/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.16121689]

>Nagarjuna's claim that emptiness does not entail nihilism, because emptiness means simply that entities lack independent existence, is untenable. Nagarjuna's superficially convincing argument completely fails to address the real criticism which his opponents are making of his philosophy. Nagarjuna does not in fact deny only that there are independently existing entities. Nagarjuna denies also that there are any entities which arise independently of conceptual construction. Nagarjuna's opponents do not think that the universal dependent origination of entities would result in nihilism. But they do consider that, if all entities were to have, as Nagarjuna contends, conceptually constructed existence, then nihilism would indeed be entailed.

...

>But it is not just that the notion that all entities are conceptual constructs precludes the possibility of a public world, and hence of compassionate activity. In addition, it would appear that Nagarjuna's opponents are right, after all, to accuse Nagarjuna of nihilism. For Nagarjuna is not merely saying- despite his apparent claims to the contrary- that entities are dependently originating, but further that all entities are entirely conceptually constructed. But if all entities are entirely conceptually constructed, then there can be nothing unconstructed out of which conceptually constructed entities can be constructed. And if there is nothing unconstructed out of which the conceptually constructed entities are constructed, then these conceptually constructed entities cannot exist. Conceptually constructed entity z might be constructed on the basis of y. Y might also be constructed on the basis of x. And so on. But at some point this regress must stop. Not everything can be a product of conceptual construction, because 'conceptual construction' requires a basis or material which is not itself conceptually constructed. To claim otherwise would be to advocate that the entire world is created ex nihilo!

[Anonymous No.16121694]

>One can see here, perhaps, the cause of the Abhidharma (and the Yogacara) objection to Madhyamaka philosophy. Also, the notion of conceptual construction would appear to entail - not only something foundational on the basis of which constructed entities can be constructed, but also - someone or something foundational who or what is doing the constructing. If it is contended that all entities are conceptually constructed, this would seem to necessitate an answer to the question, conceptually constructed by whom? If it is then said, as a consistent Madhyamika presumably must say, that whoever conceptually constructs is himself conceptually constructed, an infinite regress results.

>I don't think that I can make sense of the idea that even the agent (be it the self, the mind, or the flow of impermanent cittas) which conceptually constructs entities is itself a conceptual construction. The explanation that the agent is itself a conceptual construction begs the question, for such a conceptual construction would itself require an agent to do the constructing. The meaning of 'conceptual construction' presupposes an agent which is a perpetrator of, and is logically prior to, the conceptual construction.

>This in no way contradicts the important psychological spiritual point that, in many respects, one's views about one's self and the world are conceptual constructs (e.g. as a result of upbringing, habit, education, and, arguably, karma). I am simply making the compatible philosophical point that in order to have conceptually constructed views about who one is and how the world is, there must be someone/something itself unconstructed which has the views, or is doing the viewing. The very idea of conceptual construction seems to imply, then, both some material, itself unconstructed, which is the basis of construction, and also some agent who is the constructor of what is constructed. Yet, according to the interpretation which I have presented, in his assertion that all entities are conventions, i.e. prajnaptisat, Nagarjuna precludes the possibility of either of these necessary requirements for conceptual construction~ If, therefore, as Nagarjuna seems to say, the ultimate truth is that all entities are conventional truths in the Abhidharma sense, then it seems to follow that - unwelcome -as the conclusion might be to Nagarjuna himself - in fact nothing whatsoever exists at all. Nagarjuna is, as his opponents contend, a nihilist.

[Anonymous No.16122992]

bump

[Anonymous No.16123876]

It'd help if you provided some substance to your post other than random quotes

[Anonymous No.16123888]

so advaitafag is back to spamming again ... while also getting mad at other people for spamming, at the same time

fuck this guy has no self awareness (no pun intended0

[Underage kid from /pol/ No.16123901]

>>16123888
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[Anonymous No.16124513]

>>16123876
Nagarjuna's defense against the charge that he is a nihilist turns out to be predicated on fallacious reasoning

