/lit/ - Literature

I desire cunny but it's not like I actually want cunny lmao brb gonna draw more lolis

>>18662005
>brb gonna draw more lolis
do share. /lit/ is a certified cunny board.

>>18662005
i desire and it is like i actually want cunny

t. 18 year old who desires 5 year old 3d cunny

>>18661992
It may appear as a lack phenomenally, but really, if you look at it more closely, it is an interrelation between various psychological, physical, biological states and there are no gaps in them. Just read what Nietzsche says about the Will in BGE section XIX, where he criticizes Schopenhauer's notion of Will by claiming that its not a unitary thing, but an constantly changing multiplicity. Both Nietzsche and Dolce Gabana squad are naturalists, there is no saltus or lack in nature for them, everything is made out of the same substance, from your micro biological level, your psychological desires to broader systems. Lack may only appear as a by-product of primal productivity, hunger is a productivity, just like your desire to buy certain type of clothes is a by-product of marketing or your social milieau. Tl;dr - it all boils down to ontology. If you suppose everything is just an interplay of positive things, then there will be room left for positive notion of lack.

>>18662059
forgot to add, it doesnt matter whether desire is lack or productivity, our desire for lolis is valid anyway

Because desire for Deleuze is essence, and I cannot lack my own essence. As I have my essence, and through my essence "puissance" or potential, desire is not the expression of a striving toward what I still lack, but the expression of my potential to put myself to work. This work might involve a thing I am not yet, or do not have yet, but my relation to that thing is not defined negatively through lack, but positively through potential.

Arjen Kleinherenbrink writes on this in his excellent book 'Against Continuity': "Potential or power is not a potential 'for something.' The power of wood is not damns, boats, trees, or desks. Instead, any given piece of woord has its irreducible, transcendental, internal desire contracted from connections with its parts."

>>18662021
kill me already

>>18662059
>>18662075
>>18662391
Seven deep and we have an actual effort answer & effort jokes? This place is coming around

wanting things is self-reproducing. the more you satisfy your want, the more you want. the fatter you are, the more you want to eat. the more drunk you are, the more you want to drink.

>>18662059
thats retarded as well, ontologically (in naturalism/atomism) there is no place for desire either, its just atoms in motion.

>>18662140
Yes, but unlike wood, desire is for something. Each desire is directed towards that-which-is-desired. The appropriate analogy would be if all wood was found as discreet pieces, each of which had a purpose inscribed upon it. Point being, this potential can be described as lack in the case of desire because consciousness gives it direction. (Or, in being filtered through consciousness it gains direction.)

>>18662718
Just because some desires are not permanently satiable does not mean that they are not to be understood as the lack of something. While drinking you cannot desire to drink; if you are a drug user who has developed a tolerance and can no longer sate his desire, this is not an example of desire being a thing in and of itself but rather that the lack becomes practically impossible to fill with the means available. That which is lacked (desired) is physiologically impossible to achieve. This is not a contradiction because truly anything can be absent and only be understood or lacked as an image. (Or is it perhaps that you desire something associated with the imaginary thing? Hm.)

It's easier to think of this in terms of Spinoza, from whom Deleuze is heavily influenced. According to Spinoza, any desire other than the inherent one to preserve our own power of living (conatus, which is inherently a positive one because we don't "lack" our own living) is caused by our interactions with affects of which we don't know the cause of for the most part. Us being affected by these affects causes emotions and desire, and its ultimately pretty deterministic because these affects are governed by their own unchanging rules.

>>18662075
Which is also confirmed by D&G being against the age of consent.

>>18661992

Desire is endless
It can't be a lack because that would mean you lack an endless amount of things

>>18662005
>>18662021
>>18662022
>>18662391
Hrrrrrrrrrmmmmmmm....

>>18663466
>and its ultimately pretty deterministic because these affects are governed by their own unchanging rules.
Why are they unchanging?

>>18663513
Analogy would be like the laws of physics. There are objectives laws of physics that are unchanging (like Newton's 2nd). We may not know them all, and we may even have the wrong understanding of them rn, but the laws still exist. In other words, principle of sufficient reason

>>18662059
Based effort posting. It's worth noting that there is a certain logic of difference and repetition (repetition with variation, differences consolidating themselves through repetition, etc.) involved and all kinds of contingent connections constantly fading in and out of actuality (from virtuality) trying to gain a foothold so to speak. Especially when it comes to the mind the amount of possible dimensions of connection is beyond anything else in the world. You can also, as Spinoza points out, have a thought about a thought about a thought and so on to infinity or until you starve to death, but in each moment there is a kind of centrifugal force (to borrow from Deleuze's early terminology) that changes things with each "passing" over a thought.

