Why isn't Kant right?

[Anonymous No.14714259]

I'm interested in criticisms against his Epistemology and Metaphysics. I just finished the Prolegomena, and his philosophy seems the most reasonable one so far.

Why isn't everyone a Kantian?

[Anonymous No.14714300]

>>14714259
Schopenhauer

[Anonymous No.14714308]

Nick land refuted him

[Anonymous No.14714313]

>>14714300
Schopenhauer is still a Kantian though. I'm interested to know why other philosophers reject his framework altogether.

[Anonymous No.14714318]

>>14714308
>a kantian refuted kant

[Anonymous No.14714325]

Just read Perpetual Peace.

[Anonymous No.14714330]

>>14714313
Most of what he says makes no sense. The transcendental aesthetic is the part that can't be dismantled.

[Anonymous No.14714352]

>>14714318
At least read the intro to FN

[Anonymous No.14714363]

>>14714259
Kant was BTFO by Guénon (pbuh) and Hindu metaphysics

Kant claimed that it wasn't possible for humans to have intellectual intuition because he couldn't think of how it was possible (Guenon (pbuh) succinctly flays Kant in 'Intro to Hindu Doctines' for wishing to impose the limits of his own ignorance upon others and for wishing to impotently substitute a 'theory of knowledge' for Knowledge itself). The supreme irony is that Kant himself in his first critique admitted that God would have to have intellectual intuition because otherwise He would be subject to limits which could not be true as any true supreme God is unlimited. As the Upanishads state that God is really the inner Self of all beings it provides the explanation in accordance with Kant's thought for how they can experience intellectual intuition (i.e. it's really God inside their consciousness who has this intuition) but because Kant never left Konigsberg he never had the chance to be initiated into the metaphysical teachings and associated spiritual practices which allow someone to do this.

[Anonymous No.14714395]

>>14714352
why?

[Anonymous No.14714433]

>>14714363
Based

[Anonymous No.14715128]

>>14714259
He's an idealist (albeit a moderate one), and despite all the hype he failed to certainly establish the existence of universals — without which idealist-type claims (e.g. categorical imperative) fall flat.

Of course, nearly all philosanons around here are cock-smoking idealists (or worse, mysticists) of one stripe or another, so most criticisms offered itt will only amount to axiomatic circle jerking.


The thing is, we don't need saving from the problem of induction. Pragmatically speaking, it's not much of a problem... We don't require 'perfect' knowledge for human endeavours. Outside of an extremely scant set of apodictic truths, we must accept that most knowledge is -technically- provisional. Get over it.

[Anonymous No.14715165]

>>14714259
Garve/Feder is the first serious critical review. See "Kant's Early Critics: The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy".

[Anonymous No.14715209]

>>14715128
If you pretend to know something at least include theory written after 1900

[Anonymous No.14715237]

>>14715209
If you pretend to know something at least include an argument.

[Anonymous No.14715248]

Metaphysics: Spinoza, Deleuze, etc.
Epistemology: I think Nietzsche and Heidegger can be seen as the first big deviation, but of course, psycho-analysis...

In philosophy, often you don't get a big, direct refutation - just later thinkers who accepted or changed previous ideas for many different reasons.

[Anonymous No.14715260]

>>14715209
If you pretend to know something at least

[Anonymous No.14715265]

>>14715128
>Pragmatically speaking
kek

[Anonymous No.14715278]

Honestly this thread makes me suspect Kant was right all along.

[Anonymous No.14715611]

>>14714259
Read Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Hanna goes into detail on why analytic philosophers rejected Kant's philosophy and argues that this rejection was based on a misinterpretation of Kant. Moore thought that Kant's theory of judgment was too psychologistic. Frege & Carnap had different ideas on what constitutes an analytic/synthetic judgment, but both thought Kant got it wrong. Their ideas on analyticity and syntheticity eliminates the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. Quine rejected the analytic/synthetic distinctions all together. Many philosophers also thought that Kant's idealism was problematic, especially the concept of things-in-themselves. One problem is how things-in-themselves "cause" phenomenal representations when causality is a relational category that has no objective validity outside phenomena.

Give it a read if you want more details.

[Anonymous No.14715663]

>>14715611
Finally a good post! Thank you. Going to get that book.

[Anonymous No.14716086]

>>14715611
Causality is not just a relational category. The fact that there is anything to experience at all necessarily means there is a concrete continuity between objective reality and experience. Even if it is the case that this continuity works in ways alien to our intuition, it is still causality.

[Anonymous No.14716094]

>>14714363
Upanishads are shit

[Anonymous No.14716097]

>>14716086
on your way to breaking the spell

[Anonymous No.14716293]

>>14714259
Kant thinks that when you take a book and you turn it around to see its back, what actually happens is that first it pops in your mind the image of a book's cover, followed by the image of a book's back, which tricks you into thinking that there is actually a book in front of you. In fact your body, your room, and the sun outside your window don't exist either, it's just a series of mental images arranged in such a way that gives the illusion of such things. Now if someone thinks that this cannot be Kant's position and that I am somehow strawmaning him, he is very much mistaken and he failed to understand the consequences of construing space as a principle of the understanding rather than a feature of a mind independent world.
Bottom line is, can Kant explain why do we have all these mental images arranged in a certain way as to produce the illusion of so many things? Was Descartes right about the mischievous demon deceiving us all along?
I will also make a second point. Kant says that his system refutes many grandiose ambitions of older metaphysical systems, but in fact his own philosophy gives ground for the belief in the immortality of the soul. The main reason people believe that our conscious experience ceases to exist after the destruction of the body is because they think that the mind is causally produced by the brain. But on Kant's account, this idea is altogether mistaken. The brain doesn't actually exist, what exists is a series of images inside the mind that create the illusion of a brain. Hence, "the destruction of the body" is just a series of images inside your mind being replaced with another. (Keep in mind that I don't present this as an argument for the immortality of the soul, but rather as a reductio ad absurdum of his position).
Of course in order to refute Kant completely I would have to attack his arguments behind his "formal idealism" (his term), but bringing attention to some implausible consequences of his system may serve to weaken the conviction of it being "the most reasonable one so far".

[Anonymous No.14716336]

Immy only set the groundwokrs for Metaphysics. The german Idealists finished Metaphysics.

[Anonymous No.14716366]

The fundamental breaking point of Kantian epistemology is the question of the epistemic value of the senses.

Kant attempted to reconcile the empiricists with the rationalists, that is, those who believed that truth came from the systematic study of observation with those who believed truth came from intrinsic structures of reason, intuition, and concept.
Many later scientific results support Kant; special relativity greatly support's Kant's assertion that space and time are cognitive constructs and sensory modalities, rather than strict physical attributes.

If for instance the faster I approach the speed of light the slower in time objects far from the speed of light behave, then what then is the concept of time? To both me and those left behind the subjective experience of time is the same, moments pass as moments pass. And yet centuries can pass in moments for myself, while those I left behind remain in the same slow slice of time as ever.

Here then the reality of time (or this higher dimension of speed or whatever it is) is directly confronted with the illusion of time as the mind constructs it.

At this point it is almost impossible to refute Kan'ts claims that the mind projects it own interpretive structures on objective reality. Science itself, which Kant viewed only as a portion of knowledge, is itself reaching this conclusion.

[Anonymous No.14716374]

>>14716293
OP here. Admittedly I'm not the most educated person I'm Kant, but there are some things in your post that I believe should be addressed.
>Kant thinks that when you take a book and you turn it around to see its back, what actually happens is that first it pops in your mind the image of a book's cover, followed by the image of a book's back, which tricks you into thinking that there is actually a book in front of you. In fact your body, your room, and the sun outside your window don't exist either, it's just a series of mental images arranged in such a way that gives the illusion of such things.
This part not only I don't find disconcerting, rather I find it enlightening. This is the part I most enjoyed in his thought. Philosophy is meant to change our views, not to confirm our previous beliefs (or else there wouldn't be any point to it).
>Bottom line is, can Kant explain why do we have all these mental images arranged in a certain way as to produce the illusion of so many things? Was Descartes right about the mischievous demon deceiving us all along?
But isn't this a transcendental question? Transcendental questions can't be answered since the answer lies outside of experience.
>The main reason people believe that our conscious experience ceases to exist after the destruction of the body is because they think that the mind is causally produced by the brain. But on Kant's account, this idea is altogether mistaken. The brain doesn't actually exist, what exists is a series of images inside the mind that create the illusion of a brain.
On this part I believe you've misinterpreted Kant, and you're doing him an injustice to suppose according to him external world isn't real.
Of course, the appearance is dependent on our minds and modes of intuition, and therefore it couldn't represent thing-in-it-self as it is, but Kant says experience is all we have (internal or external makes no difference) and so we have no reason to doubt it's reality.
> but in fact his own philosophy gives ground for the belief in the immortality of the soul
Since experience is all we have, we can know only of the time from birth to death, since anything before or after is not contained in experience, so we have no ground to assume life after death exists.

It might be interesting for you to know that all of your issues with him were directly mentioned in Prolegomena. Dare I say, he had retroactively refuted you.

[Anonymous No.14716366,1]

>>14716293
I'm sure there are exegetical accounts that view Kant as a phenomenalist, but I don't think it's true. Kant is not an empirical idealist, he's an empirical realist who believes that there is a reality out there that generates experience, but that there is no access to this reality except through experience, and that experience constituted by subjective conditions (a priori intuitions & concepts).

Kant does not think that space is a principle of the understanding, but a pure form of sensibility. He thinks that without the pure intuition of space, you would not be able to represent spatial relations.

Honestly, I think you're confused about Kant.

[Anonymous No.14716385]

>>14716366
Nice to know that modern physics affirms Kant.

[Anonymous No.14716601]

>>14716374
>On this part I believe you've misinterpreted Kant, and you're doing him an injustice to suppose according to him external world isn't real. Of course, the appearance is dependent on our minds and modes of intuition, and therefore it couldn't represent thing-in-it-self as it is, but Kant says experience is all we have (internal or external makes no difference) and so we have no reason to doubt it's reality.
Then as I expected you don't understand Kant at all. Kant absolutely denies that the (observable) external world exists, the only thing outside our minds that he affirms its reality is the mysterious thing in itself, of which we have no knowledge. Trees, mountains, houses, brains, solar systems etc. are all illusions. I don't know how to explain it to you if you haven't figured it out yourself from what Kant says. When I turn the book I have in my hand, what actually happens is that a series of book-images, as if photographed from various angles pass inside my mind, giving the impression that there is actually a book out there. But this impression doesn't correspond to anything external, it's all in the mind.
>But isn't this a transcendental question? Transcendental questions can't be answered since the answer lies outside of experience.
It doesn't matter, the point is that according to Kant we have a stream of experiences fed to us arranged in a way that tricks us into thinking the physical world is real. That naturally raises the question of who or what is orchestrating all of this. Of course, on the alternative hypothesis that the physical world is real there is no mysterious conspiracy to explain, hence it holds more explanatory power (that is, it better explains our experiences by virtue of not creating additional enigmas).
>Since experience is all we have, we can know only of the time from birth to death, since anything before or after is not contained in experience, so we have no ground to assume life after death exists.
You have no experience of your consciousness existing tomorrow, or after 10 seconds from now for that matter, yet you don't tremble in fear that you are going to pop out of existence any minute now, right? If Kant's system is right, it is completely arbitrary to think your consciousness will continue to exist tomorrow but it will stop after your body deceases. That is because on Kantianism consciousness is not caused by the brain. In fact the brain isn't even real. There are only body-images inside your mind arranged in such a way as to trick you into thinking there is a body out there, much like a painting of a forest creates the illusion of a forest in the eye, even though it's just marks of paint arranged in a certain way. If you think your mind will continue to exist tomorrow, there is no additional reason to think something may change after death. If you are a Kantian, that is. If you think the physical brain exists, and it causes all of your conscious experiences, things become very different indeed.

[Anonymous No.14716992]

>>14714363
So brainlet Guenon didn't read Kant and equivocates 'intuition'. It's always fun to win arguments by letting the other guy just talk. Self refuter Guenon really highlights the dangers of Freemason-favor printing presses. I guess even that didn't keep him out of the trashbin of history. Squeeking by with Disraeli on archive.org.

[Anonymous No.14717015]

>>14715128
Cringe youtube-intro-to-phil tier. Posers are the worst lol.

>>14715611
First helpful post, thanks

>>14716293
Haha "I can't undesterstand Kant therefore bad". He set the limits to what we can logically know, doofus.

[Anonymous No.14717031]

>>14715611
Things in themselves don't "cause" anything, the principle of sufficient reason is a priori necessitating our understanding to put perceived causes with perceived effects

[Anonymous No.14717208]

>>14716293
I'm sure there are exegetical accounts that interpret Kant as a phenomenalist, but I don't think it's true. Kant is not an empirical idealist, but an empirical realist who believes that there is a reality out there that generates experience, but that there is no access to this reality except through experience, and that this experience is constituted by subjective conditions (a priori intuitions & concepts).