>In Nagarjuna's texts his opponents not infrequently object that if the ultimate truth is, as Nagarjuna says, the emptiness (sunyatii) of all entities, then Nagarjuna's teaching in fact destroys all entities. Nagarjuna's position entails, in other words, nihilism- the view that nothing exists at all. Nagarjuna's response to this criticism is invariably that, on the contrary, it is emptiness which makes possible all entities: His opponents have, he claims, misunderstood the meaning of emptiness. Emptiness does not entail the non-existence of the various entities of which it is the emptiness. On the contrary, emptiness means that these entities exist as dependent arisings, without svabhiiva. Emptiness is, Nagarjuna claims, the famous Buddhist Middle Way between eternlism and nihilism. Entities exist, it is true, but they exist only in dependence upon conditions. Entities are thus empty of independent existence. Nagarjuna turns the opponents' argument on its head, claiming that in fact it is the rejection, rather than the acceptance, of the teaching of emptiness which destroys all entities. Entities arise and perish in dependence upon conditions. To deny emptiness · is to deny that there are such dependently arising entities. It is, therefore, emptiness which explains the existence of all entities. When one first reads Nagarjuna's explanations of the compatibility of emptiness and the existence of all entities they perhaps seem entirely convincing.

>Of course emptiness is compatible with svabhiiva of all entities entails considerably more than simply that entities are dependently originating. In fact, seen in the light of Abhidharma philosophy, there would appear to be a strong argument that Nagarjuna's assertion that all entities lack svabhiiva does destroy - contrary to Nagarjuna's intention - the manifold world of entities. Nagarjuna may be, unwittingly, a nihilist. Nagarjuna might think that he treads the Middle Way, but perhaps in fact he has raken a wrong turning. My interpretation here should be distinguished from that ofT. Wood? Wood argues that Nagarjuna is self-avowedly a nihilist. I claim, by contrast, that Nagarjuna probably did not see himself as a nihilist, but that it is arguable that, given the principles of his philosophy, he was a nihilist nevertheless. And, certainly, given the pre-suppositions of Abhidharma philosophy, his thinking would have been understood by many of his fellow Buddhists to result in nihilism.

[Anonymous No.16124520]

>>16124513

Nagarjuna's works were written in the content of Abhidharma thought and critiqued its ideas, the Abhidharma made the distinction between the things which have like substantial or primary existence (dravyasat) and things which only have samskrta dharmas which are 'ultimate truths' and which have 'substantial or primary existence' and are regarded by the Abhidharma to have svabhava while being subject to dependent origination, and which make up the foundational components of things; and on the other hand things which have conceptually constructed existence (prajnaptisat) and which are conventional truths

>Nagarjuna says, I have explained, that the dependent origination of entities is incompatible with their possession of svabhiiva. Taken at face-value, this means simply that all entities dependently arise, and therefore they do not have independent existence. However - and this is a crucial point - in Abhidharma philosophy the dependent origination of some entities, i.e. samskrta dharma-s, is said to be actually compatible with their possession of svabhiiva. In other words, according to Abhidharma thought, possession of svabhiiva does not entail independent existence. 8 · For the Abhidharmika,9 svabhiiva is attributed to dharma-s because dharma-s are independent of causes and conditions in a specific sense. Dharma-s are not dependent upon parts for their existence. The dharma-s are the foundational components of the world. They are not further analyzable into constituents, 10 and they are the constituents of all other entities. These dharma-s are, or the Abhidharmikas, 'ultimate truths' (paramiirthasatya), and have 'substantial' or primary existence (dravyasat). 1

[Anonymous No.16124529]

>>16124520

>Sarrtskrta dharma-s are - it must be emphasized - subject to dependent origination (pratityasamutpiida). 15 . Thus, the samskrta dharma-s have the general characteristics (siimiinyalak~a1;1a) of birth (jiiti), duration (sthiti), and impermanence (anityatii). Often, decay (jarii) is also included in this list. 16 In fact, complex theories of conditionality were developed to explain the arising, duration, decay, and impermanence of samskrta dharma-sP These samskrta dharma-s are, furthermore, each said to remain only for a moment (k~a1;1a). 18 There is a causally connected flow of these momentary atomic events. The complex, analyzable entities constructed out of the . svabhava-endowed ultimate truths (the dharma-s) have a derivative or conceptually constructed existence (prajiiaptisat) and are conventional truths (sarrtvrtisatya). 19 These are the entities of the commonly experienced world - i.e. the world of trees, mountains, houses, and people. · Sanghabhadra and, later, PlirQavardhana make a further distinction between 'first-order' and 'second-order' prajnaptisat entities. First-order prajiiaptisat entities are those which are constructed directly on the basis of dravyasat entities whereas second-order prajnaptisat entities are constructed on the basis ofother prajnaptisat entities.

