/lit/ - Literature

>>18072048

Interesting

One of the Vedanta-posters here. You caught me while I was at work, and I dont have the free time here to fully type out and post on my phone a response to all of the points he makes. I’ll be getting home around 6:30pm EST today and I intend to write out my thoughts on what de Motreff argues, it may take me an hour or two, if the thread has died by then I’ll repost it along with my response

>>18072380
Okay no problem vedantabro, I hope you found it interesting, it's the best I could find in Catholic criticism of Guenonism with the book of Jean Vaquié.

bump

>>18072048
>Rene Guenon's sympathies for Lucifer
>initiation is demonic
funny

Why would I read all that shit with no context?

>>18072760
>there are more than 10 words, I need a good reason to read
go somewhere else if the subject doesn't interest you, retard

>>18072048
The pictographs remind me of Hegel's weltgeist explanations, and that's not a good thing. Gives me Peterson vibes.

>>18072792
>The pictographs remind me of Hegel's weltgeist explanations
please elaborate? Guénon is quite critical of Hegel:

>For Guénon, history is only the reflection of a vast cosmic process which itself takes its source in the metaphysical, timeless dimensionDB 1. Consequently, history as a science derives from the metaphysical doctrineLS 1. In the traditional perspective, time remains a purely contingent notion of the manifested world and draws its reality only from immutable principlesVD 1. It was underlined by several authors, that such a conception of history is diametrically opposed to that of Hegel who locks up, on the contrary, his metaphysics in the sphere of the temporalLS 1,GV 1,DB 2. More precisely, as Georges Vallin explains it, in the thought of Hegel, the timeless mystery of the non-duality, of the "coincidence of the opposites", that we find in Guénon, is replaced by "a temporal dialectic of the thesis and the antithesis" GV 2. For Vallin, this enclosure in the time of the human condition in opposition to the "metaphysical perspective" of Guénon continued with the Martin Heidegger of Being and TimeGV 3. For Guénon, such a confinement of history in time cut off from any transcendent reality takes on a satanic dimension that explains the fall of the modern world: as Jean-Pierre Laurant writes, "history asserting its autonomy [in the temporal sphere] and the freedom of man in a continuous creation made by him" becomes, for Guénon, "the MalLS 1 [which henceforth becomes] the true motor of LS history 2".
>https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_R%C3%A8gne_de_la_Quantit%C3%A9_et_les_Signes_des_Temps

>>18072856
>"the MalLS 1 [which henceforth becomes] the true motor of LS history 2".
"the Evil LS 1 [which henceforth becomes] the true motor of history LS 2". *

bump

bump

bump

>>18072048
>>18072050
>Guenon doesn't agree with my brand of christianity, therefore he is demonic
lmao

>>18073845
>>Guenon doesn't agree with my brand of christianity, therefore he is demonic
Yes. And unironically, you cuck.

>>18073845
retard

>>18073911
Now I see why the book hasn't been translated, the French know how bad they would look if it were
>>18073906
You're just salty Guenon (rightfully) demolished christianity lmao

>sedevacantist
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0MWKp8oxOE

>>18073975
I myself am against sedevacantism

bump

>>18072431
>it's the best I could find in Catholic criticism
it's shit

>>18074252
with the book of Jean Vaquié***

but yes, Catholics have hardly studied René Guénon, the arguments of perennialism and hardly Hinduism. it is a pity, so we have to read their criticism of similar systems and make the translation (their arguments against Parmenides' monism or against panentheism for example).

there is also this http://salve-regina.com/index.php?title=Pr%C3%A9mystique_naturelle_et_mystique_surnaturelle

>>18072380
I alsou found this:

https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/303491/Dissertation%20complete.pdf?sequence=1
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23582565?seq=1

maybe you'll find this interesting, I haven't read it yet

+ https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/471439
+ http://www.studiesincomparativereligion.com/Public/articles/A_Thomist_Approach_to_the_Vedanta-by_Bernard_Kelly.aspx

bump

>>18074301
>https://www.jstor.org/stable/23582565?seq=1
fuck that's an interesting article

>>18074286
It's a real blindspot in current Catholic thought which alot of work could be done in. Anyone know more authors?

