/lit/ - Literature

>>14984068
Posting in based thread. Establishing duality (to show it is illusory)
Peace be Upon All Posters

>>14984068
Tell me more about Guenon's truth and wisdom.

>>14984103
Leave......
Brothers..... Ignore this man. Remain aloof from all controversy and ignore him.....

>>14984103
>Tell me more about Guenon's truth and wisdom.

“René Guénon (pbuh) defies classification. . . . Were he anything less than a consummate master of lucid argument and forceful expression, his work would certainly be unknown to all but a small, private circle of admirers.”
—Gai Eaton, author of The Richest Vein

“Guénon (pbuh) established the language of sacred metaphysics with a rigor, a breadth, and an intrinsic certainty such that he compels recognition as a standard of comparison for the twentieth century.”
—Jean Borella, author of Guénonian Esoterism and Christian Mystery

“To a materialistic society enthralled with the phenomenal universe exclusively, Guénon (pbuh), taking the Vedanta as point of departure, revealed a metaphysical and cosmological teaching both macrocosmic and microcosmic about the hierarchized degrees of being or states of existence, starting with the Absolute . . . and terminating with our sphere of gross manifestation.”
—Whitall N. Perry, editor of A Treasury of Traditional Wisdom

“René Guénon (pbuh) was the chief influence in the formation of my own intellectual outlook (quite apart from the question of Orthodox Christianity). . . . It was René Guénon (pbuh) who taught me to seek and love the truth above all else, and to be unsatisfied with anything else.”
—Fr. Seraphim Rose, author of The Soul After Death

“His mixture of arcane learning, metaphysics, and scathing cultural commentary is a continent in itself, untouched by the polluted tides of modernity. . . . Guénon’s (pbuh) work will not save the world—it is too late for that—but it leaves no reader unchanged.”
—Jocelyn Godwin, author of Mystery Religions in the Ancient World

“René Guénon (pbuh) is one of the few writers of our time whose work is really of importance. . . . He stands for the primacy of pure metaphysics over all other forms of knowledge, and presents himself as the exponent of a major tradition of thought, predominantly Eastern, but shared in the Middle Ages by the . . . West.”
—Walter Shewring, translator of Homer’s Odyssey

>>14984132

“In a world increasingly rife with heresy and pseudo-religion, Guénon (pbuh) had to remind twentieth century man of the need for orthodoxy, which presupposes firstly a Divine Revelation and secondly a Tradition that has handed down with fidelity what Heaven has revealed. He thus restores to orthodoxy its true meaning, rectitude of opinion which compels the intelligent man not only to reject heresy but also to recognize the validity of faiths other than his own if they also are based on the same two principles, Revelation and Tradition.”
—Martin Lings, author of Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions

“If during the last century or so there has been even some slight revival of awareness in the Western world of what is meant by metaphysics and metaphysical tradition, the credit for it must go above all to Guénon (pbuh). At a time when the confusion into which modern Western thought had fallen was such that it threatened to obliterate the few remaining traces of genuine spiritual knowledge from the minds and hearts of his contemporaries, Guénon (pbuh), virtually single-handed, took it upon himself to reaffirm the values and principles which, he recognized, constitute the only sound basis for the living of a human life with dignity and purpose or for the formation of a civilization worthy of the name.”
—Philip Sherrard, author of Christianity: Lineaments of a Sacred Tradition

“Apart from his amazing flair for expounding pure metaphysical doctrine and his critical acuteness when dealing with the errors of the modern world, Guénon (pbuh) displayed a remarkable insight into things of a cosmological order. . . . He all along stressed the need, side by side with a theoretical grasp of any given doctrine, for its concrete—one can also say its ontological—realization failing which one cannot properly speak of knowledge.”
—Marco Pallis, author of A Buddhist Spectrum

“Guénon’s (pbuh) mission was two-fold: to reveal the metaphysical roots of the ‘crisis of the modern world’ and to explain the ideas behind the authentic and esoteric teachings that still [remain] alive.”
—Harry Oldmeadow, author of Traditionalism: Religion in the Light of the Perennial Philosophy

>>14984138
Brother.... This is based..... The hylic cannot respond..... Only with heresies....

Brothers, each time I gaze upon that most flattering blue background thread picture of René-Jean-Marie-Joseph Guénon (PBUH) I am rendered breathless. I refreshed 4channel.org on my phone while preparing lunch in my kitchen and so aggressively was the wind knocked out of my lungs that I spilled my water and then slipped on the spill, banging my head on the counter on the way down. I briefly lost consciousness—it was during this time that René-Jean-Marie-Joseph Guénon (PBUH) appeared to me and said nothing. His silence was comforting. I came to and my head no longer hurt. This man is so fucking based and so very wise. So, so, so fucking based. Very based. Good afternoon, brothers...

>>14984171
Holy based..... When you lost consciousness..... Perhaps you attained a supra formal state....moving up along the Polar axis of being.....

>4 posters
Just stop

>>14984285
The thread has hardly begun, rather than being ashamed of being the first few initial posters, we consider it to be a great honor

The Sun was still warm...yet it's light was no longer upon the earth...as if it were a candle...behind stained glass windows...letting escape one or two feeble sparks...Before me was a limpid stream...from which I drank...and behind the waterfall...Guenon (pbuh) appeared...

>>14984068
alright I'll bite, what books do I start with? Any charts?

>>14984413
Start with his first book "Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines", when you click on the archive.org link in OP's post it's the one that automatically pop's up. This chart is pretty good, I would recommend reading the book Man and His Becoming According to the Vedanta before Symbolism of the Cross, Multiple States of the Being or any of the other books on metaphysics. You are about to be blessed with a most sublime illumination...

>>14984445
Based.....another initiation performed......

>>14984285
Multiplicity only has an illusory existence.

>>14984474
based

>fr*nch
>betrays Europe
>converts to pisslam
Checks out

>>14984859

>" The West was Christian in the Middle Ages, but is so no longer; if anyone should reply that it may again become so, we will rejoinder that no one desires this more than we do, and may it come about sooner than all we see round about us would lead us to expect. But let no one delude himself on this point: if this should happen, the modern world will have lived its day"

- Rene Guenon (pbuh), The Crisis of the Modern World pg. 96

>>14984892
Based!

>>14984102
>Posting in based thread. Establishing duality (to show it is illusory)
Holy based...... I saw through the cracks with this Rope you threw into the deep pit of my delusion, brother...........

I am liberated............

>>14984859
Guénon was a crypto-Christian. He even believed that Christ rose from the dead iirc.

>>14984132
>>14984138
Thank you, he was influential, but I would like to know more about his teachings, his essence, directly from his own words.

>>14985749
then read the short essay written by him linked in OP's post

>>14985767
Can you summarize the essence of his teachings, what are his most important points?

>>14985749
>his essence
he was a born gnostic... pbuh....

>>14984068
So based!

>>14986086
>you will never read Guenon in Cafe Guenon

based....

Confused about Guenon spam? Not sure where to start? Begin with this handy image explaining how Advaita Vedanta is universally considered a late, crypto-Buddhist mutation of Hinduism and not real Hinduism at all. The only people who disagree are western LARPers who get their religious beliefs from Wikipedia and Youtube.

>>14984068
how can one man be so based?

>>14986820
He's a role model for me.... Pbuh.....
I look up to him for guidance in this reign of quantity..... I even destroyed my computer and switched to more ascetic practices and established a Guénon (pbuh)-like study in my house.....

Ok, I will read this tonight bros.

Let us not forget brothers...that Guénon (pbuh) was well versed in the belles lettres...Guénon (pbuh) unveils the oceanic depth of Dante's masterpiece...which was constantly overlooked by Hylic professors...PBUH

>>14987027
based, his 'East and West' and 'Reign of Quantity' are his two other main books on culture/modernity, all 3 are great

>>14986726
Why would anyone care who is not a poo in the loo?

>>14987004
Kinda based. I just noticed that I completely stopped listening to all music and other distractions shortly after reading him.

The fact of consciousness is entirely different from everything else. So long as the assemblage of the physical or physiological conditions antecedent to the rise of any cognition, as for instance, the presence of illumination, sense-object contact, etc., is being prepared, there is no knowledge, and it is only at a particular moment that the cognition of an object arises. This cognition is in its nature so much different from each and all the elements constituting the so-called assemblage of conditions, that it cannot in any sense be regarded as the product of any collocation of conditions. Consciousness thus, not being a product of anything and not being further analysable into any constituents, cannot also be regarded as a momentary flashing. Uncaused and unproduced, it is eternal, infinite and unlimited. The main point in which consciousness differs from everything else is the fact of its self-revelation. There is no complexity in consciousness. It is extremely simple, and its only essence or characteristic is pure self-revelation.

The so-called momentary flashing of consciousness is not due to the fact that it is momentary, that it rises into being and is then destroyed the next moment, but to the fact that the objects that are revealed by it are reflected through it from time to time. But the consciousness is always steady and unchangeable in itself. The immediacy of this consciousness is proved by the fact that, though everything else is manifested by coming in touch with it, it itself is never expressed, indicated or manifested by inference or by any other process, but is always self-manifested and self-revealed. All objects become directly revealed to us as soon as they come in touch with it.

Consciousness is one. It is neither identical with its objects nor on the same plane with them as a constituent element in a collocation of them and consciousness. The objects of consciousness or all that is manifested in consciousness come in touch with consciousness and themselves appear as consciousness. This appearance is such that, when they come in touch with consciousness, they themselves flash forth as consciousness, though that operation is nothing but a false appearance of the non-conscious objects and mental states in the light of consciousness, as being identical with it. But the intrinsic difference between consciousness and its objects is that the former is universal and constant, while the latter are particular and alternating. The awarenesses of a book, a table, etc. appear to be different not because these are different flashings of knowledge, but because of the changing association of consciousness with these objects. The objects do not come into being with the flashings of their awareness, but they have their separate existence and spheres of operation.

>>14987122

Consciousness is one and unchanging; it is only when the objects get associated with it that they appear in consciousness and as identical with it in such a way that the flashing of an object in consciousness appears as the flashing of the consciousness itself. It is through an illusion that the object of consciousness and consciousness appear to be welded together into such an integrated whole, that their mutual difference escapes our notice, and that the object of consciousness, which is only like an extraneous colour applied to consciousness, does not appear different or extraneous to it, but as a specific mode of the consciousness itself. Thus what appear as but different awarenesses, as book-cognition, table-cognition, are not in reality different awarenesses, but one unchangeable consciousness successively associated with ever-changing objects which falsely appear to be integrated with it and give rise to the appearance that qualitatively different kinds of consciousness are flashing forth from moment to moment. Consciousness cannot be regarded as momentary.

For, had it been so, it would have appeared different at every different moment. If it is urged that, though different consciousnesses are arising at each different moment, yet on account of extreme similarity this is not noticed; then it may be replied that, if there is difference between the two consciousnesses of two successive moments, then such difference must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness. In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case, if another awareness be required to comprehend their difference and that requires another and so on, there would be a vicious infinite.

>>14987129

If the difference be itself said to be identical with the nature of the consciousness, and if there is nothing to apprehend this difference, then the nonappearance of the difference implies the non-appearance of the consciousness itself; for by hypothesis the difference has been held to be identical with the consciousness itself. The non-appearance of difference, implying the non-appearance of consciousness, would mean utter blindness. The difference between the awareness of one moment and another cannot thus either be logically proved, or realized in experience, which always testifies to the unity of awareness through all moments of its appearance.

It may be held that the appearance of unity is erroneous, and that, as such, it presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous. It cannot be urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false, then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true; for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved. The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses, which is self-evident.

>>14987027
>>14987043
>>14987050
>>14987109

>people actually reading our Great Teacher (pbuh)
Based ....

>>14987122
>>14987129
>>14987133
>>14987149
Brothers...I'm contemplating............

>>14987169
Based....

>>14987190
Interesting to see how Guenon praised the contemplative life. Didn't know that.

>>14987169
>>14987190
>>14987194
>Upon being asked to elaborate, he explained that Guénon would sometimes stand in his balcony overlooking Cairo and stare into the night sky literally for hours. When I inquired from his son as to the precise nature of his spiritual practice, he replied in one word: “contemplation”

>>14984068

Sup niggers, can any of you wagies refute the man himself?

>>14987230
Only Allah (swt) knows the depths of the subtle metaphysical doctrines he must he dwelt on

>>14987244
>refute the man himself?
impossible, the man was guided by the grace of God

>>14987244
Brother...we don't condone such base language within our sacred island of learning...please leave if your are not interested in the enlightenment of Guenon (pbuh)...

>>14987253

Don't tell me what I can and cannot say. I've come to share my rare Guenon's that I've made myself, please show me some respect.

>>14987266
How can one man be so based? If M. Guenon (PBUH) was on this plane today, he would be posting here with us.....

>>14987244
>>14987266
(pbuh)....
this is some nice Sacred Art to contemplate uphon....

>>14987253
>sacred island of learning
so based.....

>>14987244
>>14987266
Holy...based...

>>14984068
is there any secondary material that will be understand his metaphysical vision? I read his texts and I intuit something profound but it hasnt rly *clicked* yet, as in I feel I don't see the overall big picture yet

>>14984068
>is born a christian bourgeois
>bears the name of the female ape
>gets bored with Christianity and secular Christianity, ie free masons, like any midwit low bourgeois
>dabbles in spiritualism, theosophy and perennialist mysticism
>becomes infatuated with vedism-mahayanism
>exactly the same retardation
>but it is exotic so it is true
>keeps shilling the idea that all religions are the same
>dies a muslism
>It's really only to make idiots feel righteous and like they are in the know
>"i am spiritual but not religious", says any generic whore
>100 years later, the people who spout the same nonsense are the bored midwit humanist bourgeois like soccer moms posting on Facebook craving for virtue signaling points

>>14987887
Guenon is already quarterly source.

>>14987887
Yes, find other websites that take this man seriously and read other Traditionalist authors. I have no doubt that there are some on this board who wish to take his teachings seriously but I have yet to see a single quality discussion.

>>14988033
What remains to be said? Anyone who has even the slightest amount of spiritual and intuitive capacity will understand his works on their first reading..... Guenon (pbuh) is already a third level source for most things (Vedas, Shankaracharya, Guenon)
All that is left for us to do is read his teachings and set off upon a path of spiritual development and initiation. Any more discussion is fruitless.

Guenon (pbuh) is just so..... baaaaaaaaaased!

>>14988049
>Anyone who has even the slightest amount of spiritual and intuitive capacity will understand his works on their first reading.....
Based.....
>>14988221
based... how do I gain such a calm look as our Great Teacher (pbuh)?

Based

Yahya (pbuh).....

>>14988621
Holy.... based....

>>14988621
>>14988636
>>14988227
>>14988221
>>14987375
>>14987334
>>14987252
>>14987248
>>14987230
>>14987194
>>14987190
>>14987169
>>14987149
>>14987133
>>14987129
>>14987122
>>14987109
>>14987050
>>14987043
>>14987027
>>14987004
>>14986820
>>14986086
Based
>>14986105
Made me cry.........

>>14988695
>Made me cry
peak bug

>>14988788
woah based....

>>14988695
Dangerously based....

>>14988788
Crying is very based, anon....
Many prophets cried when contemplating upon Allah (swt) as Guenon (pbuh) taught them to do, such as David (pbuh).....

>I am weary with my groaning; all the night make I my bed to swim; I water my couch with my tears.
>Mine eye is consumed because of grief; it waxeth old because of all mine enemies.
>Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity; for the Lord hath heard the voice of my weeping.
>The Lord hath heard my supplication; the Lord will receive my prayer.
>Let all mine enemies be ashamed and sore vexed: let them return and be ashamed suddenly.

>>14988621
>>14988636
>His prayer was answered: "O Zakariya! We give thee good news of a son: His name shall be Yahya: on none by that name have We conferred distinction before."
holy.... based.....
>>14988695
>>14988791
>>14989051
based....
>>14988788
cringe... the brothers know best how to contemplate... learn from them...

>>14989051
>Crying is very based
Based.. I cried today from rereading the Reign of Quantity (peace be upon it).

>>14989051
>>14989065
Holy based........ Our power grows every day
Peace be Upon the Brotherhood

>>14989116
Based.......

आधारित....

>>14988221
>post your literary 3x3

>>14989241
Based Department? Yeah, we have an emergency...... Yes I can hold.................. Contemplation time...............

AAAAAAAH JESUS FUCKING CHRIST I CAN HARDLY..........CONTEMPLATE HOW BASED THIS IS BROTHERS OH MY GOOOOD FUCK FUCK FUUUUUUCK AAAAHHHHH

A based morning to you all my brothers.... Continue to wage holy war against the HYLICS ...... I feel quite contemplative today.......

>>14989741
Brother you are becoming too based.... Speak to our brothers on the discord and return to the center....

The Guenonians (pbut, pbuh) are in full force today....

>>14989858
There is no force necessary brother.... Only.... contemplation.......

Alright Geunon fags

What is your arguments against Buddhism

>>14990241
Buddhism was refuted. Get out NOW AND STOP POSTING CRINGE. GET OUT!!!

>>14990241
René-Jean-Marie-Joseph Guénon blew-it-the-fuck-out. Next question, hylic. Keep the cringe to a minimum next time.

>>14990241
Cringe loser. Pathetic. Get out of our threads.

Based thread

>>14990241
>What is your arguments against Buddhism

The great sage Sri Śaṅkarācārya famously summarized Buddhism thus in his bhasya on the Brahma Sutra 2.2.32.

>"From whatever new points of view the Buddha's system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well, dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly. Moreover Buddha, by propounding the three mutually contradicting systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only and general nothingness, has himself made it clear that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused…Buddha’s doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness."

Just about every major school of Indian Buddhism (upon which all the later Tibetan and East Asian ones are based on) have completely illogical and inconsistent ideas which fail to stand up to critical scrutiny, and not only this but none of them even understand what the Buddha actually taught and each just projects their own retarded nonsense onto the Pali Canon. Sarvastivada/Theravada, Yogachara and Madhyamaka all have serious holes and contradictions and none of them have any good understanding of consciousness, all of them fail to come up with an explanation for consciousness which actually aligns with how we experience it.

>>14990513
Based.
A single word from Śaṅkarācāryas lips is filled with more wisdom than the entire Pali Canon

Brothers...I've made...the sacred pilgrimage...(PBUH)

>>14990575
based! I couldn't agree more brother

>>14990582
I one day hope to make the same journey inshallah

>>14990513
But all he is saying is the the Buddha is wrong
Not once does he explain himself

>>14990595
Here are Śaṅkarācārya's criticisms of Yogachara and Sarvastivada/Theravada where he explains in detail what is illogical about their ideas, he considered Madhyamaka to be below criticism as it doesn't offer sufficient proof of the unreality of everything, specifically he wrote "The third type of Buddhist doctrine that states that everything is void is contradicted by all means of right knowledge and thus requires no special refutation. This apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all means of knowledge, cannot be denied unless someone should discover some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) – for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances. " Madhyamaka is mostly below criticism because it does provide any clear proof of any truth that would show everything is void, but if you'd like I can go into more detail on what I consider to be illogical about Madhyamaka beyond just what he said about it as I'm quite familiar with its many holes.

