/lit/ - Literature

[Anonymous No.12030394]

Help a brainlet out. Did Wittgenstein really manage to dismiss the tradition of philosophy as irrelevant? Why? Because language prohibits us from arguing about things which can't be proven using scientific examination?

[Anonymous No.12030434]

Get on his level.

>U.G. Krishnamurti rejected the very basis of thought and in doing so negated all systems of thought and knowledge. Hence he explained his assertions were experiential and not speculative – "Tell them that there is nothing to understand."

[Anonymous No.12030449]

>>12030394
No he didn't he was just an autist

[Anonymous No.12030481]

He failed to understand that existence is not a predicate. An object existing tells us something about our perception, and not about the object.

[Anonymous No.12030501]

>>12030449
I said help a brainlet out

[Anonymous No.12030518]

>>12030394
Read Frege and Russel and then come back to be allowed to talk about Wittgenstein.

[Anonymous No.12030522]

no and no

[Anonymous No.12030523]

>>12030501
I did wtf you want to know more?
You want the details? But you just said yourself that You're a brainlet.

[Anonymous No.12030525]

>>12030481
>An object existing tells us something about our perception
You're not eternal. Nothing is.

[Anonymous No.12030535]

>>12030525
I'm not a platonist my dude. I mean that if I claim that a dragon exists on the moon, that doesn't tell me anything about dragons in of themselves, but that we will find dragons on the moon.

[Anonymous No.12030547]

>>12030535
>that doesn't tell me anything about dragons in of themselves
At the very least it's a general statement (hypothetical or not, it's /asserting/ something) and can be deconstructed accordingly.

[Anonymous No.12030556]

>mfw that bright kid I used to play for now says you can't discuss things if language won't allow you to, despite me telling him the opposite

[Anonymous No.12030560]

>>12030449
Truth, autists think literally and can't into context, only content.

[Anonymous No.12030601]

>>12030481
You haven’t actually read him

[Anonymous No.12030622]

No, he changed his mind radically later in life. Read Philosophical Investigations.

[Anonymous No.12032348]

>Did Wittgenstein really manage to dismiss the tradition of philosophy as irrelevant?
No, in his later work Wittgenstein's take on philosophy was an essentially Kantian move of trying to understand the conditions of the possibility of discursivity. Meaning, he wanted to exhibit how it is that we talk about things, how we understand things and make ourselves understood, in the first place and at all, as the ground of talking about things in any purportedly "philosophical" mode.

What is traditionally called philosophy isn't irrelevant or stupid, it's just a specific discourse within language, in fundamentally the same way that scientific fields (or discourses) are within language. But scientific discourses are locally relevant/immanent to the objects they study and the ways those objects are implemented and talked about. The object that philosophy (in the general sense) studies is "thought in general," "the world in general," "language in general," "truth in general," or the necessary conditions of truth in science and scientific discourses in general, etc. In order to talk about what philosophy is, or can be, and therefore what it can say about things as important as the mind, the world, language, and so on, Wittgenstein first talks about language itself, as the ground of anything becoming intelligible whatsoever.

This is why it's Kantian, and very similar to Heidegger's project. Instead of talking about things WITHIN discursivity (including even ultra-abstract things, like the idea of "things," or the idea of what an "idea" is, etc. - here you can start to see how difficult it is to think about this shit), he's talking about discursivity in general, as the condition of understanding anything at all. What abstracts like "truth," "logic," "the concept of things in general," "what a concept 'is'," how thought works, how thought relates to its objects, how ideas relate to the objects they represent, what "representation" is, etc., etc., all have in common is that language makes them communicable in the first place. It is the condition of the possibility of talking, or thinking, about things at all. So we ought to start by understanding how it works, and because this understanding will ITSELF express itself IN language, it's almost certainly bound to be a peculiar kind of understanding.

The upshot of the whole inquiry is more or less that we are within language, and to simplify it a lot, language is imperfect, or put another way, there are no privileged sorts or subsets of language that can "capture" or "access" the "really real" truth of the world/of things in general. Language is always provisional, language is always pragmatist (in the philosophical sense), it's always DOING something. Intelligibility is always interpretive, always implies communication and dialogue between people and discourses. Languages knows (or assumes) more than it says. Etc. So there can be no pristine meta-logic, no purified scientific meta-language of reality.

