tfw a 24 year old ended philosophy

[Anonymous No.16099666]

>A statement is factually significant if and only if it is known how to verify the proposition which it purports to express -- that is, if it is known what observations, under certain conditions, would lead to the proposition being true.
Kant: BTFO
Delueze: BTFO
Plato: BTFO
Hegel: BTFO
/lit/: BTFO
Anywah, this thread was made to give you a chance to make arguments against this. Make sure your statements are verifiable.

[Anonymous No.16099711]

low effort shitpost

[Anonymous No.16099721]

>>16099711
seethe

[Anonymous No.16099722]

https://www.osho.com/osho-online-library/osho-talks/philosophers-existential-philosophy-a975e3dc-07f?p=31e22ad139f8007136a433a9b4c3b5d2

[Anonymous No.16099726]

>>16099722
Not an argument

[Anonymous No.16099730]

factually significant =/= important, useful, relevant, educational, etc.

[Anonymous No.16099733]

>>16099666
Fifty years after he wrote his book, he said: 'Logical positivism died a long time ago. I don't think much of Language, Truth and Logic is true ... it is full of mistakes.'

[Anonymous No.16099741]

>>16099730
Technically true but the implication is not. Do better

[Anonymous No.16099748]

>>16099666
Come back when you learn the difference between a definition and an argument.

[Anonymous No.16099751]

>>16099733
Just a boomer going senile

[Anonymous No.16099760]

>>16099722
he was a sex addict and a fraud, no one cares what he says about anything loser. get a real spiritual guide. are you a 40-year-old single mom?

[Anonymous No.16099762]

>>16099748
S E E T H E

[Anonymous No.16099769]

>>16099733
OP annihilated

[Anonymous No.16099776]

>>16099762
come back when you learn the difference between le ebin picture and an argument

[Anonymous No.16099798]

>>16099769
lol
>>16099776
Cope

[Anonymous No.16099807]

>>16099726
why do you like arguing? your life must be suffering im guessing

[Anonymous No.16099809]

>>16099798
you and your wojak folder are the worst trash that plagues this board and deep down you know it, I wish you get a moment of clarity and neck yourself in the final, noble moment of your worthless life

[Anonymous No.16099833]

>>16099733
OP probably read it in wikipedia too but ignored it for some reason, probably to make this low effort shitpost nonetheless.

[Anonymous No.16099835]

>>16099809
seethius maximus

[Anonymous No.16099842]

>>16099833
Some guy saying something Is Not an Argument

[Anonymous No.16099854]

>>16099835
>he thought for 3 minutes just to come up with this reply
just neck yourself, it's time

[Anonymous No.16099855]

>>16099842
I really hope you stay in college. It is rough out there

[Anonymous No.16099857]

>>16099666
this book is well written but a vestige of a philosophical movement that ended up being an embarrassment to all of its participants because of how hard they had missed the point

read the intro to the latest edition, you can hear the shame in his voice looking back at his young naive logical positivist self

[Anonymous No.16099866]

The number 2

[Anonymous No.16099877]

>>16099857
You dont realize that they basically got strongarmed by power. They werent wronn, they had to cover their asses. Never can anybody explain how they were wrong because they were right and crucially exposed the academy as fraudulent.

[Anonymous No.16099884]

>>16099854
Der Ewige S e e t h e r

[Anonymous No.16099970]

>>16099877
It's never too late to learn english.

[Anonymous No.16100015]

>>16099666
Nobody cares.

[Anonymous No.16100016]

>>16100015
You did enough to comment retard, seethe

[Anonymous No.16100030]

>>16100016
Absolutely dont give a fuck.

[I No.16100066]

>>16099666
exactly. that is why when people say "I am catholic" or "I believe in god" is absolute degeneracy and schizophrenia, not verifiable, the only purpose of them is to attract attention and justify own actions.

[Anonymous No.16100075]

>>16100016
Hey loser, say something funny.

[I No.16100079]

>>16099711
this shitpost is the key to understand why people are stupid faggots for last thousands of years, and no any hope of maturing.

[Anonymous No.16100184]

>>16099721
>>16099762
>>16099835
>>16099884
w o r t h l e s s

[Anonymous No.16100192]

>verify that statement empirically
annnd hes btfo

[I No.16100290]

>>16100075
Hey loser, say something funny.

[Anonymous No.16100302]

>>16099666
>it's better when truth is reliant on context
context is reliant on truth

[Anonymous No.16100375]

>>16099666
>A statement is factually significant if and only if it is known how to verify the proposition which it purports to express -- that is, if it is known what observations, under certain conditions, would lead to the proposition being true.
This is shitty retard way of saying falsifiability, which was already stated better like 50 years ago. Also
>factually significant
is totally meaningless

[Anonymous No.16100411]

>>16099666
>durrr babby's first karl popper
you do realize that every social science student reads this guy right? and that nothing about any of this is even remotely novel?

