[ 3 / biz / cgl / ck / diy / fa / ic / jp / lit / sci / vr / vt ] [ index / top / reports ] [ become a patron ] [ status ]
2023-11: Warosu is now out of extended maintenance.

/lit/ - Literature


View post   

File: 155 KB, 770x462, philosophyvspsychology.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19133750 No.19133750 [Reply] [Original]

>> No.19133756

>>19133750
when you start making money

>> No.19133771

>>19133750
Freud is a materialist, you shouldn't rely on him to have an adequate definition of psychology, or understanding of philosophy. In Neither Freud nor Heidegger is there an understanding of where one 'ends', that is why you should read Jung. Furthermore Jung has many similarities with Heidegger.

>> No.19133778
File: 76 KB, 737x506, Jung.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19133778

>>19133771
>“All that is outside, also is inside,” we could say with Goethe. But this “inside,” which modern rationalism is so eager to derive from “outside,” has an a priori structure of its own that antedates all conscious experience. It is quite impossible to conceive how “experience” in the widest sense, or, for that matter, anything psychic, could originate exclusively in the outside world. The psyche is part of the inmost mystery of life, and it has its own peculiar structure and form like every other organism. Whether this psychic structure and its elements, the archetypes, ever “originated” at all is a metaphysical question and therefore unanswerable. The structure is something given, the precondition that is found to be present in every case. And this is the mother, the matrix—the form into which all experience is poured.
>In former times, despite some dissenting opinion and the influence of Aristotle, it was not too difficult to understand Plato's conception of the Idea as supraordinate and pre-existent to all phenomena. "Archetype," far from being a modern term, was already in use before the time of St. Augustine, and was synonymous with "Idea" in the Platonic usage. When the Corpus Hermeticum, which probably dates from the third century, describes God as το άρχίτνπ-ον φώς, the 'archetypal light,' it expresses the idea that he is the prototype of all light; that is to say, pre-existent and supraordinate to the phenomenon "light." Were I a philosopher, I should continue in this Platonic strain and say: somewhere, in “a place beyond the skies,” there is a prototype or primordial image of the mother that is pre-existent and supraordinate to all phenomena in which the “maternal,” in the broadest sense of the term, is manifest. But I am an empiricist, not a philosopher; I cannot let myself presuppose that my peculiar temperament, my own attitude to intellectual problems, is universally valid. Apparently this is an assumption in which only the philosopher may indulge, who always takes it for granted that his own disposition and attitude are universal, and will not recognize the fact, if he can avoid it, that his “personal equation” conditions his philosophy. As an empiricist, I must point out that there is a temperament which regards ideas as real entities and not merely as nomina. It so happens—by the merest accident, one might say—that for the past two hundred years we have been living in an age in which it has become unpopular or even unintelligible to suppose that ideas could be anything but nomina. Anyone who continues to think as Plato did must pay for his anachronism by seeing the “supracelestial,” i.e., metaphysical, essence of the Idea relegated to the unverifiable realm of faith and superstition, or charitably left to the poet.

CONT

>> No.19133782

>>19133778
>Once again, in the age-old controversy over universals, the nominalistic standpoint has triumphed over the realistic, and the Idea has evaporated into a mere flatus vocis. This change was accompanied—and, indeed, to a considerable degree caused—by the marked rise of empiricism, the advantages of which were only too obvious to the intellect. Since that time the Idea is no longer something a priori, but is secondary and derived. Naturally, the new nominalism promptly claimed universal validity for itself in spite of the fact that it, too, is based on a definite and limited thesis coloured by temperament. This thesis runs as follows: we accept as valid anything that comes from outside and can be verified. The ideal instance is verification by experiment. The antithesis is: we accept as valid anything that comes from inside and cannot be verified. The hopelessness of this position is obvious. Greek natural philosophy with its interest in matter, together with Aristotelian reasoning, has achieved a belated but overwhelming victory over Plato. Yet every victory contains the germ of future defeat. In our own day signs foreshadowing a change of attitude are rapidly increasing. Significantly enough, it is Kant’s doctrine of categories, more than anything else, that destroys in embryo every attempt to revive metaphysics in the old sense of the word, but at the same time paves the way for a rebirth of the Platonic spirit. If it be true that there can be no metaphysics transcending human reason, it is no less true that there can be no empirical knowledge that is not already caught and limited by the a priori structure of cognition. During the century and a half that have elapsed since the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason, the conviction has gradually gained ground that thinking, understanding, and reasoning cannot be regarded as independent processes subject only to the eternal laws of logic, but that they are psychic functions co-ordinated with the personality and subordinate to it.

END.

Taken from The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious and Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype.

>> No.19133995

>>19133756
Do you mean in research? Or in terms of psychotherapy? Because philosophy has been enormously influential, in fact indispensable to both.
Thus, the question continues.

>> No.19134016

>>19133750 (OP)
>Es = Sein
>Ich = Seiend
>Über-Ich = das Man

Woah!

>> No.19134017

>>19133750
Humanist, Jungian and Gestalt psychology are the closest branches to philosophy.

>> No.19134205

>>19133771
>>19133778
>>19133782
Jung was literally btfo by Freud, friend.