>Conventional truths are, for the Abhidharma, entities which are conceptual constructs in the sense that they are the product of the mind's synthesizing activity on the basis of the various dharma-s. In which case, it appears that for ·the Abhidharma, conventional truths originate in dependence upon two factors: (i) the constituents, i.e. dharma-s which form the basis of construction, and (ii) the constructing activity of the mind. Without the presence of both of these elements, there can be no conventional truths. Thus, for Abhidharma philosophy, it is incorrect to say that the possession of svabhiiva, i.e. the nature/characteristic possessed by the unanalyzable dharma, entails that a dharma is independent of causes and conditions. All dharma-s possess svabhiiva and most of these svabhava-possessing dharma-s, · i.e. all of the sarrzskrta dharma-s, also dependently originate. By contrast, Nagarjuna seems to say that an entity with svabhiiva would have independent, uncreated existence.

[Anonymous No.16124542]

>>16124529

Although Nagarjuna never explicitly says that there are only prajnaptist entities and no dravyasat entities or realities, a study of the textual clues in his works strongly indicates that he was intending to argue against the Abhidharmika view of there being dravyasat entities with svabhava when Nagarjuna attacks the idea of svabhava as untenable, and that his position was that all entities are only prajnaptist

>It might be argued, therefore, that Nagarjuna has simply defined svabhiiva differently than the Abhidharmikas. Which would be to say that the svabhiiva which Nagarju~a rejects is not the svabhiiva which the Abhidharmika upholds •. Whereas Nagarjuna defines svabhava asnindependent existence, the Abhidharmika defines svabhiiva as unanalyzable, more-than-conceptual existence, i.e. dravyasat. In this case, it might be argued, Nagarjuna and the Abhidharmika agree that there are deperidently originating, unanalyzable, and more-than-conceptual (dravyasat) . sarrzskrta dharma-s. But whereas for Nagarjuna the dependent origination of these sarrzskrta dharma-s means that they do not have svabhiiva (= iAdependent existence), for the Abhidharmika these dependently originating sarrzskrta dharma-s do have svabhiiva (=unanalyzable, more-than: conceptual existence). With regards to sarrzskrta dharma-s, Nagarjuna and the Abhidharmikas are in philosophical agreement but terminological disagreement. (But note that if Nagarjuna is claiming that all entities lack svabhava (= independent existence), then this would seem to imply that for him, unlike for the Abhidharmikas, there are at least no asarrzskrta dharma-s22 ).

>There is a strong ;ugument, however, that in fact the disagreement with regards to svabhava is not about terminology. One must remember that Nagarjuna is, after all, a second century Indian Buddhist. The lingua franca of ancient Indian Buddhist philosophy was the language of the Abhidharma. It is improbable, it can be argued, that Nagarjuna would simply begin to employ, without notification, a key term of the Abhidharma philosophy in an entirely innovative way. It is more plausible that Nagarjuna considers the notion of svabhava which he refutes to be that employed within the Abhidharma context in which he operates. (It certainly appears from Nagarjuna's texts that he thought that he had a point of substantial disagreement to make).

[Anonymous No.16124551]

>>16124542

>In this case, when he claims that all entities lack svabhava, Nagarjuna probably means, not simply that no entities originate ind~pendently of conditions but also, that no entities originate independently of the constructing activity · of the mind. There are no basic, unanalyzable existents out of which the prajiiaptisat world is formed. Thus, all entities whatsoever are, for Nagarjuna, simplY. conceptual constructs. When Nagarjuna says that entities with sv.abhava would be uncreated and independent he must mean, in fact, that such entities would be uncreated by and independent of the constructing mind. Nagarjuna's denial of svabhava is not in fact a statement of the truism that all entities dependently originate, but is rather an assertion that all entities originate in dependence upon the constructing mind. It is arguable, however, that Nagarjuna's general tendency to equate lack of svabhava with dependence on causes and conditions, rather than specifically with dependence on parts, indicates a subtle shift or broadening in the meaning of svabhava.