[Anonymous No.16100423]

>>16100411
Popper was a retarded Jew, Ayer is a based Aryan

[Anonymous No.16100432]

>>16100184
cope

[Anonymous No.16100439]

>>16100066
based

[Anonymous No.16100448]

>>16100375
Elaborate on "totally meaningless" because its not
Also aryan positivism is not semitic "facts arent real" falsificationism

[Anonymous No.16100475]

>>16100030
Poor bait

[Anonymous No.16100515]

>>16100030
How’s that working out for you

[Anonymous No.16100522]

>>16100030
Tomorrow’s a big day

[Anonymous No.16100544]

>>16099666
Ayer himself dropped his logical positivism later in life. Why? Because everyone did, honestly. Like, the positivists themselves. So OP, I guess Ayer refuted himself later in life. Also, Ayer gave a pretty wrong impression of what Carnap was about, which is sad because Carnap is far better than what people think logical positivism is. LTL is a really nice book, it's very literary, it reads well, and the ideas aren't completely terrible even then, but it's wrong regardless. Anyway, Ayer himself actually is conscious of a problem with observation in LTL which I think kind of undermines the way verificationism is set forth. Carnap was also aware of it, and that's what set him apart from Schlick (the only logical positivist who actually meets the phenomenalist stereotype--Ayer is a close second though, but even he doesn't quite). The problem is that determining what it is you actually observe is not theory-neutral. People like Quine and Sellars would criticize logical positivism on this basis later. The other problem is that analyticity in logical positivism really means conventionalism: that something is true because you define it to be true. And Quine also criticizes that, and I think it deserves to be criticized, because it isn't sufficient for truth to just say "From now on, X means Y" unless you bottom out somewhere outside convention. But the so-called analytic truths weren't supposed to bottom out outside convention, since that would make them observation-based and thus synthetic. The last problem with verificationism, and the one everyone picks on, is that the verification principle itself is not analytic nor synthetic, so it would have to be meaningless, which undermines the project as a whole. There's other criticisms of logical positivism. For one, Fitch's paradox suggests that making 'knowability' a criterion for truth is completely untenable. The paradox says that if there are knowable but still-unknown truths, you produce a result where everything is actually known already. That's clearly false and also contradicts the starting premise. Godel's incompleteness theorems also suggest that some truths are indeed true but unknowable, which is another strike against verificationism.

[Anonymous No.16100557]

>>16100544
>meets the phenomenalist stereotype-

What is that?

[Anonymous No.16100563]

>>16100544
Also could you please suggest an analysis of Godel's incompleteness theorems that will make sense to someone who is new to these things?

[Anonymous No.16100577]

>>16100439
what's the matter, I'm sure you have 300mb of those pics, show your autism and keep posting them

[Anonymous No.16100630]

>>16100544
>Godel's incompleteness theorems also suggest that some truths are indeed true but unknowable, which is another strike against verificationism.
You were spot on until here. Existence of unknowable truths is not a problem for verificationism.

[Anonymous No.16100646]

>>16100544
>The paradox says that if there are knowable but still-unknown truths, you produce a result where everything is actually known already.
I think this relies on some modal logic mental gymnastics (as in: ridiculous axioms) that defy common sense.

[Anonymous No.16100709]

>>16100544
Thank you anon. As for your first point, that Ayer cucked, this is irrelevant to the truth of the matter.
Your second point is silly. "what you observe is not theory neutral". Observation is prior to theory. This is a very political point, designed by people who just wanted to deconstruct. It is obviously bad faith and untrue.
Your third point, that the verification principle is neither analytic nor synthetic, is untrue. It is analytic.
The fourth point is a clever word trick and not relevant. Truths are knowable when they could be concievably tested. There are unknown knowable truths because we havent tested them yet.
Finally, Godell engaged in metaphysics for his theorem ("there is truth beyond what is knowable" ie there is beyond what is observable) and is thus wrong and completely misses the point and simply reasserted wrongness.

[Anonymous No.16100740]

Can the proposition in that statement be verified by the means it laid out for verification?

[Anonymous No.16100786]

>>16100448
>Elaborate on "totally meaningless" because its not
Then what does it mean? It certainly doesn't mean "factual", and it certainly doesn't mean that there isn't actually a method for falsifiability. It seems to be a shitty rewording and misunderstanding of Karl Popper

>Also aryan positivism is not semitic "facts arent real" falsificationism
nice word salad

[Anonymous No.16100796]

>>16100423
Yes, a retarded Jew that OP is copying from.

[Anonymous No.16100798]

>>16100709
>Observation is prior to theory.
What is epistemology? You confuse "theory" as in scientific theory and theory in a wider sense.
>verification principle is analytic
you wat m9y? did you just confuse "analytic" with something else, like aprioric?