Here are Śaṅkarācārya's criticisms of Yogachara and Sarvastivada/Theravada where he explains in detail what is illogical about their ideas, he considered Madhyamaka to be below criticism as it doesn't offer sufficient proof of the unreality of everything, specifically he wrote "The third type of Buddhist doctrine that states that everything is void is contradicted by all means of right knowledge and thus requires no special refutation. This apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all means of knowledge, cannot be denied unless someone should discover some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) – for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances. " Madhyamaka is mostly below criticism because it does not provide any clear proof of any truth whatsoever that would show everything is void, but if you'd like I can go into more detail on what I consider to be illogical about Madhyamaka beyond just what he said about it as I'm quite familiar with its many holes.

>>14990688
meant to reply to >>14990595

>>14990688
Based..... I read some Buddhist texts... And always found them unconvincing on the matter of the void..... Shankaracharya is truly based..... I will read him.....now in the filthy language of English (piss be upon it) and one day in the pure metaphysical tounge of Sanskrit (peace be upon it)
Peace Be Upon Śaṅkarācārya

>>14990724
I am pleased to see that my great work of spreading the name of Śaṅkarācārya has attracted you to our cause. Stay strong brother.

>>14987190
Guenon was not against action. He simply saw that action without contemplation was pointless and that most of western society had committed such an error.

I am only a bystander to these threads and not initiated myself.. But I must say that Buddhists get utterly BTFO in each and every Guenon thread. It is beautiful.. I have never seen refutations so powerful. I may begin reading Śaṅkarācārya simply because of how powerful his refutations are. Buddhism is a loser's religion.

He has no idea about what Buddha taught.
Buddha very clearly asked what is the basis if someone says there is another thing outside the five aggregate.
As far as Buddha concern five aggregate is all. (eye, ear etc.)
Rupa Jivitandriya and Nama Jivitandriya are taught in Abhidhamma.
Nibbana is outside the five aggregate but Buddha said that it is not an objective reality.
Buddha did not talk about that we union with the Nibbana.

>>14991557
based
>>14991909
Cringe, our experience of consciousness is of one smooth continuum, not of a bunch of different aggregates interacting as parts of the same mind. Buddha didn't understand consciousness, all those years sitting on his ass in the palace before he finally left it in his 30's must have caused him to have a stroke at some point from all the unhealthy food he was eating which resulted in severe brain damage from the lack of oxygen, thereby damaging his brain and resulting in him coming up with an explanation of consciousness that doesn't make sense and which doesn't correspond to how we actually experience things.

>>14991909
Fucking retard. /lit/ is an advaita board. Nobody cares about buddhism. You have been REFUTED. Go somewhere else.

>>14992133
no

>>14990582
BASED!

>>14990688
>Here are Śaṅkarācārya's criticisms of Yogachara
OH NO NO NO

HIS HOLINESS DALAI ROBINSON REFUTED YOUR BROWN ASS

>guenonfag spergs about Buddhism again
Pracchanabuddhists in full swing I see, time to enlighten these cretins again

>>14992503
I'm with you bro, Eternalist retards are forever stuck in samsara with their level of cringe

today we will remind them of Shankara's Buddhism

>>14992554
based

>>14992558
>>14992554
>>14992503
>>14992485
All of these pictures have been refuted many times before. Why do you keep coming back if you have been refuted?

>>14992764
He is a seething Hylic brother...ignore those who have been deluded by the Maya...

>>14992764
>All of these pictures have been refuted many times before
funny how you say this but your claim bears no fruit

>>14992800
Fuck off. Śaṅkarācārya refuted your retarded pseudo religion as I have proved this a thousand times now. FUCK OFF.

>>14992764
Brother, waste not your time on these idiots...they will understand in time...

>>14992806
thats a funny way to spell incorporated most of it

>>14990688
>Here are Śaṅkarācārya's criticisms of Yogachara and Sarvastivada/Theravada where he explains in detail what is illogical about their ideas
they've already been refuted (pic), next

>he considered Madhyamaka to be below criticism as it doesn't offer sufficient proof of the unreality of everything, specifically he wrote "The third type of Buddhist doctrine that states that everything is void is contradicted by all means of right knowledge and thus requires no special refutation. This apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all means of knowledge, cannot be denied unless someone should discover some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) – for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances."
You've already gone over this quote before and made an ass out of yourself but just to remind everyone else that madhyamaka's emptiness is grounded on pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) and can be found by realization (as shankara would put it, 'getting rid of avidya'). There is no need to derive supra knowledge outside of real knowledge to demonstrate the unreality of the world just like how you don't need to wear special goggles to see through a stage magicians tricks.

>Madhyamaka is mostly below criticism because it does not provide any clear proof of any truth whatsoever that would show everything is void
It is actually 'below criticism' because it was too similar to Advaita. Shankara either couldn't answer to it (due to the similarity) or was actually afraid of being found out. It is noteworthy that he actually parroted Vijnanavada talking points when it came to Madhyamaka (that it is nihilism etc) and couldn't offer anything substantial beyond that, supposedly you hail Shankara as this all refuting figure with a gigantic lingam yet whenever Madhyamaka is brought up he goes limp.

>but if you'd like I can go into more detail on what I consider to be illogical about Madhyamaka beyond just what he said about it as I'm quite familiar with its many holes.
go ahead lol, hoping you actually come up with something new for once.

>th-those have already been refuted you stupid hylic!
the neo-vedantists shudders as he comes up dry

>>14992860
>they've already been refuted (pic), next
except he doesn't he just spergs out about nihilism

>You've already gone over this quote before and made an ass out of yourself
if i repeat this long enough it becomes true!

>But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.
But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.

>is actually 'below criticism' because it was too similar to Advaita
Advaita was too similar to Madhyamaka Sankara is a known copycat

Guénon was a muslim

>>14992923
He was Jewish, that's clearly Ben Shapiro with Guenon (pbuh).

>>14992923
>N-NOOOOOOOOOOO NOT MY HINDUBOO GOONERINOOOOOO NOT MY HECKIN VEDANTARINI NOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO HOW CAN YOU SAY THAT HE'S A MUSLIM TO MY FUCKING FACE DID YOU KNOW THAT THOSE BARBARIANS KILLED MY BRAHMIN GRANDDAD YOU RETARDED HYLIC!

Brothers, how do I determine if i am a brahmin? I want to study true spirituality but I do not want to transgress the eternal law if my caste is not high enough to do so....

>>14992860
Advaita is cryptobuddhism. See >>14986726


The most prominent Advaitins in the world themselves admit it in that pic. Sharma admits it. Robinson admits it. Every source you rely on admits it. You aren't even a real Hindu, you're some half-Muslim LARPer who lives in the states and your best friend is a Swede who eats cum. Sad!

>>14993064
Shit, meant to reply to >>14990688

>>14992999
If you have an interest you might be a Brahmin. Spiritual castes brother

>>14992999
It's not reserved for the Brahmins alone, the Brahma Sutras say that only the Shudras are prohibited from the studying the Vedas

>>14984068
Someone help me learn how to meditate? Read a few Guenon books and just want to start engaging in some Eastern practices slowly. Also, someone on one of these threads linked a really cool meditation book that studies multiple different cultures, would appreciate if someone can find that on here. Thanks brothers

guenonfag will wake up in 3-4 hours and reply vitriolically (in a cingey way of course) to the based buddhists itt and continue brotherposting (aka samefagging) his thread to keep it from archiving. His life literally revolves around 4chanist-Guenonist proselytism. What a sad life....

>>14993363
>someone on one of these threads linked a really cool meditation book that studies multiple different cultures, would appreciate if someone can find that on here.

https://www2.uned.es/dpto-hdi/History%20of%20Non-dual%20Meditation%20Methods.pdf

>>14993430
>4chanist-Guenonist proselytism
holy based....

>>14993430
>continue brotherposting his thread to keep it from archiving
holy.... BAAASED!

The b*ddhist posting in this thread is so cringe. They just keep posting the same shit, and keep being refuted by the same Śaṅkarācārya quotes.
They are like interlocutors in Plato, except twice as cringe, and refuted by a mind 200x more based.
Keep posting buddhist-fags, every post adds to our numbers

>>14993839
based...

>>14993839
How will the Hylics recover? ...based...

>>14992860
>they've already been refuted (pic), next
No you didn't, you barely addressed any of his arguments and instead just nit-picked over a few points, you offered no convincing defenses and you didn't show that any arguments he wrote were wrong.

>The Buddhist view in contrast resolves causality into the invariance of succession where the cause is devoid of any motion or influence. The Buddhist model of causation is not the production of commonsense objects like pots, but the infinitesimal process of becoming, as illustrated in the stream of consciousness.
This doesn't rescue it from being illogical

>Static commonsense objects need to be replaced by continuous processes or flux. The identity of an object is defined by its characteristic function which must express itself instantaneously and cease. As a new function emerges a new object must be held to have been produced. However, the indiscernibility of similar successive moments and functions leads to a sense of persistent identity in sequence. It seems that Shankara criticism did not follow through to the end result which I suspect he presupposed in the beginning.
This is wrong, you completely missed the point of his criticism and you didn't refute him at all, it is precisely this attempt to say there is a continuous flux that results in inexcusable contradictions. Momentary atoms and ideas cannot unite into the two types of aggregates because if they last long enough to move from one position to another they are non-momentary. If momentariness is true there can be no causation of any sort and so causation and the 12 links of dependent-origination fall apart "because no effect can arise without imbibing the nature of the cause and to admit this is to admit the continuity of the cause in the effect which would overthrow the theory of momentariness. Again if the preceding moment is admitted to last till the arising of the succeeding moment, cause and effect will become simultaneous; and if the preceding moment perishes before the arising of the succeeding moment, then the effect would arise without a cause. Hence, either momentariness or causation is to be given up."

"If it is urged that the antecedent moment when fully developed (Parinispanndvasthah) becomes the cause of the subsequent moment, it is untenable, because the assertion that a fully developed moment has a causal efficiency necessarily presupposes its connection with the second moment and this repudiates the theory of momentariness."

>>14994433
>No you didn't
Baaaaased,...........

>>14994433
The wheel of causation and dependent-origination fall apart when they are combined with momentariness as the Theravada/Sarvastivada do because the antecedent link in the causal series cannot be the cause of the subsequent link because it ceases to exist when the next one arises, and since it no longer exists it cannot impart any causal effect upon the next link, in order for it to stick around long enough to do so it would violate momentariness. The Buddhist says in defense of momentariness that "the indiscernibility of similar successive moments and functions leads to a sense of persistent identity in sequence" but being indiscernible to humans doesn't give momentary objects the magical ability to impart causal effects to other objects despite not existing long enough to do so, the defense of momentariness you gave does nothing whatsoever to address the underlying contradiction pointed out by Shankara.

One cannot simply insist that time or objects are such a flux or process that the division of times into moment by moment and the associated contradictions both vanish because if the flux becomes one enduring moment it's not momentary, if you insist on there is momentariness it necessarily divides time up into moment by moment slices because that's the only thing which allows the previous object to vanish before it is replaced otherwise the past and future versions would occur simultaneously which is absurd; hence the defense of time or objects being a flux is a complete failure of an argument and all of Shankara's arguments against Sarvastivada/Theravada being illogical still apply with full force.

Furthermore they don't even apply momentariness consistently but believe in the three uncaused reals, if these are admitted to be momentary it results in further absurd contradictions which are explained in the picture. Momentariness is also disproved by the fact that our awareness is that of one continuous conscious presence without intervals and interruptions "Memory and recognition imply consciousness of at least three moments —the first moment in which something is experienced, the second moment in which its past impression is revived or it is again experienced and the third moment in which the first and the second moments are compared and the thing remembered or recognized as the same. Even if identity is rejected and similarity substituted in its place, a subject who persists for at least three moments is necessary to compare and recognize two things as similar. Again, if the self is a stream of momentary ideas, the law of Karma and the moral life and bondage and liberation will all be overthrown. One momentary idea will perform an act and another will reap its fruit. One idea will be bound, another will try to obtain liberation, and still another will be liberated. It is thus clear that the theory of momentariness destroys all empirical and moral life and renders the teachings of Buddha about bondage and liberation useless."

>>14994441
Lastly, this isn't even in the picture but Shankara also makes the point in his works that it's completely retarded to say that objects spring out of nothing to replace the temporary objects they replace as the doctrine of momentariness says they do because the non-existence of any objects is not different from the non-existence any other object, nothingness being the exact same in all cases, hence there is no reason why a tiger should spring out of nothingness to replace the tiger that was there a moment before instead of a boar or a tree because the non-existence of each is the exact same but because of momentariness there can be no abiding force ensuring the right object replaces the previous one. If there is any sort of residual force or power which is available to ensure that the right objects replace each other than that thing is non-momentary.

>Apparently, he has in mind principally the version of Vijnanavada as found in Vasubandhu, Dignaga and Dharmakirti.
Because original Yogachara as established first in the works of Asanga was such an obvious rip-off of the Upanishads that his half-brother Vasubandhu and the other Yogachara thinkers all immediately made a different interpretation of Yogachara that made it less Absolutist and did away with the eternal consciousness of parinpispanna that Asanga had up made in imitation of Hindu scriptures. All the ideas people say are "Yogachara-like" in Advaita can be traced to pre-Buddhist Upanishads. This idea of consciousness being self-effulgent is not a Yogachara invention but the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad from several centuries before Buddha states that the Self is self-effulgent in part 4 chapter 3 and gives various examples to illustrate this. Similarly the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says in verse 2.5.19 that multiplicity appears in Brahman because of Maya and the pre-Buddhist Chandogya Upanishad in verse 6.1.4. denies the reality of change and says the unchanging basis of all change is real; hence the idea of Maya and of the world being not completely real (although Advaita accepts that the elements and objects exist conditionally but just not in Absolute reality) cannot be alleged to be taken from Yogachara because they are fundamentally Upanishadic ideas predating Buddhism. Just so, the idea that Shankara took "idealism" from Yogachara cannot be substantiated when the pre-Buddhist Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says that Brahman as "Pure Intelligence alone" (2.4.12.), is the "Inner Controller who controls this world, the next world and all beings" (3.7.1.) and that as the "Self of all" (4.4.13.), He is the inner seer, hearer and knower and any other seer etc besides Brahman is denied (3.7.16.). All of this clearly conveys an idealism-like spiritual Absolutism.

>>14994449
>Vijnanavada is actually really close to Advaita and it seems like Shankara does his best to try and make clear the distinction for its epistemic realism as valid in order to justify Atman, which is absent in Vijnanavada since Shankara could easily superimpose Atman and subsume Vijnanavada.
None of this is a refutation of the various points that Shankara made against Yogachara, you claimed that his criticisms of Buddhism were refuted but then didn't actually explain why any of his criticisms of Yogachara for being illogical are wrong. In case you want to try again here are some for example,

It's illogical for Yogachara to completely deny the existence of objects (even conditionally) and say that the form of objects can appear in objects when Yogachara doesn't admit the existence of objects, because then there is no way it could appear in consciousness when there is no content for that form to be related to or derived from, and since there were never any existent objects to begin with, there cannot be a beginningless relationship of previous impressions of external objects feeding off one another, "Even the ‘objects' which appear in illusion or dream presuppose our experience of world-objects. A person who has never seen or heard of a snake can never mistake a rope for a snake nor can he dream of a snake. Even the Buddhist while explicitly denying the external object implicitly accepts it. Dinnaga says that ‘the internal idea itself appears as if it were something external’. Now, if there is no external world, how can he say that the ‘form’ in consciousness appears as if it were external? Indeed, no sane person says that Visnumitra appears like the son of a barren woman. There can be no hypothetical without a categorical basis. Possibility always implies actuality."

>But what strikes me is that he's claiming that in order to disprove Yogachara, he attempts to prove the unreality of the world through 'self-contradictory character' of this world. This is exactly just Sunyavada.
That part is just clarifying his position on what should be regarded as unreal and how, it's not a part of his refutations of Yogachara ideas that is described elsewhere in the picture, this is not the same as Sunyavada because Advaita admits that there is an Absolute reality with unconditioned existence underlying the unreal whereas Sunyavada does not admit this and says that even the absolute truth is empty.

>>14994456
>Nagarjuna claims to follow the middle way and identifies it with pratityasamutpada and Shunyata. It is clear that Sunyata is not to be understood as non-existence in the empirical sense. Sunyavada, thus, is clearly not to be construed as nihilism in the ordinary sense. Furthermore Nagarjuna's two truth schema which did not deny the importance of convention allowed Nagarjuna to defend himself against charges of nihilism, understanding both correctly meant seeing the middle way.
Nihilism means someone who believes that there is no meaning to anything, Nagarjuna says that emptiness is the nature of everything and that everything lacks a permanent nature/essence but also says that Nirvana is also empty, but if Nirvana has meaning it's not empty; hence Nagarjuna is not being honest when he says his two truths save him from nihilism because when you get to absolute reality in Madhyamaka there is no meaning or reality there but emptiness. In order for Nirvana to save Nagarjuna from Nihilism it would have to actually exist as some transcendental reality but Nagarjuna won't admit this and so he is not really saved from nihilism because the world is just co-dependent and empty but the Nirvana posited as the higher truth is also empty and has no reality to it; i.e. there's no meaning residing anywhere in the scheme that saves it from nihilism. To obliterate yourself into nothingness (the status of Nirvana and its attainment in Madhyamaka after the body has died is functionally non-different from nothingness as there is nothing admitted whatsoever which continues) is not a meaning that saves it from nihilism

>go ahead lol, hoping you actually come up with something new for once.
How about we begin with the problems in Madhyamaka which you have never provided a convincing response to or answer for? Every time I raise these issues I only ever see people move the goal posts but nobody ever actually defends their nonsensical ideas.

>>14994464
Madhyamaka has no explanation whatsoever what causes samsara to exist, which discredits everything else they say. If you want to claim that the world is empty of inherent reality then you should explain how despite being empty it is able to appear to us at every moment. Emptiness being posited as the ultimate nature of things only adds to the problem, emptiness cannot cause or give rise to anything not even illusions. There are no examples that one can draw upon to support this. Even if the world is unreal, unreal illusions cannot be caused by themselves or by nothingness, the very fact of illusions appearing proves that there is an existing basis/reality which is either causing them or passively allowing them to appear via virtue of the impossibility of them appearing any other way. This is a decisive line of reasoning which Nagarjuna failed to refute. It's also a contradiction to say that everything lacks a stable permanent existence but that samsara continues on and on permanently and one has to individually escape it. If samsara is eternal then not everything is empty of permanence, but if samsara is not permanent then it will eventually end on its own and all beings will be released from it regardless and the path of the Buddhists becomes completely unnecessary.

Madhyamaka is also rendered even more incoherent by its denial of any Self or Atman aside from the aggregates. Emptiness cannot realize or apprehend itself, if everything was ultimately empty of inherent reality/existence then we would not be conscious beings, there are no known instances of emptiness being self-cognizant that we can draw upon. Just like the idea that emptiness can cause illusions or that samsara could have emptiness as its basis, with the idea that emptiness can be self-apprehending Madhyamaka is asking us to accept something which completely violates basic logic and which cannot be substantiated with any supporting examples from the world.