>As I have explained, the Abhidharmikas had argued that entities which can be analyzed into their parts are simply conceptual constructs, i.e. they lack svabhava. But dharma-s, though in most cases dependently originating, are partless and thus are not conceptually constructed, i.e. they have svabhava. Perhaps by contrast Nagarjuna is claiming that any entity which originates in dependence upon causes- be these causes the parts of the entity or external to the entity - can be analyzed into these causes, and is thus simply a conceptual construct imposed on the concatenation of causes. Thus, for Nagarjuna, even if there were partless sarrzskrta dharma-s as the Abhi,dharmika says (though, as I show below, Nagarjuna himself occasionally seems to deny the existence of partless entities), because these dharma-s are dependently originating, as the Abhidharmika claims, they can be analyzed into - and are thus (according to Nagarjuna) conceptually constructed on the basis of - their causes. Svabhava and dependent origination are - contrary to the Abhidharmika understanding - incompatible. According to Nagarjuna, if the Abhidharmika persists in attributing svabhava to the dharma-s, he cannot also say that they dependently originate. To be dependently originated is to be conceptually constructed.

[Anonymous No.16124557]

>>16124551

>So Nagarjuna arri~es at his often stated position that any entity which is positf:!d as having svabhava must also be independent of causes, i.e. permanent (despite what the Abhidharmikas maintain). And there are, of course, no such independent, permanent entities for Nagarjuna.If this interpretation is correct, the ultimate' truth is for Nagarjuna that there are no ultimate truths in the Abhidharma sense. By this Nagarjuna does not m~an simply that there are no independent, permanent entities. Nagarjuna means, in addition, that there are no unanalyzable, more-than-conceptually constructed entities.23 In the language of later Madhyamaka philosophy,24 no entity whatsoever is found under analysis. Whatsoever entity one examines, one finds, according to the Madhyamika, that it is simply a concept (or name) attributed by the mind to a concatenation of causes. If the causes are themselves examined, they are themselves found· to be simply concepts attributed by the mind on the basis of their own ca\lses. And so on. There are no foundational more-than-conceptually constructed entities. Nagarjuna 's advocacy of universal. absence of svabhava is thus equivalent to the notion that everything is just conceptual construction (prajiiaptimatra).

In the book Emptiness Appraised the author goes through the many pieces of evidence that Nagarjuna indeed employs the Abhidarma notion of svabhava and that his denial of anything having svabhava is intended to mean that there are only prajniptist or conceptually constructed entities.

>I think that the evidence which I have collated below demonstrates that Nagarjuna does indeed employ the Abhidharma notion of svabhava, and his denial that any entities have svabhava does entail, for him, that all entities are pra;naptisat. In which case, Nagarjuna's claim that emptiness does not entail nihilism, because emptiness means simply that entities lack independent existence, is untenable. Nagarjuna's superficially convincing argument completely fails to address the real criticism which his opponents are making of his philosophy. Nagarjuna does not in fact deny only that there are independently existing entities. Nagarjuna denies also that there are any entities which arise independently of conceptual construction. Nagarjuna's opponents do not think that the universal dependent origination of entities would result in nihilism.

[Anonymous No.16124565]

>>16124557

>But they do consider that, if all entities were to ~ave, as Nagarjuna contends, conceptually constructed existence, then nihilism would indeed be entailed. As I.shall explain later in this chapter, I think that they are right. At no point of which I am aware does Nagarjuna explicitly and unambiguously state that all entities are pra;naptisat, at least in the works which I consider to be most reliably attributable to him.l5 The question is, therefore, what other indirect textual evidence is there that Nagarjuna does in fact think that all entities lack svabhava - in the sense that they are analyzable, and hence conceptual constructs? I shall examine the evidence, which, I think, is plentiful.

>There do not appear to be many places in Nagarjuna's writings where he makes explicit that he means that all entities originate in dependence upon their parts. He does not seem to say often that entities lack svabhava in the sense that they are dependent on their parts for their existence. On the contrary, as I have already explained, he usually describes svabhava more broadly as independence from causes and conditions, and he claims that all entities lack svabhava because they originate in dependence upon causes and conditions - be these causes and conditions the entities'· parts or external to the entities.
>On account of many parts, there is not one, and there is nothing without parts ... (RV I, 71a-b).