[Anonymous No.16100811]

>>16100798
>What is epistemology?
A dead end.

[Anonymous No.16100812]

>>16100066
>not verifiable
I mean you absolutely can "talk" to "angels" in your mind. You just have to put in the effort

[Anonymous No.16100829]

>>16100811
Yep, it's hard to argue with that. And by that I mean it's hard to argue with something so fucking stupid it's self-defeating.

[Anonymous No.16100842]

>>16099666
Can someone please point out the difference between this and the other 150 people that have said that same thing?

[Anonymous No.16100843]

>>16100829
Find me any epistemic theory and I can easily tear it apart.

[Anonymous No.16100864]

>>16100843
>self-defeating

[Anonymous No.16100873]

>>16100630
>Existence of unknowable truths is not a problem for verificationism.
It actually is a problem, because supposed 'unknowable' truths would be unverifiable: they would be truths not given in actual or possible experience (note the distinction: unknowable, not unknown-but-knowable) or true-by-definition. So the verification principle does reject that. And many positivists use this to reject certain metaphysical ideas. For example, Ayer himself discusses substance and its role for idealism and materialism and rejects that whole matter as a pseudoproblem because so-called 'substance' would be unverifiable on this view.

[Anonymous No.16100875]

>>16100864
What have I said that's self-defeating?

[Anonymous No.16100887]

>>16100875
don't ? me, put some effort into thinking and / or stop being stupid

[Anonymous No.16100899]

>>16100709
>Observation is prior to theory.
Is it though? Just to give an example, the phenomenalism Carnap constructs, based around what he calls elementary experiences (elementarerlebnisse), is different from the phenomenalism Goodman constructs, based around what he calls qualia, and there are other forms of phenomenalism subtly different from these as well, for example Hume's is not quite the same as Goodman's though closer to it than Carnap's. Carnap and Goodman themselves recognized that this stuff showed that 'observation language' wasn't neutrally determined. The idea is that your 'observation language' itself may look different depending on your earlier theoretical commitments, your concepts, etc.

[Anonymous No.16100907]

>>16100887
>put some effort into thinking and / or stop being stupid
I am, you clearly aren't.

[Anonymous No.16100913]

>>16100873
I still refuse to believe that a fancy generalization of the liar paradox (that's basically what Goedel's theorem is) is enough to BTFO logical positivism. But maybe I give the whole project too much credit.

[Anonymous No.16100928]

>>16100907
Write a book how you can reason free of any epistemology and end philosophy genius. Or maybe you have some hot skeptical take that's totally not self-defeating? Yeah, you've clearly thought this through.

[Anonymous No.16100951]

>>16100928
>Write a book how you can reason free of any epistemology and end philosophy genius.
The same way everyone else does?

[Anonymous No.16100987]

>>16100557
Phenomenalism is the view that we can reduce everything to a base of individuals and predicates supposedly actually 'given' in empirical experience, e.g. sense data. Berkeley was the first to go in that direction, though he preserved a non-phenomenalist element with his souls and God. Hume was the first phenomenalist. Mill and Russell continued that trend in Britain, Mach and Avenarius in Germany. Schlick, the first logical positivist, continued it. Carnap and Ayer sort of continued it. The difference is that to an extent Ayer and to a much bigger extent Carnap recognized that observation language was theory-loaded, and Carnap actually notes in the Aufbau that he could have picked a physicalist base instead of a phenomenalist base, and he later switched to physicalism in life. Many of the other positivists, I believe this includes Neurath, Hempel, Reichenbach, also would become physicalists. Schlick was the only one who believed observation was theory-neutral and was thus a traditional phenomenalist in the style of Hume.

[Anonymous No.16101029]

>>16099877
t. tiny brained
read philosophical investigations with the max black guide

[Anonymous No.16101032]

>>16101029
*read investigations and the tractatus with the max black guide

[Anonymous No.16101076]

>>16101032
to convince myself that logical positivism is rightfully dead?

[Anonymous No.16101116]

>>16099721
>>16099762
>>16099835
>>16099884
Do you not understand obvious it is that soijack posters like you are projecting?
yikes my dude

[Anonymous No.16101214]

>>16101116
>yikes
Passive-aggressive zoomer detected.

[Anonymous No.16101333]

>>16100709
>Godell engaged in metaphysics for his theorem ("there is truth beyond what is knowable" ie there is beyond what is observable) and is thus wrong and completely misses the point and simply reasserted wrongness.
Are you saying Godel's Incompleteness theorems are not valid?

[Anonymous No.16101374]

>WHY WON'T THIS SOIJAK POSTER USE REAL ARGUMENTS OR FUCK OFF!? *replies again* IT'S ALMOST LIKE HE'S JUST TRYING TO GET ME UPSET *bumps thread* WHAT AN IDIOT, I'LL BTFO HIM YET!

