/lit/ - Literature

>>22729680
You sure are desperate. Maybe you should have picked something a little easier for the first read?

>>22729680
>starting now
>read it now

>>22729706
I'll fix it if I remember
>>22729704
You are free to ignore these threads

>>22729734
>I'll fix it if I remember
the guy this is for probably died

>>22729704
holy shit, not really. judgement of a memory is clearly something else, you will figure out with Schopenhauer, but let's just say he does not know which part is coming from where

>>22729680
>During the first week [15.11 - 22.11] we'll read the Preface & Introduction
SLOW THE FUCK DOWN.

>If this is too little, we'll adjust.
*facepalm*

Anon, I have to be blunt: the intended audience for CPR was 18th century philosophy professors, people already had started with the Greeks, were way more educated, and infinitely smarter, than your average Neechee misreading 4chanistani-- AND EVEN THEY GOT FILTERED. If you don't want this reading group to die before it even starts do PARAGRAPHS (yes literally paragraphs because I guarantee you will spend 30min re-reading a paragraph because you will have no idea what it means).

I want this thing to exist. I literally read Kant everyday, but my experience on here has shown me that this book filters so many people so hard that unless anons read it religiously (I mean hours on end just sitting, their concentration [which unfortunately is in short supply today] fixed on the text) VERY few anons will make it past the Transcendental Aesthetic (as countless threads on Kant have clearly and indubitably revealed) if even that.

GOT MIT UNS

>>22729680
bump

>>22729680
>Which edition/translation?
Also, anon you need to specify which edition, not just translation, but the actual original German first or second edition since there are major differences between them (different prefaces, certain sections COMPLETELY re-written, certain sections COMPLETELY removed, certain sections added). Most current translations have both editions, but (for this project) I do not recommend reading the differing sections consecutively since this will just filter even more people: stick to one edition at first and read that all the way through. I recommend the second edition since that was Kant's definitive statement on theoretical philosophy (there were more editions after the second but they all were more or less the same as the second) and the edition that became famous and most later philosophers only read this edition and responded to it. The first edition is more for people who are really, really into Kant.

One more thing, I do not recommend Guyer/Wood because that is a literal translation from the German which will make reading it even harder. For newfags I think the old Meiklejohn translation best because he rephrases Kant's words in actually readable English (and what matter's as a new reader and getting an understanding of the whole of the text instead of dwelling on technical particularities-- which will always be there for those that want more Kant. There is good amazon review I posted one time that explains why Meiklejohn is better. I'll look for it and post it. In the meantime here is a quote from Kant on focusing getting through and understanding the whole work instead of getting caught up on particular passages (which is why readability is so important).

>I must, therefore, leave the task of clearing up the obscurities of the present work—inevitable, perhaps, at the outset—as well as, the defence of the whole, to those deserving men, who have made my system their own. A philosophical system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to particular passages, while the organic structure of the system, considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their connection and comparing them with one another, it is easy to pick out apparent contradictions, especially in a work written with any freedom of style. These contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement of others, but are easily reconciled by those who have mastered the idea of the whole.

>>22729680
>The world is my representation of space and time
Arthur was right.

The promised Amazon review:

Please note that I am reviewing only the Guyer-Wood translation, not the work itself.

There are four previous English translations of this work: Francis Haywood (1838, revised 1848); JMD Meiklejohn (1855); F Max Müller (1881, revised 1896); and NK Smith (1929). All of these (save the first) have considerable merit. Meiklejohn shows considerable skill in making Kant speak idiomatic English. As Müller points out, however, Meiklejohn not infrequently flounders in Kant's monstrous gothic sentences, and loses the thread of meaning. As a native German speaker and scholar of language, Müller's 1881 version set the standard for this work for intelligibility, clarity, and readability.

Smith's version has been standard for many years, but even a cursory comparison of Müller with Smith will show that Müller often has a clearer grasp of the German, and provides a better expression of the key concepts. Smith had also come under the influence of the radical neo-Kantians, and his translation suffers severely from that.

Prospective readers of a great philosopher's work come to the work with certain expectations. They have the right to expect - nay demand - prose that reflects that greatness. Kant's great work is a work of literature, and must be respected as any other work of literature. He often employs literary devices (such as metaphor) to make his point clearer. Sensitivity to idiomatic English style must be paramount in the translation of so difficult a work as this.

>>22730276
[continued]

In short: Translating a work of this kind calls for special talents. Guyer and Wood, unfortunately, do not possess these talents.

They have no credentials in literary translation, translation theory, or semiotics. Despite this, they have installed themselves as General Editors of the Cambridge Kant translation series.

They expressly affirm that they have tried not to 'interpret' as they translate, but to translate 'literally', and leave interpretation to the reader. The difficulty is that such a stance is ideological, rather than practical, and as such it is unsupportable.

Their translation follows the original in a slavish, word-for-word fashion. The results are wooden and unnatural, and often unintelligible. For a truly successful translation of a work such as this, it is absolutely necessary to interpret, and to rewrite the interpretation in idiomatic English, specifically late 18th-century philosophical English. Often, complete reconstruction of the sentence is necessary. Guyer and Wood never do this, and are in fact incapable of doing this.

There is no excuse for allowing a translation to be unintelligible or unidiomatic. If there are textual problems in the original (and in this text there are many) the translator must attempt to resolve them. Simply passing them along for the reader to dispose of (even though the reader may be utterly incapable of 'interpreting' the resulting gibberish), in the name of 'accuracy', is a mistaken notion. It does no-one any good. The translator, not the author, will be blamed.

As a consequence, the Guyer-Wood translation is the worst ever of this work, except for the very first one from 1838, by Francis Haywood, and for the same reasons, cited by JMD Meiklejohn in his translation of the Critique, published in 1855. Speaking of Haywood's primitive, literal, word-for-word approach, Meiklejohn remarks:

"A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader; but in this case the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary."

>>22730280
[continued]

The same can be said of the Guyer and Wood translation. It is interesting that Guyer and Wood, in their preface, praise the very Haywood translation denounced by Meiklejohn, because (they say) it was so 'literal' (folks, I'm not making this up!).

This is quite revealing of the incompetence of these two translators. The best translation of this work was that of F. Max Müller, in 1881/1896. How do I know? I checked them all!