[Anonymous No.12032394]

>>12032348
As a sidenote, I think some of the confusion surrounding the soundbite understanding of Wittgenstein as the ultimate BTFO'er of philosophy comes from some confusion of several things: his early work in the Tractatus, which is very very different from his later work and difficult to understand (and may even be a form of pro-logicism & naive realism/logical atomism); the "New Wittgenstein" school of interpretation, which is fairly quietist in certain ways, possibly extending Wittgenstein's ideas (claiming to be interpreting them correctly of course) to be a little more heavy-handed about post-metaphysical ethics and and the impossibility of traditional metaphysics; the diffuse prejudice within analytic philosophy of saying that metaphysics is "nonsense" (as in, not signifying anything, semantically meaningless talk of non-entities), for instance associated with hard-line logical empiricism, or with commonly quoted statements by C.S. Peirce.

So that "whereof one cannot speak..." quote, actually from the Tractatus, difficult to interpret and usually taken out of context, is often mixed up with a more diffuse analytic disdain for abstruse continental metaphysics, most common in the '20s and '30s among people like Carnap and Schlick but still very characteristic of analytics (who were the primary readers of Wittgenstein by accident of geography and association) for a long time. It was almost inevitable that these people would give even the late Wittgenstein a very quietist, anti-metaphysical reading.

Which isn't to say that reading is wrong. But like I said, Wittgenstein is fairly Kantian when you really get down to it. And while Kant was an "anti-metaphysical" thinker, he also inaugurated a new form of metaphysics. On top of that, I think Wittgenstein was a subtler thinker than certain New Wittgensteinians take him to be.

[Anonymous No.12032561]

>>12032394
>On top of that, I think Wittgenstein was a subtler thinker than certain New Wittgensteinians take him to be.
Could expand or give an example of this? I've not read a lot of secondary material but I find someone like Conant to be most convincing and it seems he reads W as Kantian in a similar way to how you describe but is quite adamant about there being no metaphysics there.

[Anonymous No.12033209]

>>12032561
I think it's just a subtle streak. Conant is really good. I definitely don't think Wittgenstein has some hidden metaphysics in the conventional sense, but I think he was constitutionally non-dogmatic and kind of impish and mischievous, and some Wittgensteinians veer close to cult-like in their self-satisfaction that the Great Master has forever dispelled all illusions. It's obviously backed up a lot better in the letter than Carnap's anti-metaphysics was, and even "correct," but the spirit is sometimes abrasive.

Heideggerians do very similar things. I always think of this one interview with Dreyfus where the interviewer was asking innocently, "okay, but what IS the nature of the world, then?" and Dreyfus almost leaped out of his chair with excitement that he gets to slap down such a naive and stupid question by invoking the philosophy-completing Sage to explain how we can never get to such things.

I have a feeling orthodox Kantians did similar "look how good of a Kantian I am"-style manoeuvres in the 1790s, when they were really just crypto-common sense philosophers, Newtonians, or sceptics, and that even though Kant was "right" in a very important sense, they weren't really answering the underlying spirit of the complaints of people like (e.g.) Schelling in good faith. And the result of that is that you get a sclerotic "orthodox Kantianism," which produces more Schellings in opposition.

You see the exact same thing happening again right now, actually, because people are trying to take all this linguistic turn stuff and "naturalize" it yet again. If the linguistic turn is Kant and Fichte, then we're seeing the post-Fichteans play themselves out again. But if all these linguistic turn people were more honest about their underlying Kantianism, they would more easily reflect on how it's AGNOSTIC about other possible forms of knowledge, not dogmatic.

[Anonymous No.12033223]

>>12033209
>But if all these linguistic turn people were more honest about their underlying Kantianism, they would more easily reflect on how it's AGNOSTIC about other possible forms of knowledge, not dogmatic.

I meant to say, and they would therefore be able to answer the new dogmatisms of the "naturalists" by correctly invoking Kant/Wittgenstein/Heidegger to critique it, rather than just smugly saying "Don't you know Kant said you can't do that?" The thing is, the new dogmatic naturalists DON'T know, and they don't care, because all that comes across from anti-metaphysics tends to be the smugness.