[Anonymous No.16101868]

>>16099666
1. The criteria is not itself verifiable, therefore meaningless according to itself
2. Trying to state the conditions of observation creates an infinite regress, as you'd have to state further conditions under which those statements were verifiable, etc
Not dissing Ayer however, verificationism was a significant step forward, but it was just too extreme

[Anonymous No.16101901]

>>16099730
The former kind is for science and rigorous philosophical analysis thereof. The latter is for the freer and more inspired kind of philosophy, and for literature.

[Anonymous No.16101917]

>>16100448
based

[Anonymous No.16102047]

>>16101333
Yes or it doesnt mean what you think it means

[Anonymous No.16102058]

>>16100899
What is observation language? I reality not real and objective? I don't see how any of this matters.

[Anonymous No.16102090]

>>16100798
Epistemology tells us how we can consider things to be known, not how to observe...
Verificationism is analytic, yes. Ie the statement of the principle is analytic.

[Anonymous No.16102120]

>>16099666
LTL is actually a good first book to read if you want to get into philosophy. You can think of contemporary philosophy as an elaboration as to why the picture (of logical positivism) that Ayer summarizes is too simplistic.

[Anonymous No.16102128]

>>16101868
>1
This is a brainlet take. Is there a reason I should believe you arent an upset postmodernist now? The principle is clearly an analytic statement.
>2.
This makes no sense.

[Anonymous No.16102139]

>>16101901
The latter kind is worthless and for brainlets/dopamine and serotonin addicts

[Anonymous No.16102147]

>>16102120
So Ayer is right and everyone after him is just sperging out and nitpicking? Good to know.

[Anonymous No.16102156]

>>16102128
What a useless post.

[Anonymous No.16102184]

>>16102147
No, Ayer is wrong. But it takes a bit of work to show how and why he is wrong. Ayers basically summarizes the "common sense" philosophy that scientifically-minded young people default to. It all sounds fine until you get into the details. Read Carnap for the fully elaborated vision. Then read Carnap's critics. Etc.

[Anonymous No.16102189]

>>16102147
>All of the criticism in this thread is merely nitpicking.

[Anonymous No.16102197]

>>16100544
>>16100873
>>16100987
Based effortposter who knows what he's talking about.

[Anonymous No.16102214]

>>16100544
based dubs

[Anonymous No.16102221]

>>16100913
You are correct. The only thing Godel's theorems directly btfo is Hilbert-style formalism in the philosophy of mathematics.

>>16100873
>supposed 'unknowable' truths would be unverifiable: they would be truths not given in actual or possible experience (note the distinction: unknowable, not unknown-but-knowable) or true-by-definition.
Mathematical truths can still be true-by-definition yet fall short in terms of provability. You are conflating formalism with logicism. Godel rules out (flavors of) the former, not the latter.

[Anonymous No.16102909]

>>16099733
An author claiming a set of claims that originated from himself is subsequently false does not mean that said claims are, in fact, false.

[Anonymous No.16102928]

>>16102909
The ideas in LTL didn't originate from Ayer. His book is just an elegant but broad summary of the zeitgeist circa 1930s.

[Anonymous No.16103008]

Logical positivism is as right as any theory can be. Other theories simply hide their contradictions behind 400 pages of turgid boring writing and avoid all honest judgements

[Anonymous No.16103217]

>>16102909
you are such a retarded women

[Anonymous No.16103233]

>>16100709
you have no idea what truth means do you

[Anonymous No.16103245]

>>16100375
Falsifiability and verifiability are fundamentally different notions. Popper is extremely clear about this. Verifiability is defined in terms of confirmation, and Popper is very explicitly a nihilist about confirmation. There is only falsification for him.

>>16100786
"Factually significant" means, for Ayer, a synthetic sentence. That is, it is a sentence that is made true by facts in the world. That's in contrast to the postivists' notion of an analytic sentence, which is alleged to be "true by virtue of its meaning." Quine, famously, argued that there is no such distinction. So, to that extent, "factual significance" turns out to be an empty notion. But it's not for any of the reasons you cite.

>>16100544
This is actually a really excellent and knowledgable post. I wholly agree with >>16102197. I came into this topic wanting to be a based effortposter myself but you handily beat me to it. Very glad to see some quality philosophical content on /lit/

[Anonymous No.16103279]

>>16103245
>Quine, famously, argued that there is no such distinction. So, to that extent, "factual significance" turns out to be an empty notion.
He recaptures it, somewhat, in his 'web of belief' model. Observation sentences near the periphery, sensitive to experience, versus ratiocinative truths near the center of the web which guide interpretation and organization and which are largely immune to revision via experience.

