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15405835 No.15405835 [Reply] [Original]

How do you refute It?

Specifically, the claim that consciousness is an immaterial object (which is to say that the universe contains two kind of things: bodies and minds). That seems much less controversial than other claims that turn consciousness into souls, for example by claiming that they have causal power over the body, or by claiming that they can survive the death of my body. I'm really not interested in those positions, so i'd prefer you guys to focus on the first question.

>> No.15405839

> for example by claiming that they have causal power over the body

How do you do dualism without causality going across the gap? And why isn't the immaterial soul of dualism immortal?

>> No.15405844

>>15405835
It's unfalsifiable, so basically just believe it or don't depending on which you prefer.

>> No.15405874

>>15405839
>How do you do dualism without causality going across the gap?
The dualists I've read allow only for a one-way type of causality: brain states cause mind states, but mind states never cause any change in the body (brain included).
>And why isn't the immaterial soul of dualism immortal?
Because many people see it, me included, see it as a non-material emergent phenomenon, which emerges from a material body. How and why does that happen, I have no idea, but it seems the most plausible option to me, since
a) minds seem to be categorically different from bodies (they have a first person experience, for example), and
b) my mind states seems to be caused by my brain, and every change in my body (brain included) seems to be FULLY explainable through natural laws (so, for my mind to have an effect on my body, it would need to be able to break said laws, which doesnt seem plausible).

>> No.15405881

>>15405844
It could be falsified by proving that a complete reduction of minds to bodies is possible, hence why I've asked.

>> No.15406075

Bump

>> No.15406533

>>15405874
How do you know a leg doesnt have "first person experience"

>> No.15406550

>>15405835
You ask dualists to show that the body is separate from the mind by shooting themselves in the head. If they refuse, then they clearly believe mind is based on body. If they don't, then you basically win the argument.

>> No.15406558

>>15406533
Indeed, My Stepmom Wants To Have Sex With Me? (2013) suggests that the hips can move on their own free will.

>> No.15406617

There is not a single natural phenomenon in the universe where a physical object is affected by an abstract entity.

>> No.15406640

>>15406533
I have no idea. Still, panpsychism doesnt solve the problem, rather we would just end up positing more immaterial minds.

>>15406617
>>15406550
The dualism Im thinking about has no problems with those claims. Read this >>15405874

>> No.15406657
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15406657

nondual theory or Advaita is an incomplete representation of reality that prevents comprehension of the complete truth and is most unfortunate

In a brief historical look from the Vaisnava point of view, Advaita Vedanta, monism, is just an intermediate stage between Buddhism and monotheism. First there was Vedic monotheism and when it began degrading the Vedas were rejected by Gautama Buddha. Then Adi Sankara came to establish the authority of Vedas again, although he stressed an impersonal nature of Brahman, and after him several Vaisnava acaryas came with their variations of monotheism, Vaisnava Vedanta.

>> No.15406754

>>15406640
I dont think panpsychism is the answer but I dont think dualism is sensible either. There is not enough to suggest dualism I think. Its unnecessary.

>> No.15406779

>>15405835
read any high schooler's refutation of Cartesian dualism and you're solid.

>> No.15406843

>>15406754
Well, if not dualism, what's left is mysterianism and eliminationism, in the materialist camp, and idealism.

Basically, reality does not make as much sense as moderns would like it to make.

>> No.15406886
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15406886

>>15405835
Avshalom Elitzur thinks interactionist dualism is true.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXX-_G_9kww
http://cogprints.org/6613/1/Dualism0409.pdf

>> No.15406970

>>15406754
I'm not sure your position is tenable. A dualist could say that the existence of consciousness, and the fact that it cannot be predicted by physical theories*, imply that we have good evidence to believe in dualism. If it wasn't for consciousness, I would have no problem being a physicalist monist.