It's a lot like how the smugness of Reddit scientism just automatically stimulates interest in the occult. Even though I agree with the scientism guys in the letter (for now), I have to admit I'm more sympathetic to the weirdos in spirit, because at least the weirdos are still searching for something.

[Anonymous No.12033312]

>>12030556
Mahler is the most based man ever to live. Did he know Wittgenstein?

[Anonymous No.12033334]

>>12033312
I honestly don't get how people like Mahler, explain to me anon

[Anonymous No.12033403]

>>12033334
He's just a god. Listen to his lieder and symphonies over and over again until you understand that.

[Anonymous No.12033912]

>>12033223
So, how does Kant counter the inherent naturalism in the natural world that we live in?

[Anonymous No.12033923]

>>12033403
i find his symphonies incredibly boring and weak, like mere imitations of music, 'thin' and patched together, lacking in any sort of richness or development

[Anonymous No.12033933]

>>12033923
YOU JUST. DON'T UNDERSTAND.

[Anonymous No.12033954]

Are you guys graduate students in Philosophy? I feel like a brainlet after reading this thread. Then again, I haven’t studied philosophy beyond 3 courses

[Anonymous No.12034032]

>>12033923
he was one of the best orchestrators ever, a master of color. His form is of appropriate complexity for the grandness of his symphonic movements. He balances his power with sweetness and surpasses Wagner at creating tension gradually. You have obviously never listened to Auferstehung, the 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th 9th and 10th (as completed by Derrick Cooke in '64.) Listen to the second symphony and especially the fifth movement. It is impossibly rich, and climactic. A god wrote it. Listen to the first movement of the 9th and tell me if you think that is thin. No composer approaches that movement in anguish and terror. Das Trinklied von Jammer Der Erde and Der Abschied of the song cycle Das Lied von Der Erde are among the finest movements ever composed. The terror of the first contrasted with the reconciliation of the latter... you will not find a more tasteful juxtaposition.

[Anonymous No.12034110]

>>12033954
doubt graduate students go on here

[Anonymous No.12034136]

>>12030525
Is that a real frame from the show? Wouldn't surprise me with the amount of references they throw in.

[Anonymous No.12034821]

>>12030434
This is brilliant

[Anonymous No.12034839]

>>12030434
:^)

[Anonymous No.12035124]

>>12032348
>The upshot of the whole inquiry is more or less that we are within language, and to simplify it a lot, language is imperfect, or put another way, there are no privileged sorts or subsets of language that can "capture" or "access" the "really real" truth of the world/of things in general. Language is always provisional, language is always pragmatist (in the philosophical sense), it's always DOING something. Intelligibility is always interpretive, always implies communication and dialogue between people and discourses. Languages knows (or assumes) more than it says. Etc. So there can be no pristine meta-logic, no purified scientific meta-language of reality.
This is really elegantly worded. For the logically inclined, the final point here is actually true by Goedel's incompleteness theorem, which came out in the decade preceding Wittgenstein's eventual turn toward this linguistic perspective.

[Anonymous No.12035143]

>>12034110
grad students are definitely on /lit/ (i'm one). I don't know how many are actually full on philosophy grad students though. /lit/ seems to me like a good place for non-philosophy grad students to discuss stuff on a level that's probably ridiculously superficial if you were actually a philosophy student.

[Anonymous No.12035196]

>>12030535
>I mean that if I claim that a dragon exists on the moon, that doesn't tell me anything about dragons in of themselves, but that we will find dragons on the moon.
If you claim there are dragons on the moon, you'd better have evidence to suggests what are dragons in of themselves.
What is a dragon? Is it a fish? Any evidence about a claim will lead to its definition and, over time, will lead to a better understanding of it.

[Anonymous No.12035226]

>>12033312
>Did he know Wittgenstein?
Mahler used to perform private concerts for Wittgenstein's family. Its was fin de siecle Vienna, you had to be there

[Anonymous No.12035233]

>>12030394
>Because language prohibits us from arguing about things which can't be proven using scientific examination

there's your answer. if we're prohibited from proving things with language...then how did he prove that with language? That was the gist of Russel's point at the time, pre and post publishing.