Also, we discussed this next point in the last thread but you never provided any rebuttal to this point, Madhyamaka does not really show that everything is co-dependent and without unconditioned existence, they fail to show that this is true of consciousness which unconditioned, unchanging and one. If Consciousness is eternal, unchanging and unproduced then those who believe in an eternal soul or Atman are right and Madhyamaka wrong; the standard argument that "an object comes into contact with the sense organs and in that sense induces consciousness of that object and this shows that consciousness is produced by various objects and their causal conditions" fails to actually show that consciousness is conditioned by objects and causal conditions for the following reason:

>>14994469
Senses and the sense-objects being changing, to say that the shape of consciousness and that by extension consciousness is dependent on those objects and senses is to presuppose the experience of consciousness as a changing series of consciousnesses dependent on those specific objects and senses involved in the production of each unique flash of consciousness produced by and pertaining to those specific sets of causal circumstances. In such a scenario consciousness would appear to be different at every moment on account of it being produced by the changing series of causal conditions, but this is not the case as consciousness is experienced as a continuum of unbroken sentient presence, If you try to claim that this semblance of continuum is false and that there is really a changing series of awarenesses dependent upon changing sense-objects falsely appearing to be a continuum, then there must be a difference between the two awarenesses of two successive moments as each are produced by separate casual conditions, but this difference between them must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness (in this second alternative if it's grasped by the same consciousness there is no change and consciousness is unchanging). In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case, another awareness be required to comprehend the difference of the 3rd awareness from the first 2 and that requires another awareness and so on which results in an infinite regress which makes knowledge of anything impossible; hence it cannot be proven that consciousness is conditioned by casual conditions as the explanation of consciousness this involves doesn't align with how we actually experience it and results in an infinite regress and so Madhyamaka fails to show that everything in fact is conditioned.

>>14994477
Lastly we come to the Richard Robinson critique of Nagarjuna's logic (pic related), which still stands as having undisputedly shown that Nagarjuna used flawed logic in his main work, nobody has ever shown how any of his criticisms of Nagarjuna's logic are wrong. Usually Buddhists try to cope by saying "well Richard Robinson is only critiquing the logic that Nagarjuna uses in an attempt to show that his opponents are wrong but he is not attacked the doctrines of Madhyamaka itself", there is just one problem with this though; Nagarjuna never offered any independent logical arguments for emptiness and Madhyamaka doctrine being true (aside from citing Buddhist texts which are not accepted by non-Buddhists), he tried to refute other views as being illogical to show that Madhyamaka was right but he doesn't offer any independent logical arguments for Madhyamaka being right; hence Robinson's critique undermines the one thing that tries to show Madhyamaka is correct using logic acceptable to non-Buddhists. Nagarjuna presumed to show that all views involving any sort of permanent or unconditional existence/essence result in contradictions and antinomies but as Robinson shows Nagarjuna uses demonstrably flawed logic in his attempt to do this, hence the Madhyamaka dialectic does not really refute all views, at which point there is no point to take his ideas seriously anymore if you are non-Buddhist because the one attempt he made to prove them with logic (via refuting opposing views) floundered and is rendered worthless to non-Buddhists because of the mistakes involved.

Let's just take a look at a few things from the critique and what they say about Nagarjuna as a thinker and how they show his logic is flawed.

1) Nagarjuna tries to argue that whatever has extension is divisible, composite, not permanent and not real; this idea of his disagrees with the consensus of other schools that Akasha is ubiquitous and indivisible. When Nagarjuna tries to refute the idea of Akasha his argument presupposes his denial of real things having extension which itself can not be admitted until after he has disproved the thesis that Akasha is extended and indivisible (because it would be a contra-example to that point). Hence as Robinson points out Nagarjuna tries to refute something else about Akasha using another line of attack (the relation of Akasa to its laksana) while using reasoning which relies on an axiom that wouldn't be accepted by the opponent until after he had successfully refuted the notion that Akasha is ubiquitous and indivisible but Nagarjuna fails to do this first, i.e. it's a completely circular and fallacious line of reasoning by Nagarjuna and he fails to disprove that Akasha exists

>>14994483
2) Nagarjuna claims to refute his opponents without advancing any empirical propositions which are not accepted by them, but this is not true in fact and he asserts dogmatically that perception is marked by conceptualization which falsifies, this is an empirical proposition that Nagarjuna merely asserts. He doesn't give any commonsense perceptual criterion for considering all phenomena, he does not examine perception empirically, he does not attempt to show that the senses are bad witnesses in all cases but he merely makes a dogmatic assertion, contradicting his claim that he doesn't make empirical assertions not accepted by his opponents. "He ought to admit either that he maintains mayavada on the authority of the sunyavadin sutras, which are not agama for the Hinayanist opponents or for the astikas, or that he requires an empirically derived theory of error in order to exclude empirical arguments from the rest of his dialectic. If he adduces the experience of the Buddhist contemplatives, he is not making an empirical assertion but making one that his opponents are not prepared to concede. Non-Buddhists are not going to accept that the Buddhist aryas are authorities, and other Buddhists do not take the experience of the aryas as evidence for sunyavadda. There appears to be no way of forcing a realist opponent to concede that commonsense experience is erroneous except to examine experience and to demonstrate empirically that it is delusive. Merely citing well-known varieties of illusion does not prove the point." So when Nagarjuna says he didn't advance any empirical propositions not accepted by his opponents he is either straight up lying or he can't keep track of his own arguments which doesn't bode well for anything else he says.

>>14994490
3) As Robinson points out Nagarjuna relies on the axiom in his arguments attempting to refute other view that "To exist means to be arisen; hence existence is synonymous with manifestation, and there is no unmanifested existence." But then Nagarjuna when in a different argument contradicts himself and in order to defeat his opponent he has to rely on a different definition of existence which is "the real is that which has never arisen (has no cause), and hence has no beginning or end, is permanent". Both of these cannot be true at the same time, if Nagarjuna wants to rely on one definition of existence in order to defeat one opponent at one point in the MMK then he fails to defeat the other opponent that he used the other definition of 'existence' when arguing with. Hence by contradicting himself when discussing basic principles like what is existence Nagarjuna's arguments cease to be credible.

In summary, there is a large host of contradictions and absurdities in Madhyamaka especially with regard to how emptiness could be the nature of everything and somehow magically cause the illusory universe to appear and somehow empty-but-consciousness beings also appear, and the way that Nagarjuna tries to logically argue for Madhyamaka being true is completely ruined by all the inconsistencies and contradictions in the logic he uses. So, as we can see all the three main schools of Indian Buddhism upon which all the later Buddhist schools are heavily based are all marked with some seriously illogical ideas, various inner contradictions and thinkers who advanced laughably bad logic.

>>14994058
>>14994094
>>14993839
>>14994439
>>14994433
>>14994441
>>14994449
>>14994456
>>14994464
>>14994469
>>14994477
>>14994483
>>14994490
>>14994504

Holy.... Based....
Buddhism logically utterly BTFOd into the Void....

This guy was a wannabe mystic and a second-rate metaphysician who is rightfully a footnote in the history of philosophy and theology. I know at least 8 out of the 10 faggots posting him constantly do it ironically but why tf does anybody take him or the hack Evola seriously. Most of these guys were the ones watching Jordan Peterson lectures two years ago

Yall ever talk about interesting stuff. Or post girls? Or anything fun?

>>14993430
you fucking called it lol

>>14994570
Of course I did. He's as predictable as ever. He's probably been concocting those replies for a few months now (notice how he posts long walls of texts 1 minute apart as if he saved it on his notepad). This guy is legit a lunatic who's goal in life is to 'win 4chan debates'.

>>14994558
>Or post girls?
Only girls who read and study Guenon (pbuh)...

>>14994483
>Lastly we come to the Richard Robinson critique of Nagarjuna's logic (pic related)
forgot to attach pic of critique

>>14994591
Based....

>>14994483
>>14994592
>Robinson

Aka the person who called out Advaita for being crypto-Yogachara >>14992485

>>14994600
>>14994591
So based, bros...

>>14994570
>>14994587
As long as Buddhists continue to write cringe fake "refutations" that don't actually make any arguments or refute anything I will gladly call them out on their bullshit and expose them. If I succeed in steering away enough spiritual aspirants from the catastrophe that is Buddhism I may be rewarded by the very Gods themselves for my noble efforts.

>advaita
refuted by these B A S E D sycnretist american buddhists......

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePtxNwk44j0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s63iRrFQ0wI

brothers... infect me with the non-dual realisation...

>>14994587
>>14994570

>he doesn't pray to Guénon (pbuh)
CRINGE

>>14992558
based

Buddhists are so cringe.

So based, bros....
>>14994642
I grant you the gift, brother...

Baaaased

Contemplation, brothers... contemplation...

>>14994433
>No you didn't, you barely addressed any of his arguments and instead just nit-picked over a few points, you offered no convincing defenses and you didn't show that any arguments he wrote were wrong.
read it again

>This doesn't rescue it from being illogical
non-argument

>Momentary atoms and ideas cannot unite into the two types of aggregates because if they last long enough to move from one position to another they are non-momentary. If momentariness is true there can be no causation of any sort and so causation and the 12 links of dependent-origination fall apart "because no effect can arise without imbibing the nature of the cause and to admit this is to admit the continuity of the cause in the effect which would overthrow the theory of momentariness. Again if the preceding moment is admitted to last till the arising of the succeeding moment, cause and effect will become simultaneous; and if the preceding moment perishes before the arising of the succeeding moment, then the effect would arise without a cause. Hence, either momentariness or causation is to be given up."
As far as I know the Sarvastivadas consider momentary flux to be quasi-instantaneous (ie sufficient enough for an effect to bear fruit), but why must cause and effect become 'simultaneous' at the interface? It seems to me that if a sequence exists, then an interaction of some kind must also exist. Furthermore it seems like a logical fallacy to say you could only have either momentariness or causation when its certainly not illogical that both can be the case.

>"If it is urged that the antecedent moment when fully developed (Parinispanndvasthah) becomes the cause of the subsequent moment, it is untenable, because the assertion that a fully developed moment has a causal efficiency necessarily presupposes its connection with the second moment and this repudiates the theory of momentariness."
I do not see how it necessarily "presupposes its connection with the second moment", causal efficacy simply means the ability or extent of causal exertion. According to Abhidharma exegesis, the efficacious action or distinctive functioning of dharmas is understood predominantly as causal functioning. For the orthodox Sarvastivada-Vaibhasika, the existence of dharmas as real entities (dravyatas) is determined by both their intrinsic nature and particular causal functioning. Intrinsic nature, however, is an atemporal determinant of real existence. What determines a dharma’s spatio-temporal existence is its distinctive causal functioning: past and future dharmas have capability (sāmarthya) of functioning, while present dharmas also exert a distinctive activity (kāritra). Present activity is an internal causal efficacy that assists in the production of an effect within a dharma’s own consciousness series. It is this activity that determines a dharma’s present existence and defines the limits of the span of its present moment.

>>14994441
>The wheel of causation and dependent-origination fall apart when they are combined with momentariness as the Theravada/Sarvastivada do because the antecedent link in the causal series cannot be the cause of the subsequent link because it ceases to exist when the next one arises, and since it no longer exists it cannot impart any causal effect upon the next link, in order for it to stick around long enough to do so it would violate momentariness. The Buddhist says in defense of momentariness that "the indiscernibility of similar successive moments and functions leads to a sense of persistent identity in sequence" but being indiscernible to humans doesn't give momentary objects the magical ability to impart causal effects to other objects despite not existing long enough to do so, the defense of momentariness you gave does nothing whatsoever to address the underlying contradiction pointed out by Shankara.
why would it not be a cause if its ceases 'when' the next moment arises? or are you saying before it arises? Also you are misunderstanding what Buddhists mean by persistent identity during a flux of moments. It simply means one sees form and constancy in a fluctuation momentary dharmas, nothing to do with 'imparting causal effects'.

>One cannot simply insist that time or objects are such a flux or process that the division of times into moment by moment and the associated contradictions both vanish because if the flux becomes one enduring moment it's not momentary, if you insist on there is momentariness it necessarily divides time up into moment by moment slices because that's the only thing which allows the previous object to vanish before it is replaced otherwise the past and future versions would occur simultaneously which is absurd; hence the defense of time or objects being a flux is a complete failure of an argument and all of Shankara's arguments against Sarvastivada/Theravada being illogical still apply with full force.
but it doesn't become 'one enduring moment'. It just seems like a constant being when its momentary flux, just as electricity is seen like a solid object when its but moving electrons and compound particles. Furthermore why would it be absurd to say that past and future dharmas have causal capabilities in terms of temporality? May I remind you that Shankara makes the claim that cause and effect are indifferent? is that not more absurd than the Sarvastivadas?

>Furthermore they don't even apply momentariness consistently but believe in the three uncaused reals, if these are admitted to be momentary it results in further absurd contradictions which are explained in the picture.
I don’t see results in further absurd contradictions in that pic..

>Momentariness is also disproved by the fact that our awareness is that of one continuous conscious presence without intervals and interruptions
This isn't a fact lol, human awareness is definitely not an infinitesimal process, this is something you have to prove.

>>14994441
>"Memory and recognition imply consciousness of at least three moments —the first moment in which something is experienced, the second moment in which its past impression is revived or it is again experienced and the third moment in which the first and the second moments are compared and the thing remembered or recognized as the same. Even if identity is rejected and similarity substituted in its place, a subject who persists for at least three moments is necessary to compare and recognize two things as similar. Again, if the self is a stream of momentary ideas, the law of Karma and the moral life and bondage and liberation will all be overthrown. One momentary idea will perform an act and another will reap its fruit. One idea will be bound, another will try to obtain liberation, and still another will be liberated. It is thus clear that the theory of momentariness destroys all empirical and moral life and renders the teachings of Buddha about bondage and liberation useless."
what exactly are you trying to say here? I get that its a pasted text from an Advaitin book but at least try to add your own words.

>>14994449
>Lastly, this isn't even in the picture but Shankara also makes the point in his works that it's completely retarded to say that objects spring out of nothing to replace the temporary objects they replace as the doctrine of momentariness says they do because the non-existence of any objects is not different from the non-existence any other object, nothingness being the exact same in all cases, hence there is no reason why a tiger should spring out of nothingness to replace the tiger that was there a moment before instead of a boar or a tree because the non-existence of each is the exact same but because of momentariness there can be no abiding force ensuring the right object replaces the previous one. If there is any sort of residual force or power which is available to ensure that the right objects replace each other than that thing is non-momentary.
Shankara is just as retarded as you for thinking that nothingness implies all possibilities (protip: it doesn't).

>Because original Yogachara as established first in the works of Asanga was such an obvious rip-off of the Upanishads that his half-brother Vasubandhu and the other Yogachara thinkers all immediately made a different interpretation of Yogachara that made it less Absolutist and did away with the eternal consciousness of parinpispanna that Asanga had up made in imitation of Hindu scriptures. All the ideas people say are "Yogachara-like" in Advaita can be traced to pre-Buddhist Upanishads.
Here we go with the 'pre-buddhist upanishad' mumbo jumbo and how all neo-absolutist frameworks are simply copying hinduism but advaita 'totally' didn't copy things like 2 truths doctrine.

>>14994456
>None of this is a refutation of the various points that Shankara made against Yogachara, you claimed that his criticisms of Buddhism were refuted but then didn't actually explain why any of his criticisms of Yogachara for being illogical are wrong. In case you want to try again here are some for example,
you didn't read the full sentence, he doesn't actually refute Vijnanavada but a portion of its philosophy that he tries to distinguish without realizing he's exemplifying sunyavada.

>It's illogical for Yogachara to completely deny the existence of objects (even conditionally) and say that the form of objects can appear in objects when Yogachara doesn't admit the existence of objects, because then there is no way it could appear in consciousness when there is no content for that form to be related to or derived from, and since there were never any existent objects to begin with, there cannot be a beginningless relationship of previous impressions of external objects feeding off one another, "Even the ‘objects' which appear in illusion or dream presuppose our experience of world-objects. A person who has never seen or heard of a snake can never mistake a rope for a snake nor can he dream of a snake. Even the Buddhist while explicitly denying the external object implicitly accepts it. Dinnaga says that ‘the internal idea itself appears as if it were something external’. Now, if there is no external world, how can he say that the ‘form’ in consciousness appears as if it were external? Indeed, no sane person says that Visnumitra appears like the son of a barren woman. There can be no hypothetical without a categorical basis. Possibility always implies actuality."
what is Chandradhar Sharma trying to say here exactly

>That part is just clarifying his position on what should be regarded as unreal and how, it's not a part of his refutations of Yogachara ideas that is described elsewhere in the picture, this is not the same as Sunyavada because Advaita admits that there is an Absolute reality with unconditioned existence underlying the unreal whereas Sunyavada does not admit this and says that even the absolute truth is empty.
His demonstration of the unreality of the world is what I was referring to which resembles Madhyamaka argumentation.

>>14994464
>Nihilism means someone who believes that there is no meaning to anything, Nagarjuna says that emptiness is the nature of everything and that everything lacks a permanent nature/essence but also says that Nirvana is also empty, but if Nirvana has meaning it's not empty; hence Nagarjuna is not being honest when he says his two truths save him from nihilism because when you get to absolute reality in Madhyamaka there is no meaning or reality there but emptiness. In order for Nirvana to save Nagarjuna from Nihilism it would have to actually exist as some transcendental reality but Nagarjuna won't admit this and so he is not really saved from nihilism because the world is just co-dependent and empty but the Nirvana posited as the higher truth is also empty and has no reality to it; i.e. there's no meaning residing anywhere in the scheme that saves it from nihilism.
You are confusing 'meaning' with substance and the notion of Emptiness. Nihilism in this context simply means external reality is without value. For Nagarjuna, and all Buddhists for that matter, external reality does have value but is empty of inherit own-being (not the same as saying it has not value). It is emptiness that makes sense of conventional reality, and conventional reality that explains emptiness. A proper understanding of emptiness thus entails the identity of the two truths. But if that is so, to take the emptiness of all phenomena seriously is to take the conventional reality of all phenomena seriously. And to take reality seriously is precisely to deny nihilism.

>To obliterate yourself into nothingness (the status of Nirvana and its attainment in Madhyamaka after the body has died is functionally non-different from nothingness as there is nothing admitted whatsoever which continues) is not a meaning that saves it from nihilism
Simply false lol, nothing in Madhyamaka entails the conclusion that Nirvana is functionally the same as oblivion, this is the most rudimentary reading of Buddhism that I bet Shankara himself doesn't even make light of.

>How about we begin with the problems in Madhyamaka which you have never provided a convincing response to or answer for? Every time I raise these issues I only ever see people move the goal posts but nobody ever actually defends their nonsensical ideas.
I have provided them in previous threads but you keep claiming the exact same thing you're doing now like the Jew who forgot about Hitler's debate with him the day before ie 'I have never seen anyone answer me!'

>>14994469
>Madhyamaka has no explanation whatsoever what causes samsara to exist, which discredits everything else they say
you keep repeating this same cringey line every thread even when an answer is given to you. For the record Nagarjuna, while he doesn't get deep into how samsara arises, presumably thought like other buddhists that it is arisen via pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination). However he makes the point that 'Nirvana is Samsara, Samsara is Nirvana' in the sense that they are both empty of own being.

