/lit/ - Literature

>>17623362
>How is the (a) Tathāgatagarbha any different from the idea of an Ātman
It's not. Buddhism has an apophatic Atman, hinduism has a kataphatic Atman. Modern Buddhism denying the existence of an immortal self is misled and corrupted.
All the replies below mine will be aimless shitflinging and tedious philosophical debates that miss the point.

>>17623362
Not an expert but as I understand it the buddha nature was a rejection of the idea than only the few could become buddhas. The Lotus Sutra puts a lot of emphasis on this.

>Modern Buddhism denying the existence of an immortal self is misled and corrupted.
These are the people you share a board with.

>>17623374
>>17623362
Buddha deconstructed all five skandhas as non-self and then refused to respond to questions about immortal selves. Mahayana's Buddha-Nature it's the result of Buddhism coming in contact with Taoism and other Chinese currents of philosophy, and while it doesn't contradict the Buddha, it adds elements which he preferred not to discuss.

>>17623502
>Mahayana's Buddha-Nature it's the result of Buddhism coming in contact with Taoism and other Chinese currents of philosophy,
That’s wrong, the early Tathagatagarbha texts were composed in Sanskrit in India, and then they made their way out of India to Tibet, China and beyond. Any point of contact with another teaching that may have generated or influenced those texts would have most likely been with one Hindu sect or another as opposed to anything Chinese.

Ah shit, here we go again.

>>17623653

>>17623362
>1- How is the (a) Tathāgatagarbha any different from the idea of an Ātman (in the purest sense of the idea in Hinduism)? (i.e., how is the Buddha-Nature any different from the Self, which, according to the Dṛg-Dṛśya Viveka, is not identical to the ego nor to the mind and which is unknowable?) From what I know the two terms are used in an interchangeable way in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, which makes things even trickier.
The mental gymnastics of the Mahayanists who cling to their dream that Mahayana is what the buddha taught is that
-the equation true self = buddhanature is mostly in chinese Mahayana sutras [not solely in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra]
-the chinese did not translate properly the late sutras [supposedly mostly from sanskrit] into chinese, so they used the chinese words that they could and those words where having strong connotation with toaism or some other teachings already
-later on, the chinese did a second translation which has less buddhanature =true self so the Mahayanists who hate to hear budhhanature= true self say this second translation is better

That's really all they can come up with.The funny thing is that they have to go back to historical studies to debunk the equation, but they get triggered when history is also applied to all mahayana sutras, because it debunks also their dream that Mahayana is not tainted by brahmins and remain 100% what the buddha taught lol.

That was on the ''scholar'' level. On the level of the teaching, they don't have much of a come back. They build another mental circuses which really falls on the ''conventional truth'' of their fantasy that there is ''ultimate truth and dichotomous conventional truth'' with a dichotomy of ontology and epistemology:

-hindus are on the ontology side. ie everything is one substance living by itself
-mahayanists are on the epistemic side, ie that the nature of phenomena is free from the dual extremes of existence and non-existence [classical mistake by them, because for the buddha being free from the ''extremes of existence and non-existence'' means there is dependent origination, but mahayanists reject this and they say there is no arising in the first place and only interdependence]. So again Mahayanists try to fall back on the usual teaching in the sutras, but them BFTO themselves lol.

Ie for mahayanists, it is the mahayana drivel that nonduality is not a monism.

All this stuff is just wavy hands by intellectuals desperate to separate themselves from the brahmins. Mahayanists say that nirvana is having no thoughts and resting in 'basis'' or ''ground'' that is the ineffable pristine eternal buddha mind. Hindus say that nirvana is having no thoughts and resting in the ''basis'' or ''ground'' that is the ineffable pristine eternal brahma mind lol. They really are the same thing.

>another thread about NO REALLY GUYS BUDDHA NATURE IS ACTUALLY ADVAITA VEDANTA

Buddha-Nature is a description of reality. All things have Buddha-Nature, even dogs and trees (which Advaita Vedanta rejects). It's something things are "made out of"; it's what all things are in the sense that all things are Empty. It's not some secret real-you that lets you consoom forever.

>>17624153
>It's not some secret real-you that lets you consoom forever.
Why do buddhists act as if they're somehow superior to everyone else because their death c- I mean religion denies everything good in life?

>>17623374
I found it interesting that you use the apothatic/kataphatic distinction to deal with the issue. I shall reflect about it.