>> No.19134215

>>19134205
It's the other way around. Freud was forced to change his sex-obsessed model of the psyche because of Jung but just became death-obsessed instead.

>> No.19134736
File: 34 KB, 640x414, Freud or Fraud.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19134736

>>19134205
Imagine believing this, read "The Culture of Critique", and "Freud: The Making of an Illusion". He was a sick pervert, and addicted to cocaine.

>> No.19134740 [DELETED] 
File: 59 KB, 850x400, quote-philosophy-begins-in-wonder-and-at-the-end-when-philosophic-thought-has-done-its-best-alfred-north-whitehead-31-36-20.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
[ERROR]

>>19133750

>> No.19134752

The legions of the antichrist follow Jung and will continue to do so, while those of us who understand Freud will remain unneurotic and blessed. Any objection to this truth is pure cope.

>> No.19134772

>>19134752
jung is the anti-cope

>> No.19134777

>>19134752
holy fuck, you are retarded

>> No.19134798
File: 2.16 MB, 224x224, 1632341761967.gif [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19134798

Unironically if you've ever been an atheist you're beyond saving as a human being.

Both Psychology and Philosophy are reddit tier beyond the greeks with rare exception.

You're missing the point of it all

Read Evola

>> No.19134802

>>19134798
>Read Evola
Arete, but you should also read Jung

>> No.19134804

>>19134802
>only psychologist who didn't deny metaphysics is the only psychologist worth a damn.

>> No.19134805

>>19134798
>>19134802
Go back to /sig/ 90 IQ NPCs.

>> No.19134811

>>19133778
>It is quite impossible to conceive how “experience” in the widest sense, or, for that matter, anything psychic, could originate exclusively in the outside world.
No it isnt. it occurs in that same world. there is no "outside"

>> No.19134829

>>19133750
Philosophy is transcendental or it is not philosophy at all. It does not study any empirical appearances but rather the conditions on the basis of which things may appear at all. Husserl, Kant, Heidegger and Wittgenstein all follow this method. Psychology meanwhile is just another empirical science that studies what appears rather than appearing itself.

>> No.19134845

>>19133750
It comes down to what your anthropological presuppositions are. Most (modern) psychology presupposes some kind of Cartesian mind, dependent on the function and form of a particular arrangement of meat and nerve. Health is managing these functions and relationships. Some philosophy is perfectly compatible with this, but others like Heidegger and Husserl, wouldn't recognize this starting anthropology as valid.

Also Jung was miles ahead of Freud.

>> No.19134847

>>19134829
Philosophy doesn't study anything. Philosophy is just mental masturbation.

>> No.19134852

>>19134847
Wrong, it’s the queen of all sciences.

>> No.19134862

>>19134736
>epic polmeme image
The rat man wasn't just afraid of rats but had vivid fantasies about rats gnawing their way into his family's arseholes.

>> No.19134870

>>19134852
That's math. But then you unironically consider Witty a thinker worth something, so it's obvious how you'd be booty bothered by it.

>> No.19134923

>>19134870
>mathematics
>with no transcendental-ontological grounding
Oh no no no no

>> No.19134942

>>19134811
How do you not grasp the idea of experience? You're not an inanimate object.

>> No.19134955
File: 49 KB, 720x707, 8fc34ab4b8768dfb756df595dbfc8fd8 (1).jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19134955

>>19134923
>oh no no no what are you doing anon we haven't even sufficiently established the apriori aposteriori knowledge dichotomy stop multiplicating numbers this thing is gonna blow!
Every time. Dilate.

>> No.19134959

>>19134870
>That's math.
I would see math is the much-needed butler of the sciences, not the regnant.

Plus the pyschologism debate was huge in mathematics, especially during the early 20th century. For example, the Frege/Husserl debates.

>> No.19134968

>>19134942
Though the phenomenologist would say that in experience there is also no inner/outer dichotomy.

>> No.19134976
File: 18 KB, 400x499, mfwreadingthisshit.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19134976

>>19134205
And Freud was btfo by Brentano and Husserl while he was still in university, so what's your fucking point, retard?

>> No.19134979

>>19134955
Bro… you just multiplied 6 times 9 with first doing a fundamental ontological analysis of the question of being… bro…

>> No.19134984

>>19134798
>Evola
this is what happnes when your parents are hicks and have a 5'7 fat faggot kid that is now at least 40 and wont leave the house

>> No.19134992

>>19134829
To be fair, Husserl considers that the empirical constitutes multiple higher stratas of our experience, and are fully recuperable at diverse points of his research (either at first when you practice eidetic reductions or toward the end once you've managed to envision the phenomenological monad.

>> No.19135007

>>19134992
I may have been misled but isn’t what is fundamentally being investigated still the phenomenality of the phenomenon?

>> No.19135010

>>19134959
>pyschologism debate was huge in mathematics
>the Frege/Husserl debates
Most mathematicians wouldn't know who Husserl was. The big debate was chiefly among Hilbert/Goedel/Russel/Brouwer.