>>18074877
>Anyone know more authors?
on hinduism?

there are some names here: >>/lit/thread/S17862097

De Smet, Upadhyay, etc.

+ https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/N%C3%A9othomisme#%C3%89cole_indianiste

>The Indianist school, established at the Jesuit College of St. Xavier in Calcutta, set out to interpret the metaphysical doctrines of Vedanta in the light of Thomism. If at first it was rather a question of showing, with a marked missionary aim, in what way the different forms of Vedânta led to partial explanations in accordance with what Thomism alone demonstrated, the more recent works of this school have been more in the direction of an inter-philosophical and -theological dialogue with mutual metaphysical or even mystical enrichment. The outstanding figures of this school are Fathers Georges Dandoy, Pierre Johanns, and Richard De Smet. We can also mention Michel (Michaël) Ledrus, professor of Indian philosophy at the Gregorian University.

>>18074858
right? amazing.

>>18074877
>>18074902

there are ressources here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahmabandhav_Upadhyay#Secondary_bibliography

for example:

De Smet, Richard. "Upadhyay's Interpretation of Sankara." Understanding Sankara: Essays by Richard De Smet. Ed. Ivo Coelho. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2013. 454-462.
Nayak, Biren Kumar. "The Christology of Brahmabandhab Upadhyay in an Advaitic Framework." Asia Journal of Theology 22/1 (April 2008) 107-125.
Lipner, Julius. "A Case-Study in 'Hindu Catholicism': Brahmabandhav Upadhyay (1861-1907)." Zeitschrift fur Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 72 (1988) 33-54. [Amaladass and Young 374.]

Lavaranne, C. "Swami Brahmabandhab Upadhyay (1861–1907): Theologie chretienne et pensee du Vedanta." Ph.D. diss. Universite de Provence, 1992.

Painadath, Sebastian and Jacob Parappally, eds. A Hindu-Catholic: Brahmabandhab Upadhyay's Significance for Indian Christian Theology. Bangalore: Asia Trading Corporation, 2008.
Palolil Varghese Joseph, "Towards an Indian Trinitarian Theology of Missio Dei: A Study of the Trinitarian Theologies of St. Augustine and Brahmabandhab Upadhyay." ThD diss. Boston University, 2013.

>>18074301
>https://www.jstor.org/stable/23582565?seq=1
holy based

>>18074301
>https://www.jstor.org/stable/23582565?seq=1
this article is non-ironically close to fully reconciling me with Catholicism

>>18074877
>>18074902
>>18074992
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_J._Lipner

>>18074301
>https://www.jstor.org/stable/23582565?seq=1
can someone upload this to archive.is or something please? when I open it in sci-hub I only get a blank screen

>>18075198
>https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/
omg this gold mine
I'm browsing the archives
God bless

>>18075219
you can read it for free by creating an account on jstor (it's fast)

>>18075230
ok thanks

bump

Here are my responses to what I consider to be the most important or worthwhile arguments, I am replying to this from the perspective of the Advaita Vedanta (hereafter just Vedanta) that Guenon's metaphysics is more or less a kind of presentation thereof. I have decided that I am going to write my replies and post them before starting on the next section. Thankfully, I don't have to work tomorrow.

>"from a purely philosophical point of view, it is impossible to conceive of a reality superior to being, unless we put potency above act. .... If one claims that being is not the first principle, one will be led to deny the necessity of the principle of identity, because there would be possibilities outside and above being.
I'm not exactly sure why de Motreff says that conceiving of a reality superior to being requires that we put potency above act (maybe someone can explain his reasoning here for me). Non-being in Vedanta and Guenon's metaphysics doesn't mean nothingness, it refers to the unmanifested possibilities. For Vedanta there is no such thing as nothingness, everything that is within maya is either manifested as an actualized possibility within a virtual maya-universe or its within the unmanifested possibilities, which is as close as you can get to nothingness in Vedanta.