[Anonymous No.16103306]

>>16103279
There are similarities, but the key word here is "largely" immune. Analytic sentences are exotic creatures, and one of their exotic properties is that they are /in principle/ immune to revision via experience. (For later Carnap, one can "give up" an analyticity by giving up a particular "linguistic framework" but this isn't revision; revision is an intra-framework affair, for Carnap.) Correlatively, sentences "at the center" on Quine's model are not true (if true at all) by "virtue of their meaning." You're right that Quine uses metaphors of inertia for sentences in the center, but they still fail to bear the hallmarks of the postivists' analyticities.

[Anonymous No.16103754]

>>16099733
So... Wittgenstein?

[Anonymous No.16103791]

>>16100544
Check 'em

[Anonymous No.16103824]

>>16100709
Refuted by basic math

[Anonymous No.16103829]

>>16103245
>>16103306
based quineposter
raising the level of the discussion

[Anonymous No.16103846]

>>16100709
>Finally, Godell engaged in metaphysics for his theorem ("there is truth beyond what is knowable" ie there is beyond what is observable) and is thus wrong and completely misses the point and simply reasserted wrongness.
Kek, his 'truth beyond what is knowable' is a conclusion of his investigation not its premise.

[Anonymous No.16103861]

math and logic dont really exist, its just curve-fitting but to what? and reality doesnt have axioms so shove them up your fat fucking ass

[Anonymous No.16103891]

>>16103846
The incompleteness theorems pertain to sentences of consistent formal systems that are true under their standard model but not deducible in the system. And here the notion of "truth" is proprietary. Godel's result is a result in pure mathematics; any implications of it (beyond some relatively recherche questions in phil math) require further philosophical argument.

[Anonymous No.16103918]

>>16102047
It means exactly what I think it means, and it is valid.

[Anonymous No.16103961]

>>16103891
Gödel's result is a result in logic, trumping verificationism.

[Anonymous No.16103974]

>>16103861
If your position must be predicated on "math and logic don't exist" you've already lost.

[Anonymous No.16103985]

>>16099721
lmao, you did it wrong. instead of greentexting a strawman of your opponent, you just made it look like you are a weakboned crying faggot telling others to seethe

[Anonymous No.16103989]

>>16103961
It is a result in mathematical logic, hence a result of pure mathematics.

Carnap wrote an entire book (Logical Syntax of Language) about how to formalize his notions of analyticity and syntheticity and linguistic frameworks in light of Godel's theorems and Tarski's definition of truth. (His book had some serious technical flaws, but put those aside.)

Roughly speaking, Godel's results are all analytic, for Carnap. If you want to give Godel's theorems a gloss in terms of truth, you must understand that it's a proprietary notion of truth---i.e. Tarski's satisfaction in a model. By themselves, the theorems do absolutely nothing to undermine verificationism.

[Anonymous No.16103995]

>>16103974
how so? what are reality's axioms?

[Anonymous No.16104004]

in and out, morty, 2 minutes moirty, gonna jack off to this shameful porn morty and then ill be done and we can forget it happened moirty

[Anonymous No.16104009]

>>16103989
Can effortposter>>16100544 continue this discussion? I don't have enough knowledge on this topic.

[Anonymous No.16104021]

>>16099666
Why are observations required? Truths exist with or without observation; many can’t even be observed and can only
be assumed to be true because either there is no conceivable alternative or the conditions/reasons are strong enough to be relied upon without observation.

[Anonymous No.16104028]

>>16104009
Not that effortposter (I don't think they're around atm), but I will just register the careful (and imo correct) use of the word "suggest" in the last sentence of that effortpost. Notice effortposter did not say that the theorems /entail/ that there are unknowable truths. One needs to have a philosophical analysis of knowability in order to determine what, if anything, Godel's theorems show about unknowable truths.

[Anonymous No.16104064]

>>16104028
Can you point me in the right direction then? Isn't this precisely what Wittgenstein did? And say, if truth is verifiable down to the very fabric of knowledge, what conclusions do these philosophers draw from that? Simply a safeguarding of scientific enquire on a philosophical basis?

[Anonymous No.16104102]

>a new challenger has appeared!