>> No.19135018

>>19134215
>>19134736
The only two mistakes Freud made was to ignore the inorganic ground of impulse canalizing all of man’s exasperation into a libidinal force, which happens to be only one expression of those impulses and to give pleasure principle prominence rather than the power principle (that is, he ignored the fact that pleasure is just the consciousness of a secondary interior sensation). Jung has never written a single important thing in his miserable life instead had to turn to botched interpretation of esotetic symbola.

>>19134976
Brentano couldn’t even interpret Aristotle in the right way lmao. His theory of history is one of the most retarded things ever conceived in the history of human mind.
Husserl is cool but works with a rationalistic paradigm, it is ironic how in his works there is nothing contradicting people like Nietzsche, Freud, Sade, that is, people who recognized that the ontological ground is not intellectualistic.

>> No.19135026

>>19134968
What inner/outer can metaphysically be defined as doesn't matter, how Jung is using the term 'inner' here is simply to mean life itself. We can look at the brain on the minutest level, but no explanation of consciousness is possible, this is what Jung means by outer.

He speaks in commonly understood lucid terminology, he's not a metaphysician and isn't trying to be. So don't judge his words metaphysically.

>> No.19135035

>>19135018
Woah anon, you sure do have some hot takes! But you let something fairly obvious slip here:

>usserl is cool but works with a rationalistic paradigm, it is ironic how in his works there is nothing contradicting people like Nietzsche, Freud, Sade, that is, people who recognized that the ontological ground is not intellectualistic.
This is the most broad retarded connection possible. Do you know how many thinkers didn't recognise the ontological ground to be intellectualistic, and do you know on how many things these thinkers disagree on past that? Do you know how much Freud would hate Husserl?

You haven't read a jot of whom you speak, but have homespun philosophy is spades.

>> No.19135039

>>19134942
Your experience is an epiphenomenon of brain activity

>> No.19135059

>>19135039
>yeah bro let's just take a look at the consciousness cells here in the brain!

>> No.19135060

>>19135026
>We can look at the brain on the minutest level, but no explanation of consciousness is possible
You're confusing our current inability to fully describe the mechanics of a complex system with an inability to recognize the domain of that system. Consciousness is clearly a downstream product of the nervous system which is obvious because its affects are dependent on it. I hit you on the head, you go unconscious; you go hungry, your mood changes. All too obviously material

>> No.19135071

>>19135059
Evidence that consciousness arises in the brain: Abundant
Evidence that you are an immaterial soul: Zero

>> No.19135073

>>19135010
Independently of that, the debate as to whether when we do mathematics we discover the nature of the human mind or of real things 'out there' continued/s.
Frege convinced Husserl of the latter, which Husserl then applied to consciousness. Today, both quantification and phenomenology are applied to the study of the brain.

>> No.19135076

>>19135035
So your contestation to everything I said is: there are more proponents of materialist/voluntarist philosophies and how come you like Freud and Husserl??
Yes, of course there are more. Schopenhauer is one but one who had not as deep an intuition as those cited had. Most materialists are not aware of what materialism itself entails. I won’t waste time with such retarded trifles, say something pertinent or fuck off.

>> No.19135082

>>19135026
I'm not but, as noted by other, he dismissed Heideggerian ontology and adopted the dying husk of Cartesian ontology despite the fact that his own approach was poorly suited to the latter.

>> No.19135085

>>19135039
No. Brain activity (and matter) is an epiphenomenon of experience.
Suck on it.

>> No.19135088

>>19135071
Lol these aren't the only two options. Undergrad take.

>> No.19135094
File: 25 KB, 474x266, le monad.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19135094

>>19133756
nice

the ideal philosopher persuades people who read with the least amount of rhetoric
the ideal psychologist persuades people who don't read with every rhetoric trick imaginable

a philosopher approaches the psychologist when he abuses the oratory art
a psychologist approaches the philosopher as his clients become more erudite

>Antiphon had been banished and was living in Corinth where he set up a “consolation booth” with a sign that he could heal the sad and distressed just by talking to them. When people came to him he listened to their tales of grief and affliction and by his soothing eloquence healed their sorrow.

>> No.19135096

>>19135060
>we will explain it.. because we will!
Great explanation.

>Consciousness is clearly a downstream product of the nervous system which is obvious because its affects are dependent on it. I hit you on the head, you go unconscious; you go hungry, your mood changes. All too obviously material
None of this is contradictory to what Jung said. Do you really think everyone who argues for the inability of consciousness to be explained materially is saying consciousness isn't dependant on the brain?

>>19135071
>he thinks Jung believed in a metaphysical soul
How fucking stupid do you have to be to continue this misunderstanding?

>> No.19135100

>>19135085
>>19135088
And I forgot to add that this is also only somewhat the case. In the case of neuroplasticity, experience does indeed refigure the brain even at the material level.

This is why the notion of 'world' is important.

>> No.19135101

>>19134798
Most cringe post I have read in my entire life, holy fuck. Do you also read Jünger because you're a totally badass warrior? Christ alive.

>> No.19135110

>>19135085
>>19135100
The brain develops according to feedback but consciousness only exists because of the brain and while it is functional. Obvious enough

>> No.19135113

>>19135039
>yeah so basically evolution evolved this giant fucking energy sink, conscious experience, that does literally nothing

>> No.19135118

>>19135088
Go ahead and state your postgrad opinion, we're all breathlessly anticipating it

>> No.19135123

>>19135082
>dying husk of Cartesian ontology
It's certainly not dead anon.

