Ethics

[Anonymous No.14532692]

I'm not sure which philosophical book describes the correct ethical theory anons. Can someone tell me the right one?

[Anonymous No.14532697]

>>14532692
all of them

[Anonymous No.14532701]

>>14532692
>correct ethical theory

[Anonymous No.14532703]

>>14532692
as if there was one

[Anonymous No.14532709]

>>14532697
none of them

[Anonymous No.14532716]

>>14532692
Deontology for religious divinely willed morality
Virtue for intrinsic morality
Consequentialism for biological morality

[Anonymous No.14532719]

>>14532697
So if lying happens to maximize utility, I should lie?

[Anonymous No.14532720]

aesthetics=ethics=metaphysics

[Anonymous No.14532740]

>>14532719
If there's no problem in your hypothetical, then there's no problem

[Anonymous No.14532773]

>>14532692
Moral error theory

[Anonymous No.14532774]

>>14532716
>intrinsic morality

lol cute "thought"

[Anonymous No.14532801]

>>14532740
But Kant would say there is a problem with my hypothetical, so is there or isn't there? How can Kant and Bentham both be right?

[Anonymous No.14533284]

>>14532692
kant looked nothing like that

[Anonymous No.14533303]

>>14532801
Surely there are at least some circumstances where Kant and Bentham are in agreement

[Anonymous No.14533327]

>>14533303
Sounds really hard to reconcile. Kant completely rejected happiness as an end while Bentham's philosophy is literally summarized as having the maximum happiness principle as an axiom.
Of course there will be some areas where there prescriptions will happen to agree though.

[Anonymous No.14533389]

>>14532692
The only thing that matters is that I enjoy my experience. The most preferable path in life, the one that we would choose over all others even if we were able to try them all, that is the most moral path. Subjective experience, irrationality, emotion, desire, this is the foundation of morality. Good actions are those that benefit you in the long term. If this isn’t morality, why should we be moral?

[Anonymous No.14533901]

>>14533327
No, he did not. For Kant happiness is an intrinsic end but a qualified one, meaning it can be bad if used, for instance, by a bad will (choosing to cause harm because this gives them pleasure).

[Anonymous No.14533909]

>>14532692
Kant is also a consequentialist. He just thinks the best consequence is a good will rather than a pleasure you get from inclination.
>>14533327
Kant doesn't reject happiness, he just knows that happiness itself can't be the source of value and a person who deserves happiness is a better person than a person who is, as a matter of fact, happy.

[Anonymous No.14533937]

>>14533909
>Kant is also a consequentialist. He just thinks the best consequence is a good will rather than a pleasure you get from inclination.
If this were to be true, there would be no Antinomy of Practical Reason. Kant specifically argued against what you just said...
>Kant doesn't reject happiness, he just knows that happiness itself can't be the source of value and a person who deserves happiness is a better person than a person who is, as a matter of fact, happy.
Kant makes no mention of value when talking about these things. Are you just making it up? He explicitly says in Chapter one of the second critique (it's not like I'm quoting anything esoteric here) that happiness can't be a practical principle that applies universally, for everyone at any time, given that happiness is an empirical phaenomenon derived from the feelings of pleasure and displeasure (he argues at lenght to prove all these point). As such a moral law that deserves this name can only be formal, devoid of material (empirical) content.

[Anonymous No.14533996]

Read After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre followed by Dependent Rational Animals which covers his mistake in ignoring biology and gives a better argument for why you should use Aristotle over Nietzsche.

[Anonymous No.14534422]

>>14533389
>If this isn’t morality, why should we be moral?
I might want to do what's right, regardless of how it'll make me feel. I guess it is easier to understand when you think anout the negative side of it: there are things I wouldn't do, regardless of how much pleasure I might derive from that action in the wrong run. You can fill this general scenario with any specific one (i.e. torturing innocent people).
To me, this seems to indicate that there is a sharp distinction between morality and the pursuit of happiness.