Kant does not think that space is a principle of the understanding, but a pure form of sensibility. He thinks that without the pure intuition of space, you would not be able to represent spatial relations. The same thing with time.

I think you're kinda confused about Kant.

[Anonymous No.14717272]

>>14717031
Then how are there appearances in the first place? Either things-in-themselves generate appearances or appearances generate themselves. Kant thought the latter was absurd. Though there are probably relational theories of perception/affection that allows Kant to escape this dilemma, like the one Lucy Allais presents.

[Anonymous No.14717293]

>>14716601
There is a reason why Kant wrote the Refutation of Idealism in the B edition. He didn't want to be understood as a phenomenalist like Berkeley or Descartes. He described himself as an empirical realist and thought it was consistent with his transcendental idealism.

[Anonymous No.14717341]

>>14717015
>He set the limits to what we can logically know, doofus.
That would be Plato.
The value of a philosophy reveals itself in its relation to simple qualities and the practical application of truth and power. One must be capable of either wisdom or decisive thought.
In this sense, Kant is a total failure, Perpetual Peace a document which shows an inept character - both the power of logic and intuition are completely lost to him.
Where Kant succeeds is a technical application of precise measurement, a machine-like thinking that reveals the qualities of materials. This is a brutal skill of the mind that maintains the integrity of the strange place of being in the modern era.

[Anonymous No.14717456]

>>14717341
shut the fuck up

[Anonymous No.14717618]

>>14717208
>I'm sure there are exegetical accounts that interpret Kant as a phenomenalist, but I don't think it's true. Kant is not an empirical idealist, but an empirical realist who believes that there is a reality out there that generates experience, but that there is no access to this reality except through experience, and that this experience is constituted by subjective conditions (a priori intuitions & concepts).
I get the impression that you are using a lot of terms without understanding what they mean. You write:
>Kant is (...) an empirical realist who believes that there is a reality out there that generates experience (...) but that there is no access to this reality except through experience.
No. In Kantianism the only thing "out there" is the thing in itself, which is absolutely not accessible through experience, that's the whole point. Trees, houses, planets and the rest of the observable things are mere appearances, not the thing in themselves. Kant is explicitly a phenomenalist about these.
>Kant does not think that space is a principle of the understanding, but a pure form of sensibility. He thinks that without the pure intuition of space, you would not be able to represent spatial relations. The same thing with time.
I don't even know what are you replying to here, but the point is that for Kant space is not something that exists out there, but something that exists in our understanding. It is obvious from that that Kant is a phenomenalist about the physical world, since if space exists only in our understanding what we think of as a physical object like eg. a spoon is really just a series of spoon-images that is interpreted by our minds as a third-dimensional object, much like a painting of a forest "looks like" a real 3d forest to us, even though in reality it's just a 2d image and the "3d" is added by our minds.

[Anonymous No.14717661]

>>14717456
>NOOOOO YOU CAN'T SAY THAT KANT RELEASES THE SHADOWS ON THE CAVE WALL AS THE ENTIRETY OF THE WORLD! THAT WOULD END MODERN PHILOSOPHY!
Seething.

[Anonymous No.14717680]

>>14717293
First off, Descartes is not a phenomenalist, I don't know why you would think that. And yes, Kant is not a pure phenomenalist like Berkley because he postulates the thing in itself, which exists independently of our minds. But that doesn't change the fact that he is explicitly a phenomenalist about the physical world, which for him is just a "phenomenal world" - mere appearence.. That's what his formal idealism is: he is an idealist about the physical, empirical world, but he is a realist about what he calls the thing in itself, which is a non-empirical entity which he thinks it is what causes our experiences in the first place.

[Anonymous No.14717681]

>>14714352
>Reading the intro to a philosophical work written by anyone other than the author
???? ppl srsly do this?

[Anonymous No.14717713]

>>14717681
You don't know many authors do you

[Anonymous No.14717729]

>>14714259
I think the most relevant contemporary Kant commentator is Michael Friedman.

[Anonymous No.14717749]

>>14714259
>epistemology
A bit of a stretch to call it this

[Anonymous No.14717785]

>>14714363
>Kant claimed that it wasn't possible for humans to have intellectual intuition because he couldn't think of how it was possible
He knew how it was possible, we just dont have that faculty. From the beginning of the first critique he claims that an intellectual intuition is a cognition that creates its object, from scratch.

>The supreme irony is that Kant himself in his first critique admitted that God would have to have intellectual intuition because otherwise He would be subject to limits which could not be true as any true supreme God is unlimited.
First of all, that's not ironic, since youre igmoring the fact that intellectual intuition could be possible only in a divine, poietic intellect. Secondly, Kant never makes that second argument, there's no positive theology in Kant's thought. In fact God existence is not even granted at a theoretical level, only at a practical one.
>As the Upanishads state that God is really the inner Self of all beings it provides the explanation in accordance with Kant's thought for how they can experience intellectual intuition (i.e. it's really God inside their consciousness who has this intuition) but because Kant never left Konigsberg he never had the chance to be initiated into the metaphysical teachings and associated spiritual practices which allow someone to do this
This implies absolute solipsism, unless you are misusing the expression "intellectual intuition".

[Anonymous No.14717996]

>>14715611
Much better than what I intended to write

[Anonymous No.14718013]

>>14716086
It means that within the logical foundations of your experience, that's the point - Kant's thing-in-itself is transcendent.

[Anonymous No.14718023]

>>14716293
lol you pretty much got Kant but your opinions are still dogshit

[Anonymous No.14718038]

>>14716366
While I personally agree with you, I've read some interesting objections to this part of Kant from speculative realists.

[Anonymous No.14718042]

>>14716601
>Then as I expected you don't understand Kant at all.
I don't know man. He literally says this isn't his position. Maybe you understand his philosophy better than he did.
>Kant absolutely denies that the (observable) external world exists
Observable world exists as a representation that is contingent on our minds. It still exists, but as a representation.
> the point is that according to Kant we have a stream of experiences fed to us arranged in a way that tricks us into thinking the physical world is real.
Again, the physical world is real, but that doesn't mean we should take it as things-in-themselves.
>That is because on Kantianism consciousness is not caused by the brain. In fact the brain isn't even real.
Again, the brain is real and the knowledge of which is a judgement of experience that Kant literally says is objectively real. That aside, you have no reason to assume the mind is caused by brain and not the other way around. The brain is the existence of mind in the sense-world, the mind is its existence in the internal sense.

[Anonymous No.14718072]

>>14716601
It just seems like you're having a hard time facing the truth. It's not even a Kantian thing, no serious thinker has been a "pure" realist for decades - in fact, even accepting the physical realist as an absolute truth won't solve the problem you bring up in the last paragraph. It's either accepting the self as (at least part) illusion, or resorting to some kind of spiritualism.

[Anonymous No.14718216]

>>14718042
>I don't know man. He literally says this isn't his position. Maybe you understand his philosophy better than he did.
Post the passage where he contradicts my claim that he is a phenomenalist about the physical world. I don't understand how you failed to grasp that point, the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal world is precisely that the empirical reality is mere appearence and does not correspond to things as they are in themselves. Previously you said that we can have access to the thing in itself through experience, there is nothing less Kantian than this statement.
>Observable world exists as a representation that is contingent on our minds. It still exists, but as a representation.
This is just playing semantics. You might as well say that the flying spaghetti monster exists, it's just that it's only a representation that is contingent on our minds. You are essentially agreeing with my phenomenalist interpretation here, you just disagree about words.
>Again, the physical world is real, but that doesn't mean we should take it as things-in-themselves.
If what we call "the physical world" is really just a representation in the mind, then it is not a physical world at all. You are describing a purely mental world and then you put a sticker with the tag "physical world" on it.
>That aside, you have no reason to assume the mind is caused by brain and not the other way around.
I give up, this is just painful

[Anonymous No.14718232]

>>14718216
>this is just semantics
That's literally the whole point of critical philosophy lmao

[Anonymous No.14718241]

Notice how the noumena translates flawlessly from German to French.

[Anonymous No.14718244]

>>14717456
https://youtu.be/fgerL96Df_Y

[Anonymous No.14718256]

>>14718216
It seems to me you understand the basic arguments quite well, but somehow think if our knowledge of the world is through representations then that means it isn't real. This is the part I disagree. Why do you ascribe unreality to representations? Kant certainly doesn't.

To explain through a metaphor, when you take a picture with a camera, the picture is representation (phenomena), dependent on the camera (modes of intuition) of the objects that could not be ever known directly to the camera (noumena). Does this make the picture, which is a representation of the object, any less real?

[Anonymous No.14718258]

>>14716366
No, what physics says is that time is ontologically (physically) relative (modulated by velocity and gravity), not relative merely due to 'sensory modality'.

Yes it is true that -the experience- of time is warped by our perception (this is not a controversial insight), but that isn't what is being referred to by relativity in physics. Furthermore, if we are constrained by sensory modalities, then neither our intuition nor science (which is entirely presented through experience) can certainly determine the extent to which space/time is cognitive vs. conrete.

[Anonymous No.14718259]

>>14718072
>It just seems like you're having a hard time facing the truth. It's not even a Kantian thing, no serious thinker has been a "pure" realist for decades.
Sellars, Quine, Armstrong, Smart, Mackie, Searle, Dennett, Nagel, there are plenty of others. Most modern philosophers are realists, I don't think you are keeping up.
>in fact, even accepting the physical realist as an absolute truth won't solve the problem you bring up in the last paragraph. It's either accepting the self as (at least part) illusion, or resorting to some kind of spiritualism.
Well personal identity is indeed partially an illusion, but this has nothing to do about realism about the external world. Every single materialist believes in the existence of the physical world as an absolute truth, does that make them spiritualists? This is a very bizarre claim.

[Anonymous No.14718267]

>>14718259
>Sellars
I'm pretty sure Sellars is a Kantian.

[Anonymous No.14718269]

>>14717618
If experience is constituted by the subjective conditions, then you can never have access to reality as it is in itself. You seem to be interpreting things-in-themselves as ontologically distinct from appearances. Kant does not think that appearances are illusions that have nothing to ground them. You should be aware of the different interpretations of the CPR out there.

Kant is not really a phenomentalist who's skeptical about the external world as you make him to be though. He believes there is an external world (things-in-themselves) that grounds these appearances:

>"Even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves, we must at least be able to think them as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears. (Bxxvi–xxvii)"

>"It... follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word “appearance” must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility... must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. (A251–2)"

>"The understanding therefore, by assuming appearances, grants also the existence of things in themselves, and thus far we may say that the representation of such things as are the basis of appearances... is not only admissible but unavoidable. (Proleg. 5: 315)"

Idealism about space does not mean idealism about the external world.

If you're going to talk about Kant at least know that he thinks that space is a form of sensibility and has nothing to do with the understanding, no?

>>14717680
Descartes is a phenomenalist in the sense that he believes that the immediate objects of perception are mental states. And no, Kant never claimed to be an empirical idealist. In fact, he rejects empirical idealism and transcendental realism. His formal idealism concerns space, time, and pure concepts of the understanding. Idealism about the physical, empirical world would be Berkeleyan-type idealism. I feel like you're contradicting yourself here.

[Anonymous No.14718280]

there's a lot of misinterpretation in this thread. it would be too hard to analyze and correct it all, so let's just settle with one point.

on the question of whether kant is a phenomenalist or not, the answer is that he himself did not view himself as one, and was at pains to distinguish his own position from that of the idealists such as berkeley. read his 'refutation of idealism' in CPR.

>>14718269
oh hey you got it nvm everybody

[Anonymous No.14718291]

>>14718280
>>14717293

[Anonymous No.14718303]

>>14714259
Had an ethics class recently and we read Kant. The women in the class could not wrap their head around his metaphysics. They kept saying things like "Yeah but everyone would reason differently so you CANT use reason for morals since it's relative" and "Yeah but what if you don't lie and it causes a bad result? Isn't that immoral?"

The following class about JSM and utilitarianism had them saying "this is perfect because it helps the most people"

In short, Kant is too complex for the average retarded vaginal brain. And I'm half a fruit myself.

[Anonymous No.14718305]

>>14718259
>Some Americans who were not simple empirical realists, and some that are complete hacks
please stop

[Anonymous No.14718310]

>>14714300
Based.

[Anonymous No.14718316]

>>14718280
Can you see if I got it right? These are my posts:
>>14716374
>>14718042
>>14718256

[Anonymous No.14718352]

>>14718303
Kant easily refuted by teenage girls.
Why does anyone follow this pathetic shit?

[Anonymous No.14718359]

>>14718352
Indeed, we should put an end to this whole business of philosophy and make teenage girls the ruling class. Truly they possess the pinnacle of wisdom.

