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15553682 No.15553682 [Reply] [Original]

>Being subject means exactly the same thing as having an object, and being object means just the same as being known by the subject.
This argument (first formulated by Berkeley) seems the most important of Schopenhauer's premises. All other aspects of his system is based on this. How plausible do you find it?

>> No.15553745

You could argue the opposite route- there is no subject without objects. This unifies us with the world, but it may be hazardous for self-identity.

>> No.15553753

it’s intuitively true. nothing can be known without a knower.

>> No.15553763

>>15553745
>>15553745
that’s not a problem for schopenhauer since he argues that individuation is an illusion anyway.

>> No.15553777

>>15553745
>You could argue the opposite route- there is no subject without objects.
Well, yes. He does do that in fact.
>>15553753
I'm inclined to agree, but you do notice the consequences of the argument? It is precisely the basic tenet of idealism. If this is true, then the famous question of apple and tree is answered by saying there is no apple and no tree if there is no comprehending object and therefore there is no noise.
>>15553763
But the premise has to be true so that he could argue for idealism.

>> No.15553780

>>15553777
>if there is no comprehending object
I meant comprehending subject*

>> No.15553795

>>15553682
The earth was there since before it had life. Physics proves this.

>> No.15553811

>>15553682
This isn't Berkeley's argument at all. In fact it probably isn't Schopenhauer's argument either, because 1) This is not what the commonsense meaning of these terms mean, and 2) even if they were, nothing about what these terms mean could ever wield any substantial metaphysical conclusion. Simply put, even if by object just meant "being known by the object" it wouldn't follow that the external world only exists in so far as it is being known.
As for Berkeley, his actual main argument for idealism is that in order to state that things exist independent of their being perceived you have to state that you perceive things existing unperceived, which entails a contradiction. Unfortunately, this argument is based on a fallacy of equivocation, which I can explain in more detail if anyone is interested.

>> No.15553814

>>15553795
Don't post if you have literally read nothing of the person in question.

For Schopenhauer the world as representation is produced only with the coming-into-existence of the individual. When you are born you produce this world with matter, time and space. We can speak of an objective world because there are a myriad of individuals which produce this world as representation (al though I would think inter-subjective fits better, correct me if I'm wrong anons). Physics merely describes the fundamental laws of nature which are present in the world as representation, adding to that, they are all groundless and originate from a irrational will.

>> No.15553817

>>15553811
*being known by the subject

>> No.15553818

>>15553795
Physics rather assumes it, not proves it. The whole framework of sciences is to assume there are objects without a subject and to build from there. That is precisely the reason both life and consciousness are such mysteries to the sciences.
>Physics investigates the essential nature of the world, and biology describes a local bump. Psychology, human psychology, describes a bump on the bump. -- W.V.O Quine
It is as much as a leap of faith as the idealist premise.

>> No.15553829

>>15553818
It is not an assumption, you can frame the existence of the external world as a scientific hypothesis and you will discover that it is in fact the most confirmed scientific hypothesis by far.

>> No.15553830

>>15553811
I have very little knowledge of Berkeley and no interest in him. I mentioned because I had read it in some secondary literature. But can you explain how it isn't Schopenhauer's argument? The greentext quite comes from his Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

>> No.15553835

>>15553829
Again, science assumes it and then *proves* it. It is rather circular.

>> No.15553848

>>15553814
>al though I would think inter-subjective fits better
I also think intersubjective suits it better, but this is how both Schopenhauer and Kant define objectivity.

>> No.15553851

>>15553830
I doubt it is an argument in defence of the thesis that an object only exists in so far as it is being known, because even if it was true that the meaning of the word "object" is "being known by the subject" that wouldn't entail any metaphysical conclusion about the external world only existing in so far as it is being known. Similarly, if "object" is defined as "existing independently of observation" that wouldn't establish the truth of realism about the external world. How we define terms cannot establish metaphysical conclusions.

>> No.15553864

>>15553835
How is it circular, hypotheses can be confirmed or disconfirmed by observation. What I am saying is that the hypothesis of the external world is strongly empirically confirmed.

>> No.15553880

>>15553811
>OP literally quotes Schopenhauer
>In fact it probably isn't Schopenhauer's argument either
top kek

>> No.15553894

>>15553851
>wouldn't entail any metaphysical conclusion about the external world
I think you are falling in the trap of transcendental realism. What do you mean by *external world*? Keep in mind Schopenhauer is coming from a Kantian framework, so there is a difference between noumenon and representation. In some ways the metaphysical conclusions had already been established by Kant and now the question is the relation between subjects and objects, to which Schopenhauer responds they are completely dependent to and defined with relation to each other. Consider the rest of the passage:

>In the precisely the same manner, with an object *determined in any way*, the subject is also at once assumed as *knowing in such a way*. To this extent it is immaterial whether I say the objects have such and such special and inherent determinations, or that the subject knows in such and such ways. It is immaterial whether I say the objects are divisible into such and such classes, or that such and such different powers of knowledge are peculiar to the subject.