For example, the Guyer-Wood team show their insensitivity to English usage by translating the expression "gewöhnliches Schicksal" as "customary fate", which is un-idiomatic and totally absurd. 'Fate' has nothing to do with 'custom'; in fact, this is an oxymoron. Fate has to do with things that are beyond men's control. What is 'customary' has to do with what men habitually do. (The correct choices include "usual fate" or perhaps "common fate".) This absurdity appears to be a direct consequence of Guyer and Wood's stated preference for using a single English term to render a single German term. But it results in absurdities like 'customary fate'.

Translation of one language into another requires thought and interpretation. It is not a mechanical process. The words are not numbers that can be processed as if through a computer, though Guyer and Wood approach it that way. For that reason, Guyer and Wood simply have no business translating anything. They are incompetent; among other things, they import medieval meanings into Kant's text, something for which they have no legitimate basis. This work demands a sensitivity to language, and an ability to write in an English style that is readable. Guyer and Wood lack that ability.

They have stated that their translation is intended for academics and scholars. No translation, though, can ever take the place of the original for scholarly purposes, no matter how carefully and scrupulously the work is performed. Translations are suitable only for introductory to intermediate classes. Anyone attempting serious study of a work of this kind must refer to the original, and that means learning to cope with Kant's somewhat idiosyncratic German.

Because Guyer and Wood do not understand the limitations of the process of translation, their work is misguided. That in turn has led them to make unfortunate choices in their translation. For this reason, and because they themselves have no apparent literary talent, this translation cannot be recommended.

>>22730281
>The best translation of this work was that of F. Max Müller, in 1881/1896
unfortunately Müller only translated the first edition.

Any anons read the Penguin revised Müller translation?

>>22730280
>For a truly successful translation of a work such as this, it is absolutely necessary to interpret, and to rewrite the interpretation in idiomatic English
and this is an ideological stance that he already accused Guyer/Wood on taking

captcha: k2nt

f

>>22730281
>>22730373
FUUUUUUUUUUUUK What do?

How does this work anyway? This week is for reading AND discussing or is it for reading only?

>>22730580
For starters, you could refrain from taking an amazon review at face value. From my understanding Guyer/Wood is used in academy for it's accuracy

Okay so for all us ebook tards you could've given us the fucking links to the book to get started with that specific edition, don'tcha think?

>>22730580
>>22730621
>>22730691
just read the meiklejohn edition. it's has a cheap dover paperback edition for like $12 and it's public domain so there are free online editions everywhere. I read the version on wikisource for free all the time. it's also the the most readable translation i've read (I haven't read Müller though) here is the link:

https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Critique_of_Pure_Reason_(Meiklejohn)

>>22730621
The example he gives (gewöhnliches Schicksaal <> customary fate) does indeed back his claim, and frankly I don't have much trust in the anglo academia when it comes to non-english stuff. My initial intention was to read the Critique in German, but I'd probably need a few more months to get to that level. Now it appears that reading it in English might be more trouble than it's worth.

>>22730711
there is also a free intro to Kant on wikisource to get you up to speed.

also, I forgot to add that the meiklejohn translation is of the second edition, but as I said in my other post, this is the most read edition and the one most responded to by post-kantian philosophers.

picrel is also free on googlebooks:
https://books.google.com/books?id=u2kRAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+philosophy+of+kant+explained&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&source=gb_mobile_search&ovdme=1&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwibmp3V9M2CAxXsj2oFHYxLC6IQ6AF6BAgJEAM#v=onepage&q=the%20philosophy%20of%20kant%20explained&f=false

>>22730738
>there is also a free intro to Kant on wikisource to get you up to speed.
forgot to post link:

https://en.m.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Harvard_Classics_Vol._51/Philosophy_IV..

>>22730691
>>22730711
>>22730738
also I forgot to add I am not OP I am the INTELLEKTUELLE ANSCHAUUNG guy

>>22730711
Thanks mate. Has anyone ever seen a bilingual (English / German) edition?

>>22730756
>Has anyone ever seen a bilingual (English / German) edition?
unfortunately I don't believe there is one.

I should also add that for some unbeknownst perhaps incomprehensible reason Dover left out the second edition preface in their Dover Philosophical Classics edition, but fortunately the version on wikisource has both prefaces.

As far as the German version, wikisources German site has the first edition:

https://de.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Index:Critik_der_reinen_Vernunft_(1781)

but unfortnately they do not have the second edition so you will have to look elsewhere.

>>22730786
>but unfortnately they do not have the second edition so you will have to look elsewhere.
The problem with German editions is that there are new ones with contemporary orthography, but so far I haven't found them.

>>22730933
>contemporary orthography
I hate this too. I think Fraktur is the best and makes reading German more fun but if you use it now ignorant retards think you are a Nazi. Such a shame.

But DeGruyter publishes 1902 Prussian Academy edition in Fraktur. I got lucky and found a relatively cheap ($30 USD) of the Second Edition Critique, but normally they are pricey. But they are available for free on google books methinks.

Here is first edition in original Fraktur:

https://books.google.com/books/about/Critik_der_reinen_Vernunft.html?id=TQHYROUGD4kC&printsec=frontcover&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&source=gb_mobile_entity&hl=en&gl=US&ovdme=1#v=onepage&q&f=false

Here is second edition:

https://books.google.com/books?id=qZEPAAAAQAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

>>22730933
>there are new ones with contemporary orthography, but so far I haven't found them.
I apologise I misread your post? So you prefer contemporary orthography?

>>22730977
>now ignorant retards think you are a Nazi
AFAIK Hitler was against the older scripts and wanted to impose newer ones.

>contemporary orthography
Actually I meant the contemporary German spelling. Like Kritik instead of Critik. My German is poor enough, so I want every bit of advantage I can get.

>>22730984
>So you prefer contemporary orthography?
Yes my good sir.

>>22730977
here is my German copy but unfortunately I am still not good at German so for now it is just nice to look at. Such sad :(

>>22731046
>Hitler was against the older scripts and wanted to impose newer ones.
true. which is why I find it stupid when people call it Nazi lettering.

>>22730735
Just do what I do and create a running glossary of recurring technical terms. I'd rather just know cognition is the word they're using for erkenntnis.

>>22731065
unfortnately I have met too many people who think anything before post-WW2 Germany = Nazi, as if Germany didn't exist before Hitler. But such is human ignorance...

>>22730742
Thanks... this brought the word "valetudinarian" to my brainlet ass

>>22730711
>>22730756
do NOT read Meiklejohn. His translation is the worst of the english ones. It is simply inaccurate and in the worst case will give you false ideas of what Kant said. If you want alternatives go for Pluhar or Kemp Smith

There really should be no need for debate over the translation. Guyer is absolutely standard and high quality. Of course you can find things to niggle about but it was a much needed and long awaited improvement over Kemp Smith.