[Anonymous No.14718362]

>>14718352
Kek

[Anonymous No.14718385]

>>14714363
Explain pbuh

[Anonymous No.14718393]

>>14714259
Oh hi. I'm the science fairy. I'm here to remind "intellectuals" like you that the affirmations of Kant are either unverifiable/untestable in a scientific manner, or are just plain wrong and don't describe humanity.
See, when Kant says something like:
>After long reflexion on the pure elements of human knowledge (those which contain nothing empirical), I at last succeeded in distinguishing with certainty and in separating the pure elementary notions of the Sensibility (space and time) from those of the Understanding. Thus the 7th, 8th, and 9th Categories had to be excluded from the old list. And the others were of no service to me; because there was no principle [in them], on which the understanding could be investigated, measured in its completion, and all the functions, whence its pure concepts arise, determined exhaustively and with precision.
He actually doesn't understand what words like "measurement" or "precision" entail, which is kind of sad cause by the time he was alive these things were pretty well defined already. The very notion of human knowledge derived from anything but experience is extremely laughable if you think about how a brain works!
Kant also seems to have a very poor grasp at physics and other hard sciences. See, this is a flat out wrong statement:
>For how can we make out by experience, whether the world is from eternity or had a beginning, whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts? Such concept cannot be given in any experience, be it ever so extensive, and consequently the falsehood either of the positive or the negative proposition cannot be discovered by this touch-stone.
>This is therefore a decisive experiment, which must necessarily expose any error lying hidden in the assumptions of reason.
No, you silly goose Kant!
Your "experiment" only shows your lack of insight in the operations of science. Scientific experiments allow you to make educated guesses - sometimes very educated guesses - on how things work, through experiments. You never truly "make out" something, as this was never the goal. The goal is to find the best possible model that is reproducible by anyone following the same steps, which in turn is the only think we could reasonably call knowledge in this life.
Of course it takes a special kind of innocence to think some Prussian aristocrat could really find universal truths about the minds of the entire mankind, but philosophers are deeply desperate to find such truths while still being painfully ignorant on how proper testing of such ideas works.
This is why 1000 philosophers thinking really hard together cannot begin to fathom how a star shines or how your lungs or immune system operates. Yet somehow they have convinced you that they know perfectly how your mind, body and entire society at large works. Isn't it just crazy how you fell for something so stupid?
Hope this doesn't make you reevaluate your truth framework or anything.

[Anonymous No.14718399]

>>14718269
If your philosophy needs these many loopholes to cope it's shit.

[Anonymous No.14718404]

>>14718256
>It seems to me you understand the basic arguments quite well, but somehow think if our knowledge of the world is through representations then that means it isn't real. This is the part I disagree. Why do you ascribe unreality to representations? Kant certainly doesn't.
That's Locke, not Kant. Kant doesn't say that the physical world exists out there, it's just that we perceive it indirectly by the mediation of mental representations. He says that there is literally nothing outside of our mental images that corresponds to them, he is a convinced idealist about the physical world. Of course, he also believes that there is what he calls the thing in itself, but this should not be identified with the physical world. Kant thinks that the thing in itself is what causes our mental images, but its true nature is mysterious to us and completely outside our ability to know what it is.
>To explain through a metaphor, when you take a picture with a camera, the picture is representation (phenomena), dependent on the camera (modes of intuition) of the objects that could not be ever known directly to the camera (noumena). Does this make the picture, which is a representation of the object, any less real?
The difference is that Kant thinks that only the photograph is real, and the object it represents doesn't actually exist. We are just tricked into thinking it exists because of the photographs the elusive thing in itself sends to us. It's as if we were trapped inside a room and our only way to see outside was through a camera, but all the footage was faked and didn't actually show us what's really outside.

[Anonymous No.14718408]

>>14718359
>kantian can't even follow the most basic argument

[Anonymous No.14718409]

>>14718393
But my dear sciencefag! Philosophy is supposed to be concerned with questions answers to which are unverifiable. This is the fundamental goal of the discipline. If it weren't so, it would have been just science.

[Anonymous No.14718413]

>>14718305
All of them were realists about the physical world. Every single one of them. If you don't understand the topic just shut the fuck up already.

[Anonymous No.14718416]

>>14717015
Cringe non-argument tier. Pseuds are the worst lol.

>>14717341
While I agree that philosophy desperately needs to move in a pragmatic direction at this point, it still behooves intellectuals to reocognize espistemological limits and respect precise logic. Indeed, reason ultimately serves our biases, but if our framework of reasoning itself becomes arbitrary then its efficacy as a tool will be compromised. Also, we can't necessarily predict what 'technical' truths might have pragmatic value in the future.

>>14718013
No, the fact that we are not omniscient means that our experience is derived from (caused by) something else. Causality is not merely a way of logically ordering our experience, it necessarily exists.

[Anonymous No.14718419]

>>14718409
But this solves the problem! OP asked "Why isn't Kant right?". If his claims are mainly concerned with unverifiable phenomena and thought experiments, he is neither right nor wrong, until he can formulate his ideas in a testable manner!
Welcome to science, my friend. I think you'll enjoy leaving this world of non-testable opinions. We have all kinds of cool shit here.

[Anonymous No.14718457]

>>14718352
Incel metaphysics. A Copernican Virgin.

[Anonymous No.14718463]

>>14718404
>You: "He says that there is literally nothing outside of our mental images that corresponds to them, he is a convinced idealist about the physical world."

>Kant: "It... follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must CORRESPOND to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word “appearance” must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility... must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. (A251–2)"

stop being a brainlet pseud and read for once

[Anonymous No.14718466]

>>14718303
DESU if you can't prove the existence of universals (which Kant didn't), then they're correct.

[Anonymous No.14718480]

>>14718404
> It's as if we were trapped inside a room and our only way to see outside was through a camera
True.
>but all the footage was faked and didn't actually show us what's really outside.
False. The footage shows us what is outside in the form of the footage. While the object in front of camera (noumena) is three dimensional, when accessed through camera (modes of intuition), it becomes two dimensional representation (phenomena). It doesn't mean the three dimensional object doesn't exist, it means that the only thing that is accessible to the camera is the two dimensional photograph.
>The difference is that Kant thinks that only the photograph is real, and the object it represents doesn't actually exist.
Not really. He says the photograph is the accessible thing to us, not that the objects aren't real.
>We are just tricked into thinking it exists because of the photographs the elusive thing in itself sends to us.
He says we are tricked into thinking thing-in-itself is the photo, which of course it isn't (the photo is a representation). Doesn't mean the object doesn't exist, it just means we only have the photo.

[Anonymous No.14718493]

>>14718419
The proposition that untestable claims are bad is only applies to science, not philosophy. We, in philosophy, attempt to act as mathematicians. If we can prove it logically, then it's true, regardless of whether it's testable or not.

[Anonymous No.14718510]

>>14718493
I agree. The main issue is, mathematics by themselves cannot explain the real world. You can formulate beautiful models which are entirely self-consistent and logically sound. (Say, the first few atomic models)
But you might come up with other atomic models that are equally sound logically, on a theoretical framework.
How can you tell which of these 2 mathematical models actually describes reality? If both are logically consistent, it seems you reach a dead end. You must make a measurement, and compare your model to that measurement. At that point it becomes science.
Now say instead of two theoretical atomic models, you are comparing the statements of two philosophers, both of which are logically sound. What happens then?

[Anonymous No.14718533]

>>14718510
The philosophers start to question their fundamental axioms and methods of each other which gave them different results (aside from looking for fallacies and logical inconsistencies). This is literally what philosophers have been doing for centuries and is what the discipline is all about. Obviously I don't need to say how valuable science is, but to reject philosophy completely is a grave mistake. I must kindly ask you to refrain from dick measuring contests that which is more valuable since both are valuable in their own rights.

[Anonymous No.14718535]

>>14718463
Hmm, I wonder why you didn't post the full quote, are we trying to hide something?
>It also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word ‘appearance’ must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something, i.e. an object independent of sensibility. Now from this arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not at all positive and does not signify a determinate cognition of any sort of thing, but rather only the thinking of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition.

[Anonymous No.14718563]

>>14718535
The full quote proves the point better actually.

[Anonymous No.14718582]

>>14718510
Mathematics doesn't "explain the real world".

Math is a language. As a language, it can be used to communicate truths as well as falsehoods.

[Anonymous No.14718584]

Anyone who thinks Kant can be simply refuted does not understand philosophy
Reread Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel together, together they constitute a philosophical whole

[Anonymous No.14718588]

>>14718582
Mathematics helps explain the world through physics. FACT.

[Anonymous No.14718590]

>>14718584
The Holy Trinity of Metaphysical Coomerism

[Anonymous No.14718595]

>>14718584
based

[Anonymous No.14718608]

>>14718393
While I generally agree with you, Kant was a pretty decent astronomer, so it's not like hard science was alien to him.

Also, I think ideally speaking philosophy -is- a science. The application of experience-derived logic to experience itself.

[Anonymous No.14718627]

>>14718608
Experience-derived logic? Logic is a priori though.

[Anonymous No.14718672]

>>14718480
>False. The footage shows us what is outside in the form of the footage. While the object in front of camera (noumena) is three dimensional, when accessed through camera (modes of intuition), it becomes two dimensional representation (phenomena). It doesn't mean the three dimensional object doesn't exist, it means that the only thing that is accessible to the camera is the two dimensional photograph.
My duderino. This is Locke, not Kant. What are you describing is called indirect realism, or the representationalist theory of perception. Kant's view is that the only thing that comes from outside in the act of knowledge is sense experience (or sense data, to use the modern term). Space and the Categories, like causality, are added by the mind. Hence our mental representations cannot correspond to 3d things outside causally interacting with one another, because space and causality are added to the mix by the mind.

[Anonymous No.14718675]

>>14718584
See
>>14718303

[Anonymous No.14718688]

>>14718672
>>14718535

[Anonymous No.14718689]

>>14716293
Classic materialist reasoning here
>argument asserts the nature of phenomena to be mental
>materialist considers the idea that the nature of the universe is non-physical
>materialist, internally asserting that the physical is all that is real, declares that the argument deems everything illusory
Like pottery

[Anonymous No.14718714]

>>14718672
We are saying the same thing here.
> Space and the Categories, like causality, are added by the mind.
Correct. Just as the two-dimensionality as added by the camera.
>. Hence our mental representations cannot correspond to 3d things outside causally interacting with one another, because space and causality are added to the mix by the mind.
Again true. The photo is 2d so it cannot correspond to the 3d object, or else it wouldn't have been a photo and would have been the object itself. Similarly our representations, to which categories of the mind are applied, cannot correspond to the noumena or else it would have been the noumena itself.

[Anonymous No.14718717]

>>14718689
I am actually a property dualist but good psychoanalysis nonetheless Mr. Sigmund. Yes, the average person doesn't think there is anything wrong with the idea that the chair he is sitting on is actually inside his mind, only hardcore materialists have an issue with it.

[Anonymous No.14718733]

>>14714259
You’ll have to fast forward to Ernst Mach Boltzmann and Schlick the Vienna Circle but it’s not particularly good imo.

They more undermine and start over and ignore Kant than refute him. But that’s where it all started. Mach said Kant and his work was a great bunch of spiderwebs to get lost in when looking for truth.

[Anonymous No.14718737]

>>14718733
>Schlick
Lewd!

[Anonymous No.14718745]

>>14718733
it's amazing how Kant influenced a lot of philosophers and physicists even if they disagreed with him

[Anonymous No.14718755]

>>14718717
>Yes, the average person doesn't think
I find it a bit harsh, I would prefer to say that the average person doesn't think about philosophy, let alone whether or not the chair they're sitting on is a physical entity projected into their mind, a mental construct projected to a perceptual plane or a self-evident mass of wood with a consciousness several orders of magnitude below that of a human.
>Yes, the average person doesn't think there is anything wrong with the idea that the chair he is sitting on is actually inside his mind, only hardcore materialists have an issue with it.
Lame way to move the goalposts and discourage criticism of your argument, you should have proved it was self-evident that I had to convince the general public of 4chan's findings on metaphysics.

[Anonymous No.14718759]

>>14716293
You’re wasting time and have completely failed imo. You’re the type of retard that thinks an unintuitive result of an investigation must be rejected. Yet you accept general relativity.

Sorry mate you are inconsistent and amateur in this statement.

[Anonymous No.14718775]

>>14718759
honestly, he's just misinterpreting Kant

[Anonymous No.14718779]

>>14718745
Germany in the 19th century was a wonder for intellectuals. Industrial enough for a comfortable life but Empty of enough distractions for many people to focus on intellectual pursuits. The chair of the Vienna philosophy department was front page news being discussed by everyone in the Austrian empire.

Imagine anyone but the 5 guys in a philosophy department giving a fuck today.

[Anonymous No.14718788]

Can other anons say if my interpretation of Kant here >>14718714 is correct? I'm still paranoid whether I've misinterpreted him.

[Anonymous No.14718789]

>>14718627
A priori? No. Truly a priori knowledge isn't possible.

Synthetic a priori? I suppose (if you really think there are grounds for divorcing the form and content of experience). Even so, logic is entirely founded upon experienced relations.

[Anonymous No.14718796]

>>14718714
I don't understand how could you possibly come up with this Lockean philosophy after reading Kant, did you miss the part where he says that you can't apply space and the categories outside of experience? This is what you are doing right now, you are postulating physical things outside our subjective experiences that are 3d and interact causally with each other, you are extrapolating space and the categories (like causality) beyond our experience. And on top of that you say that we actually know perfectly well the things in themselves, it's just that we know them indirectly - while the Kantian theory is that the things in themselves are unknowable in principle. Not knowable indirectly, they are unknowable period.