Witgenstein tried to get around the contradiction by saying he wasn't saying it, but pointing at it, like a poem. vague. and if you pull that thread you learn that inherent to that notion is mysticism. The ardent athiest found god in war and a tolstoy, and injected shit mysticism in his tractatus. which is why I imagine he said you won't get this book unless you've already had these thoughts. such a let down. as people pointed out, he really was an autist.

[Anonymous No.12035259]

>>12035233
>then how did he prove that with language? That was the gist of Russel's point at the time, pre and post publishing.

he didn't. This is why only knowing the logical positivist stuff from Russel and Carnap. The inability for a formal logical language to be proven consistent and complete within its own logic was shown by Gödel. Within a formal logic structure we can prove things, but we cannot say they are universal, they are simply true for that system. Furthermore, formal logic languages are exponentially more structured than natural language, so the claim that natural languages are not helpful for proving things should be quite obvious.

[Anonymous No.12035261]

>>12035259
>This is why only knowing the logical positivist stuff from Russel and Carnap
meant to say "This is why only knowing the logical positivist stuff from Russel and Carnap is not enough"

[Anonymous No.12035272]

>>12035233
>he was pointing at it, vague
Holy shit, that was his argument? How do people take him seriously? Was he too dumb to just outright say he was speaking from emotion or was that too irrational and mystical to say outright? Even fucking pointing at it is still using language. That's like saying he was pointing at a rock without using his fingers, yet still using his fingers to point.

You prove whether something is true with the law of noncontradiction. Language is a tool for conveying concepts from cognition and it doesn't matter if the tool itself is misinterpreted so long as the premises have no contradiction in the rhetoric. Do people not know what language is?

[Anonymous No.12035296]

>>12035259
the godel analogy is no good. godel did show that problem with self-referential statements (completeness is insignificant when the incompleteness is such a small and specific subset) but Wittgenstein was going much further and saying you can't *prove* anything at all with language. A real echo of Socrates' "all I know is that I know nothing", which interestingly, in Godel fashion, must sit in the 'undecidable' category.

anyway, you're ignoring the crucial fact that wit justified his position with mysticism. that pretty much makes the whole thing a non-starter. Wit is to be read for fun, for mental play, not true conclusions.

[Anonymous No.12035299]

>>12035296
>Wit is to be read for fun, for mental play,
>read it for the mental masturbation, not to really learn about anything
Really?

[Anonymous No.12035300]

>>12035272
I hope you're 12.

[Anonymous No.12035303]

>>12035300
I hope you say something of relevance.

[Anonymous No.12035304]

>>12035296
>Wittgenstein was going much further and saying you can't *prove* anything at all with language.
He's talking natural language (if we mean late Wittgenstein). He is not referencing formal language proofs as you would find in mathematics or formal logic exercises.

>injected shit mysticism in his tractatus
Ah, you're talking about Tractatus. Literally this thread is about late Wittgenstein, not Tractatus. This confusions crops up in every Witty thread. I agree that Tractatus is definitely flawed.

>Language is a tool for conveying concepts from cognition and it doesn't matter if the tool itself is misinterpreted so long as the premises have no contradiction in the rhetoric.
This is literally the point of (late) Wittgenstein.

[Anonymous No.12035334]

>>12035272
I like that some pseud whose never studied Wittgenstein or bothered to understand the evolution and nuance of his work is cavalierly denouncing him based on some other anon's superficial comment.

Wittgenstein is one of the only twentieth century philosophers that both the Angloanalytic folks and the postmodern folks recognize as genuinely great. Wittgenstein's philosophical work is also ultimately humbling because he constantly re-examines, refines, and often rejects his earlier thought as he goes on. Sometime he makes contradictory statements in the same work. Sometimes he makes an analogy that's actually pretty bad. His work is not about glorifying him for finding the One True Answer but rather a humbling perspective on how limited our philosophical pursuits can sometimes be.

[Anonymous No.12035347]

>>12035334
Yes yes, dick suck him all you want. Are you going to claim that the post I responded to was bad or are you just going to act shocked at my reaction to that post?

>the postmodern folks recognize as genuinely great.
I guess if people of authority consider him great that makes him great, no?