When Vedanta says that Brahman is beyond being and non-being, they mean that it is beyond the delimited and contingent type of existence that the manifested universe has, and that it is also beyond the non-being (again not nothingness but a kind of quasi- or infra-existence). Brahman has a "transcendental existence" which is different from the normal conception of mundane existence. The being or 'existence' of the manifested possibilities is delimited by various things like being subject to spatial and temporal conditions; while the transcendental existence of Brahman is completely free of delimitations just as the word 'infinite' etymologically means that which is free of all finitude or delimitations.

I saw a Muslim anon who had also studied Eastern Orthodoxy posting yesterday in a Jay Dyer thread making the point that the distinction between hypostasis and ousia in Orthodox theology corresponds to the distinction between being and existence. He claimed that this refuted the trinity, I'm not sure why he said that and I'm not commenting on that claim, I'm merely citing him for bringing this point to my attention, I'm not very familiar with EO theology.

>>/lit/thread/S18061307#p18061698

>>18076061

>The generally agreed-upon meaning of ousia in Eastern Christianity is "all that subsists by itself and which has not its being in another" - in contrast to hypostasis, which is used to mean "reality" or "existence".[19] John Damascene gives the following definition of the conceptual value of the two terms in his Dialectic: Ousia is a thing that exists by itself, and which has need of nothing else for its consistency. Again, ousia is all that subsists by itself and which has not its being in another.[20]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ousia

Taken in the sense that John Damascene uses it, I believe that the transcendental existence of Brahman would then be the ousia and the 'being' within maya would be the hypostasis. For Plotinus as well the One is similarly beyond being, and comparisons can be drawn here with the Vedantic position

>"For Plotinus, a being has limits, and these limits presuppose some type of distinctions; thus the One, considered to be beyond all limits and distinctions, is thought to be beyond all being."
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1678

So, to circle back around, I don't see it as illogical to say that Brahman is beyond being, because in my view this amounts to saying that the transcendental and self-subsistent nature/existence (ousia) of Brahman is beyond the delimited existence or hypostasis of maya-phenomena.

Is de Motreff saying that conceiving of God/Brahman as something that is beyond being means that we have to put potency above act for the reason that he is making actuality synonymous with being and so if something doesn't have being then it must be only potential? If so, that would be wrong in my opinion as it seems like it's unnecessarily collapsing the distinction between independent self-subsistent existence or ousia and delimited/contingent existence or hypostasis (taken in the EO sense).

>>18076070
If we accept this distinction of ousia and hypostasis as I believe it is reasonable to do so, then we can say that Brahman is beyond being without placing potency above actuality; because then Brahman being beyond being doesn't render Him into pure potency. This would better accord with the Vedantic view which says that Brahman is unchanging and so He cannot undergo any transition from potency to actuality, which to Vedanta would be more appropriate to apply as a distinction to the transition of the potential unmanifest possibilities (i.e. non-being) into the actual states of manifestation ([relative] being).

I believe that my response solves the second part of his point about denying the principle of identity, because he is saying if the first principle God is beyond being then

>If one claims that being is not the first principle, one will be led to deny the necessity of the principle of identity (A = A), because there would be possibilities outside and above being.
There can be possibilities outside and above being if being becomes hypostasis or contingent/delimited existence because then when we say that the ousia is beyond being we are not denying or violating the principle of identity because we are no longer saying that A exists as first principle while being beyond existence as the same time, which would be a contradiction.

If we accept this distinction of ousia and hypostasis as I believe it is reasonable to do so, then we can say that Brahman is beyond being without placing potency above actuality; because then Brahman being beyond being doesn't render Him into pure potency. This would better accord with the Vedantic view which says that Brahman is unchanging and so He cannot undergo any transition from potency to actuality, which to Vedanta would be more appropriate to apply as a distinction to the transition of the potential unmanifest possibilities (i.e. non-being) into the actual states of manifestation ([relative] being).