[Anonymous No.14718805]

>>14718779
Pre-war Germany was peak culture. So much great art and philosophy (and science) that it's not an exaggeration to say it was as great as ancient Greece.

[Anonymous No.14718817]

>>14718796
>you are postulating physical things outside our subjective experiences that are 3d and interact causally with each other
Not at all. I say the 2 dimensionality is added to the picture by the camera, similarly the 3 dimensionality and causality is added by our mind to noumena. Since the camera by its nature can only have 2d pictures, it can never know 3 dimensionality. Similarly, since we by our nature can only have experience by 3 dimensionality and causality and time, we can never know the noumena.

[Anonymous No.14718830]

>>14718779
Indeed, regardless of how we esteem particular perspectives, that contrast of intellectual vigour is a sad one.

[Anonymous No.14718841]

>>14718817
nigga stop using these dumb camera 2d-3d analogies

[Anonymous No.14718857]

>>14718759
>You’re the type of retard that thinks an unintuitive result of an investigation must be rejected.
Are you retarded, I explicitly said in my post that a reductio ad absurdum does not conclusively refute a theory, it does however weakens its plausibility. No philosoper thinks that reductio ad absurdum arguments are completely useless, it is a very important tool for evaluating competing hypotheses.

[Anonymous No.14718858]

>>14718841
Perhaps if you're so smart as to look down on my analogies from so afar, you could stop using vulgarities and explain what exactly is wrong with it? That's the way understand transcendental idealism.

[Anonymous No.14718863]

>>14718858
read Manifest Realism, good book on Kant

[Anonymous No.14718873]

>>14718817
>Not at all. I say the 2 dimensionality is added to the picture by the camera, similarly the 3 dimensionality and causality is added by our mind to noumena. Since the camera by its nature can only have 2d pictures, it can never know 3 dimensionality. Similarly, since we by our nature can only have experience by 3 dimensionality and causality and time, we can never know the noumena.
My lovely friend, you are contradicting yourself. If we can never know the noumena how do you know that there are actual 3d things outside of our experiences that correspond to them?

[Anonymous No.14718888]

>>14718858
That wasn't me btw

[Anonymous No.14718899]

>>14718873
I'm precisely saying the 3d things are our experience, not outside it. Since the 3 dimensionality are the categories of the mind applied to sense data which constructs are experience, the noumena is unknown.

[Anonymous No.14718930]

>>14718899
yeah this 2d-3d stuff is confusing to be honest

[Anonymous No.14718946]

>>14718930
The three dimensionality is literally space which is an intuition given in the mind. Two dimensionality is an analogy of it that applies to the pictures. I'm not sure what's confusing.

[Anonymous No.14718960]

>>14718946
ya, just discard these analogies, start using kantian terminology

[Anonymous No.14718991]

>>14718796
No, the fact that we are not omniscient means that our experience is derived from (caused by) something else. Causality is not merely a way of logically ordering our experience, it necessarily exists. As far as space/time goes, I would argue that variations in appearances necessitate noumenal variations, and so that which conditions those categories must possess distinctions in some dimension. That dimension may be radically different from those that we perceive, but there is still an obvious analogy there.

You're wrong to imply that knowledge is an all-or-nothing proposition.

[Anonymous No.14719007]

>>14718899
Then you don't disagree with my interpretation of Kantianism as phenomenalism about the physical world after all? If sense data is all that comes from outside, and the mind imprints space and the categories on it, the ideas of physical objects are mere mental constructs out of sense data and do not actually correspond to any external physical objects. If that's what you are saying we basically agree. But then you should retract your previous claim that the physical world is real on Kant's model.

[Anonymous No.14719030]

>>14719007
why are you only addressing yourself to the person in this thread that understands the least about the subject?

[Anonymous No.14719052]

>>14718393
>You never truly "make out" something, as this was never the goal. The goal is to find the best possible model that is reproducible by anyone following the same steps, which in turn is the only think we could reasonably call knowledge in this life.
Nigga this is what Kant is saying and no, no one was saying it before him: Hume critiques really stunted the philosophers of science of that time, to the point where they could not justify philosophically the systematic study of nature, not even when your notion of scientific research (approximation through mathematical models) was granted. Kant not only says that's the goal, but he manages to state it in a way that does not compromise the philosophical validity of physical science.
Basically, you've missed the point.
This is also why the antinomy between atomistic and continuos matter stands, and will always stand in our scientific pursuit.
>This is why 1000 philosophers thinking really hard together cannot begin to fathom how a star shines or how your lungs or immune system operates. Yet somehow they have convinced you that they know perfectly how your mind, body and entire society at large works. Isn't it just crazy how you fell for something so stupid? Hope this doesn't make you reevaluate your truth framework or anything.
Nigga this is literally the type of philosophy that Kant demolished. Are you trolling? It feels like reading someone bashing Plato because he did not believe in Theory of Forms. It makes no sense

[Anonymous No.14719059]

>>14719007
not him, but there is good textual evidence to suggest that your interpretation of Kant as a phenomentalist is mistake

this >>14718269 combined with Refutation of Idealism is enough to suggest that Kant did not think himself to be a phenomenalist

if you think his philosophy leads to phenomenalism and that Kant did not realize this or something, then sure, but stop saying that Kant thought of himself as a phenomenalist, he wrote the Refutation of Idealism to denounce accusations of phenomenalism

[Anonymous No.14719067]

>>14719007
As I said earlier, yes we agree on the interpretation. My issue (addressed as early as here: >>14718256) is that why should we think of representations as any less real? You seem to think only the noumena could be real. Is the photograph, having imprinted on it two dimensionality by the camera, is merely an illusion of the 3d thing?

[Anonymous No.14719099]

>>14719030
I agree that I'm probably the person that least understands the subject. Could you tell me where I'm wrong?

[Anonymous No.14719105]

>>14719059

>>14716293
>>14716601
>>14717618
>>14718216
assuming this is all you, if not ignore, i guess

[Anonymous No.14719163]

>>14718857
It doesn’t affect it in any single way

[Anonymous No.14719269]

>>14719099
you're not so much wrong as you're over-simplifying the argument and conflating a number of concepts that kant would like to keep distinct

and to be fair to other anon, there is also sound reason to believe that kant's refutation of idealism doesn't succeed in combating the charges of phenomenalism. why this might be would take more words than i am willing to expend here. but consider: if causality is *merely* a pure category of the understanding and, albeit necessary in the formation of judgement of external objects related in time, is not given directly in intuition, what sense can be made of of an a priori unknowable 'x' that is the cause of our private intuitions?

[Anonymous No.14719337]

Incredible how people will just talk out of their ass. Literally bullshitting because they think can get away with it since nobody reads the primary material. Remember, it is counterproductive to discuss philosophy on /lit/. Don't confuse all these pedantic ramblings for what Kant actually wrote. Just because someone expends effort to write a long post doesn't make them an authority.

[Anonymous No.14719580]

>>14714259
but could he complete the system

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iOk6HB609po

[Anonymous No.14719671]

>>14719337
So why don't you enlighten us with your intimate knowledge of Kant? If you can't address our misconceptions in a brief fashion, then may I submit that your reading of the primary material hasn't done you much good?

Just go back to whatever faggy kinds of threads you prefer.

[Anonymous No.14719726]

>>14719067
No I am just saying that the physical objects are illusions, I agree that the mental representations are real

[Anonymous No.14719836]

>>14714259
It's not kantian it's cunt

[Anonymous No.14719883]

>>14719269
A purely negative understanding. We can do that because we are not associating the category of causality to a determinate noumenic x, rather we are attributing said category to a phenomenon, and in doing so we are only stating that its cause cannot be phenomenic.

The problems, for Kant, would start coming up only once we start attributing that category to a determinate noumena: we can't do so because we cannot determinate in any concievable way such an object. That doesn't impede me from stating that the causes of phaenomena have to be phaenomena themselves, and everything that is, and is not a phaenomenon, is a noumenon. Kant argues explicitly for this case in the Refutation of Idealism, and implicitly in the Trascendental Deduction.

The negativity of the concept of noumenon is something that Kant stresses on all over the first critique. He really cared about clarifying this point

[Anonymous No.14719894]

>>14719269
>and to be fair to other anon, there is also sound reason to believe that kant's refutation of idealism doesn't succeed in combating the charges of phenomenalism. why this might be would take more words than i am willing to expend here. but consider: if causality is *merely* a pure category of the understanding and, albeit necessary in the formation of judgement of external objects related in time, is not given directly in intuition, what sense can be made of of an a priori unknowable 'x' that is the cause of our private intuitions?
Well I am not saying that Kant is a pure phenomenalist, I am only suggesting that he is a phenomenalist about the empirical, physical world, as it appears in our senses. He is obviously a realist about the thing in itself, even though he considers his true nature unknowable to us. But of course you are right that this opens a new can of worms with Jacobi's question as to whether Kant's extrapolation of causality outside of experience to explain the origin of sense data can be epistemically justified from within Kant's system. But I left that aside so I could focus the discussion instead of getting lost on a million different points.

[Anonymous No.14719954]

>>14719726
I think I finally understand what you mean. Physical objects, unlike what we assume in daily life, aren't things-in-themselves. That we customarily assume them to be so is an illusion. Is that what you meant? If so, I don't see what is unreasonable about it.

[Anonymous No.14719996]

>>14718013
>>14716086
Isn't this just a mystical/obscurantist argument? I think a better answer would be that whatever happens between noumena and phenomena is a different kind of thing than what happens between phenomena.

[Anonymous No.14720011]

he helped give birth to sjws

[Anonymous No.14720026]

>>14716366
relativity in the way you've described it has nothing to do with experience or perception. It's just a model of physics

[Anonymous No.14720278]

>>14719883
the category of cause and effect is only applicable to intuitions i.e. phenomena. of any supposed 'relation' (itself a categorical form) between the thing-in-itself and our intuition of it he can only assert an ambiguous 'correspondence', and even then only dogmatically so, as nothing can be positively stated about (no affirmative judgement can be made as to) the thing-in-itself.

[Anonymous No.14720285]

>>14717785
Based refutation anon

[Anonymous No.14720302]

>>14715278
Kant be right!

[Anonymous No.14720310]

>>14719996
No doubt it is different, given our limited perception. Different how/to what extent... We can't really say. What we can say is to what extent it is necessarily similar, as in >>14718991
even if there are very few such deductions to be made.

[Anonymous No.14720357]

>>14720278
>the category of cause and effect is only applicable to intuitions
That's the point. Again, this is a negative determination of a phenomenon, not a positive determination of a noumenon.
>and even then only dogmatically so, as nothing can be positively stated about (no affirmative judgement can be made as to) the thing-in-itself.
Not dogmatically so, unless you've got a refutation of the arguments in the Refutation of Idealism.

[Anonymous No.14720417]

>>14720357
you aren't making sense. if by 'this' you mean the subsumption (or determination) of an intuition under (or by) a category of the understanding, than no, this is not a 'negative determination'. it is just the subsumption of an intuition under a category. if by 'this' you mean the postulation of an indeterminate ='x', than this is not a 'determination of a phenomena', as the ='x' is not a possible experience.
what i am saying is kant is equivocating between the terms 'correspondence' and 'cause and effect'. by a 'correspondence' between the thing-in-itself and the intuited object he really means a causal relationship between the 'thing' and our experience of it. but this contradicts what has been said about the 'thing-in-itself', which supposedly cannot be the object of an possible experience, and so is indeterminate as regards any category of the understanding. by kant's own account, no causal connection can be discerned between the thing-in-itself and our intuition, but this is exactly what he is asserting when he proposes a 'correspondence' between the two.

[Anonymous No.14720500]

>>14714259
https://discord.gg/hCjX58e

[Anonymous No.14720644]

>>14720417
By "this" I meant this use of the category of causality. This use is a negative determination of a phaenomenon, not a positive determination of a phaenomenon. What is claimed in the Refutation is that I cannot be the causal source of these intuitions, I cannot make my experience from scratch. The causal source of my experience cannot be internal, and everything that is and is external to me is by definition a noumenon.

[Anonymous No.14720691]

>>14720644
the 'use' of the category of causality on its own--as in an incomplete judgement that neither affirms nor denies the case--is not negative; it posits a relation between two objects in time, the one a consequent of the other. this is what i mean when i say you aren't making sense; you are literally speaking gibberish.
i am saying that kant's own defense is INTERNALLY INCOHERENT for the reason's i've already stated in previous posts. take those up if you wish to continue this discussion, otherwise i am done.

