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[ERROR] No.18835940 [Reply] [Original]

The contents of your consciousness are very obviously produced by your brain even if consciousness itself may be metaphysical. When you die, you're gone, except in the cop out sense in which your identity shares in all consciousness(supposing that's even true), and 'you' were only ever a fluctuating region of incestuous memes to begin with.

The amount of cope surrounding this topic is absurd.

>> No.18835968

>>18835940
>The contents of your consciousness are very obviously produced by your brain even if consciousness itself may be metaphysical. When you die, you're gone, except in the cop out sense in which your identity shares in all consciousness(supposing that's even true), and 'you' were only ever a fluctuating region of incestuous memes to begin with.
Congrats, you've reached the penultimate stage of cope.

>> No.18835990
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[ERROR]

>>18835968
I'm shaking in anticipation of your revealing to me the truth

>> No.18836024

>>18835990
Why would I stop the cope? You need it, anon.

>> No.18836038

>>18836024
>i have le secret but won't tell you
Are you 6 years old

>> No.18836966

>>18835940
>The contents of your consciousness are very obviously produced by your brain even if consciousness itself may be metaphysical.
The 'contents' qua observed phenomena differ from consciousness itself insofar as the latter observes the former and not vice versa; consciousness itself is not produced by the brain, what you call the contents are other things taking place within or appearing to consciousness. There is no basis for equating consciousness with anything else when we have awareness as the foundation of every mental act, it's never "something other than awareness" occurring alongside a mental act like consciousness always does.
>When you die, you're gone, except in the cop out sense in which your identity shares in all consciousness(supposing that's even true),
What reason is there to think this if consciousness isn't produced by the body and if our indwelling consciousness is who we actually are? If it's not produced by the body there is no inherent reason why it would be harmed by a body dying. If our consciousness is who we are, then when it survives that's not us being gone. Your consciousness either survives or it doesn't, if consciousness only survives indirectly in other things without that consciousness itself still being conscious, that's not actually surviving. Also, it's more logical and contains less unresolved contradictions to assume that there is just one infinite and eternal consciousness that is the basis of difference and multitude instead of presuming a multitude of consciousnesses existing in a world of difference with no explanation for the why and how of them being there.

>and 'you' were only ever a fluctuating region of incestuous memes to begin with.
That can only pertain to things other than the consciousness which is (You), since awareness itself doesn't fluctuate but only non-conscious content coming and going within awareness does

>The amount of cope surrounding this topic is absurd.
I actually see this book as the real coping, as a sort of milquetoast merger of panpsychism and a materialist conception of consciousness and identity. Metaphysics like Vedanta, Neoplatonism, the Ishraqi school etc already provide compelling accounts of the existence of the world, consciousness etc that don't contain the flaws of the NPC-like conception of consciousness that is elaborated by Metzinger. The former is time-tested wisdom, the later is just an attempted hip presentation of an inherently materialist worldview that is unsatisfying when it comes to answering important questions.

>> No.18837016

Consciousness does not produce the brain, it's rather subjects that emerge in parallel with brains.

>> No.18837019

>>18836966
>, what you call the contents are other things taking place within or appearing to consciousness.
The brain determines these though, you can manually shut off and on senses, emotions, abstract thinking by poking or cutting out portions of brain.

And you seem to be equivocating between universal and particular consciousness. If it's universal then your own particular awareness, your memories, personality etc. Are already no more you than those of anyone else, if you disappear by merging with everything else you're still you since you have no content at all. If it's not universal then it's tied to the specific brain states you have since they determine your self-concepts and you will end when your brain does.

>> No.18837895

>Der Tod is ao insignifikant wie ein Schluck Wasser
How is anything this dude is gonna say not already inherent in Hegel?

Plus he is way too contemporary to seriously be considered.

>> No.18838053

isn't the point a philosophical one not 'look i can sorta reduce this to this'

>> No.18839366

>>18838053
It's not reduction, it's elimination of the self

>> No.18839379

>>18835940
>Self is obviously produced by brain
>I won't explain how though :^]
The Hard Problem continues to dab on materialistcucks

>> No.18839403

>>18839379
>*contents* of your consciousness are very obviously produced by your brain even if consciousness itself may be metaphysical

>> No.18839831

>Metzinger
Is there literally anything original this dude provides?