Don't let some autistic perfectionism prevent you from just reading the fucking book.

Sorry, anglobros. Kant cannot be translated. You will have to learn German.

man it will be really embarrassing if you quit. your fault for choosing a such a difficult book.

>>22731319
but it's less embarrassing since it's a hard book, no? Your logic doesn't make sense

>>22731356
:( you're right

>>22731270
>>22731282
Anons I have already given reasons for why a noob should read meiklejohn, which these anons have in no way refuted-- if you want to be a scholar of Kant learn German, otherwise you don't need an unreadable word for word dictionary english to german transcription like Guyer/Wood-- you need something readable in IDIOMATIC ENGLISH. Otherwise you won't understand a damn thing anyways and you've wasted your valuable time. At least with Meikllejohn you can read through THE WHOLE THING-- which again as Kant stated in the second preface-- is what matters. Then you can nitpick about particular issues of translation because you now have the idea of the whole within which those particular issues have their context. I can tell you first hand I have read both Guyer/Wood and Meiklejohn and will take Meiklejohn over Guyer/Wood any day of the week. If I need more clarification I refer back to the German text. But I doubt anyone here is that into Kant to actually do that and just wants to get through the Critique at least once in their life-- which again makes the Meiklejohn translation preferable for the reason it is ACTUALLY READABLE ENGLISH-- not to mention free.

>>22731074
Great idea. And great example. However, my biggest difficulty so far is with German syntax in long sentences. It's quite standard in German, but in English it often feels unnatural.

>>22731060
I just can't read this script. I can't tell which is s and which is ß. Like it appears that Erkenntnis is spelled with ß. Or that dass is spelled daß. Looks neat, though.

>>22731299
:( I know

>>22731299
>Sorry, anglobros. Kant cannot be translated. You will have to learn German.
I'm glad I'm not a anglobro.
I'm a proud turd worlder.

>>22731439
You know what? Fuck it. Fuck the english translations I'll read it in my native language too.

>>22731439
>>22731452
how tf are we going to communicate if we are all using different translations then damn it? Our whole project is going to shit. OP do something!!!

>>22731477
Every paragraph has a number no? Just refer to that number or something

>>22731439
Why is it that there aren't that many Brazilian immigrants? From the outside, I have the impression that Brazil must be doing some things right.

>>22731485
>Every paragraph has a number no?
no. some editions have bekker numbers referring to the pages of the akademie edition, but not all editions have this.

>>22731477
Nah it's all very standard, translations should not be an issue

Once again I am stressing to anyone in doubt, just fucking use the Guyer. It's the standard one everybody uses. It's not controversial or anything. It's just a good solid translation that also benefited from a century of people complaining about Kemp Smith. Kant's use of terms is extremely specific and repetitive, and Guyer goes out of his way to be consistent with translating all these key terms so that even if you don't like his translation you can at least reliably substitute the original German. There's a reason his critical introduction is so long.

>>22729680
I am in

>>22731498
>Why is it that there aren't that many Brazilian immigrants?
Brazilian booty is too powerful.

>>22731498
There actually are a lot of Brazilian immigrants but they all return back home immediately once they realize there are no vines to swing from

>>22731507
>no vines to swing from
?

>>22731504
Yes, indeed. Brazilian booty seems exceptional.

OP here. We will stick with Guyer. It is the most common version read today and it is used in most classes. We will not change to Meiklejohn based on one amazon review. This version might have it's problems but I believe it will have less problems for us in the long run.

>>22731439
Based af, been wanting to buy that but I'm a poorfag brhuehue

>>22731509
He's referencing Tarzan and jungle apes that swing from tree to tree by vines, man

>>22729680
>Be Cambridge edition
>100-page editors introduction

Really? The mofos must think VERY high of themselves to stick a mothafuckin 100-page introduction summarizing the book I'm about to read. Gimme one good reason to read their biased account before the damn work itself

>>22731529
*slams fists on table*
DAMN IT ANONS. ok... I concede... but when this reading group fizzles out in the next few weeks (as it inevitably will since I guarantee the Guyer/Wood translation will absolutely filter our anons by the time they reach the Transcendental Analytic) you will see for yourself the mistake you have made-- in any case, are we reading first or second edition?

>>22731593
I personally skipped it. Fuck that shit

>>22731633
me too

>>22731593
>>22731633
>>22731650
>gets filtered by intoductory materials
ohhhhh boy.... my doubts are already being confirmed.

>>22731661
You mean introductory bullshit

>>22731605
Warum ist Wonka ein Deutscher Idealist?

>>22731661
What? I've just started today with the preface. When am I supposed to read that introduction?

>>22731676
We are not reading the introductions by the editors and translators and whatnot. You can do that if you want

>>22731676
Well, in order to better understand Kant's writings before actually reading them, one would benefit from the editors' introduction, which explains their method of translation, editorial decisions, and tries to summarize what the book is about

>>22731671
Vergib mir weil meine Deutsch ist nicht gut. Ich will nur sagen dass die Antwort kann nur gefunden sein durch viele Besichtigungen des Films.

>>22731705
yes, there is the post-military mind. just let it go.

>>22731705
>which explains their method of translation, editorial decisions
Did that. It confirms some of the problems stated in the amazon review

> tries to summarize what the book is about
Fuck that shit. I'm going in commando.

>>22731717
>the post-military mind
what are you talking about?

>>22731722
>Fuck that shit. I'm going in commando.
>t. Leeroy Jenkins
we all know how that turned out.

>>22731713
Erstens, bin ich mir sicher dass mein Deutsch schlechter ist. Zweitens, ich habe die filme noch nicht Gesehen. Aber kennst vielleicht du eine gute Website wo man über Deutsche Syntax lernen kann?

>>22731746
>kennst vielleicht du
kennst du vielleicht

>>22731593
>>22731633
>>22731650
>>22731668
>>22731676
>>22731705
You don't have to read the introduction. It's not bad actually but feel free to skip. Or skim it here and there to see if any parts help you.

>>22731746
>gute Website wo man über Deutsche Syntax lernen kann?
Es tut mir leid aber ich kenne nicht. Ich habe nur durch den Grammatikbücher und Wörterbücher Deutsch gelernt. Ich muss sagen dass ich habe das Deutsch eine schwere Sprache zu lernen gefunden.

>>22731868
>das Deutsch eine schwere Sprache zu lernen gefunden.
Ich auch, und bin ein ESL. Wenn du ein Anglo bist, wird es Schwieriger, glaub' ich.