>>17623423
Indeed, the Lotus Sutra discusses it in this way too, but there are other Sūtras, such as the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, which deal with Ātman and Tathāgatagarbha interchangeably.

>>17623502
>Buddha deconstructed all five skandhas as non-self and then refused to respond to questions about immortal selves.
I cannot confirm this, since I have not fully read the Pali Canon, but, from what I've read, there are some evidences of this in the Ānanda Sūtta.
That's what I've concluded too until now: that the five Skhandas are not the Self, but that does not mean that there is an apophatic Self underlying it in the deepest level, which could not be identified with an ego or a mind.

>>17623561
Indeed. From what I've known, the original Sanskrit text of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra has only survived in fragments, but it fits the case.

>>17624144
>Okay, that's really interesting. This is the great division between Buddhism and most of Hinduism: i.e., Buddhism aims at Nirvāṇa; Hinduism aims at what Buddhism calls Arūpa-dhātu (Formless Realms). This is no problem at all if you are a Theravāda practitioner/scholar.

>>17624153
Haven't even mentioned Advaita Vedānta, but okay. I am genuinously interested in the theme of similitudes, and, although I cannot lie that I'd prefer to see Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna in certain communion, even if with some differences, that is not quite my intention: I'd even prefer to merge Advanta Vedānta in a perspective of it being a reformed version of Vedānta based on some Buddhist pressupositions (insert that whole text from anon complaining about Ādi Śankarācārya). But Vedanta is not quite the topic I want to discuss here.

>>17624153
>"At that time the World-honored One spoke to Vajramati and the other
bodhisattvas, saying, ‘Good sons, there is a great essence called the 'Tathāgatagarbha'.
It was because I wanted to expound it to you that I showed you these signs. You
should all listen attentively and ponder it well.’ All said, ‘Excellent. We very much wish
to hear it.’"
- Tathagatagarbha Sūtra
This can be seem in someway as more as just a "potential", but also an essence.

>>17623374
I found it interesting that you use the apothatic/kataphatic distinction to deal with the issue. I shall reflect about it.

>>17623423
Indeed, the Lotus Sūtra discusses it in this way too, but there are other Sūtras, such as the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, which deal with Ātman and Tathāgatagarbha interchangeably.

>>17623502
>Buddha deconstructed all five skandhas as non-self and then refused to respond to questions about immortal selves.
I cannot confirm this, since I have not fully read the Pali Canon, but, from what I've read, there are some evidences of this in the Ānanda Sūtta.
That's what I've concluded too until now: that the five Skhandas are not the Self, but that does not mean that there is an apophatic Self underlying it in the deepest level, which could not be identified with an ego or a mind.

>>17623561
Indeed. From what I've known, the original Sanskrit text of the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra has only survived in fragments, but it fits the case.

>>17624144
>Okay, that's really interesting. This is the great division between Buddhism and most of Hinduism: i.e., Buddhism aims at Nirvāṇa; Hinduism aims at what Buddhism calls Arūpa-dhātu (Formless Realms). This is no problem at all if you are a Theravāda practitioner/scholar.

>>17624153
Haven't even mentioned Advaita Vedānta, but okay. I am genuinously interested in the theme of similitudes, and, although I cannot lie that I'd prefer to see Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna in certain communion, even if with some differences, that is not quite my intention: I'd even prefer to merge Advanta Vedānta in a perspective of it being a reformed version of Vedānta based on some Buddhist pressupositions (insert that whole text from anon complaining about Ādi Śankarācārya). But Vedanta is not quite the topic I want to discuss here.

>>17624153
>"At that time the World-honored One spoke to Vajramati and the other bodhisattvas, saying, ‘Good sons, there is a great essence called the 'Tathāgatagarbha'. It was because I wanted to expound it to you that I showed you these signs. You should all listen attentively and ponder it well.’ All said, ‘Excellent. We very much wish to hear it.’"
- Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra
This can be seen in someway as more as just a "potential", but also an essence.