[Anonymous No.14720733]

>>14720644
>and everything that is and is external to me is by definition a noumenon
this is also FLATLY INCORRECT
the pure form of space is 'responsible' for the coordination of EXTERNAL OBJECTS 'within' intuition

[Anonymous No.14720794]

>>14720733
>this is also FLATLY INCORRECT
the pure form of space is 'responsible' for the coordination of EXTERNAL OBJECTS 'within' intuition
I meant external in a purely ontological sense, as in, not me or part of me or a content of my experience, etc.
>>14720691
>the 'use' of the category of causality on its own--as in an incomplete judgement that neither affirms nor denies the case--is not negative; it posits a relation between two objects in time, the one a consequent of the other.
That's not how negation works. In this case Kant is saying that something, in this case my experience, is NOT entirely caused by something else, in this case my synthetic unity of apperception. This directly implies an ontologically external cause, which, as Kant states, I cannot cognize nor form any determinate concept of it.

>This is what i mean when i say you aren't making sense; you are literally speaking gibberish.
i am saying that kant's own defense is INTERNALLY INCOHERENT for the reason's i've already stated in previous posts. take those up if you wish to continue this discussion, otherwise i am done.
This is childish. Act civil, please

[Anonymous No.14721030]

>>14720794
the category of cause cannot be applied to that which cannot be a possibe experience
the thing-in-itself cannot be a possible experience
therefore the category of cause cannot be applied in the formation of a judgement in which the 'thing-in-itself' forms one of the terms of that judgement
is that clear enough for you?
the thing-in-itself *is* an intelligible concept, which is to say it may be expressed without contradiction, though it is without determinate content; it is a purely formal concept. its function in the critical philosophy is as a logical placeholder for what for a naive realist would be the 'external world'.
the problem is that kant cannot give a coherent account of how the thing-in-itself can be the source of our sensations and so our experience if no determinate judgement can be made about it. as it cannot be a possible object of experience, its subsumption under the category of cause and effect is impossible. to do this is the very definition of a transcendental illusion.
as an aside, noumena are merely intelligible concepts that lack any possible empirical content. in that they are intelligible, they are only possible 'inside you'. they have no existence 'outside' of their intelligibility.

[Anonymous No.14721059]

>>14720794
>>14721030
>noumena are merely intelligible concepts
this is evident from the greek verb-root noein, which means 'to perceive in thought [or by the mind]'
by contrast, the verb-root for phenomenon, phainesthai, literally means 'to appear'.
so the contrast is between what can be merely thought, and what can appear to us as such.

[Anonymous No.14721440]

>>14718385
peace be upon him, an honorific muslims use for the prophets but here used in jest

[Anonymous No.14721510]

>>14715128

Based Nietzschean.

[Anonymous No.14721680]

>>14718303
I wish a woman would hold me and caress my neck and tell me everything will be okay, because she loves me and won't let anything bad happen to me.

[Anonymous No.14721684]

>>14714259
Look to materialist philosophy
>Materialism and Empirio-Criticism by Lenin
>Dialectical and Historical Materialism by Stalin
Be prepared to cringe

[Anonymous No.14722232]

>>14719954
Why not go a step further, you are almost there. The fact that physical objects don't exist in themselves but are mere appearances is logically equivalent to saying that physical objects don't exist, and what exists is merely mental representations of physical objects. You can't say that physical objects exist, it's just that they are in the mind, because what you would be then describe is a mental image, not a physical object. But I think this is mostly a semantics issue. I say that dragons don't really exist, but only mental representations of them, while you say that dragons only exist in the mind. But your expression is misleading, because it constantly tempts you to say "Well, it's not that dragons aren't real, it's just that they only exist in the mind" which just muddles the water for no good reason.

[Anonymous No.14722397]

>>14722232
I see what you mean. I think the dragon example is misleading, since dragons are imaginary representations. But the phenomena that we have access to is a representation of thing-in-itself, just as a photograph is a representation of an object. So in this sense, I don't think it's fair to say that physical objects don't exist at all, rather, that they are the only representation that we have access to.

Regardless of what we define as real, you mentioned this issue as if it undermines Kant, though I can't see how. It makes perfect sense to me.

[Anonymous No.14722447]

>>14714363
>but because Kant never left Konigsberg he never had the chance to be initiated into the metaphysical teachings and associated spiritual practices which allow someone to do this.
kek

[Anonymous No.14722450]

>>14715248
>psycho-analysis...
How so?

[86:9 No.14722530]

>>14715128
>most knowledge is -technically- provisional. Get over it.
Its called faith buddy. Get over it.
>>14714363
We are an original intellectual intuition in the mind of G-d. This is a matter of faith. It seems to me that by trying to pass his convictions of as knowlede Geunon simply stumbles over Kant and simply reconfirms Kant as the ultimate stumbling block.
>>14715278
He was
>>14715611
Not concern your self with the 20th century anglos anon. They're just empty logicians.
>>14716293
Wrong.
>>14714259
I'm not going to filter through all these mediocre opinions. Read kant and come up with your own criticisms. Write them. If they're good, you'll have done humanity a great service.

[Anonymous No.14722684]

>>14715260
you have heard the sound of one hand clapping my friend :)

[Anonymous No.14722905]

>>14721030
>the category of cause cannot be applied to that which cannot be a possibe experience
Yes, thats why it is applied to objects of experience through a negation.
I can say "a is not caused by b", in this judgement I don't have to state what's the c that causes a. In this particular case it would be "my synthetic unity is not caused by my synthetic unity of apperception". I literally dont know how to make it easier to understand at this point. It genuinely looks like you don't know what a negation is.

>therefore the category of cause cannot be applied in the formation of a judgement in which the 'thing-in-itself' forms one of the terms of that judgement
Let's try it another way.
What follows from the judgement "my experience is not entirely caused by my synthetic unity of apperception"? Maybe if you think through it youll get it.
>the problem is that kant cannot give a coherent account of how the thing-in-itself can be the source of our sensations and so our experience if no determinate judgement can be made about
Not a problem, he's cristalline about it. Noumena can be identified as the source of our experience by a process of exclusion, through a negative determination of intuitions. As such the only thing we know about the thing in itself is that it exists, because our experience is, and because it cannot be accounted with my SUoA alone.
Are you mad at Kant because he did not contraddict himself by giving a positive metaphysics of noumena?
>as an aside, noumena are merely intelligible concepts that lack any possible empirical content. in that they are intelligible, they are only possible 'inside you'. they have no existence 'outside' of their intelligibility.
Nigga read the refutation, it's like 2 pages long.

[Anonymous No.14723212]

>>14722905
no i'm not going to read Kant or any secondary sources about him but i will still share my opinions on him

and don't cal me "nigga"

[Anonymous No.14723290]

>>14723212
>i'm not going to read Kant or any secondary sources about him but i will still share my opinions on him
Epic
>and don't cal me "nigga"
Don't boss me around, Kantlet.

[Anonymous No.14723293]

>>14722905
*In this particular case it would be "my experience is not caused by my synthetic unity of apperception".

Ooos, my bad

[Anonymous No.14723458]

You are all a bunch of larping faggots. Max Stirner completed Kant. Egoism is hypostasis, autonomy and voluntarism taken to its logical conclusion. KYS. All of you.

[Anonymous No.14723619]

>>14722530
That's nice for you anon, but faith is not a valid nor sound argument for anything. If you think it's a 'matter of faith', then stay out of philosophical discussions.

[Anonymous No.14723634]

>>14723619
>but faith is not a valid nor sound argument for anything.
Have you read Hume yet, friend?

You have to have a significant amount of faith just to,say, drink a glass of water. Or maybe another example would be that you have faith you're actually talking to people on 4chan and not, lets say, an ai.

[Anonymous No.14723645]

>>14722397
>I see what you mean. I think the dragon example is misleading, since dragons are imaginary representations. But the phenomena that we have access to is a representation of thing-in-itself, just as a photograph is a representation of an object. So in this sense, I don't think it's fair to say that physical objects don't exist at all, rather, that they are the only representation that we have access to.
>But the phenomena that we have access to is a representation of thing-in-itself, just as a photograph is a representation of an object.
Let's say that you look at a tree in front of you. Would you say that your mental image of the tree is a phenomenal object, while the actual tree besides you is a thing in itself? Or would you say that the actual tree cannot be a thing in itself because things in themselves are in principle unknowable, and therefore our mental representations cannot correspond to them? Which interpretation do you think gets Kant right? Because one of them is completely wrong.

[Anonymous No.14723663]

>>14717681
oh honey

[Anonymous No.14724129]

>>14723634
That isn't equivalent at all.

The fact that the relations we experience do remain consistent throughout our experience (at least the basic ones) are a kind of evidence on which we can base expectations. Same with AI... I know that there's an 'external world' because I'm not omnisicient. I also know I exist. So there is a reasonably strong probability that there are other subjective experiencers out there (people) as a part of that external world.

Even if we take Hume's caveat at face value, faith still isn't an ontological argument for anything. According to that skepticism, reality as we know it -could- break down at any moment, and faith doesn't resolve this. If we acknowledge this as a real (albeit slim) possibility, then we are operating on probability assessment, not faith. Faith is believing in something that you can neither demonstrate as probable via empricism nor certain via logical necessity.

Finally, if faith is a sufficient basis for belief, then why must you necessarily appeal to logic in order to recommend it?

I don't bregrudge you your faith in the least, friend... But it has no place in ontological arguments.

[Anonymous No.14724180]

>>14722905
the 'negative' is itself a pure category of the understanding.
start there, see how far you get.
yes, the 'thing-in-itself' is *defined* (i.e. determined analytically, not synthetically) negatively. that is what i meant when i termed it a purely formal concept, though it is not a pure category of the understanding. however, kant says much more about the thing-in-itself than is allowable within his own system. a statement like "the thing-in-itself' is the true correlate of sensibility", though it may not appear to be a synthetic a priori judgment--because 'correlate' does not immediately stand-out to us as any of the pure categories of the understanding, namely that of necessary relation--it is. this is not a negative synthesis, but a positive one. and, as it is a synthetic a priori judgement of that which cannot be an object of possible experience i.e. a 'noumena' or mere idea of reason, it is invalid, an instance of transcendental illusion.
it is clear to me that you do not even
>"my experience is not entirely caused by my synthetic unity of apperception"
this is also not a possible valid synthetic a priori judgment, as the synthetic unity of apperception is not a possible object of experience; rather, it is the necessary ground for any judgement whatsoever, a transcendental principle.

[Anonymous No.14724214]

>>14722905
>>14724180
>because 'correlate' does not immediately stand-out to us as any of the pure categories of the understanding, namely that of necessary relation--it is
should read 'because 'correlate' does not immediately stand out as any of the pure categories of the understanding, it is, namely that of necessary relation
a problem i'm having here with you is that you aren't even getting kant's argument right, so i'm having to correct you for him and then re-address the objection to his actual argument.

[Anonymous No.14724217]

>>14723645
I believe he says the phenomenal tree is a representation of thing-in-itself of which we could know nothing. Meaning that my mental representation is a representation of something real, but this something is unknowable.

[Anonymous No.14724239]

>>14724129
Not the poster you're replying to, but thorough scepticism annihilates probability as much as it annihilates anything. Trying to justify belief in something by appeal to a series of repetitions presupposes the epistemic value of repetition/probability instead of proving it, when the whole point was to prove the stable existence of anything in the first place without presuppositions.

William James wrote an essay about this called The Will to Believe, which is a counter to Clifford's evidentialism, which is a reasonable stand-in for a moderate Humean or Popperian realist/verificationist. James is often misunderstood as not caring about objective truth in the essay, but instead what he's saying is that so much of our experience is "virtual" that we simply have to live on hunches and hopes, our perception itself is structured on such hunches and hopes.

Your wider point seems (to me but maybe I'm wrong) to be that one can accept this provisional-virtual structure of cognition without justifying any particular belief like "God exists." But James for example is not saying that, what he's saying is that beliefs are hunch-structures with vague and have fuzzy borders, the term "belief" is an imperfect way of designating "what one holds to be true or the case" which is always already mixed up with hunches and hopes, longings and biases, etc. James is not saying we should give ourselves over to our biases or to pure subjectivism, he is instead saying that we should be more sensitive to the fuzziness of these belief structures and look at how they actually work in consciousness, in society, and in history.

For example, Plato's belief structure that something lay beyond sophistic eristic and nihilism gave us Platonism, but surely Plato's ideas weren't always "Platonism" in his mind. It took him a long time, presumably with reversals and dashed hopes and even plenty of self-bullshitting, to get to his mature position. At some point he was a child who perhaps placed his faith naively in some form of Orphism. Perhaps he had a period where he threw himself into belief in a paternal Zeus in a desperate hope that personal godhood and grace would fill the void left by the sophists' rationalistic excoriations. This is the kind of "belief" we should be interested in, the living and demi-conscious structures of belief that pay off in different ways (both across our life-stories and across larger historical spans of time).

Wittgenstein covers a similar thing in a very short discussion on the epistemic nature of "belief." What does a belief mean? Is it a proposition? Definitely not. What does it mean to say "he believes in life after death?" Can we translate that to a Cliffordian evidentalism of verifiable propositions? No, because it means something that is holistically implicated with the entire lifeworld of the subject, synchronically and diachronically. I believe in Christ even though I can't justify it and I am a lapsed Christian.