*by this I mean that even given a full physical account of a body, I cannot know wether it is conscious or not, and if it is in fact conscious, I could never know anything about the mental states (or mental contents) that are associated to its brain states. This stems from the fact, imho, that the movement of bodies remains the same wether the body is conscious or not (stating otherwise would amount to claim that our consciousness implies free will over our physical vessels), which means that physical theories won't ever be able to rule out wether a body is conscious or not, since in both cases we would end up observing the same exact phenomena. To cut it short: assuming that a body is conscious gives no predictive power over the body's movement (regardless of its consciousness or lack of it, it will move following the same patterns), which means that there cannot ever be an experimental way of proving said assumption. This would apply even if I knew everything (in the sense of being literally omniscient) there is to know about physics.

>>15406779
Not every dualist follows the cartesian formulation.

>> No.15406975

>>15406843
I think eliminationism and mysterianism seem best. It seems that in the isolation of our little subjective islands, out knowledge both of ourselves and the world in general has a limit.

>> No.15406998

>>15406975
What are some arguments for eliminationism? Their thesis sounds downright false to me, which makes this position even more interesting to me.
I also tend toward mysterianism, but I still have to do my research beforehand: otherwise I might end up claiming that this problem is unsolvable not because it is, but because of my ignorance regarding possible answers to this dilemma.

>> No.15407036

>>15406970
I dont think its as one sided as this though since phenomena repeatedly shows itself to be a borderline unusable concept scientifically and theres good reason to believe that phenomena supervenes perfectly on the physical which leaves it very redundant in terms of its place in reality and makes dualism look unreasonable. I think the best recourse is looking at how clearly neither concepts of the physical or phenomena are independent of a limited subjective mind.

>> No.15407067

>>15407036
Sorry but I don't understand your response. Could you expand on it? I'm really interested in it

>> No.15407077

Duality is just the nature of our reality but not the ultimate one. The ultimate reality is that just oneness but from that comes the dual. This is best seen as shiva (consciousness) and shakti (energy). From shakti come the 5 elements than make up everything through many combinations. The physical body is solely energy, same goes for our lower forms including the mind. The soul is likely a mix given that pure consciousness is the ultimate one and individuality is experienced influx (thus needing energy). If you go further up the level though ultimately individuality is an illusion and there is no-self or as some would argue their is just self. The argument of whether Buddhists are right with no-self or Adivanta is right about self is a only held by plebs as they are speaking through the limitation of language. Saying something is or isn’t implies the opposite is possible (duality) but it is simply one.

>> No.15407213

Materialist dualism just doesn’t work because it creates its own problem by excluding the spiritual. In truth, the body is conditioned by genetics and environmental development, and the mind is conditioned by society but if this were all there is then siblings would be more or less identical. The reason they aren’t is there is another part that’s unique to us all (soul or higher mind), any amount of self discovery will prove this. The problem materialism has is that it implies the existence of the spiritual as that’s the other side of the dual reality.

>> No.15407507

>>15407213
>siblings would be more or less identical.
They would occupy different bodies in different points in time and space. At best you should say that if materialist dualism is true, in two identical universes two conscious bodies occupying the same points in spacetime (in their own respective universes) will exhibit the same physical and mental states (and that would not be denied by any committed materialist dualist)

>> No.15407516

>>15406998
>>15407067
Well i dont necessarily want to say the elimination of phenomena but I think an eliminative outlook is important. The pitfalls and misunderstandings of the physical world we have and have had in the past I think apply in the exact same way to our own mental states. Our concepts of ourselves and our mental states are constructions that can be deconstructed in terms of brain states. I think maybe if we can deconstruct concepts like knowledge and what it means in terms of brain states then maybe we will have explanations as to why phenomena seems/is ineffable, irreducible, intrinsic, immediate and private.

Its these concepts of it being irreducible, ineffable, private etc that make it unusable in scientific discourse. Phenomena never has and never will be usable as knowledge to describe the world. How can phenomena be usable in science if it cannot be described and is so private that when we talk about e.g. blue, we can only talk about it in the sense that we assume other people know what we are talking about and can only verify that because they seem to behave as if they do. Because of these difficulties I don't think we can even define phenomena in an ontologically useful way that would warrant a dualist view or a panpsychist/monist view where everything is conscious (How can you say everything is conscious but not be able to describe/explain what consciousnes is properly).