>If one claims that being is not the first principle, one will be led to deny the necessity of the principle of identity (A = A), because there would be possibilities outside and above being.
I believe that my response solves the second part of his point about denying the principle of identity; there can be possibilities outside and above being if being becomes hypostasis or contingent/delimited existence because then when we say that the ousia is beyond being we are not denying or violating the principle of identity because we are no longer saying that A exists as first principle while being beyond existence as the same time, which would be a contradiction.

>>18076096
Vedanta-poster here, it's actually pretty late now and I'm feeling tired. I think I may just go to bed and try to get up and respond to the rest in the morning after I have breakfast, I don't have any obligations tomorrow and am free to do so. If the thread dies by then I'll just repost it and continue with my responses.

>>18076061
Thank you, Advaitaposter, I appreciate your effortposts
>I'm not exactly sure why de Motreff says that conceiving of a reality superior to being requires that we put potency above act (maybe someone can explain his reasoning here for me).
This confused me too. I am a metaphysicslet, admittedly, but I was under the impression that this was Dionysius' position too, which most Thomists don't seem to have a problem with.
I wonder if there is some linguistic problem here, that the Thomist use of the word "being" is different from the Neoplatonic use.
I remember reading an article comparing Proclus to Vedanta, and a significant portion of it was the author getting caught up on the word illusion, all of which could have been avoided if he had opted for a different translation of maya, such as "art".

bump

>>18077231
>but I was under the impression that this was Dionysius' position too, which most Thomists don't seem to have a problem with.
Yes, I have read or heard somewhere before that Dionysius is the 2nd or 3rd most cited thinker in the Summa Theologica

>>18076096

continued

>It is true that created reality depends unceasingly on God for its existence: the ens ab alio (the being that exists through another) depends on the ens a se (the being that exists by itself, i.e. God). But in Rene Guenon's comparison, for the sun to be reflected, it is necessary to suppose an external mirror. But this mirror itself is an image, which needs a mirror to reflect itself and so on ad infinitum. This shows that, in Guenon's "metaphysics", there is no reality outside the "principle". Rene Guenon's mistake is not to make the distinction between efficient and formal causes. God is the first efficient cause, but he is not the formal cause of what exists. In each thing there is a proper form, distinct from God. To claim the contrary is to fall into pantheism.

With regard to the mirror comparison, Guenon uses it in the passage quoted by de Motreff as an illustration of how that which is within maya has its existence dependent upon its source, just as the image reflected in a body of water has its existence as an image dependent on the presence of the object being reflected. I assume that when de Motreff writes "But this mirror itself is an image, which needs a mirror to reflect itself and so on ad infinitum", he is saying that because maya is an image/illusion/unreality, even the mirror consisting of maya would need a non-image (i.e. non-illusory thing) which can act as the surface in which the maya-mirror can be reflected.

As I see it this is not really a problem for Vedanta, they don't mean that there are reflections of Brahman in the literal sense of visual reflections, reflection is used by way of analogy. Brahman is held to be formless and omnipresent, so He has neither a visible image denoted by various features which can be reflected in something, and nor is there a reflective surface existing anywhere which is separate from Brahman's omnipresence in which Brahman could be reflected as an image.

>>18078593
In the passage of Guenon that is quoted by de Motreff before the above paragraph of his, Guenon is speaking about the relation of the maya-phenomena to the personality (puruṣa), i.e. the Self/Atman; which as Guenon points out is distinct from the individuality (non-Self). In this analogy the Atman is the Sun and the maya is both the mirror and the image. Because maya is the power (sakti) of Brahman, the Supreme Lord (Paramisvara), e.g. maya is the Parameshashakti or Paramisvarasakti; this is what allows maya to subsist in its relative existence, through its contingency upon Brahman who sustains it. So there is no question of "what is the non-illusory mirror in which maya can be reflected in that allows it to exist", this is wrongly conceiving of the relation between Brahman and maya as taking place in the same sense as the relationship in the physical world between images and reflective surfaces. The fact that maya is Brahman's power is what allows the maya to be, Brahman is described by Vedanta as the ground or support/basis (adhiṣṭhāna) of maya.