[Anonymous No.14724402]

>>14723645
Not him, but it's better to interpret Kant as a direct perceptual realist rather than a phenomenalist or a representationist à la Berkeley or Descartes. Under this view, Kant is committed to the existence of the external world, while also being committed to the view that there is an aspect of the external world that we cannot cognize. Things in themselves do not have to be interpreted as ontologically and numerically distinct from appearances. This is most likely how Kant intended his empirical realism & transcendental idealism to be.

>>14724217
The phenomenal is not a representation of the thing in itself. The thing in itself is undermined and cannot be represented. I think what you're getting at is that the thing in itself affects us and generates appearances, which is more in tune with what Kant had in mind.

[Anonymous No.14724413]

>>14724239
>Trying to justify belief in something by appeal to a series of repetitions presupposes the epistemic value of repetition/probability instead of proving it, when the whole point was to prove the stable existence of anything in the first place without presuppositions.
We can't prove it, nor do we actually need to do (the latter is obvious). As far as epistemic value is concerned, since any possible knowledge or even any entirely logic-independent belief (if there really is such a thing... doesn't seem possible) are necessarily contingent upon experience, then the consistency of relations in that experience can be the -only- store of epistemic value (excepting the very limited set of apodictic truths, such as bare recognition of existence).

In pithier words, appealing to consistency is not circular — it's tautological (there is no other option).

As for the second half of your post, this seems to be a quasi-pragmatic argument for faith/belief. I have no problem particular problem with that (although your specific argument is vague, anecdotal and ambiguous). I acknowledge the utility that less rational thinking can provide, but that doesn't mean it has a place in ontological debates.

[Anonymous No.14724442]

>>14724413
you are using words that are way over your head
this isn't meant to be mean, but you would make more sense to yourself and to others if you just brought yourself down to a level you are actually comfortable at

[Anonymous No.14724499]

>>14724442
bro im faking it until i make it

[Anonymous No.14724557]

>>14724442
>you are using words that are way over your head
>this isn't meant to be mean, but you would make more sense to yourself and to others if you just brought yourself down to a level you are actually comfortable at
>t. philosophically illiterate

[Anonymous No.14724577]

>>14724413
>I acknowledge the utility that less rational thinking can provide, but that doesn't mean it has a place in ontological debates.

My point is that it does, because mature Platonism is an example of an ontological (in the Heideggerian sense) position nevertheless arrived at through non-propositional, non-ontical means. Plato can articulate the non-discursive nature of higher understanding in a rigorously discursive manner, in the Phaedrus for example, because he spent years having non-propositional, non-discursive thoughts about ontology, i.e about the nature of the world.

That's why I mention Wittgenstein as well, because he's not even talking about mystical insight, he's simply showing that our naive accounts of propositional, discursive thought aren't adequate to way thought actually works. We are missing something important when we lay out a basic bitch, whiggish verificationism or evidentialism. Wittgenstein is being ontological, again in the Heideggerian sense, when he cautions us to be careful about assuming that our ontical "ontologies" are any more rigorous when we purify them of "ambiguity." It's closer to the truth to say that thought is made of this "ambiguity" than that it is somehow distracted by it and needs to be purified of it.

>We can't prove it, nor do we actually need to do (the latter is obvious).
Obvious in what sense? I can't tell what sort of probability (or "consistency" of events) you're talking about. The very idea of probability as a test of certainty has been studied as a historically contingent, emergent phenomenon, for example by Gallison/Daston in the book Objectivity.

>apodictic truths, such as bare recognition of existence
To me it seems like you are jumping from a noetic (meaning simply directly apprehended or immediately, intuitively certain) form of truth to a discursive form of truth. There is a big difference between "knowing" that I have a lamp in my peripheral vision right now, in the normal flow of experience, and the statement "I have a lamp in the right side of my cone of vision right now," and presumably all kinds of differences between this proposition, the bare "thought" THAT it is there, the recognition that I am recognising THAT it is there, etc.

The point of this being: when we try to catalogue experience in this way, we quickly realise that thought doesn't break down into a tidy set of quasi-propositional contents or unit-like "beliefs," but is a constant flow of certainty (which you could call "taking for true"). It might be apodictic that I exist, in some sense, but you'd have to do a lot to convince me that the thought or statement "I exist" is identical to (for example) Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, let alone various forms of acknowledgment OF the transcendental unity of apperception.

That's why isolating arbitrary elements of this flux and trying to erect a "science of thought" from them (aka logic) is dangerous as fuck.

[Anonymous No.14724591]

>>14724402
Good post.

[Anonymous No.14724599]

here in this thread is again a lot of words which would have no bearance on any aspect of reality ever. why you should stick with chinese philosophy.

[Anonymous No.14724606]

>>14724599
philosophy grads trying to cope with their useless degree i guess

[Anonymous No.14724802]

>>14724557
>necessarily contingent
just analyze, for yourself, that one expression first
you'll find that it is literally meaningless, an oxymoron
then look up 'consistency' 'tautology' 'epistemic' 'anecdote' 'pragmatic' 'ontology' 'recognition' 'experience' 'apodictic'

[Anonymous No.14724855]

>>14724577
Not a good way to make your point, since Platonism is a considerably contentious ontological position to take (especially these days). This anecdote establishes nothing.

>he's simply showing that our naive accounts of propositional, discursive thought aren't adequate to way thought actually works
I haven't suggested that there is a true dichotomy between dianoetic and intuitive thought, only that the consistency of relations in experience and the logic that stems from them is the only standard we can appeal to. You demonstrate this logically arguing for skepticism regarding logic. Do you not see the irony in making the specific claim that thought is inherently ambiguous? Not that such a claim means anything, since ambiguity is relative concept.

>Obvious in what sense?
It is obvious that we do not need truly certain knowledge to go about our business.
>The very idea of probability as a test of certainty
It is not a test of certainty, it is a pragmatic replacement for certainty (since certainty isn't possible except in the case of apodictic truths).
>but is a constant flow of certainty (which you could call "taking for true")
No, certainty is that which is necessarily true. What we 'take for true' are assumptions (which can be probable or not).
>you'd have to do a lot to convince me that the thought or statement "I exist" is identical to (for example) Kant's transcendental unity of apperception
The core of apperception is apodictic. We are not omniscient, therefore there is an 'externality' which feeds our experience (an externality which we cannot truly know due to our limited perception). Many of Kant's particulars beyond that are indeed assumptions, and I won't defend them as I'm not a Kantian.

Again, the consistency of our experience and the logic founded upon that consistency are ultimately all we can appeal to. It is a necessary tautology. You are demonstrating this in the very mode of your argument to the contrary.

[Anonymous No.14724860]

>>14724855
holy shit shut the fuuuuuck uuuuup

[Anonymous No.14724896]

>>14724802
"Necessarily contingent" is not an oxymoron. A redundancy perhaps, but I wanted to emphasize the point.

I am already acquainted with the meaning of those other terms. If you wish to dispute any specfic use of them on my part, then do so. Otherwise, you aren't saying anything.

I'm sorry that you're an idiot, but that is not my fault.

[Anonymous No.14724904]

>>14724896
>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency_(philosophy)
>A contingent proposition is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.
fuckwit motherfucking cunt piece of shit

[Anonymous No.14724938]

>>14724904
That anon's phrase ("necessarily contingent") can be used in this definition.

>It is necessarily the case that a contingent proposition is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false.

[Anonymous No.14724950]

>>14724938
no. 'necessarily' is modifying 'contingent' in his use above

[Anonymous No.14724969]

>>14724180
>it is the necessary ground for any judgement whatsoever, a transcendental principle.
A trascendental principle which cannot account for my experience.

[Anonymous No.14724976]

>>14724904
The proposition itself is necessary (why I said 'necessarily', the word contingent here is simply synonymous with 'dependent' (as in knowledge depends upon experience to exist). I suppose I could have been more careful and just said "knowledge necessitates experience", but if you were genuinely confused then I must still conclude that you are pretty dumb. You have to go back.

[Anonymous No.14724981]

>>14724969
it does not 'account' for it; it is the necessary ground for any experience whatsoever. that is what makes it a 'transcendental' principle.
please, go read.

[Anonymous No.14724991]

>>14724976
you are loose with these terms to the point of incoherence is my whole point. if you mean 'dependent', then use that word. it is not, as you suppose, a close synonym with contingent in the context you are employing the latter term.

[Anonymous No.14724994]

>>14724950
IDK it reminds me of Kripke's necessary a posteriori & contingent a priori.

[Anonymous No.14725069]

>>14724991
Sorry, I didn't realize that you are the sole arbiter of synonymy. You have my solemn pledge to relearn my vocabulary according to an anon-certified thesaurus.

Seriously though, no other interlocutors have had such difficulty in understanding me as you claim to. I think you're just being petulant because a) you don't like my arguments and/or b) you have none of your own. Really, just fuck off already.

[Anonymous No.14725117]

you morons are arguing about whether a guy 200 years ago with zero knowledge of neuroscience, cognitive science, quantum mechanics, molecular biology, and evolution, was "right" about everything.
this is why academic philosophy is a joke. instead of moving on past these ancient dead men you're still jerking off over them.

[Anonymous No.14725148]

>>14725069
the other fellow is being overly polite, and you'll notice he seems to have left the thread after the last nonsense you belched at him
fucking idiot

[Anonymous No.14725158]

>>14725117
It's not only that Kant's philosophy allows for those advances in scientific fields, but also that modern science inclines towards Kant more and more. Who would have thought Darwin, Schrodinger, and Einstein were Kantians?

My dear friend, I'm afraid there has been, so far, only one moron in this thread.

[Anonymous No.14725177]

Starbucks corporation rejects.... all of you

[Anonymous No.14725214]

>>14725177
Good thing we can apply the same autism on display here to tech jobs. Now chop chop! I'm waiting for my Latte.

[Anonymous No.14725222]

Fuck off my Internet you wordsmithing faggots. Starbucks.com/careers

[Anonymous No.14725240]

>>14724239
>>14724577
Good posts

>>14723645
>>14724413

good effort post. I agree with the other anon, but I can see you genuinely engaging.

[Anonymous No.14725362]

>>14725240
lmao what's the point of this post are you a referee or something

[Anonymous No.14725491]

This thread is annoying. So much misunderstanding. If you think you're smarter than Kant or that his ideas can be refuted easily, then you don't understand the ideas.
>>14718789
Is there a number so large that you cannot add 1 to it?

Can a line get so long that it can no longer be lengthened?

You can not answer these questions empirically. (Have fun counting) But somehow we can answer them.

This is an example of logic that is not grounded upon experienced relations.

[Anonymous No.14725776]

>>14725491
There's no 'mystery' as to how we can answer those questions; we can answer them by following the axioms with which we have defined those abstract systems. Whoop-dee-do.

The pertinent question then, is what informs the basic concepts from which we extrapolate those symbolic systems? The answer is experienced relations. Any highly abstract numerical concept is ultimately traceable back to our mere intuition of the multiplicity of objects in our experience.

Kant knew that experience is our only conduit to knowledge, which is why he qualified the 'a priori' distinction with 'synthetic'.

It is I who should be chagrined at your misunderstanding.

[The Man !QkRJTXcpFI No.14725822]

>>14714363
>Kant claimed that it wasn't possible for humans to have intellectual intuition because he couldn't think of how it was possible (Guenon (pbuh) succinctly flays Kant in 'Intro to Hindu Doctines' for wishing to impose the limits of his own ignorance upon others and for wishing to impotently substitute a 'theory of knowledge' for Knowledge itself).
Do you not get it? This is so simple that you might as well give up on philosophy right now. You cannot percieve the "thing-in-itself" because that would mean you percieve it identically which would mean that your perception would be equivalent with that you are attempting to percieve. This is and always will be impossible. It is the equalization of unequal things.
So why do you think you can gain the ability percieve the "thing-in-itself" (truth)? Precisely because you want this ability so badly, this truth, so that you can use it to dominate and tyrannize over everyone else. It is not out of overabundance that you think you can percieve the "thing-in-itself", it is out of hunger, an emptiness, a desire and yearning for power that you will forever lack, a cowardice.

[Anonymous No.14725831]

>>14725776
synthetic a priori judgments are not empirical judgments you pompous nitwit.

[Anonymous No.14725843]

>>14725776
What do you understand by synthetic a priori judgments?

[Anonymous No.14726182]

>>14725831
>>14725843
I'm just not convinced that such a distinction is really sensible, given that such propositions still require an experiential component (the concepts). It's like we a draw a somewhat arbitrary line after defining our axioms via concepts and say "Ok, now everything after this point is a special category of knowledge because it's a self-referential system." Except that it isn't truly self-referential, is it?

I suppose the distinction has abstract utility, but I'm concerned that people misapprehend it as a concrete bifurcation of knowledge (i.e. thinking universals concretely exist).

[Anonymous No.14726230]

>>14725822
Unironically got'em (and got digits).