At the same time the mind seems so intrinsically entwined to the brain that even though science cannot tell you how something feels (i dont think it ever could explain a subjective thing objectively anyway; that just seems like a contradiction), it seems that phenomena is a necessary product of physical structure to the point it seems lmost redundant. How something feels is not independent in the slightest of the brain structure.

>> No.15407527

>>15406998
>>15407067

cont. of >>15407516

I dont think a dualist or idealist view can really stand on its own. On the otherhand thats not to say that physical concepts are not ultimately constructed and confined/dependent on the subjective limits of our head. As Berkely said, theres no such thing as a mind-independent tree and so I think we also need to question whether physical knowledge can actually mean anything outside of the context of our minds, what degree that satisfies an ontology of reality. Physicalism also kind of has its own circularity in definition.
Despite this though, physical descriptions and models are very useful at conceptualising what is happening in the world, giving it advantages over overly mentalistic views. The fact that they give structure to the world gives them the upperhand as a basis for viewing reality. But thats not ignoring the notion that all our ideas of reality are constructed within the limits of our minds.

For me then its a push and pull that subjective experience is the basis of all knowledge but I cannot give an account of either subjective experience or physics that justifies it as unique ontological status. I can say for instance that I am clearly "feeling" something so its difficult to say phenomena doeant exist however there is literally nothing useful that I can say more about it. I cannot define an ontology for it. On the otherhand, while I can say all we know is our minds, it seems implausible that there isnt an extensive physical world out there which also necessarily explains the structure of my mind (i.e. brain), the only thing is that I cannot describe it outside the context of the mind which leads to problems in questions about what the intrinsic nature of that reality is. I can say for instance that there is noumena like Kant says but that too is almost a meaningless placeholder rather than having a good deal of validity.
It all just seems a paradox to me.

>> No.15407795

>>15407516
>>15407527
I must admit, I'm still new to thinking this stuff, so at the moment I'm still taking for granted certain notions, over which you've clearly already thought way more than I did. Namely, I'm taking for granted naive physicalist realism, the notion for which physical theories really present us external objects. This of course implies an ontology of external objects which cannot seemingly account for my internal consciousness, leading me to believe that there must be a broader (dualist, in this case) ontology containing the one mentioned before.
Do you reject ontology in general? And if you don't, which one have you adopted?

>> No.15407836

>>15407507
If I said identical then that would be better but pointless argument. My point is that material differences between two people born from same genes, growing up in the same household and being conditioned by the same point in society would yield very simpler results. The fact that it doesn't points to something else being involved and in my opinion, consciousness is what allows us to go against conditioning.

>> No.15407879

>>15407836
I'm not sure about that. I think that, even given those similarities, their bodies and experiences would be radically different, since they a) would be affected by different forces (which means that they would experience different things) and b) their bodies would find themselves in different conformations (so we would have structural differences in their experience too). Given how susceptible is our mind to changes in our bodies, it could be fair to claim that even two perfect clones might present radically different behaviours, as long as they do not occupy the same body.

>> No.15407918

>>15405835
i refute it by breathing and being born

>> No.15407923
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15407923

You don't. Embrace it.

>> No.15407929

Dualism is true.

>> No.15407981

Genuine question regarding dualism:
How does one know his rational faculties are constant and reliable if not through sense data?
Certainly, I believe 3 is less than 10 but if a man said to me that it is not always the case, then proceeded to turn a pebble in his hand into a bird, I might vacillate.

>> No.15408002

>>15407879
You're creating infallible arguments that don't help lead to any practical understanding. It doesn't matter what two perfect clones do or what two identical beings in alternate realties are because how could one even verify those claims? At best they are just mental masturbation. What I am trying to create is doubt that all that is the physical and through some self inquiry its easy to see that there is something unique to us all past the genetic (body) and conditioned (mind). Material dualists have realised because they realise the body (material) isn't all there is which creates the need for mind but this is another way of saying immaterial/spiritual and they can't square their hate of God (born usually out of an overcorrection from hate of organised religion) so they use language to create mental side step the issue.