>This shows that, in Guenon's "metaphysics", there is no reality outside the "principle". Rene Guenon's mistake is not to make the distinction between efficient and formal causes. God is the first efficient cause, but he is not the formal cause of what exists. In each thing there is a proper form, distinct from God. To claim the contrary is to fall into pantheism.
If reality is accepted in its absolute sense, i.e. absolute reality then it would be correct to say that there is no reality outside (i.e. aside from) the principle, but this does not rule out there being conditional reality (unreality) in addition to the principle.

>>18078599
Guenon does not say that Brahman is the formal cause of what exists, de Motreff seems to perhaps be mistaking Guenon as implying that Brahman is the formal cause because Guenon said that the things within maya are reflections of Brahman and so for de Motreff this makes Brahman the formal cause because reflections generally having the same form as the reflected object. But since the formal cause of something according to Aristotle is the manifest and particular pattern/form that something has, Brahman cannot be considered as the formal cause of anything since Brahman is held to be invisible, soundless, odorless, free from or devoid of the 3 gunas and devoid of internal distinctions and worldly attributes.

Brahman is held to be different from name and form but something that is without these cannot be the formal cause of anything since the formal cause practically amounts to somethings form. So, for this reason I think du Motreff is incorrect to say that Guenon's or Vedanta's metaphysics leads to Brahman being the formal cause of everything and hence pantheism. There are other reasons why Vedanta is not pantheism which it's not necessary to mention here, it is sufficient to point out that to assume that the train of thought "maya-objects being reflections of Brahman = Brahman being the formal cause of everything = pantheism" is incorrect for the reasons which have been laid out.

>>18078610
something came up in my life today that I have to spend the rest of the day attending to and I actually wont be able to finish replying to it all today, hopefully on this friday I should be able to continue

>>18076061
>I'm not exactly sure why de Motreff says that conceiving of a reality superior to being requires that we put potency above act (maybe someone can explain his reasoning here for me).
If I understand correctly, he says this because the only way to affirm something beyond being, in the strict sense, is to appeal to potency: indeed, being is the actual, non-being is nothing, and potency is a kind of intermediate domain between the two. If we reverse the potency and the act, only then can we pose things beyond being, potency beyond act. This is what Guénon seems to do when he identifies the Absolute with the "Total Possibility", which would contain all the possibilities, but as you said it is difficult to be sure because Guénon uses the term "Being" ambiguously, sometimes as a synonym of manifested, and non-being as unmanifested, sometimes he seems to be more radical.

>while the transcendental existence of Brahman is completely free of delimitations just as the word 'infinite' etymologically means that which is free of all finitude or delimitations.
About that, see
>>18074301
>https://www.jstor.org/stable/23582565?seq=1

>>18078593
>As I see it this is not really a problem for Vedanta, they don't mean that there are reflections of Brahman in the literal sense of visual reflections, reflection is used by way of analogy. Brahman is held to be formless and omnipresent, so He has neither a visible image denoted by various features which can be reflected in something, and nor is there a reflective surface existing anywhere which is separate from Brahman's omnipresence in which Brahman could be reflected as an image.
I don't understand how the problem Motreff raises is not valid in your eyes. Analogy or not, he does raise a problem. If the world is illusory, like a reflection, then at some point there must be a support for this illusion, otherwise the illusion itself requires an illusion that supports it, ad infinitum.