But again, Jung spoke in lucid terms to be understood. The fact that you can understand that he was 'poorly suited to the latter' while he wrote within it shows he was correct in his common sense approach.

>> No.19135124

>>19135110
>The brain develops according to feedback
'Feedback' covers over the important point, in which a physical organ is moulded by that which is not material in the most stringent sense - it is not quantifiable or measurable.

> Obvious enough
Yes I agree, obvious enough that it can be assumed to be taken for granted.

>> No.19135128

>>19135118
I fleshed it out a little underneath.
The other elephant in the room is the undefined nature of consciousness.
You might find the work of Varela interesting here.

>> No.19135148

>>19135096
>Do you really think everyone who argues for the inability of consciousness to be explained materially is saying consciousness isn't dependant on the brain?
We can easily demonstrate that it's an epiphenomenon of the brain, whereas your a priori assumption that something immaterial is also involved has no evidence, and really cannot ever have evidence because evidence would have to be material. You have nothing to go on except how captivated you are by your own subjectivity.

>> No.19135164

>>19135124
>Feedback' covers over the important point, in which a physical organ is moulded by that which is not material in the most stringent sense
And what exactly is this non material aspect of experience that you are positing? You're going in circles here. The brain produces consciousness materially and the brain materially changes over time. It is a complex system, meaning it has a feedback loop. Zero mysticism required.

>> No.19135173

>>19135076
>So your contestation to everything I said is: there are more proponents of materialist/voluntarist philosophies and how come you like Freud and Husserl??
No anon, I'm saying you can't say there is nothing in Husserl contradicting Freud or Nietzsche (or Sade LMAO). It's also wrong to say Nietzsche or Schopenhauer were materialists unless you have some epic definition of your own.

I said nothing about there being 'more proponents of materialist philosophies', nor am I saying there are more components of these apparently 'materialist philosophies' which differentiates them, since it is wrong to even group them together under 'materialist philosophies'. They are wildly different philosophers with wildly different metaphysics.

Your attempt to unify them under a 'non-intellectualistic ontological ground' just shows very plainly philosophical dilettantism. Whatever that phrase exactly means, you'd do better to identify it as a very vague but progressively growing philosophical current in modernity, rather than anything which could be unified over philosophers. However it is completely wrong to introduce the word 'materialistic' in there.

>> No.19135180

>>19135007
>I may have been misled
Probably not. Husserl is by far the most profound thinker I've come across. I've been reading him for about 17 years now, and my conception of his phenomenology has changed immensely over the time.
If you can find Gaston Berger's "Le Cogito Chez Husserl" (and speak French), it is by far the best introduction to Husserl I have found. Sadly, I found it only a year ago, a 1950 edition that had never been opened (the pages were still uncut). Really wish I would have found it earlier. I did my Phenomenology course paper on the Cogito in Husserl and it would have been a tremendous help.
>what is fundamentally being investigated still the phenomenality of the phenomenon?
Yes, it is what you direct your view toward, but the aim is to create a valid foundation to all sciences through transcendental explicitation. Ultimately, the process of reduction and bracketing leads you to around on itself and let you contemplate your complete being, (Husserl used the term monad early, but eventually switched to the term transcendental subject or ego), as the ultimate seat your historical formation (which is where Phenomenology shows itself as a potential valid foundation to social sciences, something which has not been exploited much).
This is in part why I find the whole debate about the naturalization of phenomenology so fucking infuriating. Husserl's phenomenology was already plenty "naturalized", it definitely allows us to explore the stratas of experience that the naturalists wants us to focus on, so the anti-naturalists are wrong, however WHO THE FUCK CARES ABOUT THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF YOGA?!? They always end up focusing on retarded shit like that.

>> No.19135189

>>19135035
>Do you know how much Freud would hate Husserl?
They knew each other, they attended the same class under Brentano. And yes, they absolutely hated each other.

>> No.19135201

>>19135148
>We can easily demonstrate that it's an epiphenomenon of the brain,
Sure, demonstrate it for me anon. How does the dependency of consciousness on the brain materially explain consciousness? I'll speak in your materialistic dialect: there's nothing in nature which cannot be empirically explained like consciousness. It should be a provable result, but it's not. You don't know shit, and that's why radical materialists like Dennett have to deny consciousness altogether.

>assumption that something immaterial is also involved
That wasn't claimed either.

>> No.19135212

>>19135164
> The brain produces consciousness
Ok, first define consciousness in material terms.

> the brain materially changes over time
Yes, but through 'experience' which is not objective or quantifiable. Therein lies the rub.

>
Dynamic, complex systems are not just 'a feedback loop'.

> Zero mysticism required.
Have you just been watching 2002 Dawkins for the first time? No one is inserting 'mysticism' by pointing out remaining paradoxes in scientific understanding.

>> No.19135214

>>19135180
Husserl bro, what do you think of Sartre’s critique of Husserl’s Trancendental Ego in Trancendence of the Ego

>> No.19135225

>>19135189
It's a manner of speech. In other words, their worldviews are irreconcilable. I wouldn't be surprised if Freud would go on to consider Husserl's philosophy as 'occult'.