[Anonymous No.14534458]

>>14534422
>I might want to do what's right, regardless of how it'll make me feel.
What is right? If your feelings aren’t involved, then why are you acting? Everything we do is related to emotions and instincts. Reason is only used to assist our irrational tendencies.
>there are things I wouldn't do, regardless of how much pleasure I might derive from that action in the wrong run. You can fill this general scenario with any specific one (i.e. torturing innocent people).
Because these actions aren’t good in the long run. If they were, then a lot more people would do them. Your instincts let you know what actions or good or bad by providing you with empathy/fear/etc. We instinctively know that killing humans is bad as it likely leads to bad consequences for ourselves but we do not feel the same when killing ants.

[Anonymous No.14534464]

>>14532692
>correct
Nice ethical theory you got there dumbass. Find me a metaethician and I’ll find you a fraud.
Correct answer is Wittgenstein btw

[Anonymous No.14534495]

>>14533389
>monster
>post is overrated shit

[Anonymous No.14534585]

>>14534495
>post is overrated
huh?

[Anonymous No.14535593]

>>14533937
I havent read the second critique but afaik there are no antinomies of practical reason. Direct me to a passage if you can though.

For source of value see Korsgaard's Creating the Kingdom of Ends. He also discusses the importance of deserving happiness in his precritical writings (there's a strange thought experiment quoted as length in Arendt's lectures on kants political philosophy) and in the Groundwork e.g. when explaininhg why happiness is not an end in itself.

[Anonymous No.14535668]

>>14532720
>all language is transparent
>being is one
>unity is eternally present

[Anonymous No.14535756]

>>14532692
Virtue ethics is circular bullshit.

[Anonymous No.14535820]

>>14535756
All ethics is circular, just do what thou wilt.

[Anonymous No.14535835]

>>14534422
>I might want to do what's right, regardless of how it'll make me feel.
No you won’t. People only make “moral” choices because it makes them feel good.

[Anonymous No.14536382]

>>14535756
It'd be nice if you completed the thought instead of leaving it hanging, lol.
There's nothing circular about Aristotle's virtue ethics though. Eudaimonia is the bedrock concept.

[Anonymous No.14536761]

>>14532692
between the autist and the cynic, stands the wise, virtuous man.

[Anonymous No.14536826]

Kant's is more elabourate but clear. He essentially creates a moral principle/duty, proves that it is real a prior and valid then tells you live by it.
Aristotle just says do what ensures the largest common good, not the perceived good (e.g. addiction, extremism).
The real answer probably lies between these two.

[Anonymous No.14536870]

>>14533389
Monster is a good example of bad animes that pseuds believe are good
also,
>anime
>Unsubstantiated edge-lord opinion
checks out

[Anonymous No.14536884]

>>14532774
>What is biology

Enjoy your tabula rasa wonderland, faglord

[Anonymous No.14537065]

>>14536870
not an argument

[Anonymous No.14537194]

>>14535820

Have you ever heard of munchausen trilemma?
>Inb4 he doesn't realize all propositions inevitably revert back to one of three epistemological starter pokemans

[Anonymous No.14537685]

>>14536870
>checks out
>edge-lord

[Anonymous No.14537693]

>>14535835
What if making moral decisions makes them miserable?

[Anonymous No.14537727]

>>14534422
Torturing people would make you feel good?

[Anonymous No.14538872]

>>14535593
>I havent read the second critique but afaik there are no antinomies of practical reason. Direct me to a passage if you can though.
There's a section called "The Antinomy of Practical Reason". Anyway you should read the full text, it's only 180 pages.
>For source of value see Korsgaard's Creating the Kingdom of Ends. He also discusses the importance of deserving happiness in his precritical writings (there's a strange thought experiment quoted as length in Arendt's lectures on kants political philosophy) and in the Groundwork e.g. when explaininhg why happiness is not an end in itself.
Koorsgard is a lady, also I seriously disagree with her interpretations of Kant, since they tend to be absolutely incompatible with the Analytic section of the second critique (for example she resolves the "murdered at the door" dilemma by arguing that some people are not worthy of moral consideration, which is ENTIRELY at odds with the foundational argument used to justify the existence and validity of the CI).

