of his time with his Absolute as becoming, he almost solved the the thing-in -itself quandary . The problem with reading Schelling is so much integrated in Hegel's dialectics that its hard to separate the two. I wonder if anyone has tried to re-interpret his philosophy of nature again but through entirely immanentist lens . Like trying to "Deleuzefy" Schelling in a sense. But I guess these "grand theories" are a bit passe in modern philosophy.

[Anonymous No.16211755]

>>16191472
>What actually happens to a thing-in-itself after Kant?
Art and music in particular reveal specs of it

[Anonymous No.16211817]

>>16204675
>Phenomena can absolutely be causes in the logical sense. For example, if, through my reproductive imagination, I recombine two representation of mine into one, those two representations are properly speaking causes of the third, insofar as thr third representation could have not been represented by me without the first two.
Hold on, there is no such thing as a cause in the logical sense. A cause is not a logical distinction, what you are describing is just a cause in the ordinary sense of the term.
>In my argument, phenomena cannot be the cause of my experience, since their representation already requires an experience (and also because intellect is a synthetic faculty which cannot manifacture purely by itself a representation).
I don't understand what are you trying to say, but on the Kantian framework a "cause" does not exist outside of representations. It is just a concept the mind uses to organize sense data. You are speaking of causes as if there are actual things, you need to drop Kantianism to say that.

[Anonymous No.16212148]

>>16211817
>Hold on, there is no such thing as a cause in the logical sense. A cause is not a logical distinction, what you are describing is just a cause in the ordinary sense of the term.
>I don't understand what are you trying to say, but on the Kantian framework a "cause" does not exist outside of representations. It is just a concept the mind uses to organize sense data. You are speaking of causes as if there are actual things, you need to drop Kantianism to say that

As I've said in another post, Kant establishes these terms (logical/trascendental sense, concerning the use of a category) in the anphiboly section. As another anon pointed out, you might be familiar with said distinction (when it comes to the category of causality) with the terms "ground/cause". Feel free to substitute the word "ground" to the word "cause" in that post, maybe it will make it a bit more intelleggible.

[Anonymous No.16212167]

>>16211755
The true successor of Kant

[Anonymous No.16212199]

>>16212167
>the true successor
>only values the first edition of the first critique
Yeah, okay

[Anonymous No.16212228]

>>16212199
Being a successor doesn't necessitate acceptance of the predecessor's full corpus. And for that matter, you'll find that the relationships between Schopenhauer's aesthetics and discussion of freedom are not developed without Kantian influence. Regarding the latter, Schopenhauer accepts that agency of action arises noumenally.

[Anonymous No.16212271]

Btfo by Rorty

[Anonymous No.16212526]

>>16212228
I guess then that I can be the true successor of Schoprnhauer by disregarding all of his major texts, apart from the first edition of his doctoral thesis

[Anonymous No.16212649]

>>16212148
Okay I understand what logical grounding is but I still don't see how it makes sense to describe a Kantian phenomenon as a cause. And especially it makes no sense to describe a Kantian noumenon as a cause. I am assuming here you are talking about actual causes, not just logical inferences and the like.

[Anonymous No.16212699]

>>16212649
I meant "cause" only in the logical sense ("ground"): their existence is logically required for an experience to take place. Without it, there would be no representation whatsoever. This goes back to my initial argument, which explains in what sense we can say that they exist, and why this is not contradictory.
Basically, it is a standard trascendental argument.

[Anonymous No.16212700]

>>16204675
>Existence is not a positive detetmination. It is not a predicate, and it doesn't determine a concept in any shape or form. The negation of the phenomenon is not determined, in this argument.
That move comes with a cost though. If existence is not a positive determination, and you haven't given the noumenon any other positive determination either, what is there to exclude the possible identification of the noumenon with nothing?

[Anonymous No.16212720]

Does the world exist if there's nobody to percieve it? Where was the world before humans?

[Anonymous No.16212747]

>>16212526
All you've done is reassert your original position in different words. Again, Schopenhauer directly engaged with Kant's second and third critiques when he formulated his own aesthetics and ethics. That's far from disregarding them, as you seem to claim. Just because he critiqued Kant's view of these things does not mean he just nonchalantly dispensed with him. The very reason why he engaged with those texts is because he saw it necessary to constructively respond to the greatest philosophical developments in modernity.

Following your assessment, many would be therefore be wrong to say that Nietzsche was a successor of Schopenhauer for the mere fact that he ended up repudiating Schopenhauer's pessimism. And this would be notwithstanding the fact Nietzsche engaged with Schopenhauer across pretty much all of his writings from Birth of Tragedy onwards.

You're conflating disregard with critique.

[Anonymous No.16212771]

>>16212720
yes

[Anonymous No.16212802]

>>16212700
I'm not sure we can take "nothing" as a possible ground, since it would contradict the judgement "my intellectual faculties alone, and all their products, are not sufficient grounds for my experience to take place" (compared to the judgement "my intellectual faculties, all their products, and nothing are sufficient grounds for my experience to take place" - the two judgements seem at a first glance analitically identical, but one is true and the other is false).
I must say, yours is a very interesting question, I never thought before about the fact that noumena, in the negative sense, should negate not only phenomena, but also nothing. I'll certainky think more about this tidbit.