I would be careful

>>17623362
>How is the (a) Tathāgatagarbha any different from the idea of an Ātman (in the purest sense of the idea in Hinduism)? (i.e., how is the Buddha-Nature any different from the Self, which, according to the Dṛg-Dṛśya Viveka, is not identical to the ego nor to the mind and which is unknowable?) From what I know the two terms are used in an interchangeable way in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, which makes things even trickier.
I. https://www.reddit.com/r/vajrayana/comments/kvec85/how_is_tathāgatagarbha_different_from_the_hindu/
II. https://www.byomakusuma.org/MadhyamikaBuddhismVisAVisHinduVedanta.html

I've always found the "isn't this just an atman" discussion to be superficial. The context is different, the intention, path, soteriology, relation to other points of doctrine, etc. The point of everything having buddha-nature is that all beings have potential for liberation, which means you are justified in the vow of coooompassion for them. No efforts made are futile if they are made to liberate others because all have this potential (which makes sense given the corpus of teachings on non-duality, relativity, emptiness, etc.). In other words there is no class of scorned beings who are beyond help. The atman of Hinduism is rather different, especially the capital Atman, since it is a question of a personal self versus a great Self that is permanent and not other than God. Buddhism always denies the personal self has absolutely real existence, because it cannot be found separated from the aggregates/clusters, what causes it to arise; it's like any other composite such as a chair or a pot. Some of the Vajrayana or esoteric Mahayana schools do literally affirm a great self, but they also equate this with other terms like dharmadatu or dharmakaya or tathagatagarbha or sunyata which to the earlier point, is a very different context than how Hindus situate and teach Atman. The argument for teaching this way is that it is expedient means for atman-minded beings.

Walser 2018
If I am correct that the Mindlessness section of the Perfection of Wisdom
assumes both familiarity and competency with specifically Yajurvedin discus-
sions of yoga and of brahman qua Prajāpati (the latter being referred to as both
nirātman and as śūnya “empty”)75 then we may also have an answer as to why
Subhūti does not see the bodhisattvas. His “not seeing” is part of his withdrawal
of all awareness back into its source, a yogic attempt to directly experience that which has ultimate and absolute ontological and epistemological priority: brah-
man qua emptiness understood as that which is prior to (and empty of ) any
possible conceptual distinctions whatsoever.
Once we see the opening section of the Perfection of Wisdom to describe a
kind of meditation in which conceptualization is brought back into its cosmo-
gonic source on par with yogic meditations of the Kṛṣṇa Yajurvedin branches,
I think we can make more sense of the parts of the expanded Perfection of Wis-
dom in 8,000 Lines that Orsborn identifies as being central to its chiastic structure.
Orsborn identifies chapter 16 and Dharmodgata’s sermon in the middle of the
Sadāprarudita section to be structurally (and therefore thematically) central to
the text. The topic of the first is “suchness” (tathatā) and the topic of the latter
is the Buddha himself or the “Tathāgata.” I would like to return to my argument
from Chapter 6 that the iterations after section G of the ur-sūtra were attempts to
bring the teachings of the ur-sūtra in line with a budding Buddhist “orthodoxy”
that was heading in a different direction. While, as Orsborn points out, there were
certainly sutras in the early canon that held up emptiness (or signlessness) as a
thing76 – even an ultimate thing – the Brahmanical tradition had developed (or
was developing) an idea of an ultimate cosmic font or foundation that was also in
some sense personal. Most of the Upaniṣads treat brahman as a kind of impersonal
force, but as we have seen, the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad assumes this brahman to be
Prajāpati, just as the Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad has the seeker enter into a long conver-
sation with brahman represented anthropomorphically as sitting on a throne.77
Canonical Buddhism had an ultimate (whether emptiness or nirvana), just not
as a person. The developed Perfection of Wisdom takes Subhūti’s non-perception
in the beginning, applies it to the epithet “Great Vehicle” in the first chapter
to say that the Mahāyāna of Buddhism neither comes nor goes. This theme of
“neither coming nor going” (a phrase applied to nirvana in the Udāna)78 is then
applied to “suchness” (tathatā, an epithet occurring in the canon that can apply
to either “Buddhist” or “non-Buddhist” ideas of the ultimate)79 in chapter 16.