>If you want to claim that the world is empty of inherent reality then you should explain how despite being empty it is able to appear to us at every moment. Emptiness being posited as the ultimate nature of things only adds to the problem, emptiness cannot cause or give rise to anything not even illusions. There are no examples that one can draw upon to support this. Even if the world is unreal, unreal illusions cannot be caused by themselves or by nothingness, the very fact of illusions appearing proves that there is an existing basis/reality which is either causing them or passively allowing them to appear via virtue of the impossibility of them appearing any other way. This is a decisive line of reasoning which Nagarjuna failed to refute. It's also a contradiction to say that everything lacks a stable permanent existence but that samsara continues on and on permanently and one has to individually escape it. If samsara is eternal then not everything is empty of permanence, but if samsara is not permanent then it will eventually end on its own and all beings will be released from it regardless and the path of the Buddhists becomes completely unnecessary.
I see the problem now, you seem to think that Emptiness means the world is 'unreal'. Nagarjuna doesn't make this claim. Nagarjuna doesn't posit the world as 1) real, 2) unreal, 3) both real and unreal, 4) neither real nor unreal.

>Madhyamaka is also rendered even more incoherent by its denial of any Self or Atman aside from the aggregates. Emptiness cannot realize or apprehend itself, if everything was ultimately empty of inherent reality/existence then we would not be conscious beings, there are no known instances of emptiness being self-cognizant that we can draw upon. Just like the idea that emptiness can cause illusions or that samsara could have emptiness as its basis, with the idea that emptiness can be self-apprehending Madhyamaka is asking us to accept something which completely violates basic logic and which cannot be substantiated with any supporting examples from the world.
It is clear you haven't read enough of Madhyamaka, nothing you said is even remotely what they argue, refer to the my previous point.

>Also, we discussed this next point in the last thread but you never provided any rebuttal to this point,
you were talking to someone else I wasn't in the last thread

>>14994469
>Madhyamaka does not really show that everything is co-dependent and without unconditioned existence, they fail to show that this is true of consciousness which is unconditioned, unchanging and one. If Consciousness is eternal, unchanging and unproduced then those who believe in an eternal soul or Atman are right and Madhyamaka wrong;
non-argument, here you're just saying 'im right you're wrong'

>>14994477
>the standard argument that "an object comes into contact with the sense organs and in that sense induces consciousness of that object and this shows that consciousness is produced by various objects and their causal conditions" fails to actually show that consciousness is conditioned by objects and causal conditions for the following reason: Senses and the sense-objects being changing, to say that the shape of consciousness and that by extension consciousness is dependent on those objects and senses is to presuppose the experience of consciousness as a changing series of consciousnesses dependent on those specific objects and senses involved in the production of each unique flash of consciousness produced by and pertaining to those specific sets of causal circumstances.
Just because sense objects and sense are both fluctuating, doesn't mean they aren't causally functional because those fluctuations are minute at the level of moment to moment experience, they don't drastically alter the senses or its objects.

>>14994477
>In such a scenario consciousness would appear to be different at every moment on account of it being produced by the changing series of causal conditions, but this is not the case as consciousness is experienced as a continuum of unbroken sentient presence, If you try to claim that this semblance of continuum is false and that there is really a changing series of awarenesses dependent upon changing sense-objects falsely appearing to be a continuum, then there must be a difference between the two awarenesses of two successive moments as each are produced by separate casual conditions, but this difference between them must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness (in this second alternative if it's grasped by the same consciousness there is no change and consciousness is unchanging). In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case, another awareness be required to comprehend the difference of the 3rd awareness from the first 2 and that requires another awareness and so on which results in an infinite regress which makes knowledge of anything impossible; hence it cannot be proven that consciousness is conditioned by casual conditions as the explanation of consciousness this involves doesn't align with how we actually experience it and results in an infinite regress and so Madhyamaka fails to show that everything in fact is conditioned.
Ok I think I understood what Shankara meant earlier since you just repeated him in your own words. You're basically saying that there is no follow-through when it comes to momentary existence due to its flux. This is the same objection repeated by the Nyaya school (which I presume Shankara parroted from). In any case, It is not numerically the same object which is recognized during this awareness-schema that you've concocted, but rather a sameness or resemblance between different momentary objects in a homogeneous series. Thus patterns of resemblance are manifested over time, while objects themselves are not, and the patterns of resemblance which obtain between ontologically discontinuous moments are sufficient to explain recognition. The next question then becomes, does a permanent awareness have to be present outside of momentary existence in order to detect patterns? No, patterns of resemblance are re-created in subsequent moments. Thus there is no need to posit a stable and on-going awareness in order to explain perception of the regularities which characterize the series of moments.

>>14994483
>Lastly we come to the Richard Robinson critique of Nagarjuna's logic (pic related), which still stands as having undisputedly shown that Nagarjuna used flawed logic in his main work, nobody has ever shown how any of his criticisms of Nagarjuna's logic are wrong. Usually Buddhists try to cope by saying "well Richard Robinson is only critiquing the logic that Nagarjuna uses in an attempt to show that his opponents are wrong but he is not attacked the doctrines of Madhyamaka itself", there is just one problem with this though; Nagarjuna never offered any independent logical arguments for emptiness and Madhyamaka doctrine being true (aside from citing Buddhist texts which are not accepted by non-Buddhists) he tried to refute other views as being illogical to show that Madhyamaka was right but he doesn't offer any independent logical arguments for Madhyamaka being right;
Nagarjuna wasn't merely a deconstructionist, he employ plenty of positive logical arguments for Madhyamaka, not just prasanga. In fact it is Robinson himself who analyzed these arguments (pic related). Clearly you need more reading outside of wikipedia.

>hence Robinson's critique undermines the one thing that tries to show Madhyamaka is correct using logic acceptable to non-Buddhists. Nagarjuna presumed to show that all views involving any sort of permanent or unconditional existence/essence result in contradictions and antinomies but as Robinson shows Nagarjuna uses demonstrably flawed logic in his attempt to do this, hence the Madhyamaka dialectic does not really refute all views, at which point there is no point to take his ideas seriously anymore if you are non-Buddhist because the one attempt he made to prove them with logic (via refuting opposing views) floundered and is rendered worthless to non-Buddhists because of the mistakes involved.
If it was rendered worthless, why did Shankara plagiarize the shit out of it?

I'm sure you are all going to be in death bed like: Yup I'm glad I spent so much time writing those long ass boring paragraphs about stuff that either I can't fully understand because of how abstract they are or I have no control over.

>>14996184
Cope

>Let's just take a look at a few things from the critique and what they say about Nagarjuna as a thinker and how they show his logic is flawed.
>1) Robinson points out Nagarjuna fails to do this first, i.e. it's a completely circular and fallacious line of reasoning by Nagarjuna and he fails to disprove that Akasha exists 2) when Nagarjuna says he didn't advance any empirical propositions not accepted by his opponents he is either straight up lying or he can't keep track of his own arguments which doesn't bode well for anything else he says. 3) by contradicting himself when discussing basic principles like what is existence Nagarjuna's arguments cease to be credible.
>In summary, there is a large host of contradictions and absurdities in Madhyamaka especially with regard to how emptiness could be the nature of everything and somehow magically cause the illusory universe to appear and somehow empty-but-consciousness beings also appear, and the way that Nagarjuna tries to logically argue for Madhyamaka being true is completely ruined by all the inconsistencies and contradictions in the logic he uses. So, as we can see all the three main schools of Indian Buddhism upon which all the later Buddhist schools are heavily based are all marked with some seriously illogical ideas, various inner contradictions and thinkers who advanced laughably bad logic.

Now lets see what Mahayana saint Richard Robinson (omph) actually made of Nagarjuna

"There is no evidence that Nagarjuna denies any principles of logic. He asserts that a certain set of propositions-the Buddhist doctrine--is true under a certain condition, that of emptiness, and false under another condition, that of own-beingness. It is not right to say that "Nagarjuna denies the validity of logic . . to establish ultimate truth." He simply refutes all theories of own-being. This refutation ipso facto establishes right understanding. This does not constitute "irrationalism," since it merely refutes by rational means a manifestly irrational notion. It is not meaningful to call Nagarjun's system "negativism" because he uses the functor of negation frequently, unless one is willing to call Plato's or Hume's philosophy "conjunctivism" because they use "and" frequently. With at least some wrong questions obviated, philosophical inquiry can pursue genuinely productive ones. Nagarjuna's contemporaries were infinitely less sophisticated than Kant's. Their problems were simpler, their concepts were fewer, and their devices for handling concepts were much cruder. It is not that they were worse thinkers than the moderns, but simply that they were earlier. It is in this milieu that Nagarjuna's reasoning should be praised. I believe that when this environment has been analyzed and taken into account, his stature will appear greater, and his system much less barbarous and baffling than it has seemed hitherto."

I rest my case

Om Mani Padme Hum fellow worldings....

>>14996109
>>14996121
>>14996128
>>14996134
>>14996148
>>14996156
>>14996164
>>14996169
>>14996181
>>14996207

>>14984068
base

>>14996210
>1563612130580.gif
Why do you always reply to your own posts with the same cringe Mr. Bean reaction image?

https://warosu.org/lit/image/gXkaLxqGe-8uhKXBxsEObQ

>>14996109
>e quasi-instantaneous (ie sufficient enough for an effect to bear fruit), but why must cause and effect become 'simultaneous' at the interface?
This is you trying to have your cake and eat it too, something is either instantaneous or not instantaneous, "quasi-instantaneous" is a fake made-up category with nothing corresponding to it in reality that you are trying to slip under the door unnoticed, Instantaneous and non-instantaneous are mutually contradictory categories which cannot be combined like light and darkness (the absence of light), hence 'quasi-instantaneous' isn't a real thing, that's incredibly sloppy thinking; if momentariness is correct then objects have only a momentary and instantaneous existence, if they exist for more than one moment such as they would if they were "quasi-instantaneous" then by virtue of them abiding for more than that one moment they are neither instantaneous nor momentary. As has already been explained in order for there to be some sort of relationship of cause and effect between two objects both objects have to exist at the same moment because if the object acting as the cause doesn't exist at the moment the relationship takes place then qua being non-existent it cannot impart its effect unto the cause, and correspondingly if the object acting as the effect does not exist when the cause does it cannot be affected by that cause because it doesn't exist yet; non-existent objects cannot affect anything or be effected by anything. This is some very basic logic that you seem to be going to absurd lengths to avoid facing head on.
>It seems to me that if a sequence exists, then an interaction of some kind must also exist.
impossible for the reasons explained above
>Furthermore it seems like a logical fallacy to say you could only have either momentariness or causation when its certainly not illogical that both can be the case.
You have not pointed out what the logical fallacy is and merely insinuated that there is one and have failed to address the underlying contradiction in the Buddhist premise, i.e. how objects in a cause and effect relation are supposed to affect one another if one doesn't exist at the same time as the other.

>: past and future dharmas have capability (samarthya) of functioning, while present dharmas also exert a distinctive activity (karitra).
Objects which were momentary and which existed in the past or which will come to exist in the future but which don't exist in the moment cannot have activity of any sort in the moment because of their non-existence, this is nonsensical

>>14997912
>>14996121
>why would it not be a cause if its ceases 'when' the next moment arises? or are you saying before it arises?
Because if it ceases to exist either when or before the next object arises it cannot affect that object in any way, in order to impart any sort of affect it must necessarily be non-momentary and existing at the same time as that other object for reasons explained above
>Also you are misunderstanding what Buddhists mean by persistent identity during a flux of moments. It simply means one sees form and constancy in a fluctuation momentary dharmas, nothing to do with 'imparting causal effects'.
I'm aware that this is what the meaning is, but the functional implications of it are that causality and the functioning of the 12 links becomes impossible because all those processes are dependent upon the simultaneous existence of two or more things in a causal relationship for more than one moment, the moment these become momentary any sort of causal relationship becomes impossible for reasons explained above and a bunch of other Buddhist teachings fall apart.

>but it doesn't become 'one enduring moment'.
By making the defense that there a momentary flux that just seems like a constant being as in the example of electricity the Buddhists is trying to escape the contradictions that come with the doctrine of momentariness, but this attempted escape is unsuccessful, because the doctrine of momentariness inevitably involves the separation of moments into "moment 1" "moment 2" "moment 3", because of the necessity for objects to not exist for more than one moment, the separation of moments that follows from the changes made by the arising and ceasing of an object at each moment involves the slicing of time into segments of moments even if they somehow give rise to the perception of one continuous flux.

>Furthermore why would it be absurd to say that past and future dharmas have causal capabilities in terms of temporality?
if they don't exist by virtue of them ceasing to exist or from them not having arisen yet they are unable to affect anything because of them not existing at that moment.

>May I remind you that Shankara makes the claim that cause and effect are indifferent? is that not more absurd than the Sarvastivadas?
It's actually quite logical, he is talking about material transformations and not the causal relation between two separate objects, he is not saying the baseball bat that hits the baseball is non-different from the baseball, he is saying that object-effects which from originate from some object-source are really just a transformation of that source, i.e. milk into curds, earth into pot, water into ice

>>14997920
>I don’t see results in further absurd contradictions in that pic..
The 3 uncaused reals admitted are space, pratityasamutpadda and nirudna, the contradictions are as follows:

"If these three are admitted as uncaused eternal realities, then the theory of universal momentariness is given up. And if, to save the theory of momentariness, these three are declared not as ‘reals’, but as ‘negation’ (abhava-matra) further contradicdons would arise. It would be illogical to regard space as merely ‘negation of covering' or emptiness (avaranabhava), for space provides room for extension of things. Again, to say that the causal wheel is merely ‘negation of permanence’ would be untenable, for this ‘negation of permanence* (nityaivabhava) applies only to a momentary link, and not to the wheel itself which is eternally going on, even though the liberated may escape from it. Even to say that the process or the flow of the series is ‘eternal’ only in the sense of ‘enduring’ (santati-nitya) is to give up momentariness."

>this is something you have to prove.
Wrong

"It may be held that the appearance of unity (behind all awareness and it's continuity) is erroneous, and that, as such, it presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous. It cannot be urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false, then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true; for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved. The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses, which is self-evident."

>>14997927
>>14996128
>what exactly are you trying to say here?
>hurr durr I have no good rebuttal against this so I will just play dumb and ask you to rephrase a simple paragraph in your own words
Memory and the recognition of similarity between two things or moments requires 3 different moments to take place, the first moment when anon sees "This is my bookshelf", the second moment when the anon sees "I am again experiencing the bookshelf" and then the third moment when anon is able to realize "the bookshelf I witnessed at moment 1 and moment 2 are the same bookshelf", this requires the same witnessing subject experiencing all three moments so that he is able to make the connection, if momentariness is true this becomes impossible because one awareness or consciousness-instance will experience the bookshelf before ceasing to exist and being replaced by another, but this next consciousnesses-instance did not experience the witnessing of the bookshelf by the previous awareness and so it cannot establish the common identity of anything from moment to moment.

>Shankara is just as retarded as you for thinking that nothingness implies all possibilities (protip: it doesn't).
You didn't refute his argument at all but just called him retarded, saying "protip it doesn't" is not an argument. You haven't explained how a tiger is suppose to spring out of nothingness to replace the previous tiger instead of a hippo if everything is momentary and there is no abiding forces which ensures the right objects replace one another. There is no reason whatsoever why a tiger should replace a tiger, the non-existent of any one object being the exact same identical nothingness in all cases.

>Here we go with the 'pre-buddhist upanishad' mumbo jumbo and how all neo-absolutist frameworks are simply copying hinduism but advaita 'totally' didn't copy things like 2 truths doctrine.
If you believe there is any other idea taken from Yogachara by Advaita which I didn't mention than please let me know and I will gladly cite the verses showing that such an idea appears in the pre-Buddhist Upanishads, as I did for the 3 other ideas already, It's not my fault that the Upanishads predate Buddhism it's just the truth. Shankara did not take the two truths doctrine from Madhyamaka, the origin of the idea is Mundaka Upanishad verse 1.1.4. which mentions a supreme and non-supreme knowledge. This Upanishad is the first text in all of Indian philosophy to explicitly make the distinction and it predates Nagarjuna by hundreds of years, the Buddha never mentions this distinction once in the whole PC, It was Nagarjuna who most likely took it from the Mundaka Upanishad.

>>14997939
>you didn't read the full sentence, he doesn't actually refute Vijnanavada but a portion of its philosophy that he tries to distinguish without realizing he's exemplifying sunyavada.
He chose to focus on the later Yogachara of Vasubandhu, Dinnaga and Dharmakirti because no Buddhists follow Asanga's Yogachara and none of them seem to want to go near it with a 10-feet pole. Shankara did refute Yogachara by pointing out its complete denial of the reality of external objects is illogical and results in contradictions such as not being able to explain how we experience the perception of them and you have been in denial and have refused to acknowledge this

>what is Chandradhar Sharma trying to say here exactly
Dont play stupid with me you insufferable brat, the portion of writing at the beginning of that paragraph was mine, it summarized the flaw with Yogachara and I will repeat it here, the portion from Sharma was in quotes, you can either choose to respond with a defense of the position of Yogachara or you can choose not to which is implicitly conceding that it's illogical

It's illogical for Yogachara to completely deny the existence of objects (even conditionally) and say that the form of objects can appear in objects when Yogachara doesn't admit the existence of objects, because then there is no way it could appear in consciousness when there is no existing content for that form to be related to or derived from, and since there were never any existent objects to begin with, there cannot be a beginningless relationship of previous impressions of external objects feeding off one another, hence there is no way to account for how we can even receive the impression that there are external objects to begin with.

>>14996148
>And to take reality seriously is precisely to deny nihilism.
But if all meaning is ultimately co-dependent, without independent-existence, then that implies the non-reality of that meaning if you say that things which have dependent existence are not completely real as Madhyamaka does

>Simply false lol, nothing in Madhyamaka entails the conclusion that Nirvana is functionally the same as oblivion, this is the most rudimentary reading of Buddhism that I bet Shankara himself doesn't even make light of.
Okay, so can you explain to me then what continues after someone has attained Buddha-hood or Arahant-hood and their body dies? If there is nothing whatosever that continues after the death of the body for such a person and it is a complete extinction and obliteration then it's not different from dissolving into nothingness. Even to say that this would be eternal bliss ends up only being used figuratively in the sense of "not coming back to existence and being extinct forever is bliss because you don't feel pain anymore", it can only literally be eternal or permanent bliss if there is a sentience presence to experience that bliss.

>>14997950
>>14996156
you keep repeating this same cringey line every thread even when an answer is given to you. For the record Nagarjuna, while he doesn't get deep into how samsara arises,
Which makes his system a complete joke! If you can't even explain what's causing the world appearance there is no reason to think you have discovered the ultimate truth of things or the path to perfect knowledge. How can you expect to find your way out of the maze of samsara if you don't know how you entered into it in the first place, that means you don't know where the exit it.
>presumably thought like other buddhists that it is arisen via pratityasamutpada (dependent origination).
This is impossible and was BTFO by Gaudapada and Shankara, dependent origination being the cause of samsara is completely illogical, a beginningless relationship of cause and affect cannot cause itself to arise and cannot will itself into existence. There can be no beginningless series of cause and effect between the binary members of a series because then that would result in mutual dependence, the effect producing a cause that would produce an effect which would in turn produce its own cause, like a son giving birth to his own father. One cannot come into existence or be produced because doing so requires the other to exist already which cant happen if the cause of it hasn't been produced. If you say it's a beginningless series of cause and effect between a non-binary series of elements (such as the 12 links of dependent origination) then it's not a complete explanation unless you explain which of the element is the cause and the other the effect, if you say that they arise simultaneously then neither is really a cause or an effect and there can be no actual relation between them. The cause in a beginningless series of cause and effect has no capability to give rise either to an effect that exists prior to its origination or to an effect that does not exist prior to its production. Nor can it be determined in such a system which is actually the cause and which is the effect which leads to a violation of the order of cause and effect. I have seen other people before who have also read Nagarjuna say that he rejects the Sarvastivada/Theravada explanation of dependent-origination being the cause of samsara for similar reasons.