>> No.15553901

>>15553880
I mean the argument is so bad that it would be very surprising if Schopenhauer actually made it. Also nowhere in the quote it says that the statement is supposed to be an argument for idealism.

>> No.15553911

>>15553894
Is the statement you quoted in the OP supposed to be an argument in favor of idealism or not? If it is, it is fallacious. It doesn't matter whether he subscribes to a Kantian framework or not, his argument is either formally valid or it isn't.

>> No.15553926

>>15553864
Well, the idealist assumption in question is also in perfect harmony with the sciences. The question is whether we take the assumption of science as the basis for our whole worldview (instead of the idealist one), and there is no justification for that. Consider the following quote from Schopenhauer that makes my point clear (and also how it anticipates the prior quote from the realist Quine):
>So this is the fundamental absurdity of materialism: it starts out from something objective and takes something objective as its ultimate explanatory ground, whether it is matter in the abstract, i.e. the mere thought of matter, or whether it is an empirically given material b that has already been formed, such as chemical elements and their simplest compounds. Materialism considers something such as this to exist intrinsically and absolutely so that it can allow organic nature and eventually the cognitive subject to develop from it and be completely explained by it. – But the truth is that everything objective is as such already conditioned in a variety of ways by the cognitive subject and its cognitive forms; everything objective presupposes these forms and disappears completely if the subject is thought away.

>> No.15553927

>>15553911
It rather presupposes idealism. But how is it fallacious?

>> No.15553928

>>15553682
Rather silly. The world would go on just fine without sentient observers.

>> No.15553933

>>15553928
And it is just an assumption, a faith. You can prove it neither by experience nor by reason.

>> No.15553939

>>15553933
Proof is only possible in logic and mathematics.

>> No.15553958
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15553958

>>15553682
Very bugman. He falsely believes that everything is a type of "thing" and that everything splits into a subject and object.

>> No.15553967

>>15553958
And how ignorant you must be to say this. He starts from the most immediate experience (including types of things and relations of subjects and objects) to ultimately conclude everything is but one in essence and all division is an illusion. Disrobe, O priest! You have no business with philosophy.

>> No.15553988

>>15553967
>the most immediate experience
He was an apostate from the Church by engaging in Hindoo rites, thus barring himself from communing with the Holy Spirit. Thus his mind and soul were left to degrade under the effect of the fall of Adam and of his idolatrous sins, so his false experiences cannot be trusted. That is very bugman.
>everything is but one in essence
Very bugman and denied by the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, whom is the Logos made flesh, assuming an essence distinct from the Father's.
>division
How very bugman of him to assume that there are only strict identities or divisions.

>> No.15553990

>>15553927
I took it to be a conclusion FOR idealism. If you think it presupposes it, can you spell on the premises and the conclusion of the argument as you understand them?

>> No.15553991

>>15553988
ok christcuck

>> No.15553996

>>15553926
I don't understand your argument. Why do you bring materialism to it, we are discussing realism about the external world.

>> No.15553997

>>15553682
>>15553745
>subject
>object
>2020 AD
>he's still trapped in dialectics
Oh no no no

>> No.15554018
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15554018

>“For the worshipping of idols not to be named is the beginning, the cause, and the end, of all evil.”
Is there anything more cringe than "eastern "wisdom""? Turn to our Saviour instead of engaging in the foolishness of this world.

>>15553958
>>15553988
>>15553997
Based.

>> No.15554024

>>15553990
On second thought, I don't think it presupposes anything at all. Schopenhauer presents it as a basic premise as I indicated in the OP. The conclusions are in the second quote (>>15553894) in which he suggests a subject and the objects mirror eachother in terms of their qualities.

>> No.15554026

>>15554024
>I don't think it presupposes anything at all
that itself is a presupposition. schopenhauer btfo lmao.

>> No.15554032

>>15554024
So what are the premises and the conclusion can you spell them out to me

>> No.15554036
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15554036

"But the idol made with hands is accursed, and so is the one who made it—
he for having made it, and the perishable thing because it was named a god.
For equally hateful to God are the ungodly and their ungodliness;
for what was done will be punished together with the one who did it.
Therefore there will be a visitation also upon the heathen idols,
because, though part of what God created, they became an abomination,
snares for human souls
and a trap for the feet of the foolish."

"For the idea of making idols was the beginning of fornication,
and the invention of them was the corruption of life;
for they did not exist from the beginning,
nor will they last forever.
For through human vanity they entered the world,
and therefore their speedy end has been planned."