The sectarian ambiguity of tathatā (in contradistinction to, say “nirvana”) would
have served our Buddhist Brahmins well when they got to the Dharmodgata ser-
mon, which takes the argument about the neither coming nor going of tathatā
from chapter 16 and applies it to the “Tathāgata.” The latter is now said to be the
“thusness” (the tathatā of Tathāgata) that neither comes nor goes (the agata of
the Tathāgata).81 Voilà, we have a version of the Buddha that is, arguably, the func-
tional equivalent of the Kṛṣṇa Yajurvedin brahman – śūnya, nirātman, timeless and
yet still the Tathāgata of Buddhist discourses with whom a sovereign might iden-
tify. And here it should be kept in mind that it is the last chapter of the Perfection
of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines and its discussion of the Tathāgata that was the inspiration
for subsequent Mahāyāna discussions of the dharma-kāya of the Buddha.
Once we place the core Perfection of Wisdom within larger discussions within the
Maitrāyaṇīya Yajurveda branch, other things attract our attention as well. As men-
tioned above, in addition to the Maitrāyaṇīya version of the Yajurveda, there are a
number of other Yajurveda recensions. The Vājasaneyī Saṃhitā (both Mādhyandina
and Kaṇva versions), the Taittirīya Saṃhitā and the Kaṭha Saṃhitā (both Kaṭha and Kapiṣṭala-Kaṭha versions) each begin with the identical sentence, which presum-
ably would have been the first to be memorized by boys of the Yajurveda branches:
iṣe tvorje tvā vāyava sthopāyava stha devo vaḥ savitā prārpayatu śreṣṭhatamāya
karmaṇe
The only outlier for this sentence is the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā, which has:
iṣé tvā subhūtāya vāyáva sthopāyava stha devo vaḥ savitā prārpayatu
śreṣṭhatamāya karmaṇā
The Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā is the only one with the word “subhūtāya” in the first
line. Though I do not believe that there is enough evidence to say that “Subhūti”
in the Tripiṭaka was to be read as a Maitrāyaṇī Brahmin, the choice of Subhūti
as the main interlocutor of a sutra that lauds the ideal mind as an acittaṃ cittaṃ
may well have been a wink at those in the audience who came from this particu-
lar branch.

>>17623374
/thread

>>17624694
it is superficial, especially since advaita vedanta copied so much of its ideas and frameworks from mahayana anyway, so regardless of what it says about atman there are obviously massive similarities. even guenonfag agrees on this point, pic related

>>17624789
don't /thread your own posts

>>17624144
I’m curious, and I have a few questions:
what is your take on dependent origination?
What do you think dependent origination means? What does one realize when they realize that principle?
Also: are you an autodidact or do you have any teachers? Even indirect teachers you’ve learned from that you haven’t met IRL?

>>17624694
I agree we can't just say that a concept from one side is just another concept from another side, since there is a whole construction of narrative which has a coherency with a whole in each case. Even so, I cannot escape to see similarities.
My take on the matter, relatively, is that Advaita Vedānta took a lot from Mahāyāna Buddhism and, seeing its reality, could reunderstand a bit of what was taught by the Ṛiṣis.
Such reconection took Ādi Śankarācārya to a perspective of identification of Ātman (such "personal" Self) and Brahman; but, doing so, one does not have any personal Self, such as it would be understood in other traditions, but would merge itself into the Brahman, and not become an individualized being anymore; such view held by Advaita Vedānta is pretty similar to some ideas concerning Nirvāṇa.
So, again, yes, Ādi Śankarācārya, not wanting to become a "cryptobuddhist" could reunderstand some of the knowledge of the Ṛiṣis by grasping some ideas which underly the truth in Buddhism.

Another thing I would like to make clear is that this discussion, as it is, is pretty much intelectual discussion by itself and for itself, in some sense, not having too much of value when concerning the deepest and most essential parts of the matters. Buddhism, for example, as Dharma, is pretty practical, and this is not something one can dissociate the "doctrine" from. The same, in other level, with Hinduism. Such fact means that, to discuss such matters as identification of term A and term B, are irrelevant in the deeper sense, for it does not bring neither Mokṣa nor Nirvāṇa. Although the purpose of this thread is to shed some light to the idea of "Tathāgatagarbha", not necessarily in a way to compare it with the concept of "Ātman" by itself, but more to compare it with the idea of an essence, a permanent existence (be it personal or impersonal) etc., because it is odd to perceive Parinirvāṇa as some sort of complete annihilation (i.e., something similar to what atheists believe that happens when we die).

>>17623362

>How is the (a) Tathāgatagarbha any different from the idea of an ĀtmanHinduism aims at what Buddhism calls Arūpa-dhātu (Formless Realms)
I'm not sure about that. These are very rare forms of yoga.

>How is the (a) Tathāgatagarbha any different from the idea of an Ātman
Different schools / texts may look at Buddha nature in very different ways. Again, the term "atman" is understood in very different ways by brahmana philosophy.