>nur durch den Grammatikbücher und Wörterbücher Deutsch gelernt
beeindruckend

Are we reading A or B?

>>22732130
bboth, they are just synthesized in most modern editions. that's why guyer has both editions' prefaces.

>>22732134
*facepalm*
I give up. You retards are setting yourselves up for failure. Stick to one edition. I apologize for being an ass but I really want this group to succeed and you faggots are not making it easy.

>>22732159
Reminder that this fucking Amazon review retard is deliberately sabotaging the general for some reason.

>>22732175
I guess he got filtered himself so now he is trying to demoralize as much as he can lmao

>>22732175
>sabotaging
LOL. You retards are doing it to yourselves. At this point this dumpster fire of a reading group has become an amusement which I will now step back from and enjoy watching its predictable collapse from a safe distance.

>>22732219
>demoralize
I've literally been trying to avert this but ok

>>22732227
OK

>>22732159
Ok then which edition is better to read first

>>22729680
>he's right but he didn't try hard enough

>>22732292
don't feed the troll

>>22732292
I already told you guys: second or "B" edition

>>22732227
You're free to start the discussion yourself, asshole, instead of complaining about the same shit over and over

>>22732301
>troll
you call the one anon actively trying to help the reading group succeed based off years of his own direct experience reading the first critique a troll. ok.

>>22732329
believe me I have tried to help anons for years and for years I see anons get filtered over and over again. I had given up completely but then I saw thus thread and thought maybe this time it would be different and maybe I could help anons out.

>>22732347
Then help them, what's keeping you?

>>22732355
Are you joking? I literally have been doing this the entire thread. Every post with a Kant picrel up to this point has been me.

Retard here. Could someone explain what Kant means by “experience”?

>>22732366
Dude all you've been doing is complain about the edition

>>22732422
The German word is "Erfahrung", a noun formed from the verb "erfahren" composed of the prefix "er-" which suggests "result" or "getting something out of something" and "fahren" which means something like "to go, to travel". So "erfahren" means something like "to get something out of going out or traveling" and "Erfahrung" is that which you get out of that traveling, like what you learned from your travels or the memories of travels, what you take back with you, mentally speaking; not too different with how you use "experience" in English. The implication however is that experience comes about through your senses-- you experiences gained through seeing, hearing, feeling, etc.

>>22732441
and more. and for good reason.

b

>>22732472
>>22732768
yes, stop laughing, spousal hire

>>22732422
Anything derived from sense-data from the external world, or more accurately and more specifically, from experience of contingent experiences of particular things in the actual world. So this would include contingent experiences of one's "internal life" as well - because the key thing making something experience or experiential is that it is not a formal condition of thought reasoning on its own terms. It's something that had to be learned from the external world, meaning the world EXTERNAL TO the FORMAL CONDITIONS of thinking itself.

Basically think of experience as anything derived from particular, empirical interactions with contingent entities in the real world. Kant presupposes a duality in consciousness, between "merely" formal contents and empirical contents of thoughts. Empirical contents come from experiences. They are knowledge of this or that thing, which we then of course abstract into knowledge of classes of things, like dogs or planets let's say. One of the features of experiences is that they are always contingent and particular. We see a million dogs do a million jumps, we see a trillion stars following the same paths every night. But a million or a trillion is still a finite number of particular contingent things particularly and contingently acting a certain way. We derive concepts and posit laws about these things, but these are still ultimately conform to the many particular cases we have experienced.

On the other hand, non-experiential or pre-experiential, FORMAL thoughts, do not have any content "about" or "referring to" any particular contingent, i.e. actually existing entities. For example we don't have any "experience of" the concept of substance, or of cause. Rather substances and causes are formal conditions of forming any kind of thought at all about particular contingent substances (like dogs or planets) and the causal relations between them. These formal conditions underlie our conceptual judgements about the world. They are still "there" when we abstract away from all experience. We can say that A does not equal not-A, regardless of any PARTICULAR A, and prior to any experience.

>>22732839
Note that this commits Kant to a kind of mental logicism, what Wittgenstein later calls the "ideal language" belief, still prevalent among many analytic philosophers who believe (consciously or simply simply instinctively) that our thought is basically "propositional" - that is to say, that thought is structured "like" or "in" logical judgements, their modes, etc., and that the most basic thought of "knowing something to be the case" is somehow "like" the proposition "X is Y." This shows up in Frege, Russell, and in Wittgenstein's early logical "atomism" in which all significant thoughts are quasi-propositional and somehow "refer to" "facts" or "states of affairs" "in the world." This is very similar to rationalist conceptions that influenced Kant. Kant believes the mind thinks in logic, or that the logic of the textbooks, which (in the CPR prefaces) he says has not needed to change much since Aristotle's laying it down. Why? Because it's basically just a phenomenological exposition or mirroring (or something like that) of thought's actual mechanisms.

Many later philosophers will criticize or at least complicate Kant's thinking on this, by saying that even the very language we use (for example, the language of "categories," "concepts," "substance," and so forth), is all ITSELF gotten by "experience," that is, experience with the THOUGHTS and LANGUAGE of other people who lived before us. For example, we wouldn't have the notion "substance" if not for the Greeks laying it down, and the Romans translating it into Latin, and the scholastics taking up the Latin jargon etc. But when reading Kant, it's good to just take for granted his logicist conception of cognition, in which BASICALLY any thinking mind is going to have a concept like cause, a concept of substance, etc., if it really abstracts away from all contingent experience. You can see this conception of thought already operative at the beginning of scholasticism in Anselm's writings in the 11th century.

>>22732840

The criticism that Kant's categories are themselves contingent ends up being basically the same criticism levelled at Husserl's transcendental phenomenology too, by the post-Husserlian phenomenologists - again for the same reason that this transcendental phenomenology presupposes that the structures it is positing as part of consciousness (Husserl's noetic structures, Kant's logicist categories and judgement-forms and such) are not "pure" but contingent, i.e. derived from experience. But this isn't necessarily fatal to the whole enterprise of transcendental idealism/phenomenology. We just need to carefully differentiate between experience in the sense of human cultural, linguistic, and conceptual forms, which are historically contingent, and experience in the sense of shit derived from contingent experiences of contingent beings in the actual world (so, anything involving contingent sense-data we receive, e.g. from a dog or planet). When Kant says experience he means the LATTER. You don't have to agree with his categorial deduction, or his faith in the basic structure of ancient/medieval + contemporary Leibnizian rationalist logic, to follow along with his distinction between "external" experience (of contingent particulars) and "internal" formal conditions of experience.