Also keep in mind that D&G were reacting to Lacan's notion of lack which is understood as the origin of unconscious desire of the infant. The child is denied immediate and exclusive access to the Mother as object of desire by the figure of the Father and thus is forced to "branch out" and seek other objects and thus becomes a normal neurotic, never fully satisfied with what he attains (as this would end his desire and potentially his life for desire is life). If the Father figure is absent or fails in this task (Father figure can also be a stern aunt for example) then the child is at risk of becoming psychotic in his desire. D&G were against this idea of an original lack always haunting us or at least to how psychoanalysis was describing and treating it, not just the "common sense" idea that you must lack something before you can desire it. Deleuze wrote some convincing and funny things against the conceptions of "common" and "good" sense for what it's worth.

>>18663090
Nietzsche has been a critic of that kind of atomism and D&G follow Nietzsche rather than that approach to naturalism. Nature for D&G is made of contingent relations, some very consolidated, some constantly shifting. You can just as well say that atoms in motion are desire, the terminology gets very strange when discussing vitalism and its relation to panpsychism for example.

>>18663466
Agreed, but I would not insist on the determinism part too much because for D&G the Body without Organs is just one instance of how flexible desire really is, connecting even seemingly contradictory things such as pleasure and pain (in sadism and masochism).

>>18663460
That's a good point, although the way you expressed it is a bit too convoluted. In any case I don't think that D&G deny the ways in which lack can be inscribed in desire, especially through language, as fundamentally unobtainable yet driving desire. Their point is more that that's not the only way to desire and certainly not the formula for desire.

>>18661992
Life is will to live, will is deficiency, deficiency is pain, every life is pain. But every creature that lives believes it is alive and that it has life; and for every creature pain is always mute and continuous so that it does not call it pain – but it calls pain the revelations of non-existence of its believed possession … So even its pain is called according to its own illusion … It laments the loss of the thing, not its losability: the unreality of possession. And in order to live it turns to new things … But whoever really wants life refuses to live in relation to those things … Wanting true possession, the mute, obscure suffering of all things takes shape and unfolds in him. His life is a refusal and a fight against all the temptations of illusory satisfactions. (“Pessimista è l’imperfetto pessimista,” in La melodia, 115–16)

>>18662059
it has nothing to do with monism, the negativity that D&G are against comes from Hegel, a monist who thought everything is spirit. D&G are pluralists. The real answer is that desiring machines produce things, they are a factory, they create real, actual things in the world. A lack cannot have this unique productive capability which connects with and powers other machines

I desire threads about literature or philosophy threads pertaining to specific books. But I lack that itt.

>>18664191
>they create real, actual things in the world.
name one

>>18664200
>decent thread with efforposting for once
>waaaah talk about books!
jannies are so fucking retarded

>>18664208
Your desire to not be a fucking retard probably produces real depression

>>18664191
>it has nothing to do with monism
they were literal spinozist. your divide between monism and pluralism is dumb, since their ontology literally encompasses both, one substance expressed in infinite modes.
>>18663763
>Also keep in mind that D&G were reacting to Lacan's notion of lack
yeah, it all comes down to the notion of the Real, where Lacan thought that the Real is a lack, D&G thought the primal real and desire is productive forces

>>18664255
You misunderstand their connection to Spinoza. They are materialists, of course they are monists, but they are pluralists, they don't think "everything is the same thing". There is, in fact, no such thing as a "same thing" in D&G, every "thing" gains individuation by difference. My point wasn't that they weren't monists, it's that the naive reading of "if monism then no negativity" is simply wrong and their concept of desire can't be explained by monism

>>18664200
I mean, people aren't exactly naming their sources, but the books discussed are those by Deleuze and Guattari and Deleuze's solo work, among many others from Nietzsche, Spinoza, Lacan and so on.

>>18664312
>they don't think "everything is the same thing"
to some extent yes, they do. Everything IS made out of one substance, thats why they use concept of the One so often. But this One expresses exists in different registers (identity and difference, molar and molecular levels, even if in the end, identity and molar level is subordinated to difference and molecular).
>it's that the naive reading of "if monism then no negativity" is simply wrong
its literally what Spinoza says and its clear that Deleuze, borrowing his ontology from Spinoza carries trough the same sentiment. You simply fail to realize the unity of One and difference.

>>18664378
>to some extent yes, they do
read Deleuze's book on Nietzsche, the eternal return is the eternal return of the different. then read Anti-Oedipus where they describe how desiring machines work without a single reference to Spinoza.
>it's clear that
just read the books lmao you don't need to trust me

>>18664312
Not him, but don't you find this pluralism peculiar? To me it feels just as weird as the Eternal Return, there's always a tendency to rethink it in different terms, maybe it's a "human, all too human" tendency.