>two terms are used in an interchangeable way in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra
Buddhists can conventionally use "Hindu" terminology. That is, you can call "Narvana" - "Moksha", and Buddha - "Shiva", etc. and the text will remain Buddhist in meaning. Some textes specifically use such mimicry.

Let's put it this way: for some part of Buddhists, there is no difference between Buddha-nature and Brahman except for the name.
This does not make them "Hindu", but their dharma-logia is not very different from the brahminical. In India, they could merge with the Shaivas, while in China / Japan and Tibet they partially remained.

>why would someone even "take rebirth" in a Buddhakṣetra (Pure Land)?
Well, they upgrade there into high-level bodhisattvas and collect the blessings of the Buddhas.

>Pure Land is identical to Nirvāṇa in some traditions of Tibetan Buddhism
I haven't heard anything like that. However, as "upaya" everything will go.

>even exist and not be Formless Realms
It's like a spiritual desert (sump for dumb super-yogi) and Buddhists are not interested in it.
All cool places according to Buddhist ideas are located somewhere in the 4th Jhana.

>>17625249
I just tune out when people start warping the doctrines to be "nihilism," because they don't understand them. It's a garbage argument, to take something from another party, scramble it into a hostile vocabulary, and return it as some sort of refutation. Buddhism does not teach that nirvana is annihilation. It's really that simple. If that is someone's takeaway then they are wrong or Buddhism is wrong for them. There were actual nihilists in Buddha's time as far as Indian philosophy goes, and they are debated in the Pali nikayas, while nihilism is argued against by the Mahayana texts on sunyata as well. As for the other extreme of permanence or the eternal, like everything else it needs to be read in context. What is certainly not permanent is what is dependently originated, phenomena, appearances, etc. For the sake of metaphysical completeness one may want to argue some thing is permanent, but if so what is it? It doesn't seem to be possible for it to be spoken of since nothing permanent actually appears, and it would be necessary to reduce it to mere verbiage. Worse than the nihilism debate is eternalism, since there are no grounds for us to discuss the grounding of everything. It is pure dogma unless one believes in the possibility of achieving advanced spiritual states where one can experience such eternity beyond mere cognizance. But to believe such states are possible is same as believing the dogma anyway, for in neither case has one actually had them yet. And if one has had them, he is now forced to make dogmatic statements regarding them to those who have not, or he can be silent.

>>17625503
>Buddhism does not teach that nirvana is annihilation.
That's not why it's called nihilistic. Buddhism rejects everything good about existence because it's temporary. All physical pleasures, all mental pleasures, everything that can be enjoyed in any way is to be discarded.

>>17625866
That's not nihilism. That's being aware that attachment to pleasure causes pain. If someone is avoidant of sources of pleasure and pain, how does that make him a nihilist?

>>17626023
Nihilistic is used as a synonym for life-denying in that context even though it's inaccurate as you point out.
Regarding Nirvana I do agree with the detractors that it is annihilation for all intents and purposes, and just saying "no it's not, just meditate and you'll see" does not constitute a compelling argument when Nirvana is explicitly described as the cessation of all consciousness and awareness.

>>17625866
>Buddhism rejects everything good about existence because it's temporary. All physical pleasures, all mental pleasures, everything that can be enjoyed in any way is to be discarded.
And it's a good thing.

>>17626072
If you hate life, I suppose. Don't expect everyone to agree with you. I think it's a cowardly and depressing ideology.

>>17626077
reducing life to tastes, ie likes and dislikes is right. Saying likes and dislikes are wroth it is moronic.

>>17626094
Reductionism is wrong because it fails to take the sublime into account. Living is worth it.

>>17626066
>>17626108
Living is worth it if you aren't living a life consumed by affections. For one to just lust after enjoyable things and fret over losing them is slavery. That's the point. People who want a detailed blueprint of what nirvana is or isn't are missing the point; they are essentially trying to figure out if they will lose their current personal enjoyments or acquire new ones.

>>17626245
You don't need buddhism to not be too attached to things, that's just dumb dogmatism. It's important to know to not center your life around desires, and it's important to learn to let go of worldly things. None of this requires you reject everything good in life.

>>17625866
Not at all. There's nothing wrong with pleasures and pains, the problem is the craving. Someone who has let go of craving can experience pleasure just fine. Your problem is you're mistaking desire for pleasure. Desire is never fulfilled, you just stop desiring X and start desiring Y.