>However he makes the point that 'Nirvana is Samsara, Samsara is Nirvana' in the sense that they are both empty of own being.
Something that is empty of own-being cannot be self-caused or eternal, hence Samsara and Nirvana would have to be caused by something, but Nagarjuna has no idea what causes them and so his whole system collapses into uncertainty

I'm new to these threads but it's nice to see Buddhism getting BTFO like it deserves.. I might just read some Guenon. Where do I start with him brothers

>>14997954
>I see the problem now, you seem to think that Emptiness means the world is 'unreal'. Nagarjuna doesn't make this claim. Nagarjuna doesn't posit the world as 1) real, 2) unreal, 3) both real and unreal, 4) neither real nor unreal.
This changes nothing that I wrote, this is the favorite trick of the Madhyamaka when confronted with the absurd implications of sunyata. Emptiness doesn't have to mean "unreal" or "nothingness" for the statement to remain true that there are no known examples of emptiness causing illusions, there are no known examples of illusions inhering in or arising in emptiness and there are no known examples of emptiness being self-aware or conscious; regardless of how you want to define emptiness this is still completely illogical and is contradicted by all the examples we can draw from.

>It is clear you haven't read enough of Madhyamaka
Madhyamaka clearly subscribes to the view of there being no Self like the other schools of Indian Buddhism which means it faces all of the problems they do on this such as being unable to satisfactorily account for the continuity of the witness

>>14996164
>Just because sense objects and sense are both fluctuating, doesn't mean they aren't causally functional because those fluctuations are minute at the level of moment to moment experience, they don't drastically alter the senses or its objects.
In your defense of fluctuation when you say that these don't drastically alter the senses and its objects from moment to moment you are implicitly admitting the continuity and non-changing of conscious presence, otherwise you wouldn't have felt compelled to explain why the fluctuation doesn't result in drastic changes from moment to moment
> In any case, It is not numerically the same object which is recognized during this awareness-schema that you've concocted, but rather a sameness or resemblance between different momentary objects in a homogeneous series.
As has already explained above this is impossible, because one produced and temporary awareness cannot recognize sameness or resemblance because it didn't have the prior experience, not does it stick around long enough to be able to compare multiple moments.

>>14997958
based, I recommend starting with his series of commentaries on 8 Upanishads which can be read here or purchased on amazon

https://estudantedavedanta.net/Eight-Upanisads-Vol-1.pdf
https://estudantedavedanta.net/Eight-Upanisads-vol2.pdf

If you are struggling to understand anything you find on lib-gen the book "The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy" by Sharma, and you can use the index/glossary in it to look up any subject or concept that you are not clear on. Also Guenon's "Man and His Becoming According to the Vedanta" can be used as a resource to consult also.

>>14997959
>>14996181
>he employ plenty of positive logical arguments for Madhyamaka,
Would you care to give some then? I have never seen a single one and all the sources I have read stress that he claimed to not hold or advance any views and instead just endeavored the show contradictions in non-sunyata views.
>>14996207
You avoided addressing any of the serious flaws in Nagarjuna's logic (i.e. he blatantly contradicts himself, uses circular logic and claims to not make any empirical propositions not accepted by his opponents but does in fact make these propositions), and instead just copy and pasted a paragraph where Robinson praises some of his logic. The fact that Robinson praised him there doesn't do a single thing to invalidate the flaws Robinson pointed out in his logic elsewhere. Nagarjuna can have some good ideas and some clever logical tricks while being completely retarded and having awful garbage logic in other areas. Your refusal to address the flaws Robinson pointed out in the logic Nagarjuna uses in the MMK I am forced to conclude is because you have no response and you know that Nagarjuna uses flawed logic there and that his dialectic collapses into garbage once the holes are pointed out as Robinson did.

>>14997958
Welcome brother, start with his first book "intro to hindu doctrines", then if you want his social criticism and thoughts on modernity and East/West then read 'East and West', 'Crisis of the Modern World' and then 'Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times' in that order. If you want to read his works on pure metaphysics then after to Intro to Hindu Doctrines then read 'Man and His Becoming According to the Vedanta', 'Symbolism of the Cross', 'Multiple States of the Being' and then 'Symbols of Sacred Science' in that order. All his books can be found for free in the OP link.

>>14997967
>>14997963
Based, thank you brothers.. I will begin reading Guenon immediately..

The hylics are being btfo today

Bump

cringe general.... cringe nation... not based at all. non dualism is cringe

>>14997950
>*and say that the form of objects can appear in consciousness

>>14998036
Cringe. You are building a Sandcastle that will be washed away by the unstoppable tide of Guenonposting......

>>14998036
YOU ARE CRINGE, HYLIC!!!! NOW, GO AND CONTEMPLATE UNTIL YOU ARE ALSO BROUGHT TO THE TRUTH

>>14998051
The first wave crashes to shore......based

BASED...BASED...BASED...
(PBUH)....(PBUH)...(PBUH)

>>14998067
The next wave..... Swhshshshhsh

>>14998036
>non-dualism is cringe
Why?

>>14998049
>>14998051
you are as cringe as this pajeet who thinks trump's atman is immence of brahman. the spirit is not universal for all. all is not one, cringe lords. soul is eternal and it's not God. cringe delusion!!! so blind!!!! so cringe!!!!!

>>14998064
>>14998051
>>14997996
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>>14997756
Based brothers

>>14998082
Wave after wave, wave after wave........

>>14998078
>racism

Lol. The Nagarjuna retard shows his true colors. Begone HYLIC.

>>14998076
non dualism is abstract metaphysics that revolve around 'divinization' through wisdom instead of salvation. it's for larpers such as kenneth. big words and some knowledge but spiritually dead people. very cringe. they don't realize salvation already is the highest goal achievable

May Allah (swt) cleanse this sacred Jazira (جزيرة) of learning...from all of those who have condemned themselves to Jahannam (جهنم)...Remember brothers...Guenon (pbuh)...and bask in Tamal (تأمل)...

>>14998106
Run along little boy.... Shudras are not meant to study advanced doctrines such as non dualism. Stick to chanting Hare Krishna is your best bet.

>>14998101
cringe... im not an orientalist cringe lord. to be born in the west and long for eastern religions is already very cringe. even jung btfo people who look after the east for religion... even cringe jung who got btfo by the cringe osho

>>14998118
Based

>>14998120
>>14998118
>>14998127
based

>>14998122
Cringe

>>14998120
see >>14998122
i was born in the west. i was initiated in a western tradition. im not a cringe orientalist. try as much as possible with your cringe mental gymnastics to be one with god bro... it's just human abstraction for spiritually dead people.

>>14998142
Here we go brothers..... what's the western tradition?

>>14998163
Once he posts the tradition it is all over. The refutations will flow down from Heaven like celestial dew from the leaf of Our Lord

when you meet people from actual tariqas you'll notice esotericism is just an abstraction and the divinization they seek is a symptom from their spiritual death. SALVATION is the highest achievable goal. creature is not the creator. if you honestly think you are one with brahman you're unaware of your own condition as creature. God cannot create something that is as perfect as He is
>>14998163
not answering

>>14998187
THATS RIGHT HYLIC BECAUSE THE BROTHERS WILL REFUTE YOU LIKE YOU HAVE NEVER BEEN REFUTED BEFORE IF YOU POST THE NAME OF SOME PSEUDO INITIATIC ORGANISATION!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

now what means when someone says the spirit/atman dwells in each? that's another question but it does not support non dualism by any chance.

>>14998203
what tradition do you belong to, western man? you were born in the WEST and you seek traditions from the east. even cringe jung once said: it's cringe to go seek spirituality from the east if you're from the west. EVEN JUNG

>>14998213
GO HYLIC GOOOOOOO! YOU CANT ANSWER MY QUESTION SO YOU TRY AND MAKE A STRAWMAN!!!!!
IS IT THE MASONS? IS IT THE GOLDEN DAWN? OR IS IT THE ROSICRUCIANS?
ANSWER ME NOW HYLIC OR YOU ARE GOING TO THE SHADOW REALM

>>14998225
those are cringe organizations and anti-traditionnelle

>>14998213
COME ON HYLIC......WE ARE ALL WAITING.....

TELL US THIS MAGICAL ORGANISATION HYLIC!!!! WE ALL WANT TO JOIN IF A REAL TRADITIONAL ORDER EXISTS IN THE WEST!!!!

I BET ITS SOME "PAGAN" GROUP THAT SIT AROUND WANKING ON A TREE! IS THAT IT HYLIC?!

>>14998242
the catholic church is the only tradition in the west

>>14997967
>>14997963
>>14997959
>>14997954
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>>14997939
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>>14997920
>>14997912
Based refutation brother, the b*ddhist has no response as usual.

>>14998255
OHNONONONONONONONONONONONO
HYLIC....
GUENON PBUH MADE HIS POSITION ON THE CATHOLIC CHURCH CLEAR!!!! IT HAS LOST ALL VALUE AS A TRADITION!!!!! AND VATICAN 2 CONFIRMED THIS!!! ITS OVER HYLIC! ITS OVER! YOU LOSE!!!!!!!!! JOIN A SUFI ORDER TODAY!!!! WOOOO

>>14998275
cringe... guenon was wrong on many things about christianity (and dante). the sacraments still confer initiation and were not initially esoteric only. based st. aquinas refuted non dualism and you non dualists don't have any saint capable of ressurrecting a dead person. cope more cringe larpers

Give me one Guenon paragraph that's pertinent to current pandemic.

>>14998294
I WANT TO BELIEVE HYLIC.... I REALLY DO.... I WAS BORN AND RASIED CATHOLIC.... EVERY SUNDAY MASS..... MASS IN SCHOOL.... IT WAS GREAT

BUT ITS ALL EMPTY NOW HYLIC...THERES NO HOPE... FRANCIS IS GOING TO MAKE THINGS WORSE MY FRIEND..... ESCAPE BEFORE ITS TOO LATE... LOOK AT ST MALACHYS PROHPECY....

>>14998294
>based st. aquinas refuted non dualism
no he didnt

>>14998313
dont be a cringe apostate. if you were baptized you are considered initiated by guenon's own terms of initiation. even rama coomaraswamy converted to catholicism, although he became a cringe sede. if you are in the west there's no other way. V2 is another problem, but the sacraments are still valid and that's all that matters. if one wants he can go to a catholic eastern rite mass. rebellion against the pope is psychic anti tradition

>>14998294
>>14998356
OH NO NO NO NO NO NO

>>14998359
FRANCIS IS A SATAN POPE. LOOK AT MALACHYS PROPHECY. I KNOW THINGS HYLIC. BUT I CANNOT REVEAL THEM AT THIS TIME...

>>14998363
>>14998378
cringe. non dualism is heresy. prove you are immanent divine sparks right now! cringe shitposters! so deluded! SO CRINGE!!!!!

Does anyone here actually go to an Advita Vedanta temple?

>>14998425
The Advaita-based Ramakrishna Order has temples around North America as does the Shri Paramhans Advait Mat Order. I live within driving distance of both, I have been busy with life/work but I plan on trying to check one out soon.

>>14998470
Contemplation is greater than action brother..... I live in a house miles from civilization and cannot access such things... You are blessed with proximity.... Take advantage of this.... Peace be Upon You.... And peace be upon all my Brothers across the sea in America.....

>>14984068
what should I read first? Those archive.org scans look awful, any better source?

>>14998533

This is better on the eyes brother..

https://dinghal.com/bibliotheek/The_Crisis_of_the_Modern_World.pdf

>>14994630
>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s63iRrFQ0wI
>youtube channel: Dharmakirti
LMAO is the reason that you were unwilling to even acknowledge Shankara's BTFOing of Yogachara in the back-and-forth in this thread is because you named your channel after him and since Shankara's criticism largely targets Dharmakirti's ideas it's too embarrassing and uncomfortable to even acknowledge the holes in his thought which were pointed out by Shankara?

>>14998670
based Dhrama Squads

>>14997972
based!

infection check

>>14984068
>text of the day: Gulshan-i Rāz by Mahmoūd Shabestarī
>https://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/srg/index.htm
wow thanks op shit slaps

B-B-B-BASED
A
S
E
D

B A S E D
A.......... E
S...........S
E .......... A
D E S A B

BBUTT.......Based Be Upon This Thread

BA
BASED
BA BA SED
BA BASEDBASED
BASEDBASED
BA BAS BASED
BAS BAS BA
BAS BAS BA
BASE BAS BA
BASEDBASED BA
BA BA BAS
BA BAS BAS
BASEDBASED BASEDBASED
BAS BA

Brothers we have converted /lit/ to the glory of Guenon (PBUH)

Truly we have rid this board of Oshoposter and his hylic trash.......congratulations brothers....

>>15000281
BAAAAASED

>>15000315
Great work, brothers! We have made short work of this task, indeed! Based!

B

A

S

E

D

Remember brothers...use your incoming NEETbux for the sacred pilgrimage...(pbuh)...

>>15000435
based!

>>15000315
By Allah, I swear that all hylics will perish under the contemplative blade of Guénon (pbuh)...

Guenon fans are the equivalent of bonbi fans over at /wsg/. I've never seen a fanbase so passionate than those two

>>15001188
Based Department? Yeah, we are gonna need the whole squad....

B
A
S
E
D

Why are Guenon posters so smart? How can I become like them?

A BAAAAAASED NIGHT TO YOU ALL, BROTHERS

>ctrl-f
>hylic
>24 matches
Warms my heart that the righteous never falter in their war against the soulless materialist heathens.

>>15001462
We have conquered /lit/ brother, I myself made many Guenon memes and I see even hylics posting them every day to btfo buddhists

>>15001470
De Bello Autismo
The amazing story of how a ragtag group of awakened non dualists conquered the materialist world, and established an intellectual bulwark in opposition to the forces of darkness.

>>14998118
Baaaaaased

>>15001530
kek based!

>>15001470
>>15001530
>>15002275
>>15002881
cringe

>>15001530

>>14997912
>This is you trying to have your cake and eat it too, something is either instantaneous or not instantaneous, "quasi-instantaneous" is a fake made-up category with nothing corresponding to it in reality that you are trying to slip under the door unnoticed, Instantaneous and non-instantaneous are mutually contradictory categories which cannot be combined like light and darkness (the absence of light),
false dilemma

>hence 'quasi-instantaneous' isn't a real thing, that's incredibly sloppy thinking
aka 'I have no argument so i'll just dismiss it', cool

>if momentariness is correct then objects have only a momentary and instantaneous existence, if they exist for more than one moment such as they would if they were "quasi-instantaneous" then by virtue of them abiding for more than that one moment they are neither instantaneous nor momentary.
that's quite a leap of logic to say that momentary existence implies constancy by virtue of its sequential nature

>As has already been explained in order for there to be some sort of relationship of cause and effect between two objects both objects have to exist at the same moment because if the object acting as the cause doesn't exist at the moment the relationship takes place then qua being non-existent it cannot impart its effect unto the cause, and correspondingly if the object acting as the effect does not exist when the cause does it cannot be affected by that cause because it doesn't exist yet; non-existent objects cannot affect anything or be effected by anything. This is some very basic logic that you seem to be going to absurd lengths to avoid facing head on.....impossible for the reasons explained above
this isn't basic logic, its a fallacy based on false premises. If cause and effect 'simultaneously' occur qua objects existence at the same moment, it would mean that the effect is contained in the cause apriori (satkaryavada), which amounts to a tautology. For Buddhists, simultaneity is a cause itself because it is not apparent that an effect exists where a cause paradoxically exists, therefore a more appropriate indicator of causal efficacy is the ceasing and arising of moments.

>Objects which were momentary and which existed in the past or which will come to exist in the future but which don't exist in the moment cannot have activity of any sort in the moment because of their non-existence, this is nonsensical
who said they don't exist in the moment? of course they do, that's what 'momentary existence' is defined as.

>>14997920
>Because if it ceases to exist either when or before the next object arises it cannot affect that object in any way, in order to impart any sort of affect it must necessarily be non-momentary and existing at the same time as that other object for reasons explained above
Ok so you're taking 'when' to simply mean 'just' before. I think you're confusion lies with how you equate objects of cause and effect with cause and effect itself.

>I'm aware that this is what the meaning is, but the functional implications of it are that causality and the functioning of the 12 links becomes impossible because all those processes are dependent upon the simultaneous existence of two or more things in a causal relationship for more than one moment, the moment these become momentary any sort of causal relationship becomes impossible for reasons explained above and a bunch of other Buddhist teachings fall apart.
no you clearly didn't get it, you are confusing perception with potentiality and you're making a separate (but repetitive) point.

>By making the defense that there a momentary flux that just seems like a constant being as in the example of electricity the Buddhists is trying to escape the contradictions that come with the doctrine of momentariness, but this attempted escape is unsuccessful, because the doctrine of momentariness inevitably involves the separation of moments into "moment 1" "moment 2" "moment 3", because of the necessity for objects to not exist for more than one moment, the separation of moments that follows from the changes made by the arising and ceasing of an object at each moment involves the slicing of time into segments of moments even if they somehow give rise to the perception of one continuous flux.
You didn't actually address the point and just repeated yourself. Buddhists don't actually subscribe to infinitesimal summation of moments just like they don't see a waterfall being separate from its bundle of molecules endlessly fluctuating.

>if they don't exist by virtue of them ceasing to exist or from them not having arisen yet they are unable to affect anything because of them not existing at that moment.
So you are basically then saying things must exist in the present moment for it to have causal efficacy?

>It's actually quite logical, he is talking about material transformations and not the causal relation between two separate objects, he is not saying the baseball bat that hits the baseball is non-different from the baseball, he is saying that object-effects which from originate from some object-source are really just a transformation of that source, i.e. milk into curds, earth into pot, water into ice
Red herring. Buddhists talk about transformation too, stick to the point: Shankara makes the absurd claim that cause and effect don't differ despite him saying that they are asymmetric. Yea, 'quite logical' lol...

>>14997927
>The 3 uncaused reals admitted are space, pratityasamutpadda and nirudna, the contradictions are as follows:
>"If these three are admitted as uncaused eternal realities, then the theory of universal momentariness is given up. And if, to save the theory of momentariness, these three are declared not as ‘reals’, but as ‘negation’ (abhava-matra) further contradicdons would arise. It would be illogical to regard space as merely ‘negation of covering' or emptiness (avaranabhava), for space provides room for extension of things
This is just the 'half-empty-half-full' argument.

>Again, to say that the causal wheel is merely ‘negation of permanence’ would be untenable, for this ‘negation of permanence* (nityaivabhava) applies only to a momentary link, and not to the wheel itself which is eternally going on, even though the liberated may escape from it. Even to say that the process or the flow of the series is ‘eternal’ only in the sense of ‘enduring’ (santati-nitya) is to give up momentariness."
Why would it not apply to the wheel? If you look at a turning clock, you don't assume its dynamic motion is disconnected with its momentary rotation of its gears. Again all of these arguments by Shankara have serious holes and consist of him basically saying things are such and such 'because I said so'.