>> No.19135226

>>19135201
On my side: the fact that by changing the matter of the brain you change whether or not consciousness is present as well as the affect of that consciousness, all of which evidences consciousness being an epiphenomenon of the brain.

On your side: ??

>> No.19135227

>>19135180
>I've been reading him for about 17 years now, and my conception of his phenomenology has changed immensely over the time.

How do you now see Heidegger's departure from Husserl's phenomenological approach?

>> No.19135228

>>19135180
Question about naturalizing phenomenology, do you think Heidegger’s World vs Present-at-hand ‘World’ is comparable to Sellar’s space of reason vs space of causes if we read Heidegger as a scientific realist like Dreyfus does?

>> No.19135241

>>19135226
Neuroplasticity refers to organic matter which is changed by experience. It might all be material, but there isn't a one-way causal direction from
brain ----> consciousness

The story is more complex than that.

>> No.19135244

>>19135226
LEARN BASIC PHILOSOPHY YOU SMOOTH BRAIN.

You just repeated yourself: consciousness is dependant on the brain therefore it's just an epiphenomenon of it.

You already said that, just with another example. I've already replied to it, so reply to that and stop repeating yourself. Or if you insist on not replying, stop repeating yourself.

>> No.19135249

>>19135212
Anon, you're just confusing yourself. I'm not breaking out a multiple greentext point response here. Your brain is material and it changes based on things that materially happen to it. Your thoughts arise from your brain and are not magically disconnected from it. Try to understand just that point.

>> No.19135254

>>19135244
I see you've reached the tantrum stage where your frustration at your own inability to argue turns into outwardly directed anger.

>> No.19135265

>>19135241
I didn't say it was one way, I specifically said it was a conplex system with a feedback loop. Brain produces consciousness, consciousness processes experience, changes brain. No immaterial gaps required here

>> No.19135269

>>19135244
I haven’t read the rest of this thread but physical brain states affecting consciousness doesn’t make consciousness an epiphenomenon. It’s only an epiphenomenon if consciousness also doesn’t have any causal power of its own. There’s no way to know whether a p-zombie would act differently from a person with consciousness.

>> No.19135270

>>19135254
So instead of replying to what I said or repeating yourself, you've chosen to insult me.

That just seems like YOU'VE reached the tantrum stage 'where your frustration at your own inability to argue turns into outwardly directed anger.'

Pure projection.

>> No.19135281

Where my Stekhel niggas at?

Combines philosophy and psychology quite well

>> No.19135288

>>19135249
>Your thoughts arise from your brain and are not magically disconnected from it. Try to understand just that point.

The problem in communication here is that you lack knowledge of the huge amount of literature across neuroscience, cognitive science and philosophy that this debate pertains to.

The simplest way I can put things is:
There are materialists who are not epiphenomanlists.

You are absolutely incapable of acknowledging the spectrum of investigation. You believe that they are two positions available:
> Epiphenomenalism
> Magic

This is not the case.

>> No.19135297

>>19135269
As you said, there's no evidence for it; just faith, the feeling it must be so.

>> No.19135310

>>19135270
You're using insults, capslock, etc because your argument is dead in the water. It's really all too obvious. Just stop posting and hide the thread, better for your mental health.

>> No.19135315

>>19135297
Ok, my contention that you've just discovered Richard Dawkins has further evidence.

>> No.19135320

>>19135288
Perhaps I'll reply to you again if you decide to actually articulate what you think.

>> No.19135331

>>19135315
Nah. You're just trying to go at my intellectual pedigree to spare yourself having to show that I'm wrong, because you can't, because I'm not.

>> No.19135335

>>19135310
Enormous cope. Repeating yourself is what ended this argument.

>> No.19135338

>>19135297
The inability to be empirically tested is what makes it a problem of philosophy. I think there are good reasons to believe consciousness isn’t an epiphenomenon, even if those reasons aren’t empirically grounded.

>> No.19135344

>>19135320
I have and I pointed out the fatal flaw in your entire framework which renders debate impossible.
You are committed to the idea that the only alternative to epiphen. is magic. This means that instead of defending your position against counterarguments, you bring in the idea of magic and souls and claim that magic and souls don't exist.

What would you say, for example, to the neuroscientists who argue against epiphen. and use empirical findings to support their claims?

>> No.19135365

>>19135344
So you have nothing then.

>> No.19135367

>>19135320
Sub-90 iq.

>> No.19135376

>>19135244
>>19135270
>>19135335
>>19135367
big mad

>> No.19135377

>>19135365
See the arguments posted above, which you did not reply to aside from talking about magic again.

>> No.19135397

>>19135376
Projection.

>> No.19135412

>>19135173
You can make an anti-intellectualistic interpretation of phenomenology, that is what I implied (eg. Intentionality). Of course Husserl will think in one way and Freud in another.
I didn't say Schopenhauer was a materialist (included in voluntarist as opposed to intellectualist). Nietzsche can be read materially but in a way that will end up distorting the core of his philosophy, his philosophy of power. Yes, I have an epic definition but not of my own but I won't disclose it to you. About Sade, pfff. You have no idea about anything concerning him, right? For example... does the revelation that he was closer to Catholicism rather than Enlightenment hypoccrites shock you?