One thing to keep in mind as you read Kant is that he's almost always talking about logic and logical relations when he talks about the apriori or pure reason. He's not doing the kind of radical scepticism that many people imagine when they picture the phenomenal/noumenal distinction, for instance. We moderns are much more influenced by what is often called perspectivalism and coherentism, so we tend to take Kant beyond what he himself envisioned or intended and throw a kind of veil of radical sceptical doubt over the whole external world. But Kant thinks the moon is really there, he thinks nature is more or less really out there, as we see it and find it in our experiences, which we then order into Newtonian astrophysical observations etc. He's inquiring into whether we can ever have CERTAIN, FINAL knowledge of nature's ULTIMATE causes and "essences" and so on. And this entails a logical, formal inquiry, into the sources and nature of human thoughts' ability to attribute "certainty" and "finality" to its judgements (which are, as I explained above, either propositions or similar to propositions in some way).

>>22732877
>But Kant thinks the moon is really there, he thinks nature is more or less really out there, as we see it and find it in our experiences, which we then order into Newtonian astrophysical observations etc.
only insofar as "out there" means in space, which as you know(according to Kant), is not absolute but dependent on the peculiar or idiosyncratic way humans (at least) intuit or "see" things. It's not "out there" in absolute sense, as if space existed even if no humans existed.

>>22732877
NTA but this is helpful stuff, thanks

>>22733031
I think Kant thinks that it IS out there, in an objective sense, i.e., even if humans didn't exist to perceive it. But you are correct that he doesn't think it is out there spatially, in the way that we perceive space. But this doctrine is a perfectly familiar one within Leibniz/Wolff rationalism: for Leibniz, spatial and temporal relations between substantial entities (in his case, the monads and God) are "well-founded phenomena." They don't exist objectively of themselves, but we can/do speak of them reliably "as if" they did.

Kant is insistent that the real world, from which we get our sense data, exists. He just doesn't know its ultimate form or nature "to itself." But by remembering Leibniz's weird-ass monadology, and Spinoza's weird-ass modal monism too for that matter, we can get a sense of what kinds of alternative "what-is-really-out there's" Kant COULD (and did) conceive of as candidates for what is "behind" our experiences of spatio-temporally structured phenomena.

The question for him is whether we can ever use pure Reason (Vernunft), as opposed to Understanding (Verstand) and Intuition* (Anschauung), to prove things about the objects of our experience. Our Understanding cooperates with our Intuition (perception) to structure our world as a series of spatio-temporal entities in causal relationships with one another, but we want to know what is behind these entities and their apparent relations - again, are there many but finite substances? Is there one big substance (Spinoza's monism, or a form of materialism)? None of THESE sorts of entities are given to us in empirical experience, of sensuously given objects like dogs in three-dimensional space. If you want to argue that, e.g., dogs are really instantiations of a single dog-essence, or "modes" of one Spinozist substance, you need to argue as Spinoza and Leibniz did, from pure Reason - using pure logic.

THIS is the launching point of Kant's inquiry: When we seek to go beyond the coordinated activity of Understanding / Intuition (perception) that gives us our ordinary and familiarly structured experience of the world, and ask ultimate (i.e. metaphysical) questions about what lies behind all these contingent entities, we call upon Reason. But can Reason actually tell us anything? Is that a valid function of Reason - to go BEYOND Understanding and Intuition (perception)? Or does it have some other function? (Hint: Kant's answer is this last one - Reason is regulative and should never "operate on its own").

* Intuition is a famously bad translation, a legacy of one of Kant's translators (Kemp Smith I think). An-schauen means "on-looking," looking on something, while intuition suggests to most people the idea of looking into something, seeing through to its core, which is the opposite of what Kant intends.

>>22733066
>I think Kant thinks that it IS out there, in an objective sense, i.e., even if humans didn't exist to perceive it.
What is "out there" is not phenomena, not spatial, not temporal (which I acknowledge you admit in the following sentence). But the problem with you saying Kant thinks there is something "out there" is that one has to recognize this is pure metaphor. It is not the moon; it is not nature; it is nothing that can be ordered with the categories of thought: the Ding an sich is unknown and in principle unknowable, and any claim that phenomena correspond in some way to the Ding an sich, whatever it may be, is to commit the error of applying the categories of substance and causality beyond (per Kant) their only legitimate domain. In other words, by claiming there is someting "out there" (metaphorically speaking of course since space is idiosyncratic to humans) you have already passed beyond applying the Categories to proximate causes and matter (what Kant calls 'phenomenal substance") and attempted the theoretical use of the Categories beyond phenomena to that which lies beyond phenomena, and therefore beyond experience. From the standpoint of the theoretical use of reason, even this use is forbidden according to Kantian principles.

Basically, for the same reasons that reason in its theoretical use cannot obtain knowledge about the Soul, Freedom, or God, reason in its theoretical use cannot obtain knowledge even of the Ding an sich. It is, in effect, an object of faith or belief, in the same way the other Ideas of Reason are.

As far as Spinoza's and Leibniz's speculations about what the Ding an sich is, for Kant that is a moot point, having no possible way to affirm their truth or falsity since they are (as you admit) beyond experience. And this is why Kant is so devastating to metaphysics in the traditional sense of "the science of Being qua Being" since we cannot know anything other than Being qua phenomena.

Let me emphasize: the Ding an sich , "the real world", is not an actuality for Kant-- we do NOT KNOW it actually exists or is or whatever (in fact, even using words like existence or being is already a misuse of the categories of reality, substance, causality, etc,) It is, effectively, for us humans NOTHING. To put even more clear, even our concept of nothing does not correspond to it, since it can never be an object of our thought-- if we think we are thinking or talking about it WE. ARE. NOT. It cannot be spoken about; it cannot be conceived. Not even the word "Nothing" corresponds to it.

This is the logical conclusion of the Kantian system-- the missing capstone of the Great Pyramid.

>>22733187
depressing as fuck

>>22733187
I agree with you that Kant is ultimately respectably extreme about denying that anything in our minds corresponds, in terms of its content, to anything objectively beyond our minds. But he DOES believe the "X" is there - the external world. Only the post-Kantian idealists broke with him on this - and then, really, only Fichte did, and even he didn't really, since even for Fichte the forms external to the world-positing "Ego" still have a KIND of objectivity.