[Anonymous No.16104567]

>>16103995

That logic and math exist

[Anonymous No.16104999]

>>16104009
>>16104028
Godel's theorems show that if arithmetic is consistent (= doesn't lead to contradictions), then it is not complete (= some truths of arithmetic cannot be proven within the language of arithmetic to be true). It is true that arithmetic would be considered analytic for logical positivists like Carnap. But their conception of analyticity in arithmetic was closely connected with the old logicist hope that arithmetic was consistent and complete. That is to say, analyticity was supposed to be connected to aprioricity, and Godel's proofs suggest that these two actually come apart. Let's put the problem this way. I don't think anyone would be too worried if we can't prove a certain fact of arithmetic just because we would need some infinite mind to grasp it. Godel's proof goes beyond that though: even an infinite mind would not be able to prove certain truths of arithmetic. As far as I understand, you need ascent to a meta-language to prove every truth of arithmetic, and the same is true of other languages. Should positivists be worried by this? Maybe. I think they should, although maybe they would think they shouldn't. If anyone is interested, Kripke says what I'm saying on p. 37 of Naming and Necessity. Godel's proofs suggest that some supposed analytic truths (and certainly necessary truths) are not a priori known or even knowable, even with infinite minds (barring what I said about a meta-language). Maybe the positivists would say Godel's proofs are no big worry, but I do think they are a worry, if not for Kripke's reasons then at least because of problems with analyticity (which for the positivists was conventionalist) that Quine lays out in "Truth by Convention." Even if they aren't a worry though, I would refer back to Fitch's paradox of knowability, which remains a problem for verificationists.
>t. the effortposter

[Anonymous No.16105071]

>>16104999
Unironically, I believe Chris Langan enters the discussion here. His essay (CTMU) was an attempt to develop said meta-language without resorting to convention. I din’t really understand what the hell he was explaining but it is supposed to address incompleteness among other things. Just sayin...

[Anonymous No.16105086]

>>16104999
Positivists always just say something isn't a worry or something doesn't matter whenever a disproof of their "philosophy" is shown. They never actually give arguments to defend themselves.

[Anonymous No.16105095]

>>16105071
I think one problem is that Godel's proofs actually apply to more than just a model of arithmetic. Going up one meta-language makes the problem of incompleteness appear at a higher level, if I'm not mistaken.

[Anonymous No.16105118]

>>16099666
feynman btfo this proposition and he probably didn't even know it existed.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MO0r930Sn_8

[Anonymous No.16105577]

[Anonymous No.16105610]

>>16105577
Trash

[Anonymous No.16105755]

>>16105118
>magnets, how do they work
Fuck out of here.

[DoctorGreen !DRgReeNusk No.16105820]

>>16099666
>factually
anglosaxon buzzword.
>significant
No one can claim anything is significant ever because we cannot study everything at once to know for sure, we just pretend. Thus the whole if and [...] is pretending.

[Anonymous No.16105863]

Sounds like a midwit take on the Tracticus

[Anonymous No.16106186]

>a statement is only true if its true

Am I missing something?

[Anonymous No.16106200]

Any recommendations for the linguistic and semiotic (syntax, semantic) aspects behind math?

[Anonymous No.16106435]

>>16106186
Verifiable truth conditions

[Anonymous No.16107033]

>>16099666
I am interested the nature of language but i am too retarted for it.
Anyone feels the same.

I know all paths go to the understanding of language through my experience and intuition but i am just so much of a brainlet that i couldnt understand a paragraph of Wittgenstein.

It´s like an eternal roadblock for me.
Anyone feel the same??

[Anonymous No.16107041]

>>16106200
Kline Loss of Certainty and history of mathematics

[Anonymous No.16107052]

>>16104999
They're only a problem for Hilbert-style formalists in the philosophy of mathematics. They are not a problem for those who see mathematics as an extension of logic, truth by definition (logicists).

[Anonymous No.16107056]

>>16107033
Every journey has a beginning, and if the first steps weren't hard, the destination wouldn't be worth setting out for

>If you should put even a little on a little, and should do this often, soon this too would become big.

[Anonymous No.16107063]

>>16106200
>>16107033
You'll never get anywhere without a thorough grounding in mathematical logic.

[Anonymous No.16107129]

>>16107052
>They are not a problem for those who see mathematics as an extension of logic, truth by definition (logicists).
That is the problem though. Did you read the post? It addresses what the problem is, put forth by Godel/Kripke, not to mention Quine. The positivist conception of analyticity is full of problems.

[Anonymous No.16107359]

>>16099721
I always picture the people posting these things as representing themselves. It just makes more sense that way.

[Anonymous No.16107717]

>>16104567
in your fantasy realm of logic that would be known as a circular argument

[I No.16108634]

>>16099666
lets define word "communication". I see the word "common". to communicate is to share and find common grounds. common is only reality in which we live and can observe. we cannot observe each other "minds", so when somebody says he saw jesus, talked to angels, its no use. you judge people by their actions, observable actions, not those they imagine or do in their minds. opinion is nothing, knowledge is everything. this is fucking obvious!

[Anonymous No.16109232]

>>16104999
>analyticity was supposed to be connected to aprioricity, and Godel's proofs suggest that these two actually come apart.
I don't see how. Arithmetic truth can simply be identified with the semantic consequences of the axioms. Truth and proof come apart, but that doesn't make arithmetic truth any more a posteriori or less analytic. Only a certain breed of formalist equates truth and provability, and yes, formalism fits well with the spirit of logical positivism applied to mathematics. But the logical positivist has many other options, including (what seems an even more natural fit) rejecting robust arithmetic truth altogether. Empirical science can be done using only geometry in the form of real closed fields (the theory of which is sound, complete, and decideable).