Metaphysics means nothing, it is just a methodology. Once you grasp the reality of the Absolute you'll see that it is not a pedantic attempt at unification but a revelation.

>> No.19135420

>>19133750
sigmued freud was abatch.

>> No.19135429

>>19135412
>>19135173
Ah another good one: did you know Freud was a platonist?

>> No.19135434
File: 1.09 MB, 1080x1339, 455868094.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19135434

What philosophy will give me a PAWG GF?

>> No.19135444

>>19135412
>Once you grasp the reality of the Absolute you'll see that it is not a pedantic attempt at unification but a revelation

Pagan greek philosophers could not wrap their heads around the contradiction that The Absolute is this ultimate reality from which all reality stems from but that this reality is nothing but their own imaginary creation and making.

This contradiction was solved by theologists like St.Athanasius but have fun engaging in mental sophist wankery over definitions and language

>> No.19135451

>>19135444
kek

>> No.19135484

>>19135434
Depends on her tastes.
Try Oscar Wilde and some other poets of the sort. Memorize witty and romantic poetry

>> No.19135512

>>19135484
fuck you cocksucker

>> No.19135517

>>19135434
Comtean positivism

>> No.19135742

>>19135214
>what do you think of Sartre’s critique of Husserl’s Trancendental Ego in Trancendence of the Ego
Based on the common misconception of a Husserlian betrayal of his own program and a multiplicity of phases to his philosophy. This is not the case. Husserl was always consistent to his initial intuition, was never at no point a realist in general (he was however always a realist about truth, which is were the misconception came from).
In the end it falls under the very same argument I presented earlier about the monad/subject/ego in Husserl past ~1910. Bracketing only affects you momentarily throughout the phenomenological reduction. Obviously this moment can be quite long (in the case of Husserl, at least 15~20 years).
I know Husserl already talks about the subject as a monad in Ideas II, but I think he expanded his view on it more in On the Passive Synthesis, which I am 99% sure Sartre never read.
>>19135227
>How do you now see Heidegger's departure from Husserl's phenomenological approach?
I am infinitely less hostile to it than I was in my university years. I still think the hermeneutic turn was essentially a mistake, but I understand much better now how Husserl's was also at fault. Considering he wanted Heidegger to follow up on his philosophy, he should have been more involved in his development. Husserl wrote or dictated *every* single morning up until noon, but took years before reading B&T.
The way I see it, even if Heidegger and Sartre were in the end wrong, they were exploring different avenues offered by Husserl in his earlier books. Ignoring the later developments, or arguing on the basis of incomplete readings is not ideal, but honestly, if you were to avoid trying forming an opinion on Husserl before completely reading him, you'd die before doing so.
I can reproach them the insistence on characterizing their phenomenology as a correction of Husserl's instead of a variation on it. I can't reproach them wanting to start again from the beginning; that is exactly what phenomenology is supposed to make you do.
>>19135228
I am not that familiar with Sellar, or Dreyfus for that matter. I guess it would depend if Dreyfus's reading implies something else than Sellar's psychological nominalism, which seems like it would...?

>> No.19135935

>>19135249
>Your brain is material and it changes based on things that materially happen to it. Your thoughts arise from your brain and are not magically disconnected from it. Try to understand just that point.
This only goes so far.
Sure we'll probably find some very broad cognitive justification to why our visual experience is such and such, and these might explain things which Husserl called empirical quasi-essences, such as why our vision implies a field (which I believe is currently being explained by a conservation of pattern between the input of the visual cells in the eye and on the "surface" area of the main visual brain (hilariously bringing back the Cartesian Theater theory on the table, in a way)).
However the process of valuation of rationality in terms of the actual value of thought? That is, so to speak, entirely done within language itself. Your brain selects a specific subvocalizations amongst multiple candidates on the basis of warning triggers along behavioural paths, but those warning triggers are very generalized. Think of a child being denied cookies by his mom. His brain, unconsciously (and therefore completely beyond the reach of phenomenology, just to be clear) generates multiple verbal responses and eliminates them on the basis of set values. For example, the sentence "give me a cookie or I'm gonna kill you and rape your corpse", *if* it happened to be generated for any reason, would very likely be shuffled away pretty much immediately, unless the kid is a fucking psycho. The trigger is not associated (necessarily) to the use of the terms 'kill' or 'rape', but with the behavioural path that it took. Once all but one candidate has run through without hitting any triggers (or not hitting the ones that are loud enough), if the behavioural path included an element of subvocalization, you will end up "thinking" the sentence.
However the sentence holds more content than what the path could analyze, and therefore can lead to another event of ratiocination. This cascade keeps happening throughout our every conscious moments (as we are linguistically obsessed beings) and leads to a constant overvalue of the linguistic content in relation to the cognitive content. (This is as per PPM theory).
As such Husserl's psychologism critic is ultimately proven right a second time by cognitive psychology itself. Psychology may be of help to study how our specific condition helps or inhibits coming in contact with certain essences, but those conditions will never determine these essences themselves.