>>18079149
> then at some point there must be a support for this illusion
I’m phoneposting while going about my day now and so I wont be able to write very in-depth posts in this thread or any subsequent ones following up on it until friday probably. But as I explained in this post >>18078599 Brahman is held by Advaita to be the support of maya

>>18079523
have you read https://www.jstor.org/stable/23582565?seq=1 ?

there are necessarily two facets in Brahman from all eternity in his act of knowing himself: the knowing and the known
we come very close to the Trinitarian understanding

>>18079523
>maya
it must be demonstrated that maya can exist even in theory
for I accept nothing but non-being, potency and act in the degrees of being
and you tell me that maya is and is not at the same time
so that makes it a potency.
and we arrive at big problems if the top of the manifestation is a potency (it just doesn't fit)

>>18079895
> it must be demonstrated that maya can exist even in theory
When someone sees a rope lying in the dark and mistakenly superimposes the notion of the snake onto it out of their ignorance of what the actual object is, in your view does that subjectively experienced misperception or false perception of the rope as a snake fall under non-being, potency or actual? If it’s non-being, how can it be experienced? If its potential, what could possibly be the actual state of that false misperception once it transitions from potential to actual and how can something that exists only potentially be perceived? If it’s actual, how can an illusory (unreal) superimposition of the concept of snake be classified as actual i.e. “having actual existence” like the rope is actual? For when the illusion is removed we see that there was never any existing snake

I remember this, you actually went and did it OP, thanks a lot. Great work.

Do you have the book digitized/in pdf by any chance? I can read French ok if you wouldn't mind uploading it to libgen or something.

>>18080136
It's an actual image in the mind.
So maya is like this?
So actual?
You sure?

>>18080136
It's interesting advaitins use the Buddhist snake metaphor so heavily, see pic related.

A misconception is still a conception. Whatever the psychic substance ultimately is, there is no metaphysically distinct state of "illusion" that requires definition in terms of a distinct substance. Illusions are relative to some context, and they are correct relative to the insufficient or misguiding information they are based on. A sinuous gestalt probabilistically or heuristically identified as a snake, for safety's sake for example, and then re-identified as a rope is not a transition from some ill-defined virtual to an ill-defined actual "state." At least not without adequately defining this substantialization of states.

All that is actually happening is that the unitary psychical substance is shifting its intentional attitude toward the gestalt as it receives more information, or otherwise changes its stance toward it.

Extending this analogy to brahman supporting contingent beings which are in virtual states of "illusion" about objects which are ultimately also contingent aspects of brahman, there is still no explanation about why brahman would be divided in mind about itself. If all depends upon brahman, if brahman is ultimately the only subject and object in existence, simply put the only thing in existence, then brahman is analogous the unitary psychical substance changing its intentional attitude in the rope vs. snake example. But this would leave unexplained why brahman would be capable of having multiple states with regard to itself, which is the original question why maya or illusion exists at all.

>>18080136
>>18080448
we have an illusion of something. i see a rope instead of a snake. but brahman, being alone at his level, what does he see wrong? he is perfect, but he deludes himself by knowing himself? wtf

>>18080637
The common reply is that only the contingent individual subjects, the jivas, experience illusions with regard to brahman. Brahman has no illusions, only its jivas do, so brahman is never deluded. The jivas are just deluded about brahman. But the jivas are themselves contingent aspects of brahman, since everything is.

Arguing about this with an advaitin is strange, it feels like they are shifting the goalposts back and forth. Ask about how maya is experienced, they say the jivas experience maya. Ask how the jivas exist if only brahman exists, they say the jivas don't exist. Ask who suffers maya then, they say the jivas. Etc.

>>18080673
>The common reply is that only the contingent individual subjects, the jivas, experience illusions with regard to brahman. Brahman has no illusions, only its jivas do, so brahman is never deluded. The jivas are just deluded about brahman. But the jivas are themselves contingent aspects of brahman, since everything is.
but brahman perceives all that the jivas perceive, no?

it's weird, once a guy here told me that brahman doesn't perceive the world
that he was sentient and that we jivas receive our sentience from him, like the sun rays ricochet on the earth
but that's all

so if it is true
their Absolute is supposed to be defined by his sentience (cit)
and yet he is literally blind

>>18080696
>but brahman perceives all that the jivas perceive, no?
No, because that would interrupt His non-dual presence if He observed particular objects
>it's weird, once a guy here told me that brahman doesn't perceive the world
Which is correct
>that he was sentient and that we jivas receive our sentience from him, like the sun rays ricochet on the earth
>their Absolute is supposed to be defined by his sentience (cit)
>and yet he is literally blind
He is not blind because He knows all the truly exists (Himself) and this immediate and constant revealing of Himself to Himself qua self-illuminating eternal presence does not depend upon the mind or sense organs.