>>17626276
>the problem is the craving
Why?

>>17626265
Sure you don't need Buddhism to do that but if the argument against Buddhism is that it is life-denying, i.e. not coomer enough, that's also an argument against any sort of philosophical middle way.

>>17626276
>>17626284
By the way
>Not at all.
The nikayas clearly say you need to renounce all pleasures and worldly happiness.
>>17626287
>life-denying, i.e. not coomer enough
False assumption.

>>17626284
Because it leads to suffering. We don't even really need to gigabrain this, again, the desire, the craving, this is what causes you to suffer. The pleasure itself is really secondary (as is the pain for an "anti-craving", that is, craving to not feel pain).

>>17626295
No, the Nikayas say to renounce the desire for sensual pleasure. This is done through removing one's self from temptating (among other tactics that really just amount to this). Monks don't stay away from girls because they're yucky, but rather because physically removing one's self from women prevents temptation (and thus makes neutering the craving for them easier). It's totally possible to do this without monasticism, it's just so hard as to be impossible for the average person.

>>17626318
Why avoid all forms of suffering? Why avoid suffering to the point you would seek to be completely extinguished?
>>17626318
>No, the Nikayas say to renounce the desire for sensual pleasure.
Which is functionally the same thing, you're playing with words. This is why I don't like arguing with buddhists, it always comes down to reinterpreting terms and arguing semantics. Whatever.

>>17626295
I don't buy into the life-affirming/life-denying paradigm this board sets up in every thread anyway. It's the same as the "is x based?" line of discussion. If some belief were literally life-denying it would lead to suicide. So in that sense, many hedonists are actually life-deniers, since lifestyles of pleasure maximization lead to ailments and early deaths. The Buddhists on the other hand, are yet to commit suicide.

>>17626324
Do you want to suffer?

>>17626329
>If some belief were literally life-denying it would lead to suicide.
Without rebirth, suicide becomes a very legitimate solution to the problems buddhism posits.
>many hedonists
I'm not a hedonist. I don't think pleasure is the highest goal of existence. But I yearn for the sublime, which buddhism denies and disregards in favor of a nondescript extinguishment of everything that makes you human.

>>17625503
That was actually quite helpful. I want to know more about those debates against nihilism in the nikayas, for I haven't read them and they would be of high interest...

>>17626334
Yes.

>>17626348
Well then Buddhism isn't the right religion for you.

>>17626341
>But I yearn for the sublime, which buddhism denies and disregards in favor of a nondescript extinguishment of everything that makes you human.
Give some Mahayana stuff a shot if you haven't. There is a certain sterility to the description sketched in the nikayas, as opposed to having the whole universe contained in a single pore of Vairocana Buddha.
>>17626344
I am too lazy to research for you but the Digha Nikaya and Majjhima Nikaya definitely cover debates with materialists, nihilists, eternalists, brahmins, proto-jains, etc. over the course of a couple thousand pages.

>>17626381
>Give some Mahayana stuff a shot
Oh, I have. As >>17626351 said, it's more of a problem with buddhism as a whole. When you don't agree with the first noble truth (or what it implies, rather) or with anatta, there's really nowhere else to go, is there?

>>17626399
That's fair. Personally I remember first hearing the four noble truths probably a decade ago and it totally clicked with me but I didn't have any further interest in studying Buddhism until a few years later.

>>17626422
There's definitely a lot of appeal in buddhism's simple yet precise philosophy, I get that.

>>17624962
dependent origination is just ''causality'', ie:
>When this is, that is. From the arising of this, that arises.
>When this is not, that is not. From the ceasing of this, that ceases.
applied to suffering. ie finding out what is the condition for the arising of suffering and the condition for the cessation of suffering. This gives the usual twelve nidanas.

It turns out that DO is also ''the middle way'', ie all the stuff that is taken to exist or not exist, ie usually the aggregates, arise from some conditions and cease from some conditions.
eg it is always wrong to say ''vedanas exist'', just like it is always wrong to say ''vedanas don't exist'', and it is always true to say ''vedanas arise from contact'' and ''vedanas cease from the cessation of contact''.

This middle way kills all the questions like ''does the buddha lives after death'', and so son. Those question don't make any sense.