>> No.19136005

>>19135484
>What philosophy..
>Try Oscar Wilde
Kys

>> No.19136034

>>19133750
Nice fucking thread faggot, I bet you're happy now.

>> No.19136046

Here are relevant passages from a paper on Husserl's concept of monad.

> 2. The ‘Transcendental Person’ as Concrete Unity of That Which Constitutes World
> Husserl’s analyses dealing with the problem of the human person start outfrom the methodological assumption that a certain position is required with regard to that which is to be described. [...] Opposed to the scientific ‘view from without’(the third-person perspective) is the ‘view from within’, the first-personperspective, and a discipline doing justice to the experience of the human subject must be conceived of in this sense as a ‘science of the first-person perspective’ that avoids the fundamental category mistake of framing this science with the basic categories of the natural sciences. [...] Yet, merely shifting to the first-personperspective from the previously occupied third-person perspective is notenough to establish a science. The question, then, is how to frame the first-person perspective adequately to make such a scientific account possible.
> The personalistic attitude is customarily occupied by the psychological observer, i.e., the psychological scientist who has not made the shift from specifically
human consciousness to analysing consciousness as such. In Leibniz’s terminology, psychology only establishes verités de fait, not verités de raison.
> Husserl’s terminology from the Crisis, psychology is indifferent to the ‘para-dox of subjectivity’, that the subject is an object
in the world, and as such anobject for disciplines of the third-person perspective such as psychology or biology, and at the same time a subject for the world, a subject which ‘has’ in the first-person perspective the world as its correlate. Therefore, psychology, precisely by taking the seeming fundamentality of its position for granted, declares its stance to be absolute and continues to maintain on the epistemological level a problematic duality between two different accounts that is not plausible phenomenologically. Indeed, psychology does not even see, let alone attempt to solve, the paradox of the two accounts and theirbasis in the two fundamental perspectives.

>> No.19136079

>>19136046
> Thus, the transcendental (phenomenological) attitude shares with the personalistic attitude in principle the ‘view from within’. What makes it transcendental, however, is the fact that it considers the ‘conditions of the possibility’ of consciousness as such and not of a specifically human or any other (kind of) consciousness. For example, a condition of the possibility of having perception is to have a body not as a mere physical body(Körper ) but as an organ of conscious activities (a Leib). Even a God couldnot have disembodied perception, because it belongs to the essence of ‘external perception’ that things are given in adumbrations that are only revealed in bodily interaction with them. Furthermore, consciousness is framed in terms of intentionality. This means that it does not consideronly a certain stratum of consciousness, such as the soul (as opposed to, or‘above’, or somehow appended to the body), but conscious life
as suchwhich is intentional in every respect when experiencing a world. Indeed,stipulating a priori formal distinctions such as mind and body without looking at the ‘things themselves’ is unphenomenological.
> Husserl’s paradigm of intentionality in the framework of his mature theory of transcendental constitution indicates that the world as the totality of what consciousness experiences is ‘built up’ from intentional acts. These acts can be conscious acts in the discrete sense of acts of thought (such as reflection or imagination), but also such ‘physical’ actions as walking around a three-dimensional object, touching it, dealing with it in certain contexts. The latter are not merely physical movements, but are ways in which consciousness, necessarily as embodied subjectivity, experiences world, even ‘unconsciously’. Thus, the famous analysis of perception is an example of an eidetic account of how subjectivity on a very elementary level (‘passivity’) constitutes three-dimensional objects. If we look at ‘experience of world’, we do not at first find any kind of duality; we just have ‘givennesses’ for consciousness. ‘Consciousness’, however, is
equally not some kind of abstract entity‘tacked on’ to the body, but is my subjective awareness of myself and the world on any given level, no matter whether I am dreaming, feeling pain or‘physical’ distress, or performing an intellectual activity such as doing phenomenology. Thus, viewed from the perspective of the phenomenologist, how we interact with other human beings emotionally and affectively,how we deal with them not only as physical bodies (Körper) but as ‘be-souled’ lived bodies (Leiber), is a form of constitution. Even purely ‘intel-lectual’ acts such as willing or desiring, when they are factually carried out,involve a ‘physical’ component when my willing results in an action or whena certain emotion changes my countenance.

>> No.19136103

>>19136079
> "I, the human being in the world, living naturally only as this human being and finding myself in the personal attitude as this human person,am thusly not another ego which I find in the transcendental attitude.[…] The transcendental ego as pole and substrate of its potential totality is, as it were, the transcendental person which is primally instituted [urgestiftet] through the phenomenological reduction. This ego will beframed henceforth in terms of the universality of the concrete trans-cendental and takes on for itself the all-embracing life that brings intoplay all potentialities and that can then actualize all possible modes of self-actualization. It will become apparent that natural personal existence and life is only a particular form of life, a life that remains identi-cal in view of all potential changes, i.e., [it is] the actual and possibleunity of life, centred through the identical ego-pole, which remains the same in all these potential changes."

- Hua XXXIV, pp. 200f.