[Anonymous No.14538879]

>>14537727
No, but someone might offer me money, sex and fame in exchange for that. I sfill wouldn't do it

[Anonymous No.14539078]

>>14538872
based, I have the exact same issues with Koorsgaard.

[Anonymous No.14540724]

>>14538872
Ok but her interpretation of the source of value being happiness are corroborated by the two sources from Kant I gave

[Anonymous No.14540733]

>>14540724
happiness not being the source of value*

[Anonymous No.14540746]

>>14540724
Again, Kant doesn't talk about value to prove that happiness can't be a principle of morality. I have already summarized for you the argument made by Kant in the second crorique

[Anonymous No.14540777]

>>14540746
you're being annoyingly pedantic. is the second critique all you've read? This is the point: If you asked Kant what makes a life worth living, he wouldn't say happiness, but that doesn't mean he is disparaging happiness. And precisely where he says happiness is a hypothetical or a conditional purpose, as opposed to a good will, he also says:
> the sight of someone who shows no sign of a pure and good will and yet enjoys uninterrupted prosperity will never give pleasure to an impartial rational observer. So it seems that without a good will one can’t even be worthy of being happy.

So, what makes a life worth living, the source of value, according to Kant, is not happiness. Korsgaard is right and you are just being a pedant, regardless of his explicit use of the word value in the second critique.

[Anonymous No.14541771]

>>14532692

Disregarding your idea of a "correct ethics" for the moment, start with the Greeks Wittgenstein. A transcript of one of his lectures on Ethics can be found here:

http://sackett.net/WittgensteinEthics.pdf

It is a quick read and should be thoroughly enjoyable.

[Anonymous No.14541779]

>beliving in morality
I used to be a cringe moral realist, now I'm a chad emotivist social contracting nibba

[Anonymous No.14541803]

>>14540777
>you're being annoyingly pedantic.
Or maybe you're just misunderstanding the rational foundation of Kant's ethical project? What you're implying is not trivial, in fact it contradicts said foundations. If I agree with you I have to throw away everything Kant said about ethics, and that's not a good thing, considering that you're trying to interpret Kantian ethics.
>Is the second critique all you've read?
I've read most of what Kant wrote, I'm quoting the second critique because it's the work in which Kant talks about what we're specifically talking about. Should have I quoted his lectures on theology instead?
>This is the point: If you asked Kant what makes a life worth living, he wouldn't say happiness, but that doesn't mean he is disparaging happiness. And precisely where he says happiness is a hypothetical or a conditional purpose, as opposed to a good will, he also says:
> the sight of someone who shows no sign of a pure and good will and yet enjoys uninterrupted prosperity will never give pleasure to an impartial rational observer. So it seems that without a good will one can’t even be worthy of being happy.

Being worthy of happiness =/ worth of life

>So, what makes a life worth living, the source of value, according to Kant, is not happiness.
As I've said above, you're conflating two different concepts. The worth of one's own life is derived purely a priori through the application of the CI. My life is worth it regardless of how happy I am, and Kant means this in a drastic sense: in the Metaphysics of Morals he says that not even terminal patients who experience extreme pain should kill themselves. Being worthy of happiness is a completely different matter, and it bears no influence on the worth of my life. Also what I've said about our own lives extends to everyone else's life (as long as they're rational entities).
>Korsgaard is right and you are just being a pedant, regardless of his explicit use of the word value in the second critique.
Again, I don't think I'm being a pedant here, these arguments really do not fit in the system developed by Kant.

[Anonymous No.14541828]

>>14541779
>that text
>that image
cringe: 100

[Anonymous No.14541975]

>>14540777
>you're being annoyingly pedantic
Pedantry, aka semantics, aka the very topic that is being discussed. In something like this the particulars are the important point.

[Anonymous No.14541982]

>>14532692
The Bible, and Aristotle’s Ethics second.