I strongly recommend looking into the "moderate realist" interpretation of Kant, in my opinion the most respectable one. What we could call the "strong coherentist," quasi-Fichtean reading is simply not what Kant intended. I think it distorts one's reading of Kant if one has this in mind while reading him, even if one ultimately thinks it is a logically necessary entailment of Kant's own thought.

Again, I think it's very important to visualize what Kant visualized while reading Kant. That's all. Kant's visualization of the noumenal is more like "It is undecidable whether it is Leibnizian or Spinozist, because logically Vernunft can't tell us" than some kind of nihilistic-sceptical radical doubt that anything is out there at all. YOU can argue that the latter is entailed by Kant's idealism, but Kant definitely did not think this. That's all. Kant did NOT picture a black void beyond experience. He had genuine and sincere faith in God, the immortality of the soul, human freedom, etc. His statement that he wanted to humble reason to make room for faith is perfectly sincere, "just what it says on the tin."

I think it's important that people keep this optimistic, faithful, "moderate realist" Kant in mind when they read him, otherwise they end up misreading him as this nihilistic who imagines a black void. This was a mistake I made going into Kant, being more familiar with subsequent phenomenology and (as I think most people do) "pushing" Kant's ideas further than he pushed them himself.

>Let me emphasize: the Ding an sich , "the real world", is not an actuality for Kant-- we do NOT KNOW it actually exists
This I think is the only outright error in your post. Kant is emphatic that it is "out there" (I deliberately avoid "exists," for the reasons you note). In fact, Kant was somewhat misinterpreted on this note by Fichte (as noted above, Fichte is the one who said "why even bother maintaining Kant's 'X'? Just derive all external reality from the Ego, ultimately") and by both Reinhold and the very young Schelling on this note. Or I should say, they correctly interpreted it as a gap or failure in Kant's system, but they misinterpreted Kant's REASONS for leaving this gap in his system - for Kant, it IS "covered," by a kind of faith that is not unrelated to Hume's notion of faith (cf. the game of backgammon) and Hamann's and Jacobi's appropriation of this (Glauben).

I strongly warn all participants in this reading group against the "ultra-sceptical black void" interpretation of Kant.

>>22733063
Also thanks. Sorry for all the typos and ESLisms in my posts. I just really love Kant and want to help people bypass all the little annoying hurdles to understanding him.

I should add to this post >>22733298 that I think the ultra-sceptical black void interpretation is necessary to keep in mind as a massive problem with Kant, so I don't mean to dismiss it. I just think that it shouldn't be mistaken for what Kant himself thought.

>>22733298
>he DOES believe the "X" is there - the external world
I do not disagree with you. I concede this. But with one VERY importance emphasis on the word BELIEVE. He DOES NOT KNOW there is an "external world" or rather, Ding an sich, he BELIEVES based on practical reasons.

Again, it has to be recognized that even this term you use "black void", is pure metaphor. The Ding an sich is inconceivable and cannot be spoken of in anyway whatsoever even with respect to its (in some sense) being even independent of any qualities attributed to it, just the pure concept of its in some sense being.

Kant himself acknowledges this in his Refutation of Idealism. He is not a realist in any transcendent sense, not even "moderately"; He happily admits empircal realism (the world we perceive is very real for us) and he does not DENY (i.e.make a negative knowledge claim) there is an external world, but neither can he, on his principles affirm it. He admits the necessary agnosticism towards the question of it's reality in order to destroy the arguments of materialists, fatalists, and atheists, at the cost of also denying knowledge of the existence of so-called external reality.

He is emphatic it exists, but he repeatedly affirms, this is ONLY a rational belief NOT KNOWLEDGE. He grounds that belief on reasons to be sure; it is a RATIONAL belief he infers from the commands of reason in it's practical sphere, but again, and most emphatically, NOT KNOWLEDGE.

Let me be clear: I am not claiming Kant is or claimed to be a Nihilist about the Ding an sich-- you are misreading me if you think this. And I admit he himself does not affirm there is no Ding an sich, but, on his principles (and he himself admits this) neither position, neither the affirmation nor the negation, neither the Ding an sich affirmer nor the Ding an sich denier (just like the theist nor the atheist) as any claim to KNOWLEDGE on this question by means of the use of theoretical reason alone.

The only advantage the affirmative postion has is practical reason, which the believer can ground his belief on without any fear of rebuttal by the negative position, since the Ding an sich/God/Soul/Freedom denier has no knowledge grounded on theoretical reason to refute him either.

>>22733384
[continued]
I affirm unequivocally that there is no "moderate realism" in Kant and affirm this is his position as well. The only realism in Kant is empirical realism, which is just the otherside of transcendental idealism. Our sensations are the only "real", and even then they are not real in any absolute sense, and any transcendent claim to knowledge as to their cause is a mistaken misuse of the categories, which are purely ideal. Our sensations are the threshold of our knowledge beyond which we cannot conceive anything at all, not even their cause.

We must necessarily think that there is a cause of these sensations transcending these same sensations, due to the nature of reason itself in its search for the unconditioned, but thinking something is not the same as knowing something (which Kant readily acknowledges throughout the first Critique).

b

How is metaphysics as a science possible?

b

>>22733187
>the missing capstone of the Great Pyramid.


>No one, it is true, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future life; for, if he knows this, he is just the man whom I have long wished to find.
- Canon of Pure Reason

>>22734510
Hegel was the man he was looking for-- but the poor guy never lived to see the Science of Logic.

>reflective understanding took possession of philosophy. We must know exactly what is meant by this expression which moreover is often used as a slogan; in general it stands for the understanding as abstracting, and hence as separating and remaining fixed in its separations. Directed against reason, it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests on sensuous reality, that thoughts are only thoughts, meaning that it is sense perception which first gives them filling and reality and that reason left to its own resources engenders only figments of the brain. In this self-renunciation on the part of reason, the Notion of truth is lost; it is limited to knowing only subjective truth, only phenomena, appearances, only something to which the nature of the object itself does not correspond: knowing has lapsed into opinion.

>>22733187
>the missing capstone of the Great Pyramid.


>For we rightly suppose that that which can be cognized by no intuition whatever is utterly unthinkable and hence impossible.
-Inaugural Dissertation paragraph 25

>>22733187
>the missing capstone of the Great Pyramid.