People are not equally conscious, some are more conditioned and have less free will than others but it seems that you have reach a point of difficulty in that many of mind attributes can be associated with the body (neurochemicals, psychology, etc) but there is still something more. This problem was solved along time ago because even though the break isn't so clear, the mind can be separated into lower mind and higher mind/soul/consiousness. This dichotomy can also be split to instinct (body), intellect (mind) and intuition (consciousness). The difficult of all of this is that we are talking about issues that go beyond clearly definable things but this is a limit in language and the intellectual mind.

>> No.15408020

>>15407795
I dont think I can either define an ontology of phenomena, nor an ontology of external objects independent of the mind, in any useful way. I dont see how dualism works if I cant give a proper account of either phenomena or the intrinsic nature of reality. If an ontology of intrinsic reality outside my mind is unobtainable then I dont think I could reasonably suggest that it is necessarily different ontologically to whats going on in my mind which I myself cannot even define properly. Physics doesn't really tell us about intrinsic physical reality. Its largely abstract models that account for patterns in my own experience.

Despite this I can still acknowledge that there is a consistent existence as seen empirically. We know there are brains and that phenomena seems chained to it, supervenes on it inseperably with the causal power of brains seemingly dominant. I think this too makes dualism seem unreasonable because though brains cannot explain how I feel, under a dualistic view of reality, feelings seem epiphenomenal and arbitrary. They would just seem to tag along to brains.
I also feel like due to this, its conceivable that our fascination with phenomena can probably be to some extent deconstructed into physical brain states. To me it just makes dualism seem implausible. I feel like maybe ontologies of reality cannot be firmly asserted in general.

>> No.15408027

>>15407981
You've created your own trap by using the words rational and certain. These are one side of the duality that obviously can't be understood if you take away the physical (which falls on the same side). It's like saying, how do you know what hot is if all you ever experience is cold.

>> No.15408043

>>15407836
Scientists have explanations for how identical twins in the same household are different.
This guy >>15407879 is correct.

>> No.15408051

>>15408043
>scientists have theories
If you read my reply to him, that part of the topic was an irrelevance.

>> No.15408062

>>15408020
I can't follow your argument because I'm not sure what you believe the two polarities of dualism to be?

>> No.15408084

>>15408027
I don't see how. Sense is not to reason what cold is to heat, what small is to great, and others.
Let me rephrase: Is not sensual regularity that gives man justification to trust his thoughts?

>> No.15408133

>>15408051
its not though because the differences between people can be explained by physical differences even if reared in the same environment and identical.


>>15408062
the polarities are in terms of phenomena and physics.

>> No.15408161

>>1540808
You're correct but you've misunderstood my metaphor. Certainty is to uncertainty as hot is cold, material to immaterial, masculine to feminine, etc. They are two poles of the dual universe in between which everything is made.

As such sensory perception (material) is necessary to trust (material) to trust our physic phenomena/thoughts (immaterial) but absolute certainty is a largely an illusion created by the mind. Especially in how most people tackle certainty.

>> No.15408185

>>15408002
We cannot verify these claims, but given a realist physicalist ontology these claims are at the very least plausible, while the opposite claims would posit a type of interaction that would break physical laws.
Also, what do you mean that some people are more free than others? What concept of freedom are you referring to?
Also when you say that this problem was solved a long time ago, are you talking about Kant? I hope so, since Ive read him a lot.

>> No.15408203

>>15408133
Hence why I emphasised the word theory because both my and the scientist conclusion is infallible under the accepted methods of proof in todays society. Also I'm sure replicated that study is very impractical/impossible because as I suggested, some people are more conscious than others. If two literally NPC twins are mildly different it might be easy to explain very two that are awakened and more conscious in their decisions.

>> No.15408204

>>15408020
Do you disagree with Kant's trascendental deduction, which seems to prove that phenomena, although mind-dependent, can still be determined objectively? That would grant us certainity when it comes to them, which would legitimize an ontology centered on those objects.