>The terms 'samvrti' and 'samvrta' (which, I think, are synonyms27) are used in Nagarjuna's AS to denote the dependently originating entities of which the universe is constituted28: ... pratyayaja'fl visva'fl tvayokta'fl natha Sii'flvrtam/1 ... everything born out of conditions is declared by you, Oh Protector, to be sii1f1vrta. (AS 6c-d). Samvrti arises from causes and conditions and is dependent. (AS 44a-b). As I have explained already, in Abhidharma philosophy samvrtisatya denotes an entity which has prajiiaptisat status. It seems plausible that Nagarjuna's description of all dependently originating entities as 'sa1f1vrti' and 'sii'flvrta' - bearing in mind the Abhidharma use of the term 'sa'flvrtisatya' - is meant to communicate that all entities have a conceptually constructed existence. Entities are conventions, that is, in the sense that they do not exist independently of the constructing mind.

[Anonymous No.16124568]

>>16124565

>Nagarjuna sometimes describes all ent1t1es as the product of kalpana, vikalpa, and parikalpa, terms which might be synonyms for prajnapti. He also sometimes refers to all entities as 'namamiitra', which might be equivalent to saying that all entities have conceptually cons.tructed existence. Thus, Nagarjuna declares that, Therefore, you [the ·Buddha] have fully understood .that this world is produced from parikalpa. It is unreal, unarisen [and] is not destroyed. (LS 19) .
>Just as the person is not real, because it is a composite of thesix elements, likewise also each element is not a reality, because it is a composite. (RV I, 81).26

>Hence, perhaps, Nagarjuna's frequent comparisons of dependently originating entities to dreams, illusions, and other fabricated entities. Dependently originating entities have, like a drea111 or an illusion, an existe1_1ce which depends solely on the constructing activity of the mind. (Perhaps also dependently arising enti'iies are said to be like a dream, illusion, etc because - like a dream or illusion - they often appear one way to the deluded mind, i.e. as having more than conceptual existence, yet exist in another way, i.e. as merely conceptual constructs):
>Just as an illusory elephant is considered to be, although
>arisen, in addition unarisen, so evernhing is both arisen and
>in reality unarisen. (AS 30).

[Anonymous No.16124572]

>>16124568

Some people try to rescue Nagarjuna from the charge of nihilist by saying that Nagarjuna only meant that to critique the Abhidharma notion that the samskrta dharmas exist permanently, but not that there only exist conceptually constructed entities and no dravyasat entities; but the textual evidence seems to strongly lean against this argument and rather confirm the view that Nagarjuna was trying to refute things having dravyasat existence in his works like MMK

>Is there any way out of this conundrum for the interP.reter of Nagarjuna? Can Nagarjuna be saved from nihilism (and solipsism)? Let me suggest an alternative interpretation.52 According to this alternative interpretation, the true object of Nagarjuna's critique of svabhiiva is actually the position, propounded by the Vaibha~ika Abhidharma, that (sa'?"skrta) dharma-s, insofar as they exist 'with svabhiiva only' (sasvabhiivamiitra) are permanent. In which case the Abhidharma notion of svabhiiva which Nagarjuna attacks is not svabhiiva as denoting unanalyzable and thus more-than-conceptually constructed existence. Rather, he attacks the Vaibha~ika theory that the possession of svabhiiva by the (sa'?"skrta) dharma-s entails that the (sa'?"skrta) dharma-sexist (with svabhiiva only) in all three times, i.e. permanently. For the Vaibha~ika Abhidharma, the present existence of (sa'?"skrta) dharma-s (in which they are endowed with - together with svabhiiva - activity (kiiritra)) is dependently originating, indeed momentary. However, these (sarrzskrta) dharma-s- possessing svabhiiva but without activity - are said to exist also in the past and the future. (Sarrzskrta) dharma-s are (with svabhiiva only) permanent. The permanent existence of the (sa'?"skrta) dharma-s (with svabhiiva only) is what enables (sa'?"skrta) dharma-s to have various capacities (siimarthya) even when the (sa'?"skrta) dharma-s are not presently existent, i.e. even when the (sa'?"skrta) dharma-s do not have activity (kiiritra). For example, the (sa'?"skrta) dharma-s' permanent existence (with svabhiiva only) is meant to explain how (sarrzskrta) dharma-s may be cognized (e.g. by memory or imagin~tion) even when they are past or future, and also how past(sarrzskrta) · dharma-s may have causal efficacy (e.g. the karmic effects of past skilful and unskilful mental (sarrzskrta) dharma-s).Thus, when one remembers or imagines a (sarrzskrta) dharma, it is the (sarrzskrta) dharma existing with svabhava only which is one's object of cognition. If one suffers pain because of a previous unskilful (sarrzskrta) dharma it is the (sarrzskrta) dharma existing with svabhava only which affects one's present mental continuum, producing the present mental (sarrzskrta) dharma.