>The body is illumined by a twofold consciousness in the same manner as a wall, for example, can be illumined by two types of light. Just as a wall can be lighted up directly by the sun as well as by the reflection of the sun through a mirror, and we can observe the natural sunlight on the wall existing in the middle of the different patches of reflected light, so also we can observe the natural consciousness of the Atman between different thoughts and feelings, in the short span of time when one thought subsides and another thought has not yet arisen. Generally speaking, the human mind gets attached to certain objects, and its perception is always coloured by the nature of the object to such an extent that there is no time left for the mind to contemplate the Consciousness as it is in itself, unconnected with the objects. It is possible by careful and thorough investigation and psychological processes to differentiate between the factors that belong to the object and those that belong to Pure Consciousness. In the waking, the dreaming, as well as in the deep sleep states, it is possible to make this analysis by which we are enabled to dissect consciousness from the object. An object is known by the mind with the assistance of Chidabhasa-chaitanya (consciousness reflected through the intellect, or the psyche), and it is by this that we know there is such a thing as an object or a form, but the Consciousness behind the ‘I’, which is at the background of even the object consciousness is Brahma-chaitanya (Absolute Consciousness), designated here as Kutastha (internal Self). The knowledge, “This is a body” is brought about by the Chidabhasa, and the knowledge, “I know the body” has its reference to Kutastha. Even the knowledge of the absence of an object is based on the Consciousness of the Kutastha, and it is this very Consciousness that enables, later on, the particular form of perception in relation to an object. As an arrow may be sharpened with a pointed steel-head for the sake of hitting objects, the Buddhi, or the intellect, has in itself the projecting form of Consciousness of the Chidabhasa.

>>18081639

>It is when this Chidabhasa begins to act that we have object-consciousness; otherwise there is ignorance of it, the Consciousness not being particularised. Both the unknown and known conditions of an object are, thus, finally rooted in Brahman-Consciousness, as Kutastha-chaitanya. The intellect by itself cannot know an object, because it is, after all, a modification of Prakriti (cosmic matter). Just as matter cannot know matter, the intellect cannot know an object. What is known is material and what knows is Consciousness. The freedom of the Consciousness lies in its Self-realisation that it is independent and absolute and is not really tainted by the nature of any object at all. (Verses 1-9).

> The perception of an object is due to the activity of the mind, or the intellect, in regard to it, together with the Chidabhasa attending on it. It is these that become responsible for an active perception of the object. It is not the General Consciousness of Brahman but the reflected consciousness, Chidabhasa, that particularises knowledge. As Brahman is present always, it cannot be said that it is manifesting itself only during the perception of an object. It is the Chidabhasa that rises and falls, but Brahma-Chaitanya is always there, and has no beginning or end.

>There is a verse quoted from Suresvaracharya (a pupil of Sri Sankara) to the effect that Consciousness which manifests itself as an illuminating factor in all external perceptions is really the ultimate object to be known. Here, while Suresvara regards Consciousness as the ultimate end of endeavour, what he means is that the ultimate Consciousness, for all perception, being Brahman itself, it is the Goal of all aspirations, but he does not mean that this Consciousness is the Chidabhasa, because, the latter is absolutely dependent upon the Kutastha. This has been mentioned also by Sankara in his Upadesasahasri. When there is a manifestation of the Chidabhasa there is external perception, but the Chidabhasa is itself illumined by another Consciousness as even the absence of any particular object is known by it. The mental modifications, the Chidabhasa and the object, all these three, are simultaneously illumined by the General Consciousness, but the Chidabhasa can illumine only the object. Thus, the distinction between the two is clear.