>humbling perspective
Fucking lol, nice way to say 'he fucked up and never said anything of importance but he gets an A for effort'. Either you get the truth or you're wrong. There's no in between.

[Anonymous No.12035357]

>>12035304
I stopped reading after the tractatus, assuming he'd stay mystical. good to hear he doesn't. I did pick up his biography though (excellent, do recommend) so I would have found this out sooner or later.

>>12035347
you're an idiot.

[Anonymous No.12035368]

>>12035347
>Are you going to claim that the post I responded to was bad or are you just going to act shocked at my reaction to that post?

Your post isn't shocking, don't kid yourself.

The post you responded to solely concerns Wittgenstein's first work, the Tractatus.
>if we're prohibited from proving things with language...then how did he prove that with language? That was the gist of Russel's point at the time, pre and post publishing.
This has to do with the Tractatus. Wittgenstein comes to understand the Tractatus is flawed by the early 30's. It's important to note that all the philosophers of this area, including Russel and Carnap, were also flawed.

>I guess if people of authority consider him great that makes him great, no?
No it doesn't make him great. It suggests a casual dismissal based on one poorly worded post by some anon might be a bit stupid way to approach it. It suggests you should maybe temper your giddy rejection.

>Fucking lol, nice way to say 'he fucked up and never said anything of importance but he gets an A for effort'. Either you get the truth or you're wrong. There's no in between.
Not only did he say something of importance, his main importance was showing more or less why what you just said is bullshit.

[Anonymous No.12035374]

>>12035368
>No it doesn't make him great.
Then why suggest it or mention it, idiot?

[Anonymous No.12035384]

>>12035368
>his main importance was showing more or less why what you just said is bullshit.
Doubt it because apparently Witty agrees with me on language. You can't bullshit by saying 'oh at least he tried on the road towards truth' and then say he accomplished anything, as that presupposes he reached a truth.
Anyways, I'll read Philosophical Investigations and find out whether he was right or not on language. No amount of causal hand waving will make him right.

[Anonymous No.12035387]

>>12035374
>Then why suggest it or mention it, idiot?
It was about you, not Wittgenstein. You are the one who is cavalierly making grand statements without any knowledge. Plato is considered great across a diverse group of thinkers as well; we are perfectly free to reject Platonism (I certainly don't accept lots of it) but without reading Plato and reading reactions to him I would be a fool to cavalierly dismiss him because I read a paragraph on Wikipedia. My comment was a suggestion to be humble and stop thinking you know everything without having to even engage with anything.

[Anonymous No.12035391]

>>12035384
>Anyways, I'll read Philosophical Investigations and find out whether he was right or not on language.
This is probably not a great place to start because it's a bit tedious to read (like Tractatus). I find Blue/Brown Books and On Certainty to be easier segues into Wittgenstein.

[Anonymous No.12035395]

>>12035387
you know you are right and he is wrong, why are you bothering? surly not to make him happier

[Anonymous No.12035397]

>>12035384
>Doubt it because apparently Witty agrees with me on language.
He agrees with you on language, but your conception of truth and language don't align with each other.

[Anonymous No.12035412]

>>12035387
The point I was arguing is that it does not matter whether the entire universe thinks someone is a genius or idiot, arguments stand on their own merit and whether they hold no contradictions.
Anyways, I have enough self-awareness to know I'm being smug right now, so sorry for that act of annoyance. I understand your intent on dismissing someone based off a reaction. I'm just surprised that his position was so mystical in nature. But I guess that's why people prefer late Witty to early.

>>12035397
My concept of truth is that it is the recognition of reality which holds no contradiction as per the law of noncontradiction. Language is merely a tool to convey concept about concretes which relies on reality and are judged contextually but not merely so, and are still subjugated to the laws of noncontradiction.

Using >>12035233 mention of Russel's contradiction on Witty not being able to prove things with language when language is the basis for communicating concepts is contradictory. It presupposes people from being able to convey any concept. Therefore, it is wrong. The language used to express this contradiction is clear and the interpretation thereby becomes truth as it holds no contradiction until someone points one out. It isn't revolutionary to point out that criticism is the basis of pointing out contradictions to be fixed.