>> No.15408392

>>15408185
You need to understand the traps of the mind which was developed under the guise of survival and literally splitting everything into two categories (will kill me, won't kill me). Language followed on this basis and even seemly unrelated things we still have this bias to quickly categorise everything into (true/not true) since in hunter gather times, delay resulted in death. This makes it very difficult to discuss metaphysical topics because they can't be understood intellectually and thus are quickly been rejected by a mind not capable of understanding it. Hence passable theories are irrelevant, what is important is doubt. Doubt that what you believe and the nature that base your reality on isn't true, once you can come to this position genuinely then you can tackle topics in a new light. Obviously instantly exchanging one for another is also wrong, the key is to allow concepts to remain suspended is uncertainty without believing or disbelieving it. This gives you time to experiment with it as a perception and see if it fits.

Much of what I say is a thought experiment because ultimately I believe follow everything to its source it all folds back to oneness and this discussion becomes irrelevant. Freedom as I see it is the means to influence our decisions against the conditioned body and mind. If you constantly eat junk food, don't exercise, sleep, etc then you begin to find it harder to go against your body shutting down for example, this is you losing your free will. Animals can't go against their conditioning for the most part, we have that power but some more than others and there's ways to grow it.

Nope solved thousands of years ago in many civilisations hence body, mind, soul as means to explain the self. In reality there are more degrees but it opens you up to concept of other modes of thinking. Particularly when you reach the limits of intellectualism.

>> No.15408452

>>15408392
>You need to understand the traps of the mind which was developed under the guise of survival and literally splitting everything into two categories (will kill me, won't kill me).
No consciousness works like your mythology.

>> No.15408518

>>15408452
I didn't define what consciousness or my mythology was but thanks for proving my point about the mind needing to rush to a conclusion.

>> No.15408522

>>15405835
No lol

>> No.15408575

>>15405874
>The dualists I've read allow only for a one-way type of causality: brain states cause mind states, but mind states never cause any change in the body (brain included).
The last thread on this an anon pointed out that if this were true we would not be talking about the mind state state at all. To talk about it is a physical effect that came from the brain, that was apparently caused by the brain registering the existence of the mind, ie being causally impacted.

>> No.15408598

>>15408084
It would seem to me that the regularity of reason is an image of the regularity of the world our senses give to us. Assuming reason evolved somehow(I don't see where else it came from) it did so because it is somehow echoing the structure of the world.

>> No.15408784

>>15408575
Most modern dualists would say that it is Aan emergent non-material state, emerging from physical matter. Basically, you say that mind is a physical effect, the dualist says that it is a non-physical effect obtained from physical causes. Material object are still the cause, but the effect is not material.

>> No.15408808

>>15408392
I'm the guy you were responding to. I'm not this guy >>15408452
I must admit, I don't understand what youre trying to say in the first paragraph. Is there any author you're referring to? Maybe this could give me some additional context (your posts, while interesting, are very dense).

Regarding your second paragraph, why do you think it is possible to obtain free-will through these routines? What's the rationale?
Lastly, who are the people who solved all these problems thousands of yesrs ago?

>> No.15409286

>>15408203
this is silly. theres no reason to suggest your theory if these things are explaaainable physically.

>> No.15409372

>>15408808
I'm sure I'm not the first to say but the concept of how the mind evolved for a certain purpose makes sense to me. I'm guessing its a merger of perspectives coming from evolutionary psychology and taoism though.

With free-will, you need the basis of believe in the soul or at least an operator separate from mind and body otherwise it would be hard to pin down what you are trying to liberate. This sense of self is therefore only felt and takes introspection to find out when theres benefit. For the body, you are trying to increase your energy and reduce the waste from it trying to rebalance you after (toxins, poor diet, sleep, lifestyle, alcohol, etc). Then the mind takes introspection to question why you desire things or follow certain patterns, therapy can help give an outside perspective as we have a habit of equating our thoughts to our sense of self. Yoga (which is not just the poses) is a system designed as an all encompassing way to liberate the self. But another way to understand it is that you are just trying to create space for your true self to come forward.