[Anonymous No.16212810]

>>16191472
Kant threads really bring out the best in /lit/

[Anonymous No.16212992]

>>16212802
The way I think about it is that if you told me that there is an X in the fridge, and you only described said item in negative terms only (it's not an apple, and it's not a banana) I could respond "well, maybe X is nothing at all, there is no X in the fridge" and it would be consistent with the description you gave me (it's neither an apple or a banana).
Now you could get around this by saying that "existence" is a real predicate, and X exists. In this case X cannot be identified with nothing, because the predicate of existence applies to it.
But if you say that existence is not a real predicate, there isn't anything wrong with me saying that X might just literally be nothing.

And since we are on this topic, I think there are some good reasons to be sceptical of the idea that existence is not a real predicate. If "dragons exist" is analytic, then saying "dragons" and saying "dragons exist" literally means the same thing. But surely someone who informs us that "dragons exist" has something more to say than someone who just utters the word "dragons".
I am sympathetic myself to a kind of ontology that has "matters of fact" as its broadest ontological commitments. So as a matter of fact, there is a piece of paper in the desk in front of me, and as a matter of fact there are no living dragons. On this account, to say that something exists simply means that it is included in the collection of all matters of fact.

[Anonymous No.16213140]

>>16212992
>Now you could get around this by saying that "existence" is a real predicate, and X exists. In this case X cannot be identified with nothing, because the predicate of existence applies to it. But if you say that existence is not a real predicate, there isn't anything wrong with me saying that X might just literally be nothing.
But I haven't said that, I have said that even by adding nothing to that judgement, you do not obtain sufficient ground for experience. Which is also why I said that to be more precise, it should be said that noumena are both not-phenomena and not-nothing. Kant never explicitly did so (maybe this objection of yours never occurred to him), but I don't think that this move raises any problem. After all, if we wanted to say that, by definition, noumena could be nothing, following my initial argument, we would just end up with the conclusion "noumena that are not-nothing exist" (since the nothing would end up being part of the judgement "my intellectual faculties, their products, and nothing cannot be sufficient grounds for my experience to take place"). So, it is mostly a matter of terminology

>If "dragons exist" is analytic, then saying "dragons" and saying "dragons exist" literally means the same thing. But surely someone who informs us that "dragons exist" has something more to say than someone who just utters the word "dragons".
This is not what "existence is not a predicate" means imho, rather, it means that by adding "exists" to "dragon", the concept of dragon remains the same: existence is a MODAL category, it just tells us in what modality the concept is to be intended.
So, if I say "dragons exists", "dragon don't exist" and "dragon might exist", in all these judgements the concept of "dragon" remains identical. Conversely, using qualitative categories, saying "al. dragons are red" and "all dragons are only black" give us two different concepts of "dragon" (and before that judgement we have a third different concept of "dragon", in which their color is not determined yet).

[Anonymous No.16213449]

>>16213140
>But I haven't said that, I have said that even by adding nothing to that judgement, you do not obtain sufficient ground for experience. Which is also why I said that to be more precise, it should be said that noumena are both not-phenomena and not-nothing. Kant never explicitly did so (maybe this objection of yours never occurred to him), but I don't think that this move raises any problem. After all, if we wanted to say that, by definition, noumena could be nothing, following my initial argument, we would just end up with the conclusion "noumena that are not-nothing exist" (since the nothing would end up being part of the judgement "my intellectual faculties, their products, and nothing cannot be sufficient grounds for my experience to take place"). So, it is mostly a matter of terminology
I know that you haven't explicitly said it, my point is that if you define the noumenon purely negatively, as not being a phenomenon,there is nothing in your definition that precludes it being identified with nothing. "Nothing" is not a phenomenon, and so it satisfies the one criterion in your definition. If you want to avoid this possibility you need to include in your definition of the noumenon some positive determination.
>This is not what "existence is not a predicate" means imho, rather, it means that by adding "exists" to "dragon", the concept of dragon remains the same: existence is a MODAL category, it just tells us in what modality the concept is to be intended.
>So, if I say "dragons exists", "dragon don't exist" and "dragon might exist", in all these judgements the concept of "dragon" remains identical. Conversely, using qualitative categories, saying "al. dragons are red" and "all dragons are only black" give us two different concepts of "dragon" (and before that judgement we have a third different concept of "dragon", in which their color is not determined yet).
Not sure I follow, are you trying to reduce existence to (epistemic, I assume) modality? So "dragons exist" translates to something like "we have good evidence for dragons"? That doesn't seem right. You can be a fideist and claim that dragons exist with zero evidence.

[Anonymous No.16213480]

>>16212810
To be honest, I made it mainly with Hegel in mind, as I am currently being butt-fucked by him. I just want to check some things.