[Anonymous No.16109308]

>>16107033

I only understand that Wittgenstein and popper owned everyone, with language and falsifiability respectively.

I stick with dialectic materialism for anything i want to analyze and always with the notion everything could be dead wrong.

[Anonymous No.16109356]

>>16108634
settle down, esl. men are talking.

[I No.16109520]

>>16109356
you are writing, not talking. men would notice that. I wish you were talking irl somewhere with weapons without ability to quit until one most righteous remains, that would be fun.

[Anonymous No.16109533]

>>16109232
There is a big problem with both logicism and formalism and it is that they're both constructionalist but starting from a non-empirical base. The formalist recognizes that the base is empty of significance, it's just symbols as syntactic playthings. The logicist wants to think sentences at the level of the base (the first sentences of pure logic) are somehow true but not conventional, despite being true 'by definition' which, as Quine showed, must still be conventional unless it bottoms out in something synthetic. As for aprioricity, nobody's conception of analyticity pre-Godel would have separated aprioricity from it, the analytic was supposed to be such that you could see its truth without appeal to observation simply because of its form, everything to know would be contained in the analytic proposition, that was the idea, that goes back to Kant, which is why the analytic was a priori. Of course really long or complex analytic strings would require more effort to analyze, so to speak. That's why we can still count as 'a priori' things that only an infinite mind would know. But Godel's proofs suggest that some arithmetic truths cannot be shown to be true within the very language of arithmetic, by demonstration, even with an infinite mind. I don't see why a logicist would have any advantage over a formalist with that problem. They're both constructionalists with the same notion of analyticity which is dependent on a connection with aprioricity.
>But the logical positivist has many other options, including (what seems an even more natural fit) rejecting robust arithmetic truth altogether. Empirical science can be done using only geometry in the form of real closed fields (the theory of which is sound, complete, and decideable).
Interesting, if that's true then I suppose there is a way to get by. Escaping Godel's problems doesn't fix other problems with analyticity though.

[I No.16109548]

>>16109533
say this to psychiatrist, he will give meds

[Anonymous No.16109549]

Dude just read Pierce lol

[Anonymous No.16109607]

>A statement is factually significant if and only if it is known how to verify the proposition which it purports to express
Isn't this statement self-defeating? How do you verify the proposition it purports to express?

[Anonymous No.16109758]

>>16109533
>The logicist wants to think sentences at the level of the base (the first sentences of pure logic) are somehow true but not conventional, despite being true 'by definition' which, as Quine showed, must still be conventional unless it bottoms out in something synthetic.
I see pure mathematics as an analytic exploration of our conceptions of 'quantity' -- specifically, succession/iteration (arithmetic, algebra) and part-whole-relations/mereology (geometry, analysis, topology). Those conceptions may not be so precise in our minds that they specify the truth or falsity of every statement formulatable in the relevant language (i.e., the language of Peano Arithmetic, or whatever axiomatization is relevant). So in its pure form, mathematics is simply conceptual exploration. Parts of mathematics can, however, be used to model the actual material world we live in. Like Quine, I think the only mathematics we need to worry about ontologically is what cannot be eliminated from our theories of fundamental physics. Looking at contemporary fundamental physics, we currently have QM, GR, QFT (QM+SR), and string theory on the menu. None of these theories requires the existence of discrete 'objects' at the fundamental level. All can be modeled in purely continuous terms -- manifolds and their properties (i.e. physical fields). The implication is that reality is basically a large geometric object with 4 (or more) dimensions. To my knowledge, the results of number theory have zero applicability to anything in fundamental physics (that isn't ultimately reducible to geometry or something unproblematic like Presburger arithmetic). In sum, the Godel results should not worry the empiricist, as even the humble 'language of arithmetic' is lavish overkill for representing material reality.

[Anonymous No.16109760]

Analytic bros, maybe I'm retarded but how is shit like this possible? Just because a random assumption like 3 leads to a contradiction, we can derive any other completely different and arbitrary negations from it (line 8)? Shouldn't negation introduction be restricted just to the assumption that lead to the contradiction? Otherwise it seems to me absolutely anything is derivable from an innocent contradiction.

[Anonymous No.16109792]

>>16109760
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paraconsistent_logic

[Anonymous No.16109808]

>>16109760
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disjunction_introduction

[Anonymous No.16109826]

If God came down from heaven, did a few miracles, and then said "you are all going to hell unless you stop eating beans" I would consider that statement significant.