Honestly, reading >>12032348 I think that not accepting the metaphysical law of noncontradiction is likely the flaw of Witty. Of course, I haven't read him yet but this falls in line with the conclusion of not agreeing with me on the concept of truth yet still falling in line with my definition of language. But if you cannot accept the law of noncontradiction as your starting point, you have no starting point and everything becomes undefined.

But again, I'd have to read Philosophical Investigations to judge fully.

[Anonymous No.12035595]

woah look at this

[Anonymous No.12035597]

>>12035595
woah

[Anonymous No.12035599]

>>12035595
goering's there behind Wittgenstein too

[Anonymous No.12036343]

>>12035412
>I think that not accepting the metaphysical law of noncontradiction is likely the flaw of Witty.
It's more that he is talking about natural language discussion and the pure logical formalization of that isnt possible. If I say a sentence that contradicts itself using the very premises I created for the statement then I have made a mistake or I've done something stupid like redefine a word to avoid the contradiction. So there is contradiction in our conversation. In the actual reified universe that is conceived through formal logic axioms of course there is noncontradiction. That's how you make math proofs. Wittgenstein is a mathematician, he knows this. This formal world is NOT what he is talking about in his later work, he is talking natural language games. The reason it is important is because ultimately the vast history of metaphysical/epistemological philosophy makes this error, except for mathematics and people playing very small logic games.

From Culture & Value:
>You always hear people say that philosophy makes no progress and that the same philosophical problems which were already preoccupying the Greeks are still troubling us today. But people who say that do not understand the reason why it has to be so. The reason is that our language has remained the same and always introduces us to the same questions. ... I read: "philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of 'Reality' than Plato got,...". What a strange situation. How extraordinary that Plato could have got even as far as he did! Or that we could not get any further! Was it because Plato was so extremely clever? [last sentence being sarcastic]

[Anonymous No.12036347]

>>12036343
>So there is contradiction in our conversation. In the actual reified universe that is conceived through formal logic axioms of course there is noncontradiction.
this is terribly worded by me. I mean to say that contradictions can exist in regular conversation and show an error in logic. Contradictions cannot exist in the reified universe. However, the conversational contradictions are hard to pinpoint because most natural language conversations are built on layers of layers of foggy semantics being mapped imperfectly to discrete words.

[Anonymous No.12036446]

>>12035124
And the previous points - for the "hermeneutically inclined" we could say - one can find of Heidegger, of whom Witty did read and like Being and Time anyway.
>>12035334
>the postmodern folks recognize as genuinely great
Let's not kid ourselves, only Lyotard bothered with him, while Deleuze had nothing but contempt for him.
>>12035412
>My concept of truth is that it is the recognition of reality which holds no contradiction as per the law of noncontradiction
This is not a theory of truth. Nor do you explain however is one to jump between a "recognition" to a "reality" (Kant say hi) - but especially on how and where to jump from either one of those, in order to identify a logical contradiction to exclude the false.
Would a method to exclude the false also allow us to positively include the truth and only the truth alone, or are we letting in a whole bunch of unknowns, speculations, not-yet-disproven statements, and lumping them with the Capital T Truth because we as-of-yet failed to spot the contradictions? This is what happens when you approach the issue from the side of falsification and not that of truth.
Not only that, but you want this to happen, somehow, without the involvement of language as a prime necessity. Fine, we make a nice formal logic where contradiction isn't allowed, whatever does this have to do with me figuring out whether you are holding a belief that is a justified true belief? Do you really think inquiries of this kind stop with the printing of books on formal logic?
You can't even decide for yourself whether you are looking for a theory of truth that is of correspondence ("recognition of reality" reeks of that) or one of coherence (because of your hunt for contradictions) that somehow does not need any primitive beliefs, not even a language - you hold a belief that a metaphysical law of noncontradiction is all you ever need to solve the problems of epistemology, is it true? Is it justified?
With that out of the way here's a short paper on the early and late Wittgenstein's accounts of truth: https://www.argumenta.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Argumenta-21-Paul-Horwich-Wittgenstein-on-Truth.pdf
>>12036343
Wittgenstein called math a language game too.