[Anonymous No.16124584]

>>16124572

>I make no comment here on the cogency of this Vaibha~ika explanation. The important point in the present context is that such an explanation was, the Vaibha$ikas thought, necessitated by various philosophical problems which arise from the position that (sarrzskrta) dharma-s dependently originate in a momeittary fashion (for how .can a · momentary (sarrzskrta) dharma be an object of cognition if it is no longer or not yet existent, and how can such a momentary (sarrzskrta) dharma have causal efficacy if it has ceased?) The notion that the (sarrzskrta) dharma-s, existing sasvabhavamatra, are permanent is not then intended as a denial of, but rather is an attempt to solve the theoretical problems posed by, this momentary dependent origination of (sarrzskrta) dharma-s. But Nagarjuna might argue that the Vaibha$ika theory that the (sarrzskrta) dharma-s exist permal)ently (with svabhava only) compromises the notion that (sarrzskrta) dharma-s are dependently originating. In effect, the Vaibha~ika theory entails that there is a permanent essential nature of dependently originating (sarrzskrta) dharma-s which remains independent of the process of arising and cessation. For the Vaibha$ika Abhidharma, then, dependent origination of (sarrzskrta) dharma-s is not dependent origination through and through - there is an essential .nature which is untouched by pratityasamutpada.

>According to this interpretation, Nagarjuna's philosophy would not entail nihilism. Nagarjuna does not reject (sarrzskrta) dharma-s, understood as the foundational (though dependently originating) existents upon which the world of complex entities is constructed. He does not assert that everything is a conceptual construct. There are foundational (sarrzskrta) dharma-s, Nagarjuna might be saying, but, contrary to the Vaibha$ika theory, · they do not possess a permanent existence (with svabhava only). Which is to say that the foundational (sarrzskrta) dharma-s in- no respect are other than dependently originating.

[Anonymous No.16124619]

>>16124584

>However, although I would not completely discount this interpretation, it seems to me to be somewhat irtiplausible. I think that for Nagarjuna, and later Madhyamikas, it is far more likely that it is the Abhidharma theory of dharma-s with svabhava as unanalyzable (and, hence, as more-than-conceptually constructed) exi~tents - rather than the specifically Vaibha~ika theory of (sarrzskrta) dharma-s (with svabhava only) as existing permanently which is the (principal) object of attack. This is for three reasons:

>(i) As I have already commented (see. note 9), it is not at all clear that the Abhidharma philosophy with which Nagarjuna was familiar was in fact that of the Vaibha~ika school, who upheld the notion that (sarrzskrta) dharma-s exist permanently sasvabhavamatra. And Nagarjuna at no point explicitly mentions the Vaibha~ika doctrine, which is surely strange if it is the principal object of his attack.
>(ii) As I have explained in detail in this chapter, there is very strong evidence in Nagarjuna 's texts that his fundamental objection is to the notion that any dependent originating entity has more than a conventional, conceptually constructed status. Thus, it does not seem that, even if Nagarjuna were criticizing the Vaibha~ika doctrine of permanent (sarrzskrta) dharma-s existing with svabhava only, it is the primary object of his critique of svabhava. That is, a large body of textual evidence (reviewed above) suggests that, even if (sarrzskrta) dharma-s with svabhava were posited as in all respects impermanent or momentary - i.e. as being through and through dependently originating - Nagarjuna, etc would object to them, on the grounds that the possession of such a svabhava would entail unanalyzable (and, hence, morethan-conceptual) existence;

[Anonymous No.16124648]