[Anonymous No.14542048]

>>14532692
Nicomachean Ethics

[Anonymous No.14542086]

>>14533389
You can't just change the definition of words and end it with, if that's not X why be X?
Like "kindness is whatever makes me feel best. If kindness doesn't make me feel best, why be kind?" is a nonsensical statement. The last clause is its own question, but the preceding redefining is meaningless and retarded

[Anonymous No.14542266]

>>14542086
Kindness is understood to mean treating people nicely. Morality is understood to mean concerning right and wrong behavior, what we should and shouldn’t do. So I’m saying that the right thing to do is simply whatever works best for us in the end. If not that, then what is right? If there were two paths, one being the path that I most prefer and enjoy, and the other path being the “‘moral” path, then why choose the moral path? But I’m saying that both paths are the same.

[Anonymous No.14542458]

>>14541803
I don't believe you've read "most of what Kant wrote" because you seem to be a bit of an idiot. How do you take 'x is what makes a life worth living' to imply the absence of x is a legitimisation of suicide? Being a person who deserves a happiness is valued more, by Kant, than being happy simpliciter. This doesn't mean you can kill yourself if you aren't happy, for reasons you are giving, and I agree with. But I don't see how you can actually confuse a question on the purpose of life, on what makes life worth living, with the conditions of the moral permissibility of suicide. Mind you, this started because you said "Kant makes no mention of value" and accused me of making it up. Here's a quote from the Critique of Pure Reason, and pic related is a footnote from the Critique of Judgment:

>The practical law from the motive of happiness I call pragmatic (rule of prudence); but that which is such that it has no other motive than the worthiness to be happy I call moral (moral law). The first advises us what to do if we want to partake of happiness; the second commands how we should behave in order even to be worthy of happiness... Do that through which you will become worthy to be happy.

[Anonymous No.14542477]

>>14541803
>>14542458
Btw you have not shown me how what I said (attributed to Korsgaard or otherwise) contradict "the rational foundation of Kant's ethical project".

[Anonymous No.14542545]

>>14542458
Did you notice that that passage from the Critique of Judgement directly confirms that my interpretation of Kantian ethics is th correct one? I didn't confuse the worth of our lives with the legitimacy of suicide, rather I've said that the worth of our lives can only be derived from the moral law, which not only prohibites us from committing suicide, but also obliges us to follow said law. At no point me being worth of happiness, or recieving that happiness is a condition for the worth of my life (he even says in that passage that if it was, our lives would be worth less than nothing).
Regarding the second passage, again, the worth of my life is not a synonimous with me being worthy of happiness.
>>14542477
I disagree with Koorsgaard on a different topic, namely her claim that some rational beings are not worthy of moral consideration.

[Anonymous No.14542618]

>>14542545
No it doesn't confirm your interpretation. In fact you are adding conflating deserving happiness with receiving happiness, which he is not doing in that passage. What we do purposively is what determines whether we deserve happiness, and that is identical to categorical imperative. I'm not so sure you understand Kant's moral philosophy as well as you think if you hadn't heard this before. I will quote the rest of the passage from CPR:
>The second [having as your motive the worthiness to be happy] abstracts from inclinations and natural means of satisfying them, and considers only the freedom of a rational being in general and the necessary conditions under which alone jr is in agreement with the distribution of happiness in accordance with principles/ and thus it at least can rest on mere ideas of pure reason and be cognized a priori.

How can you claim this is different to what he says in his ethical works?

[Anonymous No.14542668]

>>14542618
>What we do purposively is what determines whether we deserve happiness, and that is identical to categorical imperative.
I know you just told me I'm pedantic, but just read the first 15 pages of the Dialectic of Practical Reason from the second critique. In those pages Kant literally says the opposite of what you're putting in his mouth, namely that being worthy of happiness is a consequence of acting in accordance to the moral law, and as such it can't be used to determine its application. In no shape or form happiness ought to be a motive of our will. Again, I know I sound pedant, but these are points Kant obsessively focus on in his moral works.