[Anonymous No.16109855]

>>16109792
>>16109808
Thanks I'll read them, but can you say why it isn't a problem for logic?It looks like a giant loophole compromising everything.

[Anonymous No.16109887]

>>16109855
>why it isn't a problem for logic?It looks like a giant loophole compromising everything.
How do you figure? Logic is the science of truth-preserving inference. If there is no possible truth to preserve, as when inferring from a contradiction, anything goes.

[Anonymous No.16109890]

>>16109826
There's a lot going on there.

[Anonymous No.16109900]

>>16109826
That's only because you were raised as a Pythagorean. No matter how hard you try, you can't escape the fact that you were programmed from birth to succumb to anti-bean ideologies.

[Anonymous No.16109927]

>>16109887
But see, just because one assumption leads to a contradiction it doesn't mean all other assumptions also lead to a contradiction. Consider this scenario, following the same argument pattern: Suppose I were a blind person wondering if it is raining or it is night time. Then I'd have two assumptions:
>assumption 1: it is night time
>assumption 2: it is raining.
I could go to the window and stretch my hand in the air and find out it is not raining, because I felt no drop of rain on my hand. Then I have a premise:
>premise 1: it is not raining.
Then according to this system of logic, I could derive a contradiction from premise 1 and assumption 2, and then from this contradiction, absurdly enough, I couldderive that it is not night time.

But how could this be possible? Raining or not raining has no relation to whether it's daytime or night time. As a blind person I'd only know it is not raining. I couldn't derive from it that it is also not night time. Isn't it absurd?

[Anonymous No.16109947]

>>16109927
Your assumptions don't contradict each other, as you already seem to know. Explosion doesn't work that way.

[Anonymous No.16109952]

>>16109927
You are all kinds of confused. An argument consists of a set of premises and a conclusion. The argument is valid if and only if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. If the premises contradict each other, or if one or more of the premises are self-contradictory, then it is impossible for the premises to be true, hence it automatically a valid argument.

Your example of the blind man and the rain is not even coherently specified, since the man does not simultaneously believe that it is raining and that it is not raining, so there is no contradiction in the first place.

[Anonymous No.16109990]

and this itself is not a statement? how do you empirically verify it?

[Anonymous No.16110013]

>>16109947
>>16109952
I do not disagree with your words, but see in this argument >>16109760 we have two assumptions: ~Ga and ~Ha. Assumption ~Ga then is proved to be contradictory with the premises in line 7 because from the premises Ga was derived in 6. But from this contradiction of ~Ga and Ga in 7 somehow ~~Ha was derived in line 8.

Again, this follows my scenario: we had two assumptions (nighttime and raining). But then one of the assumptions were contradicted when the man found out it is not raining. But then from this contradiction, somehow it was derived that it is not nighttime.

How does this scenario not follow the the first argument? I'd appreciate it if you could refer to me me exactly where this is confused.

[Anonymous No.16110047]

>>16110013
What system of proof calculus is being used? What is the source of the proof in the pic?

[Anonymous No.16110055]

>>16110047
It's Monadic Predicate Logic, from the book Modern Logic by Graeme Forbes, page 188.

[Anonymous No.16110084]

>>16099666
What the fuck does factually significant means?

[Anonymous No.16110173]

>>16110055
Looks like a variation of Gentzen's Natürliche Kalkül (NK), a form of natural deduction. Is this for a course? Have you actually read the prior chapters of the book that establish the rules of inference? Your screenshot left out the most important part: the actual argument to be demonstrated.

[Anonymous No.16110181]

>>16110084
Take what you are, reverse it, then make it factual.

[Anonymous No.16110209]

>>16110173
Yes, it is NK and yes it is for a course. And yes I have read the prior chapters. I did not think the argument was necessary to show, because it could be seen in the conclusion. It looks like you have accessed the book already, but I could post it if you wish so.

[Anonymous No.16110224]

>>16110209
Do you understand the difference between premises and assumptions in NK?

[Anonymous No.16110230]

>>16110173
I believe I understand. If you perceive any misunderstanding in my reasoning please point it out to me.

[Anonymous No.16110238]

>>16110224
I believe I understand. If you perceive any misunderstanding in my reasoning please point it out to me.

[Anonymous No.16110256]

>>16110238
Your use of assumptions here >>16109927 suggest you don't quite get it. Assumptions are provisional and must be discharged. They are for convenience only; the proof does not ultimately depend on them.

[Anonymous No.16110300]

>>16110256
I believe the assumption is discharged and the provisional status is removed when the negation of assumption is introduced from the contradiction. This is precisely my problem: the negation of any possible assumption could become true (and not provisional) because of some other unrelated assumption. If you look at the first argument, assumption in 4 was discharged when 8 was derived from the contradiction. This is precisely what I assert could lead to a loophole in this system. Because any arbitrary negation of assumption becomes true.