>Intuition, with which we now deal, is the process by which we know the super-sensuous world—the world that is beyond senses and thoughts. It is true that the super-sensuous expresses itself in and through the sensuous, and to know the latter in completeness is to know the former, but the process of knowing the two must be different. To know the latter, perception and thought will be fairly sufficient, but to know the super-sensuous, Intuition is required.

b

>>22733384
>>22733386
> But with one VERY importance emphasis on the word BELIEVE. He DOES NOT KNOW there is an "external world" or rather, Ding an sich, he BELIEVES based on practical reasons.
>He is emphatic it exists, but he repeatedly affirms, this is ONLY a rational belief NOT KNOWLEDGE.
>thinking something is not the same as knowing something
Yes, that's exactly it. So we do agree. And I do understand the need to emphasize that any description of the noumenal whatsoever is impossible by the very logic of Kant's system, even minimalist descriptions.

Though this doesn't negate the fact that Kant's system creates massive problems and ambiguities, and that subsequent philosophy of science, e.g., tried to deal with these in various ways that Kant himself would either dislike or which he couldn't have envisioned.

I didn't mean "black void" in the sense of POSITING a black void really out there in the noumenal. I meant that the black void is what the noumenal "appears as," from within the phenomenal, once one takes Kant's thought FURTHER than Kant himself intended it to be taken (i.e., into radical scepticism and its characteristic solipsism-style thought experiments). I do think it's important to stress, especially for first time readers, that Kant is not trying to lead them into this kind of despair, even if he in practice created this despair as a possibility for many of his successors.

>he does not DENY (i.e.make a negative knowledge claim) there is an external world, but neither can he, on his principles affirm it.
This I think is slightly too aggressive. Regardless of whether Kant SHOULD or CAN, on the basis of his own stated principles, affirm an external "something" (the something from which we get our sensations, and in which our consciousness -- whatever it is -- is rooted), he DOES affirm an external something. It's only Fichte and others who do to Kant what Kant does to Plato, and claim to be taking his own intent to its natural conclusions in a way he himself failed to make clear.

I think a key thing for first time readers to understand, that may be counter-intuitive, is just how seriously Kant takes the whole "rational belief" thing, which he derives from practical reason. He really does have the "Humean faith" that the world exists, he really means it when he says that once knowledge (which means for him epistemologically secure, scientific knowledge) has been humbled, there is room for faith, faith in the existence and nature of the world that we are naturally inclined to BELIEVE (again, as you correctly emphasize) is out there: a good, unitary, sensible world, created and governed by God as a kingdom of moral ends, inhabited by free human beings, etc.

>>22735292
(continued)
Once again, the key thing to understand when going into Kant, as you state correctly, is that Kant is humbling KNOWLEDGE in a very specific i.e. sense (theoretical, scientific), but that he also genuinely believes in our right to BELIEF (faith) in a very real sense. It is quite close to Hume at the game of backgammon, and Kant is also clearly influenced by contemporary Scottish common sense realism.

>I affirm unequivocally that there is no "moderate realism" in Kant and affirm this is his position as well.
The moderate realist position (Ameriks) is very useful and I recommend anons skim over it if they get a chance. It's similar to certain strains of pragmatism. The "moderate" in moderate realism does not mean to imply that Kant thought we had real knowledge of certain simples, just not of larger metaphysical matters, or something like that.

Again, the position is mainly useful as a corrective to the, strictly speaking un-Kantian, "over-interpretation" of Kant as a nihilist, which is all too easy to fall into after two centuries of Kant-interpretation AS a radical sceptic with a tendency toward nihilism and solipsism etc.

Basically, Kant is similar to the ancient sceptics (and sceptically tinged philosophers like the Epicureans), who didn't DENY the existence of the external world (this would be a "dogmatic" claim, a theoretical claim), so much as say that we can never have certain, final, theoretical knowledge of it or its nature. There are different grades of this sort of "pragmatic" scepticism, for example Pyrrhonist indifferentism or Cicero's Academic scepticism, and the key to understanding these is, just as in the case of Kant, first understanding that their raison d'etre is the reorientation of human knowledge toward "practical" matters (in the sense of wisdom and virtue for the ancients, and for Kant, his very specific meaning of "practical reason," which gives us grounds for a very real sort of faith/belief). In our scientistic age the overwhelming tendency is to try to over-interpret both Kant and the ancient sceptics as making either dogmatically nihilistic claims or as confuting science just to be mischievous or something.

Also an anon in the past thread asked whom Kant means by the dogmatists: He means anybody claiming theoretical knowledge of ultimate reality. This can just as easily be a Cartesian, Spinozist, and/or Leibnizian rationalist who claims to use pure logic to deduce the nature and properties of God, being, the soul, etc., in the same way a mathematician deduces the "pure" nature of a triangle (as a set of logical definitions rather than an description of any set of particular, empirical triangles in the external world). But there are also dogmatic materialists and atheists, like many Frenchmen at Kant's time.

When reading Kant you should keep in mind that this was one of the most exciting times in human history to be a science. Remember this is the century of Newton, that Herschel discovered Uranus in the same year the first edition of the CPR was published and around that same time Lavoisier and Priestley both discovered oxygen/hydrogen, revolutionized chemistry, and arguably discovered the modern principle of conservation of energy, that Albrecht von Haller and the whole French school of physiologues were aggressively promoting reductionist mechanical interpretations of organisms while Maupertuis and Buffon were laying the foundations of evolutionary theory and the grounds upon which Darwin would make his own discoveries. There was a real sense that science was racing toward its final conclusions, and that a golden age was upon mankind. Newton was considered to have struck the central blow, imagine the way we venerate Einstein today but ten times more intense.

Over all this was hanging a gloomy sense that the endpoint toward which science was racing was bleak: atheistic deterministic materialism of the kind pushed by la Mettrie. The Leibnizians and Wolffians were trying to mount rearguard action against this, but with mixed results. Kant was a Leibnizian and devout Lutheran but also a man of science and a leading interpreter of Newtonian mechanics whose main interest for many years was writing a comprehensive physics textbook for youths, NOT writing a philosophical masterwork. This confused atmosphere, in which all kinds of "dogmatists" were overextending themselves, created the kind of metaphysical malaise and proto-"vulgar scientism" Kant decries in the prefaces we're reading for this week. In response, a school of "common sense" pragmatic scepticism arose from within the British empiricist tradition, leading to an equally vulgar "indifferentism," embodied by its German admirers, the "popular philosophers" (Popularphilosopen), whom Kant knew VERY well and did not especially like. On the other hand, in response to vulgar materialism and scientism, a strong mystical movement was forming, and Kant witnessed his own friends and star pupils (Hamann and Herder) falling to this tendency.

Kant is trying to respond to all of the above.

b

b

Looks like I'm not gonna finish until Wednesday.