>>18081643

> In the perception of an object, there is a twofold consciousness, one particular and another general. Some schools of thought regard the General Consciousness as Knowledge of knowledge or Knowledge of perception, calling it Anuvyavasaya. The knowledge, “This is an object” is due to the activity of Chidabhasa, and the knowledge, “I know the object” or “the object is known by me,” is due to the existence of Brahman. This distinction between the particular and the General Consciousness made, thus, in external perception, is also to be made in internal perceptions. The Chidabhasa lights up the modifications of the psychological instruments in the form of the ‘I’, as well as its ramifications such as desire, anger, and so on, as fire can heat up an iron ball. Just as a red hot iron ball can illumine itself, but does not illuminate other objects, so do the psychoses within (Vrittis) illumine themselves, being enlightened by the Chidabhasa, but do not directly illumine other objects. These psychoses within come in a series as bits of a process, with intervals between the different links of the process, and do not flow continuously. Also, they get dissolved in sleep, swoon and Samadhi (Super-Consciousness). The intervals between the various processes of thought as well as the absence of thought itself are illumined by an Unchangeable Consciousness, which is the Kutastha, as in the perception of an external object; the object is known distinctly and the General Consciousness is not so known. The psychoses as thoughts and feelings etc. are known more clearly than the General Consciousness of the Kutastha which is continuously present, whether thoughts come or go.

>In the case of the psychoses of the Antahkarana (internal organ) there is no question of known-ness and unknown-ness, because they are self-luminous and, hence, there is no chance of their either knowing themselves as objects or not knowing themselves at all. This happens also in the case of inert objects where Consciousness is absolutely absent and in which case there cannot be any such thing as known-ness. The subject does not become an object where either Consciousness is totally absent or where there is self-luminosity. In the two types of awareness mentioned, the particular one which gets itself connected to objects has a beginning and an end, and because of its changeful nature, it is different from the General Consciousness behind it, which is immutable and is, therefore, called Kutastha. There has to be posited a witness of the modifications of the mind; otherwise they cannot be known even to exist, and as it is in the case of the reflection of a face in a mirror, where the mirror is the medium and the face is the original with its reflection, in the case of the Self, too, the Anthahkarana is the medium, the reflection is the Chidabhasa, and the Atma, or Kutastha, is the original.

>>18081652

>It is not that the Atman by its being at the back of even the process of transmigration undergoes any change. The limitation referred to here as the Chidabhasa is not merely like the limitation of the vast space by the walls of a jar for example, because the Atman does not become a Jiva, or the individual, merely by an enclosure. We cannot say that the Atman has become the Jiva, just because we have raised some walls around with material substance. The difference is that in the case of the Jiva, the Buddhi is transparent, but mere transparency is not the sole conditioning factor, because there may not be any difference in certain cases even when there is transparency such as in a glass measure, which, after all, can contain only as much quantity of grain as wooden measure. What makes the essential difference is not merely the limitation but the reduction of quality by quantity by reflection, and it is here that we notice a difference between the original and the reflection. We call that a reflection which appears to be like original, but does not have really the characteristics of the original.

>In luminosity the Chidabhasa resembles the Atman, and it is for this reason that the Jivas mistake themselves for reality and mistake the objects of the world also for similar realities. The difference, however, is that the Atman is never attached, because it is universal, while the Chidabhasa is not. The Atman never undergoes transformation, because it is absolute, while the Chidabhasa does. The internal psychological organ conditions the Chidabhasa and the latter cannot exist without it. The former is different from the latter because of its material nature and is distinguished from the latter which has the characteristic of luminosity. In the scriptures, especially the Upanishad, it has been established by various explanations that the Atman is different from the Buddhi, and is not limited by it. The limitation is due to the variety of the constitution of the Antahkarana, not because of the variety in the original which is the Atman. The manifold that we observe can be traced back to the variety in the reflecting media, though what is reflected is one and the same.

https://www.swami-krishnananda.org/panch/panch_08.html