>>16124619

>(iii) Finally, it is clear that later Madhyamikas, such as Candrakirti (see Y$V 40-41) criticize the notion of svabhava not only as it appears in the Vaibha~ika Abhidharma, but also as it occurs in the Sautrantika and Vijfianavada54 schools, neither of which accept the Vaibha~ika theory of permanent (sarrzskrta) dharma-s (with svabhava only). (In fact, the Sautrantikas were vigorous opponents of this Vaibha~ika theory. They assert the complete momentariness of (sarrzskrta) dharma-s with svabhava55 ). What all three of these schools h~ve in common is :an acceptance - contrary to Madhyamaka - of some foundational~ more-than113 conceptually constructed form of existence (dravyasat). Candrakirti makes clear that his objection is to the notion of dravyasat as it occurs in all three of these schools. He does not say that his objection is to the Vaibha~ika theory that (sarrzskrta) dharma-s sasvabhavamatra exist permanently.

and so by all indications Nagarjuna was not just trying to refute permanence but was rather trying to refute the position that there could be any entities with dravyasat existence which exist on their own independently of our conceptual construction of these entities, thereby leading to nihlism as everything does not actually truly exist, but are only conceptually constructed illusions constructed by agents who themselves dont have any existence except as conceptual constructions; this leads to an infinite regress which is the way that Nagarjuna often tries to prove the falsehood of the positions of other philosophies. And so, among the numerous other contradictions that Nagarjuna landed himself in, by his own standards he seems to have refuted himself.

[Anonymous No.16124757]

>>16121689
read Kant then reread Nagarjuna

[I No.16124792]

>>16121689
talks about emptiness, regurgitates thousand words. emptiness is internal silence, you hypocritical dumbfuck.

[Anonymous No.16124797]

>>16121689
Daily reminder that buddhists have NO creation myth

[Anonymous No.16124811]

[Anonymous No.16124814]

Did anon copy paste an entire pdf on this thread? Well done.

[Anonymous No.16124823]

[Anonymous No.16124833]

>>16124757
How about you do the same, Nagarjuna's works make an attack on the Kantian position that there is an existing noumenon outside of our conceptually-constructed mental experience of them. Kant in his works argued against the position that there were not really exterior objects outside of our mental experience, and in doing so rejected the idealism of Berkeley. In a section of The Critique of Pure Reason called 'Refutation of Idealism" Kant prefaces his arguments by writing that he will "prove that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only on the presupposition of outer experience". Kant makes arguments against the claim of there being no existent exterior-to-conceptualization entities much in the same way that Shankara did the same in his refutations of Yogachara Buddhist doctrine (much of which also happens to apply to Nagarjuna)

[Anonymous No.16125059]

>>16124648
>And so, among the numerous other contradictions that Nagarjuna landed himself in, by his own standards he seems to have refuted himself.
wasn't that the entire point?

Wittgenstein explains it brilliantly:
>My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

Nagarjuna is just heeding the Buddha's parable of the raft.
>Often-cited parable that occurs in the Discourse on the Parable of the Water Snake (Alagaddūpama Sutta) in the Majjhima Nikāya of the Pāli Canon. The parable relates to a traveler who fords a stream by paddling across using a coracle or raft, and the Buddha asks whether it would be appropriate or not for the man to carry the raft with him once he had crossed. The parable is often thought to mean that the body of Buddhist teachings and moral precepts have only provisional utility as a means to gaining ultimate enlightenment (bodhi) and can thereafter be discarded.

[Anonymous No.16125062]

>>16121689
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>>16124648
So this was the guy who Shankara plagiarized from? Seems based.

[Anonymous No.16125115]

>>16124833
read Kant again

[Anonymous No.16125141]

>>16125115

[Anonymous No.16125143]

>>16125141
now read Nagarjuna :)

[Anonymous No.16125158]

>>16125143
as a matter of principle I refuse to spend time reading through someone who has been shown to have so many contradictions in their works, I have no investment in him being correct so I have no reason to waste my time with someone who has already been shown to be wrong

[Anonymous No.16125166]

>>16125158
same, that's why I refuse to read Shankara. Too many Hindus have proven him wrong.

[Anonymous No.16125172]

>>16125166
Based

[Anonymous No.16125253]

>>16125166
Well, at least I actually engage in those debates and provide what I consider to be refutations of those arguments instead of merely saying "read Shankara" when people point out what they think are contradictions in Advaita. I have yet to see anyone explain how Nagarjuna isn't nihilist or try to explain how the discussion of his ideas in the cited book here is wrong

[Anonymous No.16126503]

the official /lit/ discord server!

https://discorddotgg/2uMC49

[Anonymous No.16126527]

>>16124513
>Entities exist, it is true, but they exist only in dependence upon conditions
This is nihilism. Simple as