[Anonymous No.14542789]

>>14542668
>that being worthy of happiness is a consequence of acting in accordance to the moral law, and as such it can't be used to determine its application
Is this what Kant is claiming or is this what I am putting in his mouth? Because I don't disagree with and don't see how what I said conflicts this. I read up until section three of the dialectic and I don't see anything to make me change my mind. In fact, look at these quotes:

>It has been shown in the Analytic that virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good.
>The first of the two propositions, "That the endeavour after happiness produces a virtuous mind," is absolutely false; but the second, "That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness," is not absolutely false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently only if I suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a rational being
This is where he is basically imitating Leibniz's world of grace which will give you what you deserve in the supersensible world - what Kant relates to the question "What can I hope for?"

[Anonymous No.14542866]

>>14542789

>It has been shown in the Analytic that virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good.
Since you've read those sections, check what he says immediatly after that. being worth of happiness and recieving it is part of the supreme good, but it's subordinated to the moral law. That's how he resolves the antinomy of pure reason. That's why we have to account for that happiness through ideals (the immortality of our Sould and God), rather than natural laws. This is exemplified by your second extract:
>That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness," is not absolutely false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently only if I suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a rational being
Happiness can't be a motive of my will, rather I have to act as if such a just God exists.

[Anonymous No.14542989]

>>14534458
>if thing would be good it would be good
Thanks, Sherlock.

[Anonymous No.14543014]

>>14542266
We cannot know what will work out for our best before we have acted, thus requiring a system of morals to guide conduct prior to decision-making.

[Anonymous No.14543029]

>>14543014
And how is that system of principles derived?

[Anonymous No.14543036]

>>14543014
The system of morals should be based on what is most likely to make ourselves happy. The starting axiom is that my own happiness is an inherent good, then we extend all other principles from that starting point by adding our empirical knowledge on how to maximize that end.

[Anonymous No.14543060]

>>14543036
Happiness is a qualified good, being corrupt by any ill will to cause atrocities.

[Anonymous No.14543066]

>>14543029
It is derived from the categorical imperative, a system founded a priori on the one unqualified good: the good will.

[Anonymous No.14543075]

>>14543060
an ill will is that which doesn’t achieve maximum happiness. A good is only good because of its good consequences. Happiness is an end, the will is the means

[Anonymous No.14543078]

>>14543075
you haven't thought much about this have you

[Anonymous No.14543082]

>>14532692
Im with Linda Zagzebski who says we are good insofar as we are like God and imitate his divine motives and virtues

[Anonymous No.14543086]

>>14543066
Kant just pulls that out of his ass. Just because he thinks the good will is good-in-itself doesn’t mean it is. What differentiates a good will from the bad will? Consequences. Happiness is good-in-itself as we don’t need it for anything else. We value it for itself. It’s good to have a good because that leads to happiness.

[Anonymous No.14543101]

>>14543066
Why is following the categorical imperative good? Why should we try to cultivate a good will? Why be moral, according to Kant? Is it not for our own benefit in some way? To improve our experience, our happiness, our fulfillment, honor, peace, etc.? How does Kant show that having a good will is better than being happy? Where is his reason for this?

[Anonymous No.14543124]

>>14543086
a good will is the will independent of the consequence you idiot. a good will can have a bad consequence and a bad will can have good consequences. you are such a child.

[Anonymous No.14543148]

>>14543124
define good will then

[Anonymous No.14543169]

>>14543060
Committing atrocities wouldn't make me happy, especially since I'm aware that a society where regular atrocities are a norm is against my best interests. People are socialized into moralfaggotry but the only rational reason to be "moral" in the common sense we've been conditioned is so society doesn't collapse.

[Anonymous No.14543258]

>>14543148
i just did. the intention of an action, taken in isolation from the consequence. the will is literally the motive, not the consequence. to try and define inention on the basis of consequence is retarded. if you are asking me to define the good will in opposition to a bad will, then your task is to compare good with bad, not will with consequence.

[Anonymous No.14543292]

>>14543258
>if you are asking me to define the good will in opposition to a bad will, then your task is to compare good with bad
yes, that’s why I said good will

[Anonymous No.14543311]

>>14543292
what you think im going to work for you? do your own homework

[Anonymous No.14543342]

>>14543311
pathetic dodge

[Anonymous No.14543535]

>>14542866
Hey nice chatting by the way. I'm glad there are intelligent people on /lit/