>>22730195
so much of what these dudes say is just semantics

theres no substance

>>22738435
It's probable that none of us will. Damn difficult text, imho... Been struggling line by line with it

>>22729706
'memory' is not in the book, so he probably can't help you with that.

>>22739006
>>22738435
OP here. We could postpone the discussion day to monday 28th so that everyone gets enough time to read

>>22739006
I’m having to reread as well, once we get to the actual text we really should take it a lot more slowly or I think many (myself included) will not be able to keep up while still understanding.

>>22739058
Honestly even now it feels like too much, it takes a long time to chew through this.

>>22731060
What copy is that? Looks sick

>>22739057
Sounds excellent. So far, it seems to me that just trying to get the "big picture", wouldn't really do it justice.

Has anyone got to BXVIII and understood it? At first I just skipped it, but it's just a puzzling passage to me. He seems to imply that you could do Metaphysics experimentally, which just seems contradictory.

If the table of judgments is the ideal of judgment, does that make the table of categories the ideal of logic?

>>22739312
prussian academy edition

>>22739323
>Has anyone got to BXVIII and understood it?
are talking about the note? The passage following the asterisk?

>>22739323
>it's just a puzzling passage to me
that's because Guyer/Wood translate a paragraph long sentence word for word into an incomprehensible "English" sentence.

refer to the aforementioned amazon review.

Here is the Meikljohn version (who actually breaks the sentence into smaller comprehensible English sentences):

>Now there are objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot be given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason thinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things a priori that which we ourselves place in them.* This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to metaphysics, in its first part—that is, where it is occupied with conceptions a priori, of which the corresponding objects may be given in experience—the certain course of science.

and here is the note:
>*This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now the propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the limits of possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment with their objects, as in natural science. Hence, with regard to those conceptions and principles which we assume a priori, our only course ill be to view them from two different sides. We must regard one and the same conception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand, in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere thought. Now if we find that, when we regard things from this double point of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them from a single point of view, reason is involved in self-contradiction, then the experiment will establish the correctness of this distinction.

>>22739445
>table of judgments is the ideal of judgment,
it's not. Also it's not the table of judgments it's the table of the LOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN JUDGEMENTS.

b

I was obsessed with this book a few years ago, however, the deeper you get in Kant's work, the more you question yourself if all the effort to understand it is really worth it, specially due to the fact that, with no knowledge of its historical and philosophical context, not much will make sense. Besides, I kept having recurring thoughts of: "How the fuck did he get to that conclusion" after the Transcendental Aesthetics, as it seemed to me that he was simply pulling statements out of his ass in order to support his epistemological model. A great example is, when writing about the pure concepts of understanding, there is a specific table comprised of exactly 12 categories neatly divided in such an arbitrary way that, after spending some time pondering about how it was derived, there isn't much to do except accept it as true and move on. Not having philosophy as my main subject of interest, I'd much rather read about broader topics such as logic, philosophy of mind and general epistemology. But again, it's been years since I've read anything related to his books so this is all I can vaguely remember.

>>22740966
>there is a specific table comprised of exactly 12 categories neatly divided in such an arbitrary way that, after spending some time pondering about how it was derived, there isn't much to do except accept it as true and move on.
that was a major issue Hegel criticized him for. Did you manage to make it to Hegel?

>>22740975
I didn't. Kant was the author I was interested in at the time so I only read some of his predecessors that were relevant to the Critique of Pure reason such as Hume, Locke and Berkeley. Also, by reading some excerpts of the obscure and dense language of Hegel's books I concluded that it wasn't for me. Sounded like metaphysical nonsense with no clarity whatsoever to me. Perhaps I've been filtered.

>>22740991
>Sounded like metaphysical nonsense with no clarity whatsoever to me. Perhaps I've been filtered.
Honestly I've never made it through his works but his prefaces and intros give me hope he fixed the problems with Kant. But basically his deal is he claims to have rationally deduced all the categories one from the other beginning with the essential concept of Being or "Is", since that is the concept which all other concepts must have to even BE a concept (or anything at all). And in the end he claims to have gone full circle in his deductions so that the final conclusion of his dialectic is the same place where he started (except now at a higher standpoint since you realize now that the beginning was not an arbitrary starting point but itself already a rationally grounded conclusion of previous unconscious cycles of the dialectical process [think for example of literary theme where the hero ends up right back where he started but now with a new perspective gained from his journey]). Or so I have understood him from what I've read.

>>22741010
in these way his system is complete the beginning is the end and the end is the beginning.

>>22739835
exactly

>>22739935
Still not getting it, but not because of the translation. The problem is with the last sentence: How can two sides be "in harmony with the principle of pure reason" (Einstimmung mit dem Princip der reinen Vernunft stattfinde) but one side have a "self-contradiction" (Wiederstreit)? How is this an experiment if it doesn't involve experience? At best this sounds like some sort of dialectic, but then why say it comes from a "natural philosopher" (Naturforscher).

Confusion of da highest orda.

This is a pain to read if you don't know Aristoteles' logical work (the organon) which Kant seems to assume of the reader. Kant doesn't explain why he categories things as such and such

Seems to me that in order to "correctly" read Kant you gotta read every other philosopher that came before him... Which, honestly, as I'm a beginner in philosophy, was what I intended to do in the first place, and then I bumped into this thread.
I mean, how can you follow his line of thought if you don't know what the fuck he's talking about?

>>22741614
should be fine with Aristotle really. it is only aristotlean ideas he brings in without trying to defend or argue for why it is the case.

>>22741614
>Seems to me that in order to "correctly" read Kant you gotta read every other philosopher that came before him...
No you don't. A good overview of metaphysics up until Kant is enough

bump

bümp

>>22741753
not for everybody

bümpf

das Bümpf

where tf is everybody?

>>22746014
Wie geht's meine Freunden? Haben Sie einige Fragen oder Bemerkungen zu sagen?

>>22747347
bros?

>>22747650
I just finished reading the preface, now I'm going to sleep.

>>22747661
you don't wanna hang? b-but... :(

?

>>22747359
Es geht so und so. Mein Deutsch ist leider gut genug zu verstehen, dass die Übersetzung retardiert ist, aber nicht gut genug die ganze Sache auf Deutsch zu lesen. Ich bin dieser Anon >>22739323, und die Fußnote ist mir noch nicht ganz klar.

>>22747347
>>22747650
>>22747666
It appears we're in different time zones.

>>22748861
op here. The discussion is postponed till next monday.