For example, you can always ask "when did the first Eternal Return take place?" even if the very nature of time in the Eternal Return makes this question invalid. The same for pluralism, how is it possible that plurality was there from the start? Why is Difference primordial? Why wasn't it just a single "substance" that just kinda... sat there? I know I sound like I'm huffing paint, but I find this whole thing fascinating, especially Bergson's idea that asking "Why is there something rather than nothing?", as Leibniz did, to presume that nothing (which is not a part of experience, absence is still something) must be primordial to something even though that's just prejudice. Russell made a similar point against Christianity in stating that assuming the rule that "Being must have some kind of absolute beginning" is just a limit of human imagination. I'm rambling, but whatever...

>>18664399
I've read the books you mentioned. If you want to understand the unity between One and difference check out this quote:
>"—PLURALISM = MONISM <...> The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, four, five, etc. It is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which One is added (n + 1). It is composed not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted (n - 1)." ATP 20-21p
or "There is a continuum of all of the attributes or genuses of intensity under a single substance, and a continuum of the intensities of a certain genus under a single type or attribute" 154p
>read Deleuze's book on Nietzsche
deleuze doesnt articulate his own ontology in that book.

>>18664436
>deleuze doesnt articulate his own ontology in that book
Yes, yes he does. You get roped into it thinking it's a book on Nietzsche and he takes you completely off the rails into such a bastardized reading it barely looks like Nietzsche anymore. Plenty of Deleuze scholars have said as much, even Deleuze says as much. You should try actually reading him rather than larping on /lit/ he's actually a lot of fun

>>18664436
also,
> "Spinoza, Heliogabalus, and experimentation have the same formula: anarchy and unity are one and the same thing, not the unity of the One, but a much stranger unity that applies only to the multiple."158

>>18664436
Not who you were replying to, but my question would be: what's the point of a plane of immanence if everything is already the same substance differentiating itself? Is the plane of immanence just an epistemological notion then?

>>18664405
yeah I don't think he has a linear enough approach to ontology to care about beginnings. his idea of begining is closer to Simonson's individuation than Aristotle's prime mover

>>18664457
>doesnt engage with the quotes, keeps trolling
What I mean is that he presents his ontology in more clear terms later, so its no use reading out what he wrote on Nietzsche. Engage with the quotes or gtfo larper faggot

>>18664461
>not the unity of the One, but a much stranger unity that applies only to the multiple
all these quotes support my reading of a unity of different things as the eternal return never returns the same, idk what you think you are proving lol

>>18664480
Your quotes support my reading and the fcat you missed that makes me less than confident you understand D enough to engage with

>>18664486
learn to differentiate between thing and a substance then post in threads about philosophy holt shit

>>18664493
I literally said they were monist materialists lmao you are so far behind you think you are first

>>18664497
lmao you was the first one who argued against me as if I didnt acknowledge their accent of difference, then what the fuck was your problem?

>>18664510
because the structure of desire relates to machines not to monism where everything is the same so there can be no lack. the guy they accuse of saying everything is the same thing is the one who introduced negativity (the precursor to Lacanian lack) into monism is Hegel, who they reject in favor of pluralism. Again you don't need to trust me, read the first chapter of AO and see how they describe desire, it isn't "because everything is the same substance"

>>18664543
you seem to overplace the accent on their reaction against Hegel because you probably only have read his book on Nietzsche and AO and in turn fail to realize that its literally just scholastics to argue that their notion of desire depends WHOLLY on difference, since difference and the One is inseperatable for D G. You accent one part, leaving the other one unchecked. Difference is fundamentally One, since there are no dualisms in their theory, its pure continuity (plane of immanence). And if we conceptualize their notion of desire from this perspective its obvious that they react against Lacan who literally deduces desire from non-being or discontinuity. For D G desire is on the same plane just as lets say, the molecules that make up our body, there are no discontinuities. And yes, their notion of desire also implies difference, machinistic syntheses and whatever, but that was not the point I was arguing at the beggining and you just jumped in to flex your poor knowledge of D G. I'm not wasting more time on this topic, going to sleep, bye.

>>18664603
>since there are no dualisms in their theory
Not directly related to the discussion, but what do you think of the accusation that the actual-virtual couple functions as a dualism in Deleuze?

>>18664543
>structure of desire
You have no idea what the duck you’re talking about. This entire thread is awful.
>>18661992
It gets explained in an interview that’s in the beginning of the book Chaosophy

>>18664785
>It gets explained in an interview that’s in the beginning of the book Chaosophy
Nobody cares about what Guattari thinks. But thanks, I'll check it out. I find interviews very comfy regardless.

>>18664785
the unconscious is a factory, get used to it