>>14559501
>>14559501
The best definition of substance was given by Spinoza, who wrote :
‘By ‘substance’ I understand : what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept doesn’t have to be formed out of the concept of something else.’ – Spinoza :Ethics, Part I, definition III.
‘By God, I mean the absolutely infinite Being – that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses for itself eternal and infinite essentiality.’ – Spinoza : Ethics, Part I, definition VI.
‘That thing is called “free,” which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. That thing is inevitable, compelled, necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.’ – Spinoza : Ethics, Part I, definition VII.
A substance exists from its own side, and hence (as Leibniz said) has no "windows". It is self-contained, as Spinoza defined it. Given this ontological feature, one cannot consistently think such a substance to move outside itself and interact with anything other than itself.
That's why in Spinoza's system there is only God, only Nature as sole substance. If a substance would interact, it would no longer be depending on itself alone and hence it would no longer be a substance.
This we see the flawed version of interactionism as advanced by Descartes. How can a substantial brain (a res extensa) interact with a substantial mind (a res cogitans). As Geulincx (and also Nagarjuna) argue, given a substance, there is no movement, no production, no causality, no creativity. Hence, a substantial God cannot create.
If God is a substance, in casu the "substance of substances", then God is self-contained, and if so, there can be no creation of anything 'outside' such a substantial God. As existence (something outside this God) is an experiential fact of relativity, becoming, in short : not absolute, it follows it cannot be the outcome of the creative act of this substantial God for such a God, being substantial and closed-up, is unable to create anything. To posit such a God in light of the fact of existence is positing something that cannot exist to explain what apparently does exist.
There is no substance, only processes that interact (Whitehead). Even primordial consciousness (dharmakaya) is not substantial (process theology). All what exists is a process and there can not be found such a thing as something existing from its own side, self-powered and independent of other things.
The Atman exists from its own side, self-powered, permanent, independent, isolated from the world, etc. Buddha-nature does not exist from its own side, is other-powered, impermanent but continuous, depending on the factors of enlightenment, and not ontologically divided from the world. Buddha desubstantalized the atman. (1/2)