I wouldn't dig into the ancient western side of things to begin with as it's too cluttered and has been revised multiple times by people that don't know what they are talking about. Of the Eastern philosophises, Taoism is great but isn't very well documented. Indian metaphysics are great and more accessible, they literally discuss the big bang, simulation theory and a lot about the self. Jung is also good if you want western bridge though you might want to begin with the people that came after him. I'm currently reading The Origins And History Of Consciousness by Erich Neumann.

The last thing I would like mention is that theres no way to gain intellectual certainty on these things. People like to bring up others names because it helps them create a false idea of certainty on a topic but the best thing to do is open yourself up to many perspectives and pick/create one for yourself. Ultimately if you can't prove any then it just makes sense to pick the one that gives you the most benefit.

>> No.15409386

>>15408784
How do you respond to the fact that we are materially talking about it right now? If it didnt impact the material how could the material be referring to it?

>> No.15409392

>>15409286
There's evidence to support flat earth theory, it doesn't mean its true

>> No.15409427

>>15409386
The bodily movements that constitutes the action necessary for this comunication do not seem to depend on pur understanding of them. Wether we were conscious or not, we would have moved the same way, since the movement of each part of my body is entirely due to physical laws.
As such, as a non-material emergen phenomenon, we are only aware of this comunication, but we're not cause of it. Basically, it seems to we as consciousness can just observe, never interact.

>> No.15409451

>>15409427
But how is the non-conscious material talking about consciousness, for it to have the concept of consciousness at all it would have to have been affected by it. Our talking about consciousness is an effect of consciousness

>> No.15409627

>>15409451
Only if you mean it in an extremely narrow way. Our consciousness is the cause of our conceptual understanding in this act of comunication, but it isn' the cause of my body typing these words, for example. It seems to me that even if I wasn' conscious, natural laws would have compelled my body to make the same exact movements: the only difference is that there would have been no observer associated to this moving body.

>> No.15409640

>>15409627
But why would our bodies write text referring to a concept they can by definition have no input from?

>> No.15409657

>>15409640
There isn't a why, I guess, since we can explain their movements through physical laws. Again, if these bodies weren't conscious, they would have still performed the same actions, since they would have still been constituted by the same matter under the same natural laws. Do you disagree with this?

>> No.15409685

>>15409657
Yes, because there are some actions whose causes lie in precisely there being an observer that experiences them. The appearing itself has causal power.

You're telling me a p-zombie would "outwardly" contemplate its own death? That's hard to swallow

>> No.15409704

>>15409657
>Again, if these bodies weren't conscious, they would have still performed the same actions, since they would have still been constituted by the same matter under the same natural laws. Do you disagree with this?
It's specifically the fact that the physical bodies are spending their time deliberating about a concept of consciousness which should simply not ever 'occur' to them. They should not be writing any of this if consciousness doesnt have a causal impact on them.

>> No.15409714

>>15409685
>You're telling me a p-zombie would "outwardly" contemplate its own death? That's hard to swallow
It would not contemplate its own death, since it has no cognition, but its body would perform all the actions (or movements) I would perform if I was in that same body contemplating my death. To say otherwise is to say that minds can break the laws of nature.

>> No.15409725

>>15409714
That's why I said outwardly. What could possibly cause a deterministic machine to contemplate its own death? Nothing but the awareness of it.

>> No.15409778

>>15409725
I disagree, it could be thet the awareness of death is due to physical determinations of my body. I observe them, and I think them as the contemplation of my own death. Even the order of my mental states is determined, since they all correspond to a brain (or body, if we want to be more generic) state.
To cut it short: during their natural lives, my body and p-zombie-me's body would perform exactly the same mivements. There would be absolutely no difference.

>> No.15409822

>>15409714
What your saying doesn’t even make sense, sure our bodies are constrained by natural laws regardless but exhibit perfect understanding of them. The body only learns through mimicry and genetic memory, there a plenty of things such a hand signals that it never learn to do. Some things it can’t even do without a lot of conscious effort and training (advanced yoga poses for example). Even unconscious activities such as running or talking can be made conscious and improved upon.

>> No.15409828

>>15409778
So your body physically determined itself to grieve for a loved one, and you observe that and misrecognize it as grief? The absolute state.