[Anonymous No.14726368]

>>14726182
the point isn't whether or not the concept as kant employed it is metaphysically sound or whatever
the point is you don't even know the meaning of the terms you insist on splashing about
you useless turd-brained fuck

[Anonymous No.14726559]

>>14724981
>it does not 'account' for it; it is the necessary ground for any experience whatsoever. that is what makes it a 'transcendental' principle.
So you're agreeing with me. Good to know

[Anonymous No.14726651]

>>14726559
a transcendental ground is not a judgment as you suppose in earlier posts, so no, i am not agreeing with you

[Anonymous No.14726884]

>>14726368
So you keep claiming, without providing demonstration to that effect.

I pity you... You're a very petty and insecure sort of creature. Perhaps in time you will learn to accept your deficiencies with dignity, instead of projecting your frustrations.

[Anonymous No.14727143]

>>14725776
>there's no 'mystery' as to how we can answer those questions; we can answer them by following the axioms with which we have defined those abstract systems. Whoop-dee-do.

Kant thinks there is a mystery as to how we can answer those questions. Maybe you're smarter than him. idk.

"All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations until they shall have satisfactorily answered the question: How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible? For the answer contains the only credentials which they must show when they have anything to offer us in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials, they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who have been decieved so often, than to be dismissed without further ado."

>the answer is experienced relations
Not according to Kant. But you're smarter than him so you're probably right.
>Kant knew that experience is our only conduit to knowledge
Wrong. Read the Prolegomena again.

[Anonymous No.14727158]

>>14726651
So you're saying that the syntetic unity of apperception obviously cannot causally account for my experience (>>14724981) but I also cannot say that the syntetic unity of apperception cannot causally account for my experience (>>14726651)?

[Anonymous No.14727315]

>>14726884
every post of yours is a demonstration of your ignorance dum-dum
qed
take a bow

[Anonymous No.14727328]

>>14727158
the *transcendental* unity of apperception is not *intended* to be an 'account' of the *cause* of our *sensations*, no.

[Anonymous No.14727329]

>>14725822

>Precisely because you want this ability so badly, this truth, so that you can use it to dominate and tyrannize over everyone else. It is not out of overabundance that you think you can percieve the "thing-in-itself", it is out of hunger, an emptiness, a desire and yearning for power that you will forever lack, a cowardice.

lol, people who follow that path earnestly tend to lose their desire for everything...except losing their more of their desire. you can't criticize it because you don't have a clue as to what it feels like

[Anonymous No.14727364]

>>14714259
>I just finished the Prolegomena, and his philosophy seems the most reasonable one so far.
>Why isn't everyone a Kantian?
Why are undergrads so impressionable?

[Anonymous No.14727442]

>>14727328
Why it's not *intended* to be an 'account' of the *cause* of our *sensations*? Maybe because it cannot constitute for such an account?

[Anonymous No.14727477]

>>14727442
it's not its 'function' within the kantian system.

[Anonymous No.14727514]

>>14714259
He was refuted by Guenon

>Modern philosophy thus ends by wishing to substitute the theory of knowledge for knowledge itself,
which amounts to an open confession of impotence on its part ; nothing is more characteristic in this
respect than the following declaration of Kant : “The chief and perhaps the only use of all philosophy
of pure reason is, after all, exclusively negative, since it is not an instrument for extending knowledge, but a
discipline for limiting it .” Do not such words amount purely and simply to saying that the only aim
of philosophers should be to impose upon everyone else the narrow limits of their own understanding ?


-Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines

[Anonymous No.14727526]

>>14727477
...
You're so close to getting it! I genuinely hope your ego won't get in the way

[Anonymous No.14727580]

>>14714259
You can claim TAG (Transcendental Argument for God) or just regular paradigmatic Transcendental Arrangements are circular, since they are self-prepositional. But then again, even Hume conceded that induction is also circular and would be unjustifiable under a strictly empirical/material framework i.e. you can't really prove where you're getting your logic and reason from and why it works and why it's always true unless you use logic and reason to justify it.

So you're stuck with presupposition epistemology that essentially exist metaphysically. Else you can't really have debates or discussions about epistemology without these metaphysical tools. You'd be using tools like logic, reason, mathematics, space & time, morality/ethics, Truth, etc, without really asking questions about the nature of those things; which is a major flaw of materialist philosophy. It's not like you can look at the material of which logic or mathematics are made, yet we know them to be useful and true because even a material atheist uses them in debate or empiricism or any other epistemic endeavor of discovering truth.

[Anonymous No.14727650]

>>14727526
that the transcendental unity of apperception is not the 'source' of our experience does not 'negatively' prove that the 'thing-in-itself' is. nor does kant argue this. if you would like to, you're missing several premises as it stands. search them out.

[Anonymous No.14727716]

>>14727514
nice
very nice
PBUH

[Anonymous No.14727728]

>>14727650
>that the transcendental unity of apperception is not the 'source' of our experience does not 'negatively' prove that the 'thing-in-itself' is
It proves that our experience cannot be a product of our faculty of imagination, and Understanding at large (for our synthetic unity of apperception is merely a formal trascendental principle).
Now I must ask you, given this premise, how do you account for the presence of our experience?

[Anonymous No.14727757]

>>14727728
i don't have to. my point was that kant fails to demonstrate that he does not lapse into a form of phenomenalism, his refutation of idealism inadequate in its defense of the critical doctrine against that charge. this is not to claim that phenomenalism is therefore 'correct'.

[Anonymous No.14727840]

>>14727757
What do you call entities that are not nor cannot be part of your experience?

[Anonymous No.14727857]

>>14727757
>'correct'.
it just has to be coherent within a framework.

[Anonymous No.14727863]

>>14727840
kant would not use the term 'entity' to refer to such that could not be an object of possible experience, as it would suggest an *existence* (one of the modal categories) independent of a possible experience, and so illusory.

[Anonymous No.14727871]

>>14727857
which it isn't, but i don't care to argue that point here.

[Anonymous No.14727874]

>>14727863
or, is should say, the term used in such a way hazards a fall into transcendental illusion.

[Anonymous No.14727919]

>>14714363
>14714363 >>14714433 >>14716094 >>14716992 >>14717785 >>14718385 >>14722447 >>14722530 >>14725822
>HURRR

[Anonymous No.14727929]

>>14727863
Existence can be applied to indeterminate negative concepts, i.e. not-A exists, when it is proven that A is not all there is. By stating that a not-A exists I don't obtain any determinate concept of not-A, I don't precisely what this not-A is, I only know that there is something other than A. This is how he explain negation in the first critique and his lectures on logic by the way, I'm not making this up.
Since experience is present, and since our synthetic unity of apperception can only account for its formal aspects, there must be something other than said unity that will account for the presence of my experience. Whatever exists, and is not my synthetic unity of apperception nor a content of my experience, is a noumenon.
So, the noumenon in this case is literally a not-A, which is not determined in any way, since we cannot cognize it. What is established is that it is something that exists, and that it is not any of the things I've mentioned earlier.

[Anonymous No.14727932]

>>14727929
>Existence can be applied to indeterminate negative concepts
no, it can't, not within kant's system. i don't give a fuck about your pet theory. my main point has been, from the start, that you don't understand kant's argument. that's it.

[Anonymous No.14727958]

>>14727932
I have explained to you how it works. You're welcome to refute the argumentative sketch I've presented right after the passage you've quoted

[Anonymous No.14727967]

>>14727929
>>14727932
sorry, i want to be fair. finally.
my argument is that even a strictly negative inference of the existence of a supposed noumenal 'object' is an invalid application of the categories by kant's own account. noumena, by definition, are not objects of possible experience, and therefore cannot be subsumed under any pure category of the understanding, of which 'negation' and 'existence' are but two.

[Anonymous No.14727975]

>>14727958
>>14727967
what i mean is that the negative inference 'covers' the noumena, even if it remains indeterminate.

[Anonymous No.14728050]

>>14727967
>>14727975
>what i mean is that the negative inference 'covers' the noumena, even if it remains indeterminate.
How could it cover it, if it remains indeterminate? Also remember that in this case the category of negation is applied to a valid object of thought, namely our experience and its formal, trascendental grounds. So, regarding this
>noumena, by definition, are not objects of possible experience, and therefore cannot be subsumed under any pure category of the understanding, of which 'negation' and 'existence' are but two.
there's a difference between the concept of not-A and the concept of a determinate not-A. In the first case the judgement can be derived entirely from A, in the second case I'll need a B to acount for the positive determination of this specific not-A.

[Anonymous No.14728105]

>>14728050
what i am objecting to is this supposed derivation of a (i now want to call it) quasi-indeterminate not-A from a determinate A e.g. the transcendental unity of apperception. this is just a slight of hand, an equivocation, a way of postulating something while maintaining that you are not postulating something.
but i think i'm getting ahead of the argument.
so, yes, you can infer the formal necessity of some x, some not-A, from the negation of some necessary A. what i contend is that kant goes beyond this formal necessity of the not-A, the 'thing-in-itself', and posits both its existence and its causal efficacy, which is beyond what is possible given the limitations he himself has set in the application of these categories.

[Anonymous No.14728235]

>>14728105
From what I understand, you can apply relational and modal categories (remember the mathematical v dynamic categories distinction) to negative concepts. I can say that something that is not A has caused A, if I can prove that A cannot causally account for itself. From this I cannot gather neither a determinate quantity of not-A (i.e. my experience requires n determinate not-A, in fact this would be an Anphiboly) nor a positive quality (since we're dealing with the relational category of Negation, rather than Reality).

[Anonymous No.14728368]

>>14715248
The best criticisms of him came from schulze but of course you dont know that this is /lit/ so you fly immediately to nietzsche

[Anonymous No.14728395]

> Schulze’s critique of Kant is essentially the following: it is incoherent to posit as a matter of philosophical knowledge — as Kant seems to have done — a mind-independent object that is beyond all human experience, and that serves as the primary cause of our sensory experience. ... Schulze argues that Kant illegitimately uses the concept of causality to conclude as a matter of strong epistemological requirement, and not merely as a matter of rational speculation, that there is some object — namely, the thing-in-itself — outside of all possible human experience, that is nonetheless the cause of our sensations.

> Schopenhauer concurs that hypothesizing a thing-in-itself as the cause of our sensations amounts to a constitutive application and projection of the concept of causality beyond its legitimate scope, for according to Kant himself, the concept of causality only supplies knowledge when it is applied within the field of possible experience, and not outside of it. Schopenhauer therefore denies that our sensations have an external cause in the sense that we can know there is some epistemologically inaccessible object — the thing-in-itself — that exists independently of our sensations and is the cause of them.

>These internal problems with Kant’s argument suggest to Schopenhauer that Kant’s reference to the thing-in-itself as a mind-independent object (or as an object of any kind) is misconstrued. Schopenhauer maintains instead that if we are to refer to the thing-in-itself, then we must come to an awareness of it, not by invoking the relationship of causality — a relationship where the cause and the effect are logically understood to be distinct objects or events (since self-causation is a contradiction in terms) — but through another means altogether. As we will see in the next section, and as we can see immediately in the title of his main work — The World as Will and Representation — Schopenhauer believes that the world has a double-aspect, namely, as “Will” (Wille) and as representation (Vorstellung).

Well, this makes much more sense. Doesn't it?

[Anonymous No.14729032]

>>14724217
Sure, but then the question is how can a mental image "represent" something that has absolutely nothing in common with it? For example we can say (if we are common-sense realists about the physical world) that a mental image of a tree is a representation of the actual, physical tree. That makes since, since the tree has all the characteristics that it seems to have on our mental image of it: it consists of a trunk and leaves, has such shape and colours etc. But how can a mental image of a tree represents an unknowable thing in itself that has zero common characteristics with the mental image? If the representation doesn't represent any of the features of the thing it is supposed to represent, in what sense can we say that it represents it? You may be right in representing Kant's position thus (there are passages favorable to that interpretation) but then I would argue that the position is incoherent.

[Anonymous No.14729059]

>>14724402
>Under this view, Kant is committed to the existence of the external world, while also being committed to the view that there is an aspect of the external world that we cannot cognize. Things in themselves do not have to be interpreted as ontologically and numerically distinct from appearances.
Nah there is no defence for that interpretation. If the things in themselves are not ontologically distinct from appearances we have partial knowledge of the things themselves, which Kant explicitly denies.

[Anonymous No.14729103]

>>14728395
Check the rest of the thread, I have discussed this topic with another anon for almost 2 days now.
>>14727929
>>14727967
>>14727975
>>14728050
>>14728105
>>14728235

[Anonymous No.14729514]

>>14727143
>argument from authority: the post

I very much doubt I'm within two SDs of being as smart as he was, but I have the benefit of hindsight including the assessments of other brilliant philosophers. What a weasely, passive-aggressive thng to say. I hope your behaviour isn't typically so pathetic.

Firstly, I don't think 'synthetic a priori' is an ontologically meaningful distinction, see >>14726182 so I have not likewise generated a particular mystery for myself at that juncture. I simply accept that all knowledge does require experience (even the apodictic sort). Yes our experience operates within a necessary conditioning, but this does not alleviate the experiential requirement (the form & content of experience cannot be concretely divorced) nor does it certainly establish that universals exist (my contention would be that our allegedly 'universal' concepts are close approximations of eachother, variable at a granular level but similar enough for pragmatic purposes).