[Anonymous No.12036674]

>>12035143
Same, I’m Econ and I learn philosophy from here to impress the qt sociology grad students in my school

[Anonymous No.12036889]

>>12036343
The problem is saying that all language is contradictory, which it isn't. If there's a contradiction, you fix it or add proper context. If fixing or providing context were impossible, no communication would be possible because no one would be able to properly explain what concept they were referring to in the communication. The real problem of language is that single words can be used for multiple meaning thus multiple context. And if a contradiction within the sentence is present, it doesn't mean the conversation is wrong but badly formulated. Using definitions that identify the essential characteristics of concepts if how proper language is used to understand reality. Then proper sentences that hold no contradiction in the words being used to convey concepts as to make sure people do not misunderstand.

[Anonymous No.12036892]

>>12036446
>Would a method to exclude the false also allow us to positively include the truth and only the truth alone, or are we letting in a whole bunch of unknowns, speculations, not-yet-disproven statements, and lumping them with the Capital T Truth because we as-of-yet failed to spot the contradictions?
You're making the presumption of contradictions before they are made. If there are no contradictions that are apparent, then there is no reason to think that any sentence or view is contradictory. If evidence of contradiction is not presented, it become arbitrary. It's the equivalent of someone saying 'you're wrong' and nothing else.

>in order to identify a logical contradiction to exclude the false.
By the law of identity. Obviously. If something is and is not at the same time, it is a contradiction. The law of noncontradiction is simply a colerary of the law of noncontradiction. Honestly you're just asking what is a contradiction. If I make an assumption about reality and it is contradictory, it is not a recognition of reality.

>whatever does this have to do with me figuring out whether you are holding a belief that is a justified true belief? Do you really think inquiries of this kind stop with the printing of books on formal logic?
By explaining your premises and principles as evidence, same as any science. If they themselves hold no contradiction and act as facts of reality, then it is becomes true until a contradiction is shown. Writing and speaking orally is still conveying concepts, there is no difference between the two in designed outcome. You're reading this post right now, would it have changed if I said it instead of writing it?

>you hold a belief that a metaphysical law of noncontradiction is all you ever need to solve the problems of epistemology, is it true? Is it justified?
Yep. Or else it would be contradictory. I experience reality directly with my senses without any analytical-synthesis and gather facts of reality until I understand the world around me through the law of noncontradiction. The metaphysical law of noncontradiction is something that is permanent and seems to me something that most people often forget. It is impossible to ground logic without it.

[Anonymous No.12037082]

>>12036892
>By the law of identity. ... The law of noncontradiction is simply a colerary of the law of noncontradiction.
well 18th century wolffian rationalists would agree with you, as would hegel, but these days we tend not to reify logicial axioms formulated discursively by finite human minds as the metaphysical principles of reality without a really good explanation for doing so

>metaphysical law of noncontradiction is something that is permanent and seems to me something that most people often forget
people don't forget it, it just just been pummeled by 250 years of humeans, kantians, and even logicians showing that it was only ever an arbitrary formulation, incapable of sufficient clarification to ever act as an axiom, nested within language (grammar)

go back to 1750 and you will find lots of people trying to found apodictically ascending logical lattices to create bulletproof rational deductions of reality itself, based on the "first principles" of the principle of noncontradiction and sufficient reason, and coming up with vastly different metaphysical implications every time. hell they couldn't even agree on the logical steps immediately "following" the "laws" of NC/SR, the reason being that NC/SR are irreducibly semantically vague, both in a colloquial sense and in the philosophical sense that ALL language is irreducibly semantically vague. there is a whole century (or several) full of people trying their damnedest to objectively and permanently ground logic on "self-evident," immutable, unmistakeable principles, and disagreeing and mis-taking one another every single time.

[Anonymous No.12037086]

>>12030434
Experience is nothing without thought forming it.

[Anonymous No.12037437]

>>12037082
>we tend not to reify logicial axioms formulated discursively by finite human minds as the metaphysical principles of reality without a really good explanation for doing so
Why? The mind is the only method for understanding reality? By what other standard other than mysticism can you understand reality without including the law on identity and the law of noncontradiction. Nothing has changed.

>it just just been pummeled by 250 years of humeans, kantians, and even logicians showing that it was only ever an arbitrary formulation, incapable of sufficient clarification to ever act as an axiom
Arbitrary? Fucking how? The law of identity and of noncontradiction is the literal metaphysical foundation of reality.