>> No.15409831

>>15409822
>but they don’t exhibit perfect understanding of them...

>>15409778
I’ve realised you don’t understand the difference between could and would.

>> No.15409845

>>15409778
How could a pzombie discuss the concept of a pzombie? It would have to have the concept of consciousness, to have that concept it would have to have been casually impacted by consciousness

>> No.15409870

>>15405835
Consciousness is the only material object. Everything is projected in the self. Nondualism.

>> No.15410000

>>15409845
p-zombies are exactly the same as us but without consciousness. EXACTLY the same. They just dont have phenomena. Their brains are identical. They would also claim that they have consciousness due to this fact that they have the exact same brains as us.

>> No.15410019

>>15410000
Im asking you to think about how a pzombie COULD be the same as us, try to describe a causal chain that would make a pzombie refer to a concept it by definition cannot have access to. You are asserting that they just are the same as us minus C without explaining how that could be.

>> No.15410050

>>15410019
Yeah thats the point of a p-zombie: that we can conceive of designing a fully functioning human without phenomena. It says it has consciousness for the exact same reason we do: states of neuronal firing under physical laws.

>> No.15410064

>>15409822
>>15409828
>>15410019
I could explain every form of mimicry through an account of my whole physical body. P-zombie-me would emit air vibration through its vocal chords, said vibration would hit p-zombie-you's auditory sensory organ, this is connected to the nervous system, which would then activate a series of muscles leading to you emitting the same 'mimicked' sound. Sorry for the bad neuroscience. That said, it should somehow work like that.
Do you guys find it not plausible?

>> No.15410090

>>15410064
So when zombie-you tells zombie-me a joke, my body's determinations find it funny?

I know what you're saying. I've read this exact argument in a paper before: p-zombies would have a hard problem of consciousness, too, there'd be a zombie Chalmers, etc. but it's ultimately not convincing for two reasons: what the other guy and I have been saying, and even if it is plausible, the existence of an internal (and apparently totally epiphenomenal) observer becomes even MORE inexplicable

>> No.15410096

>>15410050
>: that we can conceive of designing a fully functioning human without phenomena.
Im saying that we can't if you actually think about it. A pzombie wouldnt talk about consciousness.

>> No.15410110

>>15410096
Why wouldnt it if had the exact same brain states in the exact same physical universe?

>> No.15410122

>>15410110
Because concsiousness plays a causal role, either it itself part of the physical universe and we haven't understood it yet, or it is immaterial but causally interacts with the material world. You are reducing consciousness to our observations of the physical brain, when in fact all we can say at the moment is that the two interact.

>> No.15410124

>>15406617
Dates and addresses

>> No.15410125

>>15406779
>every dualist is a substance-dualist

>> No.15410128

>>15410090
I do agree, recognition of other human beings become very hard once you adopt a dualist view, but I also admit that there's no other argument I find more convincing. I don't think Ive got at the moment a guideline I could follow if I wanted to recognize another person, at best I can just assume such a recognition by grounding it in my common sense (basically: by assuming that bodies similar to mine are also conscious and also have experiences comparable to mine).

>> No.15410156

>>15410122
You have absolutely no evidence for anything in that statement though. Youre just asserting it because you believe it so. There seems to be nothing to suggest we cannot build a fully functioning human with just the materials of a brain. The reason you feel, think and experience how you do is your brain.

>> No.15410170

https://discord.gg/FFwRXKq

>> No.15410171

>>15410156
The evidence is that there are material effects of consciousness, eg our brains writing this text right now about consciousness.

>> No.15410196

>>15410171
No one on earth thinks that is evidence. Theres no suggestion that anything other than your brain is necessary for consciousness.

>> No.15410220

>>15405835
easy, monism is a bugmen ideology

>> No.15410234

>>15410220
Based.

>>15410196
I know for an absolute fact that some people do. Why isn't this machine afflicted with other illusory non-problems then, like the hard problem of gloopdiork? Why qualia specifically? Could it be because they have causal power?

>> No.15410695

>>15410234
What machine? Read Chalmers article on fading and dancing qualia about the relation between qualia and the brain.