>Wrong "It may be held that the appearance of unity (behind all awareness and it's continuity) is erroneous, and that, as such, it presumes that the awarenesses are similar; for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. But, unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved, there is nothing which can even suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous. It cannot be urged that, if the existence of difference and similarity between the awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false, then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true; for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved. The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses, which is self-evident."
You've already pasted this before in previous threads but I'll debunk it again. It is a fallacy to say that an undivided stream of awareness is 'self evident' because its directly proved by experience since the conclusion is implied in the premise (ie circular reasoning).

>>14997939
>hurr durr I have no good rebuttal against this so I will just play dumb and ask you to rephrase a simple paragraph in your own words
'hurr durr i'll just copy paste random sentences from a badly written book and act like im a big boy philosopher with these walls of text that I've probably never read but pretend to while acting like its all just 'basic stuff bro' haha xD'

>Memory and the recognition of similarity between two things or moments requires 3 different moments to take place, the first moment when anon sees "This is my bookshelf", the second moment when the anon sees "I am again experiencing the bookshelf" and then the third moment when anon is able to realize "the bookshelf I witnessed at moment 1 and moment 2 are the same bookshelf", this requires the same witnessing subject experiencing all three moments so that he is able to make the connection, if momentariness is true this becomes impossible because one awareness or consciousness-instance will experience the bookshelf before ceasing to exist and being replaced by another, but this next consciousnesses-instance did not experience the witnessing of the bookshelf by the previous awareness and so it cannot establish the common identity of anything from moment to moment.
Again, this thought experiment doesn't make any sense. Why must the subsequent person 'reset' at each moment? If I see a bookshelf, replicate myself, and leave the room, then my newly replicated self would still recognize the book shelf.

>You didn't refute """""""""his""""""""" argument at all but just called him retarded, saying "protip it doesn't" is not an argument.
you gonna have a cry about it s󠀀oyboy?

>You haven't explained how a tiger is suppose to spring out of nothingness to replace the previous tiger instead of a hippo if everything is momentary and there is no abiding forces which ensures the right objects replace one another. There is no reason whatsoever why a tiger should replace a tiger, the non-existent of any one object being the exact same identical nothingness in all cases.
nothingness doesn't implies all potentiality, it is not a chaotic property. Do I really need to explain how retarded this argument is? You're basically saying that moment to moment existence leads to an unbinding of itself. You're better than this.

>>14997939
>If you believe there is any other idea taken from Yogachara by Advaita which I didn't mention than please let me know and I will gladly cite the verses showing that such an idea appears in the pre-Buddhist Upanishads, as I did for the 3 other ideas already, It's not my fault that the Upanishads predate Buddhism it's just the truth. Shankara did not take the two truths doctrine from Madhyamaka, the origin of the idea is Mundaka Upanishad verse 1.1.4. which mentions a supreme and non-supreme knowledge. This Upanishad is the first text in all of Indian philosophy to explicitly make the distinction and it predates Nagarjuna by hundreds of years, the Buddha never mentions this distinction once in the whole PC, It was Nagarjuna who most likely took it from the Mundaka Upanishad.
We've already been over this multiple times I really didn't want to elaborate it again but for anyone who needs to be reminded: 2 truths is expounded implicitly in the PC (DN i.202 and SN i.297 to name a few) and elaborated by Buddhists as early as the second council (70 years after Buddha's death). It is highly unlikely that post-Buddhist Mundaka came up with this concept first, which is more of a tiered arrangement rather than the 'two sides of the same coin' argument that Buddhists put forth.

>>14997950
>He chose to focus on the later Yogachara of Vasubandhu, Dinnaga and Dharmakirti because no Buddhists follow Asanga's Yogachara and none of them seem to want to go near it with a 10-feet pole. Shankara did refute Yogachara by pointing out its complete denial of the reality of external objects is illogical and results in contradictions such as not being able to explain how we experience the perception of them and you have been in denial and have refused to acknowledge this
Go ahead and keep yelling the same ‘Shankara refuted him bro you haven’t disproven it still’, Shankara’s ‘refutation’ is just him trying to agreeing with Yogachara and applying Sunyavada at the same time. It’s all there for everyone to read.

>Dont play stupid with me you insufferable brat
struck a nerve did I?

>the portion of writing at the beginning of that paragraph was mine, it summarized the flaw with Yogachara and I will repeat it here, the portion from Sharma was in quotes, you can either choose to respond with a defense of the position of Yogachara or you can choose not to which is implicitly conceding that it's illogical
I just find it incredibly dishonest that you put yourself up as this big time 'refuter' of doctrines, yet most of the time you resort to copy pasting people that agree with you hoping distracts from countless logical slips you've made before, even here you commit yet another fallacy (Argumentum Ad Ignorantium).

>>14997950
>But if all meaning is ultimately co-dependent, without independent-existence, then that implies the non-reality of that meaning if you say that things which have dependent existence are not completely real as Madhyamaka does
Again not the point being made. The question is whether Madhyamaka is nihilistic or posits a kind of nihilism, my response is that Madhyamaka doesn't reject samvriti (conventional reality) in itself nor does it get devalued by co-dependence.

>Okay, so can you explain to me then what continues after someone has attained Buddha-hood or Arahant-hood and their body dies?
According to the Buddha, those questions simply don't apply in the nirvanic framework where existence is not assented, non-existence is not assented, both existence and non-existence is not assented, neither existence nor non-existence is assent. This isn't hard to grasp.

>>14997954
>Which makes his system a complete joke!
HAHA funni XD !!!

>If you can't even explain what's causing the world appearance there is no reason to think you have discovered the ultimate truth of things or the path to perfect knowledge. How can you expect to find your way out of the maze of samsara if you don't know how you entered into it in the first place, that means you don't know where the exit it.
I can almost imagine you joyously celebrating in your mind the moment you thought 'aha I caught him lmao!' before you could read further, im cringing just thinking about it.

>This is impossible and was BTFO by Gaudapada and Shankara
ok Shapiro...

>This is impossible and was BTFO by Gaudapada and Shankara, dependent origination being the cause of samsara is completely illogical, a beginningless relationship of cause and affect cannot cause itself to arise and cannot will itself into existence. There can be no beginningless series of cause and effect between the binary members of a series because then that would result in mutual dependence, the effect producing a cause that would produce an effect which would in turn produce its own cause, like a son giving birth to his own father. One cannot come into existence or be produced because doing so requires the other to exist already which cant happen if the cause of it hasn't been produced. If you say it's a beginningless series of cause and effect between a non-binary series of elements (such as the 12 links of dependent origination) then it's not a complete explanation unless you explain which of the element is the cause and the other the effect, if you say that they arise simultaneously then neither is really a cause or an effect and there can be no actual relation between them. The cause in a beginningless series of cause and effect has no capability to give rise either to an effect that exists prior to its origination or to an effect that does not exist prior to its production. Nor can it be determined in such a system which is actually the cause and which is the effect which leads to a violation of the order of cause and effect. I have seen other people before who have also read Nagarjuna say that he rejects the Sarvastivada/Theravada explanation of dependent-origination being the cause of samsara for similar reasons.
Basically you're presenting Kalam's cosmological ie that causality cannot traverse infinity coupled with the same point you made earlier about causality in momentariness. This is beside the point, which originally was: can Buddhism explain what 'causes samsara'. In the Buddhist view, it is technically caused by avidya but its process is explained by dependent origination where accumulation of karma fuels further rebirth ie samsara. The argument you put forth during this tangent can easily be applied to Advaita, since Brahman is beginninless and is the cause and effect of all things. Technically he was BTFOing himself.

>>14997954
>Something that is empty of own-being cannot be self-caused or eternal, hence Samsara and Nirvana would have to be caused by something,
Non sequitur

>but Nagarjuna has no idea what causes them and so his whole system collapses into uncertainty
cringe...

>>14997959
>This changes nothing that I wrote,
You are making the most basic misreadings of the Emptiness doctrines, it changes everything.

>this is the favorite trick of the Madhyamaka when confronted with the absurd implications of sunyata.
non argument

>Emptiness doesn't have to mean "unreal" or "nothingness" for the statement to remain true that there are no known examples of emptiness causing illusions, there are no known examples of illusions inhering in or arising in emptiness and there are no known examples of emptiness being self-aware or conscious; regardless of how you want to define emptiness this is still completely illogical and is contradicted by all the examples we can draw from.
what do you mean by 'examples'?

>Would you care to give some then? I have never seen a single one and all the sources I have read stress that he claimed to not hold or advance any views and instead just endeavored the show contradictions in non-sunyata views.
He employs conventional indian logic in most his works (including his Seventy Verses), Modus ponens and Modus tollen in his Karika, argument from excluded middle in some of his works and his Catuskoti is sometime used in a positive sense. This is one top of the buddhist arguments and axioms he holds.

>Madhyamaka clearly subscribes to the view of there being no Self like the other schools of Indian Buddhism which means it faces all of the problems they do on this such as being unable to satisfactorily account for the continuity of the witness
You don't need a self to account for continuity of the witness

>In your defense of fluctuation when you say that these don't drastically alter the senses and its objects from moment to moment you are implicitly admitting the continuity and non-changing of conscious presence, otherwise you wouldn't have felt compelled to explain why the fluctuation doesn't result in drastic changes from moment to moment
no lol, I've actually addressed this already earlier when you made that absurd 'tiger' argument.

>As has already explained above this is impossible, because one produced and temporary awareness cannot recognize sameness or resemblance because it didn't have the prior experience, not does it stick around long enough to be able to compare multiple moments.
again you're making the argument that every moment 'resets' when it simply isn't the case.

>>15003071
>The argument you put forth during this tangent can easily be applied to Advaita, since Brahman is beginninless and is the cause and effect of all things.
>Technically he was BTFOing himself.
not gonna lie, kinda based.

>>14997967
>You avoided addressing any of the serious flaws in Nagarjuna's logic (i.e. he blatantly contradicts himself, uses circular logic and claims to not make any empirical propositions not accepted by his opponents but does in fact make these propositions), and instead just copy and pasted a paragraph where Robinson praises some of his logic
Robinson (omph) doesn't just praise him, he hails him.

>Nagarjuna can have some good ideas and some clever logical tricks while being completely retarded and having awful garbage logic in other areas
So too could Shankara have good ideas and loads of logical slips but awful GARBAGE logic and he completely DESTROYS himself at certain times.

>Your refusal to address the flaws Robinson pointed out in the logic Nagarjuna uses in the MMK I am forced to conclude is because you have no response and you know that Nagarjuna uses flawed logic there and that his dialectic collapses into garbage once the holes are pointed out as Robinson did.
There is no flaws, he considers him legitimate as I have shown.

>>15003052
>you gonna have a cry about it s󠀀oyboy?
based

>>15003024
>>15003030
>>15003040
>>15003052
>>15003057
>>15003061
>>15003071
>>15003084
>>15003085
>>15003092

>>15003024
>false dilemma
>aka 'I have no argument so i'll just dismiss it', cool
It's just basic logic. Instantaneous and non-instantaneous are mutually contradictory categories and they cannot be combined, there is no middle ground between them, this is my argument that I clearly laid out and you have chosen to avoid facing it directly. If you want to claim otherwise than you'll have to substantiate that reasoning, like several other points (such as Shankara's BTFOing of Yogachara) in this back-and-forth you have conceded defeat on them by not providing any argument

>that's quite a leap of logic to say that momentary existence implies constancy by virtue of its sequential nature
I'm not 'implying constancy', I was making the point that something can either last for a single moment, in which case it would be instantaneous, or it can last longer than that moment, in which case it is non-momentary. These are the only options available. Even if the object sticks around for one nanosecond longer than the "1 moment" it's not instantaneous anymore.

>this isn't basic logic, its a fallacy based on false premises. If cause and effect 'simultaneously' occur qua objects existence at the same moment, it would mean that the effect is contained in the cause apriori (satkaryavada), which amounts to a tautology.
The argument that momentariness makes causation impossible is equally as applicable in cases in which the effect is contained in the cause as in the cases when it is not. Buddhists may think that it is a tautology that effects can exist in the cause but that doesn't stop it from being true in everyday life, the constituents of curds already exist in milk, the constituents of paper already exist in trees. In the 12 steps of dependent origination the effect does not exist in the cause but momentariness still makes it impossible because each step doesn't last long enough to impact or be impacted by the previous/next step. In cases where the effect is contained in the cause such as milk solidifying into curds or cheese momentariness also makes this impossible because if something only lasts instantaneously then nothing (such as curds) can emerge from it as its effect because that emergence is non-momentary and requires a stable basis that doesn't flicker out of existence and get replaced by a new one at every moment.

>who said they don't exist in the moment? of course they do, that's what 'momentary existence' is defined as.
My point was that they can only affect anything else or be effected in the moment when they exist, but since this is instantaneous there is no time for there to be any sort of interaction or causation between the instantaneous object and anything else which is also momentary and so causation, movement etc become impossible.

>>15003724
>>15003030
>I think you're confusion lies with how you equate objects of cause and effect with cause and effect itself.
Already addressed above, in the dependent origination model if the previous link ceases either just before, or when the next one arises there is contradiction and the impossibility of dependent origination continuing in both cases.

>you are confusing perception with potentiality
No I'm not and you haven't shown how the Buddhist model is not contradictory, you are only nit-picking at definitions

>Buddhists don't actually subscribe to infinitesimal summation of moments just like they don't see a waterfall being separate from its bundle of molecules endlessly fluctuating.
They don't subscribe to this but this is the consequence of momentariness, they don't follow momentariness to its own conclusion because of the contradictions involved. Although they don't want to admit this, the insistence by the doctrine of momentariness that objects are instantaneous and flicker out of existence only to be replaced by another instantaneous one necessarily involves separating time into moment by moment separation because of how each instantaneous instance of object-existence constitutes a moment. They dug themselves into a hole and then try to claim "lol time is just a flux bro" to avoid facing the necessitated division of time into moments by the doctrine of momentariness.

>So you are basically then saying things must exist in the present moment for it to have causal efficacy?
Yes

>Shankara makes the absurd claim that cause and effect don't differ despite him saying that they are asymmetric.
Can you cite any sentence of any of his works where he writes this?

>>15003040
>This is just the 'half-empty-half-full' argument.
No it's not, you can either admit space to be an eternal reality in which case momentariness is given up, or you can say that space is not an eternal reality but just the negation of covering or emptiness, but this is not correct as space is not pure negation but provides room for the extension of things, not to mention that there are still existent things like gravitational fields even in empty space; whereas we have no indication that pure nothingness is capable of providing this room for extension.

>>15003143
Again with the weird Mr. Bean samefagging

>>15003730
>Why would it not apply to the wheel?
Because if the wheel of caustation it not eternal then it will end on its own at some point and everyone will liberated regardless which makes Buddhism and spiritual practices in general completely unnecessary for eventual liberation, but no Buddhist will want to admit this as being true.
>It is a fallacy to say that an undivided stream of awareness is 'self evident' because its directly proved by experience since the conclusion is implied in the premise (ie circular reasoning).
If it's not self-evident then why did you rush to explain why the fluctuation of momentary consciousness doesn't change from moment to moment and is experienced as a continuity here in this post? >>14996164 Even your denial of it presumes it to be true.

>>15003052
>If I see a bookshelf, replicate myself, and leave the room, then my newly replicated self would still recognize the book shelf.
This is impossible because the process of recognition of similarity involves multiple moments and thoughts and the flickering out of existence of the aggregates at every moment would not leave enough time for this to take place. There being no stable self admitted but only the aggregates, the mind cannot spring out of non-existent and continue part way through the same train of thought (of recognition) that the previous mind got part way through before dissolving; the interrupted train of thought cannot last being itself momentary, and one mind cannot vacuum up the thoughts of another.

>you gonna have a cry about it s??oyboy?
No, but I'm going to call you out every single time you dodge addressing something because you know it's indefensible
>nothingness doesn't implies all potentiality, it is not a chaotic property.
Not an argument it's still completely nonsensical, there is absolutely no difference between the non-existence of one object over another, but because of momentariness nothing is admitted which ensures the right objects replace one another, hence there is no reason why the right objects should spring out of existence to replace another as in their source as nothingness they are identical. Also how did nothingness come to be possessed of such magical generative powers? This is never explained, if something is capable of giving birth to an object then it's not nothingness, nothing cannot cause anything. It seems like Buddhists want to call God nothingness and imagine that the God they call nothingness creates everything at every moment like Islamic occasionalism.

>Do I really need to explain how retarded this argument is?
Please do

>>15003739
>>15003057
>2 truths is expounded implicitly in the PC (DN i.202 and SN i.297 to name a few)
Care to cite the exact sentence when he expounds it? I find reading the Pali Canon to be an absolute bore and don't care to read the whole thing right now in search of it. Also, what you wrote is contradicted by all the sources I look at, for example on wikipedia:

>"In the Pali canon, the distinction is not made between a lower truth and a higher truth, but rather between two kinds of expressions of the same truth, which must be interpreted differently. Thus a phrase or passage, or a whole sutta, might be classed as neyyattha or samuti or vohara, but it is not regarded at this stage as expressing or conveying a different level of truth."

This is not the two truths

>I just find it incredibly dishonest that you put yourself up as this big time 'refuter' of doctrine
>struck a nerve did I?
>Go ahead and keep yelling the same ‘Shankara refuted him bro you haven’t disproven it still’,
I gave you the chance to defend Yogachara's ideas in light of Shankara's complete BTFOing of them and stated that if you didn't defend them it would be the same as implicitly conceding that they are garbage and that Shankara is right. You chose the latter option, I'm glad that you agree with me that there is no good defense against Shankara's eviscerating of Yogachara.

>>15003061
>The question is whether Madhyamaka is nihilistic or posits a kind of nihilism, my response is that Madhyamaka doesn't reject samvriti (conventional reality) in itself nor does it get devalued by co-dependence.
1) nihilism is the position that there is no real meaning to anything
2) Madhyamaka says that things which are dependent on and conditioned by casual conditions are not completely real
3) Madhyamaka says there is nothing that it not dependent on casual conditions, and hence there is nothing which is completely/fully/absolutely real
4) Hence, to Madhyamaka meaning isn't ultimately real, which many people would consider nihilism, and Nirvana does not save this because on closer inspection it's just dissolution into nothingness.

>According to the Buddha, those questions simply don't apply in the nirvanic framework where existence is not assented, non-existence is not assented, both existence and non-existence is not assented, neither existence nor non-existence is assent. This isn't hard to grasp.
If you don't admit anything which continues but only admit the extinction of all traces of which came before (as Buddhists do), then that is indistinguishable from dissolution into nothingness, and no amount of logical gymnastics can overcome this

>>15003743
*no amount of mental gymnastics

>>15003743
>>15003071
>HAHA funni XD !!!
I know right? Imagine that people take it seriously, I imagine that the sunk time-cost plays a big role.
> it is technically caused by avidya but its process is explained by dependent origination where accumulation of karma fuels further rebirth ie samsara.
This is nonsensical because ignorance cannot will itself into existence, there is no explanation given of why avidya exists to begin with, i.e. it's not a real explanation. Furthermore if Avidya is the prior cause of samsara then it is uncaused and then not everything is subject to causal conditions as Madhyamaka maintains.

>The argument you put forth during this tangent can easily be applied to Advaita, since Brahman is beginningless and is the cause and effect of all things.
It actually works with Brahman though because Brahman is admitted to be an uncaused eternal entity possessed of the power of generation/maya whereas ignorance is something that pertains to an already extent sentient entity, it's not something that can cause or explain the existence of samsara and that entity.