>> No.18839848

>>18839831
I dont actually care about Metzinger, just wanted to provoke a debate about the concept of self

>> No.18840172

>>18837019
>And you seem to be equivocating between universal and particular consciousness.
There is no inherent reason for assuming that ‘particular’ consciousness is different from the universal consciousness; there is no inherent reason for assuming that they are two different consciousnesses when the only thing that differentiates them is the presence or absence of something else—the unconscious content. It’s like treating empty space and space that contains objects as being fundamentally different kinds of space which they are not, in both cases they are just space and the only thing that differs is something else within their expanse that isn’t space.

>If it's universal then your own particular awareness, your memories, personality etc. Are already no more you than those of anyone else,
That’s not true if your own particular awareness is itself the universal awareness, then in that case the “particular merging into the universal” is just the universal appearing in association with something else, and then on the other hand existing independently as it truly does in its own right; divested of any remaining seeming association with anything else. In the “transition” from one to the other the underlying space/consciousness remains unchanged in both cases. This itself does’t mean you are distinct from others, it just means everyone would actually share the same essential underlying identity, not “you” in the egoistic sense of distinct individual, but indeed the “you” in the sense of the actual taking-place of your immediate conscious presence.

>if you disappear by merging with everything else you're still you since you have no content at all.
Disappearing isnt merging, its illogical to try to have both be true at the same time. If it continues as awareness, that’s not disappearing, if it loses awareness, that’s disappearing. There is no way to have both without contradiction. If awareness “”””continues”””” in other things without retaining its essential and centrally-defining characteristic then it’s meaningless to speak of it as still existing or continuing in a sense. When the particular awareness is itself the universal awareness just appearing in association with content, the supra-individual “You” remains itself without dissolving or being lost.

>If it's not universal then it's tied to the specific brain states you have since they determine your self-concepts
They may determine psychological and egotistical notions of self-hood in the intellect/mind, but not the actual self itself qua immediate and indeterminate self-revealing pure consciousness.

>> No.18840225

>>18840172
>sychological and egotistical notions of self-hood in the intellect/mind, but not the actual self itself qua immediate and indeterminate self-revealing pure consciousness.
But what even is this? Does it have content? It's not what most people consider to be their self

>> No.18841670

>>18840225
>But what even is this?
The Atman, the foundational Self, It’s nature is discussed extensively in the Hindu philosophical school Advaita Vedanta. Here are some recent articles by western scholars that provide a useful overview of the concept and some of what it entails with regard to phenomenology.

https://www.academia.edu/43898887/Prakāśa_A_few_reflections_on_the_Advaitic_understanding_of_consciousness_as_presence_and_its_relevance_for_philosophy_of_mind

https://philarchive.org/archive/SCHAAT-52

>Does it have content?
It is the spotless light that shines on all content. That light does not appear to itself as an external observed content, but that doesn’t render it into nothingness either. “Content” as a rule is contained in something else, awareness isn’t contained in anything else but all things are contained within awareness.

>It's not what most people consider to be their self
Yes, most people incorrectly identify themselves with their mind, or with the egoistic identity that’s generated and maintained by the mind, and not with the pure indeterminate awareness which illumines all mental acts.

>Alas, how unfathomable, inscrutable, and variegated is this Māyā, that every creature, though in reality identical with the supreme Entity, and is instructed as such, does not grasp the fact, "I am the supreme Self", while even without being told, he accepts as his Self the non-selves, viz the aggregate of body and senses, under the idea, "I am the son of such a one", though these (latter) are objects of perception (and are hence not his selves) like pots etc.! Verily, it is through the Māyā of the supreme Being, that every man moves, again and again (through birth and death). There is this Smṛti on this point: "I am not revealed to all, being veiled by my Yoga-Māyā" etc. (G. VII. 25)
- Adi Shankara, Katha Upanishad bhasya