The 12 nidanas are nice and true, but they already are a bit systematized, the versions in the Snp are better
http://leighb.com/snp4_11.htm

for instance,

>"From where have there arisen quarrels, disputes, lamentation, sorrows, along with selfishness, conceit & pride, along with divisiveness? From where have they arisen? Please tell me."

>"From what is dear there have arisen quarrels, disputes, lamentation, sorrows, along with selfishness, conceit & pride, along with divisiveness. Tied up with selfishness are quarrels & disputes. In the arising of disputes is divisiveness."

>"Where is the cause of things dear in the world, along with the greeds that go about in the world? And where is the cause of the hopes & fulfillments for the sake of a person's next life?"

>"Desires are the cause of things dear in the world, along with the greeds that go about in the world. And it too is the cause of the hopes & fulfillments for the sake of a person's next life."

>"Now where is the cause of desire in the world? And from where have there arisen decisions, anger, lies, & perplexity, and all the qualities described by the Contemplative?"

>"What they call 'appealing' & 'unappealing' in the world: in dependence on that desire arises. Having seen becoming & not- with regard to forms, a person gives rise to decisions in the world; anger, lies, & perplexity: these qualities, too, when that pair exists. A person perplexed should train for the path of knowledge, for it's in having known that the Contemplative has spoken of qualities/dhammas."[1]

>"Where is the cause of appealing & un-? When what isn't do they not exist? And whatever is meant by becoming & not- : tell me, Where is its cause?"

>"Contact is the cause of appealing & un-. When contact isn't they do not exist. And whatever is meant by becoming & not- : this too is its cause."

>"Now where is the cause of contact in the world, and from where have graspings, possessions, arisen? When what isn't does mine-ness not exist. When what has disappeared do contacts not touch?"

>>17626525
>"Conditioned by name & form is contact. In longing do graspings, possessions have their cause. When longing isn't mine-ness does not exist. When forms have disappeared contacts don't touch."

>"For one arriving at what does form disappear? How do pleasure & pain disappear? Tell me this. My heart is set on knowing how they disappear."

>"One not percipient of perceptions not percipient of aberrant perceptions, not unpercipient, nor percipient of what's disappeared:[2] for one arriving at this, form disappears -- for complication-classifications[3] have their cause in perception."


>"What we have asked, you have told us. We ask one more thing. Please tell it. Do some of the wise say that just this much is the utmost, the purity of the spirit[4] is here? Or do they say that it's other than this?"


>Knowing, 'Having known, they still are dependent,'[5] the sage, ponders dependencies. On knowing them, released, he doesn't get into disputes, doesn't meet with becoming & not- : he's enlightened."

>>17624144
seriously, Theravāda-poster, what view of paticca-samuppāda do you have?
The timeless view of it “when this arises, that arises. When this ceases, that ceases”? Do you think when ignorance ceases for an Arahant: birth, old age, sickness and death instantly cease simultaneously? Or must they wait until death for suffering to cease? ‘When this ceases, in due time, that will also eventually cease’?
Is paticca-samuppāda a teaching about karma and rebirth that stretches across 3 lives (the 3-life interpretation)?
When a stream-winner realizes it, do they just intuitively know “these conditions (ignorance, craving) led to my rebirth, and if I dismantle these conditions then rebirth will end”?
Or is it a more timeless principle they realize that applies to the here-and-now?
Do you have a moment-to-moment (momentariness) view of it? Where it explains how each moment is produced by the previous one in the presence of certain conditions (ignorance, craving)?
This is just a restatement of my last reply. What view of dependent origination do you hold? How do you understand it?

>>17626525
>>17626534
to pose some more difficult questions that get to the heart of what I’m asking:
Is an arahant still subject to birth, aging, sickness, death and the whole mass of suffering while they are alive? Or do they have to wait until death and parinibbāna to be free of the whole mass of suffering?
How does a stream-winner without any knowledge at all of their past lives, understand dependent origination?
What is the cessation of contact? Can contact cease while the arahant is still alive? Or can the cessation of contact only occur at death?
What do you make of this passage in Udāna 2.4?:
>”Contacts make contact
>Dependent on acquisition.
>Where there is no acquisition,
>What would contacts contact?”
Is this describing parinibbāna? Or the cessation of contact for the arahant during life?
If contact is just the neutral and objective description of what happens when a sense object meets a sense organ, how can contact cease if not through death at parinibbāna? Or is there something deeper to contact than this?