>>15003084
>Non sequitur
No it's not, it's another one of the many contradictions in Madhyamaka. Nagarjuna mains that for something to be self-caused and eternal it would have to have own-being or svabhava which he rejects as untenable, ergo everything which doesn't have own-being and which is not self-caused by caused by other causal conditons, ergo when Nagarjuna says that Nirvana and Samsara don't have own-being he is admitting that neither are self-caused but are caused by something else. Any Nirvana that is 'caused' is a limited non-eternal thing which not the true Unconditioned.

>>15003756
>You are making the most basic misreadings of the Emptiness doctrines, it changes everything.
Okay, then using whatever special snowflake definition of emptiness that you prefer, can you give any examples or analogies to support the nonsensical position that emptiness can be the generative cause of anything like samsara, or that it can provide a basis for illusions to inhere in? I have never seen a single one.

>what do you mean by 'examples'?
Can you give me a single reason whatsoever to think that emptiness can cause anything? It completely violates basic logic, common sense, intuition, inference from analogy etc, there is no absolutely reason to accept it as true unless you've lobotomized yourself so badly by reading buddhist philosophy that you would have an identity crisis and mental breakdown if you started to subject it to critical scrutiny

>He employs conventional indian logic in most his works (including his Seventy Verses),
Can you cite any specific argument he gives for Madhyamaka being true using independent logic?

>You don't need a self to account for continuity of the witness
Wrong, all the Buddhist explanations for the continuity are untenable are Shankara pointed out.

>no lol, I've actually addressed this already earlier when you made that absurd 'tiger' argument.
No you didn't, you didn't even address the contradiction in the Tiger problem

>again you're making the argument that every moment 'resets' when it simply isn't the case.
I've addressed this above in the discussion about memory and momentariness, in the Buddhist model the reset is inevitable

>>15003092
>There is no flaws,
Sure, if you want to be in complete denial and ignore as Robinson points out in his paper here >>14994592 >>14994483 >>14994490 that Nagarjuna contradicts himself blatantly such as when he uses contradictory definitions of existence, or when he relies on circular arguments such as when he attack Akasha, or when he lies and says that he doesn't advance empirical propositions not accepted by his opponent by then he does in fact advance these.

No response as usual lol.

>>15004116
Very cringe...you cannot refute that which is irrefutable...PBUH

>>15004116
He took 19 hours to reply last time so if we are lucky we will get one tomorrow morning

>>15004151
*by tomorrow morning

>>14997977
this

bump (pbuh)

bump for interest.... im new to this subject

So is this guy just Vedanta for white people?

>>15005863
No, he also writes about Islam, Christianity, Taoism etc, religious and geometrical symbolism, metaphysics, mathematics, societal critiques etc, he was a polymath genius

>>15005753
welcome brother

Thread is looking quite based today, brothers

So.. based?

>>15007156
Based!

>>15007156
>>15007655
>>15006632
Baaaaaaased!

>>15003724
>It's just basic logic. Instantaneous and non-instantaneous are mutually contradictory categories and they cannot be combined, there is no middle ground between them, this is my argument that I clearly laid out and you have chosen to avoid facing it directly. If you want to claim otherwise than you'll have to substantiate that reasoning, like several other points (such as Shankara's BTFOing of Yogachara) in this back-and-forth you have conceded defeat on them by not providing any argument
They're not combined, you are simply putting up a false dilemma.

>I'm not 'implying constancy', I was making the point that something can either last for a single moment, in which case it would be instantaneous, or it can last longer than that moment, in which case it is non-momentary. These are the only options available. Even if the object sticks around for one nanosecond longer than the "1 moment" it's not instantaneous anymore.
again, you're putting up a false dichotomy. An object can last for as long as it takes the next moment to arise, it doesn't have to be instantaneous or 'lasting 1 ns'.

>The argument that momentariness makes causation impossible is equally as applicable in cases in which the effect is contained in the cause as in the cases when it is not.
No, Buddhists only argue that effects could be steered one way depending on the conditions of the cause. But it is not 'contained' in the cause.

>Buddhists may think that it is a tautology that effects can exist in the cause but that doesn't stop it from being true in everyday life, the constituents of curds already exist in milk, the constituents of paper already exist in trees.
Then you are arguing that physical induction is the criteria of cause being contained in the effect, which is circular reasoning.

>In the 12 steps of dependent origination the effect does not exist in the cause but momentariness still makes it impossible because each step doesn't last long enough to impact or be impacted by the previous/next step. In cases where the effect is contained in the cause such as milk solidifying into curds or cheese momentariness also makes this impossible because if something only lasts instantaneously then nothing (such as curds) can emerge from it as its effect because that emergence is non-momentary and requires a stable basis that doesn't flicker out of existence and get replaced by a new one at every moment.
these have already been answered above

>My point was that they can only affect anything else or be effected in the moment when they exist, but since this is instantaneous there is no time for there to be any sort of interaction or causation between the instantaneous object and anything else which is also momentary and so causation, movement etc become impossible.
It isn't instantaneous

>>15003730
>Already addressed above, in the dependent origination model if the previous link ceases either just before, or when the next one arises there is contradiction and the impossibility of dependent origination continuing in both cases.
again by 'when' you just mean 'just before' dont you

>No I'm not and you haven't shown how the Buddhist model is not contradictory, you are only nit-picking at definitions
this isn't nit picking, perception of constancy within flux doesn't go beyond its perception, you get it now?

>They don't subscribe to this but this is the consequence of momentariness, they don't follow momentariness to its own conclusion because of the contradictions involved. Although they don't want to admit this, the insistence by the doctrine of momentariness that objects are instantaneous and flicker out of existence only to be replaced by another instantaneous one necessarily involves separating time into moment by moment separation because of how each instantaneous instance of object-existence constitutes a moment. They dug themselves into a hole and then try to claim "lol time is just a flux bro" to avoid facing the necessitated division of time into moments by the doctrine of momentariness.
You didn't address the point again and repeated yourself twice now. There is no 1 enduring moment within a flux, a raging river is just water molecules bouncing ferociously into each other in a certain direction. This is an analogy Buddhists would make to demonstrate the absurdity of unitary existence.

>Yes
Ok congratulations you've proved momentary existence correct.

>Can you cite any sentence of any of his works where he writes this?
https://www.swami-krishnananda.org/bs_2/bs_2.1.03.html
I was lead to believe you were the Shankara expert in these places...

>No it's not, you can either admit space to be an eternal reality in which case momentariness is given up, or you can say that space is not an eternal reality but just the negation of covering or emptiness, but this is not correct as space is not pure negation but provides room for the extension of things, not to mention that there are still existent things like gravitational fields even in empty space; whereas we have no indication that pure nothingness is capable of providing this room for extension.
they both mean the same thing, like I said half empty half full

>>15003739
>Because if the wheel of caustation it not eternal then it will end on its own at some point and everyone will liberated regardless which makes Buddhism and spiritual practices in general completely unnecessary for eventual liberation, but no Buddhist will want to admit this as being true.
I don't think Buddhists won't admit that. Causation will last as long as samsara lasts.

>If it's not self-evident then why did you rush to explain why the fluctuation of momentary consciousness doesn't change from moment to moment and is experienced as a continuity here in this post? >>14996164 (You) Even your denial of it presumes it to be true.
read the post again, I didn't say it was a continuity I said that fluctuation doesn't alter its causal functioning to the point where it its causal functions no longer apply. But this again is yet another tangent from you, address the original point that its fallacious to say that unitary awareness is sufficiently proved by experience of unitary awareness.

>This is impossible because the process of recognition of similarity involves multiple moments and thoughts and the flickering out of existence of the aggregates at every moment would not leave enough time for this to take place. There being no stable self admitted but only the aggregates, the mind cannot spring out of non-existent and continue part way through the same train of thought (of recognition) that the previous mind got part way through before dissolving; the interrupted train of thought cannot last being itself momentary, and one mind cannot vacuum up the thoughts of another.
If its impossible for a replication to recognize a bookshelf in the framework of momentary existence, would it be impossible for a replication in the same scenario to recognize a bookshelf in the framework of unitary existence?

>No, but I'm going to call you out every single time you dodge addressing something because you know it's indefensible
peak s󠀀oy

>Not an argument it's still completely nonsensical,
how is it not an argument

>there is absolutely no difference between the non-existence of one object over another, but because of momentariness nothing is admitted which ensures the right objects replace one another, hence there is no reason why the right objects should spring out of existence to replace another as in their source as nothingness they are identical. Also how did nothingness come to be possessed of such magical generative powers?
you've repeated this again, already answered it

>Please do
You're essentially saying tigers should become hippos and hippos should become zebras and zebras should become ants and ants should become lions....

You are really just desperate inching for every possible reason to make your claims true

>>15003743
>Care to cite the exact sentence when he expounds it? I find reading the Pali Canon to be an absolute bore and don't care to read the whole thing right now in search of it.
I've already cited it, its there for you to read.

>Also, what you wrote is contradicted by all the sources I look at, for example on wikipedia:
>This is not the two truths
Like I said he didn't explicate the two truths but he does express it, this was immediately brought up in the second council and was thereupon expanded. Try to actually read books instead of wiki articles.

>I gave you the chance to defend Yogachara's ideas in light of Shankara's complete BTFOing of them and stated that if you didn't defend them it would be the same as implicitly conceding that they are garbage and that Shankara is right. You chose the latter option, I'm glad that you agree with me that there is no good defense against Shankara's eviscerating of Yogachara.
There it is folks, when his arguments fail him he goes back to 'haha you didn't answer I win lol'. Take note people.

>1) nihilism is the position that there is no real meaning to anything
>2) Madhyamaka says that things which are dependent on and conditioned by casual conditions are not completely real
>3) Madhyamaka says there is nothing that it not dependent on casual conditions, and hence there is nothing which is completely/fully/absolutely real
>4) Hence, to Madhyamaka meaning isn't ultimately real, which many people would consider nihilism, and Nirvana does not save this
proposition 2 and 3 are wrong. Madhyamaka identifies reality with what is realized, he doesn't reject them as completely unreal but says they are empty of own being.

>If you don't admit anything which continues but only admit the extinction of all traces of which came before (as Buddhists do), then that is indistinguishable from dissolution into nothingness, and no amount of logical gymnastics can overcome this
Buddhists don't do that.

>>15003756
>I know right? Imagine that people take it seriously, I imagine that the sunk time-cost plays a big role.
Yea bro imagine how seriously Shankara took it before he plagiarized it.

>This is nonsensical because ignorance cannot will itself into existence, there is no explanation given of why avidya exists to begin with, i.e. it's not a real explanation. Furthermore if Avidya is the prior cause of samsara then it is uncaused and then not everything is subject to causal conditions as Madhyamaka maintains.
Avidya isn't a metaphysical entity waiting to be invoked by some absolute. It is simply wrong perception.

>It actually works with Brahman though because Brahman is admitted to be an uncaused eternal entity possessed of the power of generation/maya whereas ignorance is something that pertains to an already extent sentient entity, it's not something that can cause or explain the existence of samsara and that entity.
but how does Brahman cause maya/generation then? Isn't Brahman suppose to be self-luminous intelligence?

>No it's not, it's another one of the many contradictions in Madhyamaka. Nagarjuna mains that for something to be self-caused and eternal it would have to have own-being or svabhava which he rejects as untenable, ergo everything which doesn't have own-being and which is not self-caused by caused by other causal conditons, ergo when Nagarjuna says that Nirvana and Samsara don't have own-being he is admitting that neither are self-caused but are caused by something else. Any Nirvana that is 'caused' is a limited non-eternal thing which not the true Unconditioned.
According to Nagarjuna, emptiness itself is empty. This emptiness being empty, does not imbue any causal efficacy (or lack of) of Nirvana

>>15003771
>Okay, then using whatever special snowflake definition of emptiness that you prefer, can you give any examples or analogies to support the nonsensical position that emptiness can be the generative cause of anything like samsara, or that it can provide a basis for illusions to inhere in? I have never seen a single one.
when did I posit that 'emptiness can be the generative cause of anything'? The point was that you made a rudimentary misunderstanding of Emptiness.

>Can you give me a single reason whatsoever to think that emptiness can cause anything? It completely violates basic logic, common sense, intuition, inference from analogy etc, there is no absolutely reason to accept it as true unless you've lobotomized yourself so badly by reading buddhist philosophy that you would have an identity crisis and mental breakdown if you started to subject it to critical scrutiny
Emptiness is not a 'brahman' of sorts. It does not have independent causal properties and is empty of causation.

>Can you cite any specific argument he gives for Madhyamaka being true using independent logic?
Nagarjuna uses the argument by relativity a lot in the seventy verses to demonstrate how the 2 extremes don't apply and that it is therefore empty.

>Wrong, all the Buddhist explanations for the continuity are untenable are Shankara pointed out.
Shankara was wrong

>No you didn't, you didn't even address the contradiction in the Tiger problem
The 'tiger' problem is absurd as I've demonstrated

>I've addressed this above in the discussion about memory and momentariness, in the Buddhist model the reset is inevitable
this is the first time you uttered and assume that every moment 'resets' (well I figured you did this with the shitty tiger argument but ok)

>Sure, if you want to be in complete denial and ignore as Robinson points out in his paper here >>14994592 >>14994483 >>14994490 that Nagarjuna contradicts himself blatantly such as when he uses contradictory definitions of existence, or when he relies on circular arguments such as when he attack Akasha, or when he lies and says that he doesn't advance empirical propositions not accepted by his opponent by then he does in fact advance these.
Robinson doesn't destroy Nagarjunian logic, he simply didn't agree that prasanga is all encompassong just like he didn't agree that Advaita wasn't inspired by Yogachara.

>>15008223
>>15008234
>>15008239
>>15008246
>>15008252
>>15008313

BASED

based thread bros

>>14994630
based buddhists refuting these heretics

>>15008594
based? yea Im thinking its based

can anyone tell me where I should start with BASED GUENON HAHA HE'S BASED AF but please I need some guidance

>>15008710
Guenon has been refuted in this board, try again

>guenon
woah based....

>>15008721
thats right brother, contemplate on the basity of his holiness....

>>15008710
Try Jojo's Bizarre Adventure pts 1-3


otherwise, read the Upanishads and the Pre-Socratics


or dont fuckin read cuz that shit's for virgin nerds who cant do math or code

>goonon

>>15008729
>that shit's for virgin nerds who cant do math or code
wtf literally me

Brothers....how do we convince these hylics?

is guenonfag the 'Zakir Naik' of traditionalism?

>>15008766
seems like it

>>15008766
at least Naik has that sweet muslima pussy, guenonfag will be lucky to even be within site of female flesh

>>15008824
cringe, dirty hylics are disgusting...

>>15008223
>They're not combined, you are simply putting up a false dilemma.
That's not true, if an object exists it can either be instantaneous or non-instantaneous, the latter option including all other variations such as lasting an hour, a day or for eternity. If an object exists then it has to fall under one of these two categories without exception. If you want to allege that there is some special 3rd category which nobody else has ever heard of but which you miraculously know about then you'll have to provide proof for it, simply saying "blah blah false dilemma" is the same as admitting you don't have an argument. The inability of you to explain what quasi-instantaneous is and how this resolves the contradiction I've pointed out is the result of a conceptual failure on your behalf that results from trying to square the circle of the incoherent nature of the doctrine of momentariness.

>An object can last for as long as it takes the next moment to arise, it doesn't have to be instantaneous or 'lasting 1 ns'.
The doctrine of momentariness itself says that objects only last for single moment. If that "lasting long enough" encompasses multiple moments it's no longer momentary, if you don't want to defend momentariness anymore then say so but don't pretend it's something that it's not.

>hen you are arguing that physical induction is the criteria of cause being contained in the effect, which is circular reasoning
I'm not arguing that all causes are contained in their effects, I was pointing out that some obviously are, if we identity "curds" as an effect produced by the cause of milk, insofar as those constituents of the curds already inhered in the effect, it allows us to say to in this case and similars ones that the cause is contained in the effect. I see nothing circular about this.

>It isn't instantaneous
That's wrong according to the sources which I have looked at, for example:

"Its fundamental proposition is that everything passes out of existence as soon as it has originated and in this sense is momentary."

https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/momentariness-buddhist-doctrine-of/v-1

to say that something passes out of existence as soon as it has originated is to say that it is instantaneous

>>15008837
>>15008234
>again by 'when' you just mean 'just before' dont you
No, I'm not, in both cases of 'when' and 'just before' it results in contradictions of a similar nature, in either case movement and causality become impossible.
>perception of constancy within flux doesn't go beyond its perception
That very perception of constancy is impossible without the self, which Buddhists deny the existence of, momentary object-consciousnesses and momentary thoughts cannot perceive anything to be constant, which would require them to be non-momentary to observe that constant nature as constant is not a trait which can observed in a single moment.

>You didn't address the point again and repeated yourself twice now. There is no 1 enduring moment within a flux,
Yes, YOU don't conceive it to be this way, however, the doctrine of momentariness states that objects pass out of existence as soon as they have originated. This instance of the object existing before it vanished away to magical Buddhist land where all the old objects go in itself becomes an 'object-moment', in such a doctrine time becomes a series of 'instance-moments' one after another. Even if there is an underlying flux or 'river' of time in between the instance moments which continues, this doesn't save momentariness from contradiction as it is the very occurrence of these 'instance-moments' of objects (which is the inevitable result of the doctrine of momentariness) which results in contradictions, even if they are taking place within a larger flux of time that isn't composed of such moments.

>Ok congratulations you've proved momentary existence correct.
Wrong, just because an object has to exist in the moment to have casual efficiency *at that specific moment* doesn't mean that the object didn't exist before or after that moment, nowhere did you offer any justification for that retarded leap of logic.

>https://www.swami-krishnananda.org/bs_2/bs_2.1.03.html
>I was lead to believe you were the Shankara expert in these places...
This is wrong on so many levels, first off, that webpage is a greatly summarized version of his commentary, the commentary there is like 1 paragraph and in my unabridged translation of that passage his commentary is a full 3 and a half pages of text. Secondly, that Sutra is explaining the objection of someone else and in his commentary Shankara is explaining their objections i.e. he is not actually agreeing with what is written there but it's the voice of his opponent. Thirdly Shankara subscribes to the Vivartavada causation theory and not the Parinamavada (transformation) where in the latter theory creation is to Brahman as curds to milk, the only times when Shankara says that produced effects are already contained in the cause is only in certain cases when talking about transformations of one mundane object into another, i.e. milk into curds or earth into pots.

>>15008844
>they both mean the same thing,
No that's wrong as I explained already the difference between pure nothingness and empty space is that the latter provides room for extension and still contains things like gravitational fields whereas the former doesn't, in order to avoid admitting there is a contradiction in the Buddhist doctrine you are forced to argue that there is no difference between the two, but as I have just explained for the second time this is not true and there are differences separating them.

>>15008239
>I don't think Buddhists won't admit that.
So you are admitting that samsara is temporary and that hence the Buddhist path isn't needed whatsoever for liberation? Would you ever have admitted that if I didn't point out the contradiction that resulted from not admitting that? Has any important Buddhist thinker ever condoned such a position?