Secondly, I think Kant did know that experience is our only conduit to knowledge, and this shows in his qualifications (-synthetic- a priori, -synthetic- unity of apperception). He didn't want to accept this however, as he had his heart set on universals and broader epistemic certainty — hence the creeping idealism.

The bottom line is that Kant did not establish the certainties he set out to; treating his word as gospel is anti-intellectual and counter to the philosophical endeavour.

[Anonymous No.14729603]

>>14729514
>Firstly, I don't think 'synthetic a priori' is an ontologically meaningful distinction,
But that does not entail any ontological distincrion. I can have analytical and synthetical a priori judgements concerning the same object.
Also what are the universals Kant claims to be existing?

[Anonymous No.14729671]

>>14729514
dude 'synthetic' does not mean 'experiential' nor 'related to experience'.

[Anonymous No.14729695]

>>14729059
>Nah there is no defence for that interpretation.
It's like you are unaware of the different interpretations of the CPR. There are plenty of contemporary Kantians who defend the two-aspect interpretation of things in themselves like Allison and Langton.

>If the things in themselves are not ontologically distinct from appearances we have partial knowledge of the things themselves, which Kant explicitly denies.
Not really. For example, Langton identifies things in themselves with intrinsic non-relational properties and appearances with external relational properties. We can only cognize the latter about objects.

What Kant explicitly denies is the phenomenalist or representationalist readings of the CPR. See >>14718269, >>14718280 and >>14718291.

[Anonymous No.14729777]

>>14729603
Fair enough, but then we cannot subsequently conclude the existence of universals.
I would also ask that you consider how/where we draw a hard boundary between analytic/synthetic... At what exact point do we no longer have to refer to experience to establish the synonymy of our concepts?

>Also what are the universals Kant claims to be existing?
Mathematical/geometric forms, moral laws.

>>14729671
Indeed brah, but the synthesis he refers to is the one by which our experience is composed. Experience is the foundation of all possible knowledge, and there is no neat boundary at which we can say experience is no longer a crucial element (or between the form and content of that experience).

[Anonymous No.14729862]

>>14729777
>Fair enough, but then we cannot subsequently conclude the existence of universals.
I don't think Kant thinks about universals the way you do.
>i would also ask that you consider how/where we draw a hard boundary between analytic/synthetic... At what exact point do we no longer have to refer to experience to establish the synonymy of our concepts?
I'm having troubles following you. Experience becomes a requirement for syntheticity only under schematism, yet you seem to talk about syntheticity in its logical sense. I mean, technically everything that Kant can say about logic is based on synthetic judgements, yet no determinate experience is required to do it.
>Mathematical/geometric forms, moral laws
They don't exist as objects, as Plato would have said, they are merely formal principles of our sensibility and our practical reason. According to Kant they don't exist by themselves, they're only possible determination of my sensibility/will.
This is how I understand it these matters, at least.

[Anonymous No.14729956]

>>14729695
That's a completely arbitrary interpretation, you are basically introducing new terminology because you cannot make this point with the concepts Kant introduces alone. There is no talk about intrinsic and external properties in Kant.

[Anonymous No.14730018]

>>14728235
>>14728235
small correction: negation is not a relational category, but rather qualitative, so grouped under the 'mathematical' categories.
the issue is the assertion of necessity; kant claims the thing-in-itself *must* be the 'true correlate to our sensibility', whereas it is only allowable to say that it 'may' be.

[Anonymous No.14730043]

>>14714308
And then he later supported him
https://youtu.be/2PMGuNZreWA
Land's issue with Kant is probably Kant's issue with metaphysics, but Deleuze already got past that with Dif&Rep

[Anonymous No.14730058]

>>14730018
>>14728235
this in addition to the other criticism. at best what can be determined about A is that it is not sufficient in itself a reason for some consequent, in this instance our sensations. so some not-A must therefore be the reason. but that is all that can be said. the not-A can be anything that isn't A. but kant does not limit himself to this, and proposes the 'thing-in-itself' as this reason.

[Anonymous No.14730090]

>>14729862
Perhaps I can simplify. At what point can we certainly say that a cateogry is 'pure'? Where is the hard boundary between determinate experience and the 'pure' concepts behind it (between pure concepts and empirical ones)?

Yes, 'universals' don't exist as objects... But that just kicks the can down the road. How do we establish the ontological discontinuity between objects and non-objects? Is your idealization of a form and mine actually identical? If we concede that these distinctions are but means of practical organization, and that we cannot fully perceive the nature of our sensibility/will, then what is the status of the supposed certainties they establish?

If moral laws and abstract forms are just pragmatic tools of reason, then I have no dispute. But in that case, they are matters of empirical consideration.

[Anonymous No.14730150]

>>14730090
dude shut the fuck up god damn

[Anonymous No.14730320]

>>14714259
Well, the problem, which the Post-Kantian German Idealists identified was that it lacked a foundation of the subject.

Kant's system was recognized as a great attempt of founding epistemology by the phenomenological interaction of the free self-aware subject and the noumenal nature.
But, famouly put by Schelling, he ended up with two ungraspables, namely, the subject and the object.

Transcendental Idealism is thus a great framework for giving meaning to the interaction of subject and object in terms of phenomenological experiences, but it lacks an foundation for subject and object.

Fichte sought to a pure Idealism, where upon everything was dependent and appearing solely for the egoic subject. Thus, pure idealism as we know it from Bishop Berkeley.

Later on Schelling turned the Kantian transcendental question around, so that instead of asking: what are the transcendentally necessary conditions for our phenomenal experiences?
Schelling asked: What are the ontological implication for the transcendentally necessary conditions for a mind such as ours?

This meant that Schelling like Hegel (and before Hegel) sought to ground Subject and Object in the same reality: Nature.

This is a short recap of some of the post-Kantian German idealists, and not at all accurate of course. Hope it helps a bit thou :P

[Anonymous No.14730327]

>>14718779
Agreed

Why are Kant threads always the best and least shitposty here? Are there a lot of kantians?

[Anonymous No.14730330]

>>14725362
No I just wanted to show my appreciation for a good conversation...

[Anonymous No.14730337]

>>14727580
Based

[Anonymous No.14730405]

>>14729956
>There is no talk about intrinsic and external properties in Kant.
Yes, there is. No, it's not completely arbitrary. There are passages in the CPR about intrinsic/external & relational/non-relational properties when it comes to describing things in themselves and appearances:

>"We have no insight whatsoever into the intrinsic nature of things. (A277/B333)"

>"Substances in general must have some intrinsic nature, which is therefore free from all external relations... But what is intrinsic to the state of a substance cannot consist in place, shape, contact, or motion (these determinations being all external relations). (A274/B330)"

>"It is quite otherwise with a substantia phaenomenon in space; its inner determinations are nothing but relations, and it itself is entirely made up of mere relations. (A265/B321)"

Read more exegesis on the CPR or something.

[Anonymous No.14730585]

>>14730330
And as one of the parties to that conversation, I'm glad you found it worthwhile.

[Anonymous No.14731617]

keepin it alive for the burns

[Anonymous No.14731797]

>>14723212
nigga

[Anonymous No.14731814]

>>14714363
B A S E D!
(pbuh).

[Anonymous No.14731875]

>>14731814
do you have the template for this anime girl reading meme? pls post if ya do

[Anonymous No.14731892]

>>14731875
Sure, brother.
I have two templates.

[Anonymous No.14731902]

>>14731892
and the original one.

[Anonymous No.14731903]

>>14716293
this makes sense to me, thanks

[Anonymous No.14731918]

>>14714259
>Kant
>right
OH NO NO NO NO

>>14714363
>>14714433
>>14731814
Very based.

>>14716094
>Upanishads are shit
Cringe. Read Shankaracharya (pbuh) and dispel your maya-induced delusions.

>>14716385
>Nice to know that modern physics affirms Kant.
Modern profane 'physics' have been refuted by René Guénon (pbuh).

[Anonymous No.14732267]

>>14714330
How can we dismantle space.

[Anonymous No.14733095]

>>14716992
seeeeeeeeeeething

>brainlet Guenon
ad hom, reddit-tier - he wrote 30? books, published 100s of articles, fluent & literate in 12 languages, engaged with almost every literate tradition

>didn't read Kant
unproven supposition

>It's always fun to win arguments
it is indeed, but you wouldn't know

>Self refuter Guenon
ad hom, reddit-tier, unproven - you claimed he failed to read Kant, not that he failed to refute Kant nor that he refuted himself

>Freemason-favor printing presses
association (unproven, too)

>trashbin of history.
more refined reddit rhetoric

>Squeeking by with Disraeli on archive.org
popularity (conjectured) - do you think more people have actually read Kant?

[Anonymous No.14733181]

>>14719580
Every time I watch this video it amazes me how many low-IQ new yorkers have to chime in with their completely misinformed notions of German idealism.

[Anonymous No.14733452]

>>14731892
>>14731902
thanks a lot desu

[Anonymous No.14734025]

>>14730405
First off if "appearances" and "things in themselves" both refer to two aspects of the same thing X, why doesn't Kant say anything or even has a term for the thing X? Besides, his terminology is crystal clear: He talks about things in themselves and appearances - and the terms can be naturally interpreted as "things as how they appear to us" and "things as they are in themselves". If he wanted to talk about external relations he would talk about external relations, not about appearences. And I am not even sure what exactly do you mean by "external relations", what is the ontological status this term refers to?

[Anonymous No.14734074]

Do you stinky NEETs seriously you can contend with galaxy-brained Kant?

[Anonymous No.14734108]

>>14714259
metaphysics is gay and useless
*shits pants and dies*

[Anonymous No.14734125]

>>14734025
They aren't two aspects of the same thing, this a misunderstanding. The appearances are not part of the objectivity. This is Hume's critique of induction and Kant's response to it. The common view of causality would be that the underlying objectivity causes the appearances to be induced in perception. Kant said no. Rather this principle of causality is a form of the understanding. Causality is then, "not derived from experience, as Hume had feared, but have sprung from the pure understanding. "

Appearances are a product of a distinct form of pure understanding that stands in a projective relation to the things in themselves from which a causal association between appearance and objectivity is assumed.

When the eye sees color is it really the photons that carry the materials out of which the appearance of color is produced? The perception is an overlay that the mind adds to the objectivity, not something that is latent to the objectivity.

[Anonymous No.14734205]

>>14714259
new materialism esp. karan barrad

[Anonymous No.14734303]

>>14725822
>This is and always will be impossible. It is the equalization of unequal things.

What makes you think they are unequal to being with?

[Anonymous No.14734309]

>>14725822
>>14734303

If anything, they would be not only equal but one and the same, according to Kant most of all. Assuming them unequal being precisely the thing he says one cannot do.

[Anonymous No.14734345]

>>14714259
>who? Transcendental idealism? neat.

https://news.berkeley.edu/2011/09/22/brain-movies/

>oh. cool history anyways. Wait he's still right? You're sure it's not tautology? Ah fuck it's all tautology. Good luck with that.

[Anonymous No.14735936]

>>14717272
Why can't the mind generate appearances?

[Anonymous No.14735957]

How is Hegel Kantian?

[Anonymous No.14736007]

>>14735936
well, there are a class of representations, synthetic a priori judgments, that are 'created' by the mind e.g. the axioms of euclidean geometry.
but if all appearances were generated by ourselves, we would expect to have control over all that does appear, as we are both the source and the coordinator. however, we obviously don't have this kind of control, so it must be the case that something else other than ourselves is the source.
this isn't really a 'kantian' argument, but it does answer the question.

[Anonymous No.14736170]

>>14736007
>we would expect to have control over all that does appear
But isn't that what happens? If I carve a piece of wood into a figurine, the figurine is still a thing in itself no different from the tree it came from, but I have commanded it to be different in my mind. I represent the tree itself as its own object. Only one thing can be a tree, any other object is not a tree. I make sense of the world by representing objects that are, and differentiating them from objects that they are not. Positives and negatives. Therefore the noumenal world doesn't causally act on me, which would seem to contradict the basic assumption of idealism.

[Anonymous No.14736208]

>>14736170
>But isn't that what happens?
look at some empty space before you.
now think a tree into existence in that empty space.
not an image of a tree; one you can climb, with your body.
were you successful?

[Anonymous No.14736235]

>>14736208
I have to know what a tree is first. I have to create the idea of what a tree is. Then I can plant a tree same way I can draw a triangle.

[Anonymous No.14736356]

>>14734125
Subjectivity is a subset of objectivity, so they should be viewed as continuous while not identical. It is this necessary continuity which constitutes the deduced causality we're speaking of here, as opposed to a naive intuitiion of cause and effect. This continuity isn't just assumed; we can deduce that our experience receives data from a source (continuity) alien to it, because we are not omniscient.

>>14734303
>>14734309
That we are not omniscient — the subjective perspective that is 'you' — indicates a necessary variance in some dimension (inequality).

[Anonymous No.14736667]

>>14736235
...

[Anonymous No.14736684]

>>14716293
wrong.