>> No.19136116
File: 164 KB, 750x804, 87F3F81B-20CD-4D94-B6E5-389E559D5525.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19136116

>>19136005
He had a philosophy. It was on purpose that I steer him away from the bores in *respected* philosophic circles

>> No.19136148
File: 830 KB, 640x960, 1620212396884.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19136148

>>19135180
>I've been reading him for about 17 years now,
what the fuck

>> No.19136168

>>19133750
>Where does philosophy end
Wittgenstein
>Where does psychology begin
Idk freud maybe

>> No.19136175

>>19136148
Kek.
Not gonna lie that does look like me 15 years ago.

>> No.19136262
File: 2.37 MB, 3264x2448, 20210928_174308.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19136262

>>19136148
> Light reading at home.

>> No.19136268

>>19134772
>>19134777
Sounds like cope to me

>> No.19136299
File: 42 KB, 1360x317, 1628740725253.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19136299

>>19136262
You might have a Doppelgänger

>> No.19136332

>>19135742
Husserl bro, what do you think of Michel Henry?

>> No.19136342

>>19136034
Indeed, I'm very happy. The discussion was both lively and informative.
Neck yourself.

>> No.19136452

>>19133750
Existentialism and Psychoanalysis (Using this term to reffer to Freud, Adler, Jung and those they have influenced) are where the "colors mix in the color spectrum". If you study both you will see many simmiliarities, some due to the influence of Existentialism has had on Psychoanalysis and others from just the sheer closeness between the two.

>> No.19136467

>>19134845
>Most (modern) psychology presupposes some kind of Cartesian mind
Wrong

>> No.19136469
File: 8 KB, 195x278, Ricoeur.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19136469

He can tell you where existential philosophy and psychoanalytic psychology end and where religion begins.

>> No.19136483

>>19136469
Based.

>> No.19136497

>>19136469
Based
Also Victor Frankl

>> No.19136536

>>19135180
Since you're French I have to ask: what's your take on Merleau-Ponty?

>> No.19136562

>>19136332
>what do you think of Michel Henry?
Husserl's best critic, although I don't think his arguments reach quite as far as he does. And even despite the strong deviations, I have no way but to admit that his ethical, aesthetical and sociological works are much more in line with what I perceive Husserl would have done if he had developed those fields than in contradiction to them. I can only recommend him strongly.

>> No.19136617

>>19136536
>Since you're French I have to ask: what's your take on Merleau-Ponty?
Can't give a fair answer. My mom got me into philosophy, she was a curator and had used him a lot in her doctorate, so, you know the sort of veneer your first philosopher has? which is why Nietzsche is so unduly popular. For me that goes to M-P. Even when he's wrong, I have a tendency to judge him less heavily than say, Heidie. Kinda like William James, too. Even when he's wrong he's still more right than most.

>> No.19136684

>>19136617
>which is why Nietzsche is so unduly popular
cope, Nietzsche laid the grounds for phenomenology through perspectivism and metaphoricity

>> No.19136798

>>19135164
Define material. You say zero mysticism required but your view seems as mystical as the alternatives. Sure our consciousness is dependant on the material no one denies that. The real question is about the the nature of that dependency. And what even is material, what is reality when we lack the means to see outside of the apparent world we inhabit. Personally I don't believe anything can be said about the nature of consciousness because we can never step outside of it.

>> No.19136832

>>19135331
Anon you are embarrassing yourself. Please I beg you stop before it's too late.

>> No.19136852

>>19136832
You know timestamps let us see that you're now seething five hours later, right?

>> No.19136872

>>19135297
Burden of proof fallacy. He told you to prove consciousness exists in the nervous system.

>> No.19137413

im not scrolling through this thread again
can i get a list of all the people named in this thread
it seems interesting to read

>> No.19138596

>>19136116
fuck you cocksucker

>> No.19138856
File: 44 KB, 306x683, kim.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
19138856

>>19134736
>He was a sick pervert, and addicted to cocaine

u americans never fail to amuse me with your victorian pearl clutching. puritanism is a debilitating mental disease

>> No.19138978

>>19133750
If you're a faggot? The material, chemical processes that results in man being nothing more than a machine
If you're not? They're the same thing

>> No.19138982

>>19136684
>Nietzsche laid the grounds for phenomenology
I wouldn't say so. Nietzsche had no influence on Husserl as far as I know, and they're philosophies are worlds apart.

He did have a influence on Heidy though, who some say 'Nietzsche-fied' Husserl's philosophy a bit.

>> No.19139204

>>19136872
Go ahead and shoot yourself in the cns and lets see how your cosciousness responds

>> No.19139209

>>19133771
I read Jung's chapter in Man and His Symbols and it was okay, not mind-blowing like he's made out to be. I feel like going deeper into Jung will just have him devolve into alchemical schizobabble.

>> No.19139572

>>19134805
That post is at odds with the /sig/ I know

>> No.19140037

>>19139209
I only read Jordan PeTeRsON and JuNG BrOOOOooo

>> No.19140043

>>19138856
>Roastie who posts on 4chan.
I bet you’re extremely normal

>> No.19140491

>>19135018
You've never read Brentano

>> No.19141326

>>19136852
Okay and? i wasn't any of the anons arguing. I got in late & like to return to threads.