>address the original point that its fallacious to say that unitary awareness is sufficiently proved by experience of unitary awareness.
What else would it be proved by? lmao. The stupidity of your statement can be revealed by switching it to: "it's fallacious to say that being a human being is proved by the experience of being a human being" or "it's fallacious to say that being underwater is proved by the experience of being underwater"

>would it be impossible for a replication in the same scenario to recognize a bookshelf in the framework of unitary existence?
Not in the momentariness model where the previous object vanishes to Neverland, because the same issue applies of the train of thought of recognition being interrupted by momentariness, but the question is a non-starter anyway because a replication wouldn't even have a framework of unitary existence because the very act of being replicated interrupts this.

>>15008847
>already answered it
No you didn't lol, all you did was call it retarded and say "do I really need to explain why this is wrong" to which I replied "please do", you still never explained why a tiger should replace a tiger when before it emerges when it's nothingness it's identical with the non-existence of a horse, hippo etc. Momentariness doesn't allow for anything to last which ensures the right object replace one another. Also nothingness cannot create anything much less tigers and hippos and bears. My argument here is not predicated on the notion that "nothingness implies all potentiality or that nothingness is a chaotic property." Those are strawman words which you chose to insert into my mouth and which I never used. My point which is completely separate from that is that nothingness is nothingness in all cases, ergo the nothingness or non-existence of any one object or being is identical with the non-existence of any other object, hence there is no trace, guide or controller to ensure that the right objects replace one another, it's not that this makes nothingness chaotic, but rather there are no remaining traces whatsoever upon which the proper replacement can be reconstituted and so there is no reason why this should take place (and this is not even to go into the retarded idea that nothingness can create things ex-nihlio)
>>15008246

>Like I said he didn't explicate the two truths but he does express it,
Yes, he never taught the two truths but something different and the 2nd council in 383 BC chose to read the two truths into this, most likely after the date of composition of the Mundaka Upanishad which provided this idea that they then read into the Pali Canon.

>peak onions
lol, there is nothing more onions than Buddhism dude, why do you think it had the reputation it does? why was it adopted by a bunch of leftist fags?

>There it is folks, when his arguments fail him he goes back to 'haha you didn't answer I win lol'. Take note people.
As I have stated, the Yogachara complete denial of external objects if completely retarded, and Shankara rightfully BTFOs them for this nonsense. I have already explained the logic behind why it is wrong, when you refuse to provide any defense of Yogachara but keep writing snide comments it just makes you look bad.

>proposition 2 and 3 are wrong
Okay then I didn't know, I was just arguing 2 days ago with a Buddhist who said that Madhyamaka taught those things and I took him at his word

>Buddhists don't do that.
They don't say that there is nothing that continues? then pray tell me, just what does Madhyamaka admit continues in Nirvana after the death of the body? Saying *beep* *boop* *error* *we don't say anything about Nirvana it's beyond description* *beep* *boop* has the same consequences as not admitting the continuance of anything

>>15008854
>>15008252
>Avidya isn't a metaphysical entity waiting to be invoked by some absolute. It is simply wrong perception.
and hence it cannot be the cause of samsara because only conscious entities have perception or wrong perception and to say that it is the cause of samsara is to say it is the cause of those very entities that it can't exist before or outside of, i.e. it's circular and doesn't work.

>but how does Brahman cause maya/generation then? Isn't Brahman suppose to be self-luminous intelligence?
Advaita says that maya is the sakti or power of the conscious entity that is Brahman and that it is the svabhava or self-nature of Brahman to always be utilizing, expressing or wielding its power of maya, this faces none of the contradictions that the various Buddhist models present

>This emptiness being empty, does not imbue any causal efficacy (or lack of) of Nirvana
So, if Nirvana does not receive any causal efficiency from anything else then that means it is self-caused or uncaused (which are synonymous), which Nagarjuna maintains can't happen. To me, this looks like yet another contradiction.

>>15008313
>when did I posit that 'emptiness can be the generative cause of anything'?
I have seen other Buddhists say samsara is caused by emptiness and I assumed you also shared this view. That point aside, the idea of emptiness being able to be the substratum or basis of illusions/samsara is still inherently illogical and without any justification or support.

>Nagarjuna uses the argument by relativity a lot in the seventy verses to demonstrate how the 2 extremes don't apply and that it is therefore empty.
care to repeat just 1?

>The 'tiger' problem is absurd as I've demonstrated
No actually you never addressed it you instead attacked a strawman version of my point that avoided addressing the fundamental contradiction I pointed out

>Robinson doesn't destroy Nagarjunian logic, he simply didn't agree that prasanga is all encompassing
I'm not saying that Robinson proves the non-validity of every single instance of logic ever used in every work ever by Nagarjuna, but the MMK clearly seems to have been meant to be taken together as a work which is supposed to be all-encompassing and as Robinson clearly shows it's not, but if it's not all-encompassing then suddenly all views don't lead to antinomianism and contradiction anymore and then suddenly one of the central claims of Madhyamaka is completely without any basis.

based thread bros, we have done it again!

>>15009228
based.......

>>15008837
>That's not true, if an object exists it can either be instantaneous or non-instantaneous,
prove this is the case, otherwise you are just saying 'it is so' and committing a fallacy.

>The doctrine of momentariness itself says that objects only last for single moment. If that "lasting long enough" encompasses multiple moments it's no longer momentary, if you don't want to defend momentariness anymore then say so but don't pretend it's something that it's not.
Yes, objects last for a moment then it ceases once the next moment arises.

>I'm not arguing that all causes are contained in their effects, I was pointing out that some obviously are, if we identity "curds" as an effect produced by the cause of milk, insofar as those constituents of the curds already inhered in the effect, it allows us to say to in this case and similars ones that the cause is contained in the effect. I see nothing circular about this.
It's circular reasoning because you infer causality by causality itself.

>That's wrong according to the sources which I have looked at, for example: "Its fundamental proposition is that everything passes out of existence as soon as it has originated and in this sense is momentary."
nothing in that link mentions it being instantaneous, but even if it does it is not the position of the atomist schools of buddhism anyway.

>>15008844
>No, I'm not, in both cases of 'when' and 'just before' it results in contradictions of a similar nature, in either case movement and causality become impossible.
ok but just clarify what you mean by 'when' because on one hand you make it seem like its before but on the other hand you make it seem like its 'during' aka simultaneous

>That very perception of constancy is impossible without the self, which Buddhists deny the existence of, momentary object-consciousnesses and momentary thoughts cannot perceive anything to be constant, which would require them to be non-momentary to observe that constant nature as constant is not a trait which can observed in a single moment.
This is false, illusion of constancy is just that, an illusion. This is another illogical inching-for-arguments to say that constancy is only apparent in a unitary framework when it clearly isn't the case since we see a thunder bolt as something solid when its just a discharge of electrons.

>Yes, YOU don't conceive it to be this way, however, the doctrine of momentariness states that objects pass out of existence as soon as they have originated. This instance of the object existing........................
you're going off on a tangent again, tell me how a gush of hydrogen-oxygen molecules gives rise to a unitary waterfall.

>Wrong, just because an object has to exist in the moment to have casual efficiency *at that specific moment* doesn't mean that the object didn't exist before or after that moment, nowhere did you offer any justification for that retarded leap of logic.
why is a leap of logic? didn't you just make the point that milk becomes curds etc? Otherwise you are basically positing that things exist for ALL time and have causal efficiency for ALL time, that's even more retarded.

>This is wrong on so many levels, first off, that webpage is a greatly summarized version of his commentary, the commentary there is like 1 paragraph and in my unabridged translation of that passage his commentary is a full 3 and a half pages of text. Secondly, that Sutra is explaining the objection of someone else and in his commentary Shankara is explaining their objections i.e. he is not actually agreeing with what is written there but it's the voice of his opponent.
ok would you mind posting the unabridged translation then? So far you have kept asking me for 'muh source please cite this please tell me where please feed me the information!!!', you could actually do your own due diligence for once.

>Thirdly Shankara subscribes to the Vivartavada causation theory and not the Parinamavada (transformation) where in the latter theory creation is to Brahman as curds to milk, the only times when Shankara says that produced effects are already contained in the cause is only in certain cases when talking about transformations of one mundane object into another, i.e. milk into curds or earth into pots.
Scholars disagree with Shankara's alleged Vivartavada btw

>>15008847
>No that's wrong as I explained already the difference between pure nothingness and empty space is that the latter provides room for extension and still contains things like gravitational fields whereas the former doesn't, in order to avoid admitting there is a contradiction in the Buddhist doctrine you are forced to argue that there is no difference between the two, but as I have just explained for the second time this is not true and there are differences separating them.
They're expressions of the same thing, an eternal space (which is essentially the same as an infinite space if you believe in extension) is philosophically an approximation of pure nothingness.

>So you are admitting that samsara is temporary and that hence the Buddhist path isn't needed whatsoever for liberation? Would you ever have admitted that if I didn't point out the contradiction that resulted from not admitting that? Has any important Buddhist thinker ever condoned such a position?
Samsara will exist as long as avidya exists, whether its infinite or temporary is not known and beside the point, which is that causality doesn't necessarily remain permanent when permanence is negated.

>What else would it be proved by? lmao.
not by itself 'lmao', you keep insisting that inductive arguments are just axioms

>The stupidity of your statement can be revealed by switching it to: "it's fallacious to say that being a human being is proved by the experience of being a human being" or "it's fallacious to say that being underwater is proved by the experience of being underwater"
Yes, those are all fallacious, the conclusion is contained in the premise. Why is that so hard to understand?

>Not in the momentariness model where the previous object vanishes to Neverland, because the same issue applies of the train of thought of recognition being interrupted by momentariness, but the question is a non-starter anyway because a replication wouldn't even have a framework of unitary existence because the very act of being replicated interrupts this.
Yes but would a clone of someone recognized the bookshelf in the situation if unitary existence were true?

>>15008854
>No you didn't lol, all you did was call it retarded and say "do I really need to explain why this is wrong" to which I replied "please do"
go and read it again, I was expressing my bafflement at such a retarded proposition in that instance but I did answer your question, not my fault you were confused or unsatisfied with it.

>Those are strawman words which you chose to insert into my mouth and which I never used
I was answering your silly argument that cats should turn into dogs under momentariness,

>My point which is completely separate from that is that nothingness is nothingness in all cases, ergo the nothingness or non-existence of any one object or being is identical with the non-existence of any other object, hence there is no trace, guide or controller to ensure that the right objects replace one another, it's not that this makes nothingness chaotic, but rather there are no remaining traces whatsoever upon which the proper replacement can be reconstituted and so there is no reason why this should take place (and this is not even to go into the retarded idea that nothingness can create things ex-nihlio)
What you are saying is that there is no ordered progression of moments or that at least there is no underlying mechanism as to why they should trace things outs. This is the same as saying flux doesn't have potentiality ergo momentariness bears a chaotic property. You can deny this all you want but you are just making an unsubstantiated statement that reduces to an absurd notion 'that tigers can't become tigers at the next moment'.

>Yes, he never taught the two truths but something different
No, its implicit but it is the same thing.

>and the 2nd council in 383 BC chose to read the two truths into this, most likely after the date of composition of the Mundaka Upanishad which provided this idea that they then read into the Pali Canon.
There is no evidence Mundaka was composed before the 2nd council. The Mundaka itself is difficult to estimate though it's a rather late upanishad and probably post-Buddhist according to scholars (who estimate that the date for late upanishads falls around 300-200 BC). This coupled by the fact that Mundaka shows signs of Buddhist influence where other upanishads don't and the fact that the Mahasamghikas of 2nd counil were already the defacto orthodox group who professed 2 truths doctrine, gives credence to the theory that Mundaka was a post-2-truths-doctrine upanishads.

>lol, there is nothing more onions than Buddhism dude, why do you think it had the reputation it does? why was it adopted by a bunch of leftist fags?
says the 'western hindu'.

>>15008854
>They don't say that there is nothing that continues?
They don't even affirm than anything either continues or stops, or both continues and stops, or both neither continues nor stops. That is the nature of Nirvana.

>then pray tell me, just what does Madhyamaka admit continues in Nirvana after the death of the body? Saying *beep* *boop* *error* *we don't say anything about Nirvana it's beyond description* *beep* *boop* has the same consequences as not admitting the continuance of anything
Why do you keep making this fallacy of 'if you don't admit this, then by default it is true'. You are simply making a fool of yourself. Notice that I don't come up with cartoonish retorts like 'hahaha

Here I'll give you a direct quote from the Suttas that address this (think of yourself as Vachagotta the wanderer):

I have heard that on one occasion the Blessed One was staying in Savatthi, at Jeta's Grove, Anathapindika's monastery. Then the wanderer Vacchagotta went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, exchanged courteous greetings with him. After an exchange of friendly greetings & courtesies, he sat to one side. As he was sitting there he asked the Blessed One: "How is it, Master Gotama, does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The cosmos is eternal: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The cosmos is not eternal: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The cosmos is finite: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The cosmos is infinite: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The soul & the body are the same: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'The soul is one thing and the body another: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'After death a Tathagata exists: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'After death a Tathagata does not exist: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"Then does Master Gotama hold the view: 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless'?"
"...no..."
"How is it, Master Gotama, when Master Gotama is asked if he holds the view 'the cosmos is eternal...'... 'after death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist: only this is true, anything otherwise is worthless,' he says '...no...' in each case. Seeing what drawback, then, is Master Gotama thus entirely dissociated from each of these ten positions?"

>>15009323
"Vaccha, the position that 'the cosmos is eternal' is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. It is accompanied by suffering, distress, despair, & fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding.
"The position that 'the cosmos is not eternal'...
"...'the cosmos is finite'...
"...'the cosmos is infinite'...
"...'the soul & the body are the same'...
"...'the soul is one thing and the body another'...
"...'after death a Tathagata exists'...
"...'after death a Tathagata does not exist'...
"...'after death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist'...
"...'after death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist'... does not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation; to calm, direct knowledge, full Awakening, Unbinding."
"Does Master Gotama have any position at all?"
"A 'position,' Vaccha, is something that a Tathagata has done away with. What a Tathagata sees is this: 'Such is form, such its origination, such its disappearance; such is feeling, such its origination, such its disappearance; such is perception...such are fabrications...such is consciousness, such its origination, such its disappearance.' Because of this, I say, a Tathagata — with the ending, fading away, cessation, renunciation, & relinquishment of all construings, all excogitations, all I-making & mine-making & obsessions with conceit — is, through lack of clinging/sustenance, released."
"But, Master Gotama, the monk whose mind is thus released: Where does he reappear?"
"'Reappear,' Vaccha, doesn't apply."
"In that case, Master Gotama, he does not reappear."
"'Does not reappear,' Vaccha, doesn't apply."
"...both does & does not reappear."
"...doesn't apply."
"...neither does nor does not reappear."
"...doesn't apply."
"How is it, Master Gotama, when Master Gotama is asked if the monk reappears... does not reappear... both does & does not reappear... neither does nor does not reappear, he says, '...doesn't apply' in each case. At this point, Master Gotama, I am befuddled; at this point, confused. The modicum of clarity coming to me from your earlier conversation is now obscured."

>>15009330
"Of course you're befuddled, Vaccha. Of course you're confused. Deep, Vaccha, is this phenomenon, hard to see, hard to realize, tranquil, refined, beyond the scope of conjecture, subtle, to-be-experienced by the wise. For those with other views, other practices, other satisfactions, other aims, other teachers, it is difficult to know. That being the case, I will now put some questions to you. Answer as you see fit. What do you think, Vaccha: If a fire were burning in front of you, would you know that, 'This fire is burning in front of me'?"
"...yes..."
"And suppose someone were to ask you, Vaccha, 'This fire burning in front of you, dependent on what is it burning?' Thus asked, how would you reply?"
"...I would reply, 'This fire burning in front of me is burning dependent on grass & timber as its sustenance.'"
"If the fire burning in front of you were to go out, would you know that, 'This fire burning in front of me has gone out'?"
"...yes..."
"And suppose someone were to ask you, 'This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction from here has it gone? East? West? North? Or south?' Thus asked, how would you reply?"
"That doesn't apply, Master Gotama. Any fire burning dependent on a sustenance of grass and timber, being unnourished — from having consumed that sustenance and not being offered any other — is classified simply as 'out' (unbound)."

>>15009333
"Even so, Vaccha, any physical form by which one describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. Freed from the classification of form, Vaccha, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, hard to fathom, like the sea. 'Reappears' doesn't apply. 'Does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Both does & does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Neither reappears nor does not reappear' doesn't apply.
"Any feeling... Any perception... Any fabrication...
"Any consciousness by which one describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. Freed from the classification of consciousness, Vaccha, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, hard to fathom, like the sea. 'Reappears' doesn't apply. 'Does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Both does & does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Neither reappears nor does not reappear' doesn't apply."
When this was said, the wanderer Vacchagotta said to the Blessed One: "Master Gotama, it is as if there were a great sala tree not far from a village or town: From inconstancy, its branches and leaves would wear away, its bark would wear away, its sapwood would wear away, so that on a later occasion — divested of branches, leaves, bark, & sapwood — it would stand as pure heartwood. In the same way, Master Gotama's words are divested of branches, leaves, bark, & sapwood and stand as pure heartwood.
"Magnificent, Master Gotama! Magnificent! Just as if he were to place upright what was overturned, to reveal what was hidden, to show the way to one who was lost, or were to carry a lamp into the dark so that those with eyes could see forms, in the same way has Master Gotama — through many lines of reasoning — made the Dhamma clear. I go to Master Gotama for refuge, to the Dhamma, and to the Sangha of monks. May Master Gotama remember me as a lay follower who has gone to him for refuge, from this day forward, for life."

>>15008861
>and hence it cannot be the cause of samsara because only conscious entities have perception or wrong perception and to say that it is the cause of samsara is to say it is the cause of those very entities that it can't exist before or outside of, i.e. it's circular and doesn't work.
wrong perception is not same as 'perception'. It is just like watching an illusion and thinking it is the case, this illusion fuels ignorance, which fuels fabrications which fuels craving etc... which ultimately fuels rebirth and therefore samsara.

>Advaita says that maya is the sakti or power of the conscious entity that is Brahman and that it is the svabhava or self-nature of Brahman to always be utilizing, expressing or wielding its power of maya, this faces none of the contradictions that the various Buddhist models present
so it basically just 'God did it'. Instead of God, its Brahman. Brahman just has these magical powers to create illusions. Wow very logical and totally not filled with holes....

>So, if Nirvana does not receive any causal efficiency from anything else then that means it is self-caused or uncaused (which are synonymous), which Nagarjuna maintains can't happen. To me, this looks like yet another contradiction.
Nirvana cannot be classified as either self caused or uncased, or both self caused and uncaused.

>No actually you never addressed it you instead attacked a strawman version of my point that avoided addressing the fundamental contradiction I pointed out
It isn't a strawman, go and actually engage instead of scurrying from the argument because you made a silly point.

>I'm not saying that Robinson proves the non-validity of every single instance of logic ever used in every work ever by Nagarjuna, but the MMK clearly seems to have been meant to be taken together as a work which is supposed to be all-encompassing and as Robinson clearly shows it's not, but if it's not all-encompassing then suddenly all views don't lead to antinomianism and contradiction anymore and then suddenly one of the central claims of Madhyamaka is completely without any basis.
Clearly Robinson (omph) didn't agree with your sentiment, as I've shown.

>>15009240
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>>15009265
>>15009323
>>15009330
>>15009333
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