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11104580 No.11104580 [Reply] [Original]

>2 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts
2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).
>2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.

I do not understand the last proposition. How can an object contain the possibility of a state of affair in which he is not? If non-being is a possibility within the object, then in that possibility it cannot be in connection to any other object or fact. When thinking of an apple for instance, I cannot think of a situation where there are other objects but no apple because that possibility is not contained within the apple.
I understand of course how is the proposition true when the object is, but not when the object is not (as possibilities of course).
Maybe I'm brainlet and completely misunderstood the point Wittgenstein was making, but if that's the case I'd appreciate some clarifications, thanks.

>> No.11104674

>>11104580
States of affairs are defined in terms of atomic facts. Atomic facts are defined in terms of objects. Therefore, states of affair are defined in terms of objects. What exactly do you not understand? (I'm legit asking, I'm not mocking you).

>> No.11104679

>>11104674
To clarify: what Wittgenstein is saying is basically "look, states of affairs are nothing but various combinations between objects". That's why objects "contain the possibility of all states of affairs".

>> No.11104702

>>11104679
>>11104679
Ok I guess I misunderstood the statement. The way I understood it : "Each object, taken individually, has in it the possibility of all state of affairs", but from what you're saying, I understand that Wittgeinstein was referring to the totality of objects, taken as a whole, having the possibility to from all states of affairs rather than each object taken individually being capable of that.

>> No.11104728

>>11104702
Oh, know I see what you meant. No, it's clear that Wittgenstein is thinking about the totality of objects. Which makes sense. How could an apple, for example, contain the possibility of the fact that I have a glass in my hand? The fact that I have glass in my hand is a combination between two objects, i.e., the glass and me. That's why the glass and me contain the possibility of the fact that I'm holding the glass.

>> No.11104738

>>11104728
Alright, thanks for the clarification. I wish happiness and good fortune for the rest of your life.

>> No.11104744

>>11104738
wish you*