(Wisdom 14:8-14)

>> No.15554040

>>15554026
Well, it is exactly supposed to be an intuitive premise. Whether it is or not is the question I am asking in the OP. But it being a presupposition does not automatically follow that it is an unjustified presupposition. He justifies it by arguing against the alternatives, (there being only objects, i.e., materialism, and there being only subjects, i.e., Berkeley style idealism) and his arguments are strong in both cases. What I am trying to find out is that whether there is an strong argument against this Schopenhauer's premise.

>> No.15554043

>>15554040
>whether there is an strong argument against this Schopenhauer's premise
lay out his explicit premise and i'll refute it.

>> No.15554063
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15554063

Good thread, I haven't ready Schoppy, but this thread is interesting. So I won't contriboot, but just ask you carry on.

>> No.15554077

>>15554032
The premise is that there are no objects without a subject and there is no subject without any objects.

I'm not sure which conclusion you wish to see (there are many, as I said, this is his basic premise) but I list some of them. The world (as experience, as objects for the subject) exist only for each subject, and with the annihilation of any given subject, his world is also annihilated. Another conclusion is the one in the quote: the qualities in the world of objects mirrors the qualities in the structure of subjects; Meaning that a priori forms in the subject (causality/matter, time and space) are present in the world of objects precisely because it is the way the subjects are structured, and subjects and objects exist only in relation to eachother (premise).

It is my understanding of his arguments. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

>> No.15554087

>>15553814
>>15553818
Oh so you're just mentally ill. Nevermind, I'll let your thread be.

>> No.15554093

>>15554043
The explicit premise is explicitly stated in the OP. Were you so much of an intellectual powerhouse to refute any given argument in the blink of an eye you could have figured this out at least.

>> No.15554378

>>15554018
>>15553958
>>15554036
What does subject/object opposition have anything to do with your Christ-God? Bloody papist roaches

>> No.15554495

>>15554077
My understanding was that the argument was attempting to derive from
>Being subject means exactly the same thing as having an object, and being object means just the same as being known by the subject.
to the conclusion that objects cannot exist without subjects, which would be blatantly fallacious, hence my doubts that this is what Schopenhauer intended. I don't have the full passage to interpret his intentions but if he meant something different I don't necessarily object to it.

>> No.15554520

>>15554495
It does follow from the presented arguments that objects (as representations and not as noumenon) cannot exist without subjects (and vice versa). The objects as representations have the a priori marks of the subjects on them: Objects follow the rule of causality, and are situated in space and time, which according to Kant and Schopenhauer are a priori forms and stem from the subject, and hence these representational objects cannot exist without the subject, but the noumenon (free of causality/matter and space and time) of course does.

>> No.15554598

>>15554520
But now you are treating the quote not as an argument, but as a thesis, which is derived from an assumed Kantian framework. I don't find Kant's arguments persuasive, but I don't know if I have the time to delve deep into arguments for transcendental idealism. I will say however that his arguments for causality being a priori are... quite bad, and easy to dispense with them.

>> No.15554626

>>15554598
Are you the anon that said he is writing a book against Kant's arguments? Even if Kant's arguments do not hold, it only slightly damages Schopenhauer's system, so long as the noumenon/phenomena distinction atleast holds.

>> No.15554657

>>15554626
I am not him, and I think there are already sufficient criticism of Kant as presented for example by Bennet, Strawson, and Mackie. And yes I do think that his distinction between phenomena and noumena is unpersuasive, and maybe even incoherent.

>> No.15554677

>>15554657
Schopenhauer presents some modifications with regards to both nouemon/phenomena distinction and the categories, and goes through the arguments of CPR one by one trying to correct his mistakes. I have not delved into it, but it might interest you. I at least have not encountered in Schopenhauer's strain of idealism anything that is even slightly incoherent.

>> No.15554697

>>15553682
Was refuted by Socrates.

>> No.15555579

>>15554378
Because Christ showed vain philosophies to be completely useless.

>> No.15555627

>>15553818
>The whole framework of sciences is to assume there are objects without a subject and to build from there
not true btw

>> No.15556717

>>15553795
The earth was there since before it had life. The matrix proves this.

>> No.15556909

>>15555579
Except you needed 2000 years of philosophers to try and make sense of the retardation that was the teachings of Yeshoua on-top of the Old Testament.

Christianity proved that Philosophy > Christianity.

>> No.15557206

>>15556909
>needed 2000 years of philosophers
Not really, every martyr understood the depths of Christianity.

>> No.15557212

>>15555579
It feels like guen*nfag has moved on to Christianity.

>> No.15557235

>>15557206
When Yahweh told the Jews to slaughter the men, women, children, camels, cows and goats in the neighboring cities that was so profound and mind-blowing, it truly put shame to man's timeless quest for wisdom

>> No.15557240

>>15557212
I was actually just about to reply to that post with "this but with Shankara"