>ALL language is irreducibly semantically vague
Bullshit, you're not using 'vague' language. All language, while at times incorrectly used, is not just some arbitrary whimsical undefined abstraction, unable to form concepts from reality. Centuries of idiots thinking that it is impossible to even form concept is the very root of the problem and why people think that language is simply word game rather than the means of communicating concept. Nothing is self-evident because everything holds true to the law of noncontradiction. You cannot say that a table is the same as the moon when the concept-formation of what a table constitutes and how it is not the moon is obvious. People might not accept the law of noncontradiction but it doesn't mean that they can escape reality and its consequences. At best it's bullshit wishful thinking, at worst it's praying.

Hume just showed everyone that the mind-body dichotomy was idiotic and no one ever found a new standard beyond it, because even Hume rejected the law of noncontradiction.

[Anonymous No.12037511]

>>12037437
>Centuries of idiots
most of your post can be replied to by replying to this. "centuries of idiots," if we could travel back in time and talk to them, would reply exactly as you're replying now: "past centuries of idiots mean nothing about how right IIIIII am, now that i've got it all figured out!"

and yet we look back on those idiots and say "wow, what idiots. they really took that supposedly inarguable 'principle' of non-contradiction' and ran with them to weird and totally contradictory places."

so, rationalists in 1750 (1) insisted on the perfect certainty of the principle of non-contradiction, and (2) would have dismissed the counter-argument "well, a lot of other past people that you strongly disagree with ALSO insisted on it." and now here we are in 2018, where you are doing (1) and (2) exactly as they did, except with the added rider: "yeah, but i'm REALLY right this time, i swear."

which is fine, but i would advise you to not to expect to convince anyone. even strong and narrow-minded logicists nowadays would look at what you're saying here as extremely atavistic, virtually leibnizian, in how it insists on the "self-evidence" of your axioms as if they are inarguable. well, there have been centuries of arguing about just those axioms, and you are advocating what would be considered virtually mystical/theological faith in human logic as the "mirror of the world" (along with various other problematic things, like a correspondence theory of truth, another of the most brutally attacked notions of the 19th/20th centuries).

>You cannot say that a table is the same as the moon when the concept-formation of what a table constitutes and how it is not the moon is obvious.
again, you are reifying your idea of predication as somehow metaphysically self-evident, by concealing within it both a correspondence theory of truth AND a naively realist form of logical atomism AND an entire implicit ontology of "mental contents." none of this is non-problematic, none of this can simply be stated without grounding it incredibly carefully. this is why wittgenstein bracketed out talk of things like "concepts" altogether with his beetle-in-the-box metaphor.

[Anonymous No.12037715]

>>12030394
No, but Ryle did.

[Anonymous No.12037844]

>Using your logical language brain side to systematically dismantle your logical language brain side.

Enlightment for.intps

[Anonymous No.12038590]

>>12037511
Repeating that I'm just arguing in favor of self-evidence is your own bias and speaks nothing to what I've said.

It is not metaphysically self-evident that the law of noncontradiction exists.

[Anonymous No.12038598]

>>12038590
>Nothing is self-evident because everything holds true to the law of noncontradiction.
>You cannot say that a table is the same as the moon when the concept-formation of what a table constitutes and how it is not the moon is obvious.
>People might not accept the law of noncontradiction but it doesn't mean that they can escape reality and its consequences.

these seem like pretty categorical statements about what "is" and what "isn't" "the case" about "reality," to me, man.

[Anonymous No.12038622]

>>12038598
Are you literally dense?
You can classify what a moon is and what a table is by its unit and its essence. If I say that a moon is a celestial object rotating around a planet and a table is a concept to place object on and to eat, etc, then it's not just 'self evident' but provable by their differences and classification. The law of noncontradiction and the law of identity say that because a thing is what it is and not anything else, it isn't just 'self evident' that they are not the same but the constituents of its whole are not the same to others.
To say that a table is the same as a moon is contradictory because a moon cannot be a moon and a table at the same time as it violates the law of identity. It's not 'self-evident' but that it is truth by virtue of not having any contradiction.

[Anonymous No.12038622,2]

>>12034032
>>12033923
>>12033403
Read Spengler.