/lit/ - Literature

>>17562593
time and space are the root cause of the phenomena.

>>17562593
Space and time are just subjective forms of intuition, they do not exist outside of us.

>>17562814
Do time and space exist without phenomena?

>>17562836
no.
we cant intuit empty space or empty time.

>bro like...outside your mind...there is like stuff....bro there is like stuff you don't even KNOW about because it's like outside your mind
>everything bro....everything--- like even the way everything is...is just your mind...and outside that ...you don't even know

>>17562836
Yes, but only as (non-actualized) forms of intuition. Things-in-themselves are not spatio-temporal

>>17562849
Then why say that time and space cause phenomena? If phenomena are the cause of time and space, why separate time and space from phenomena?

>>17562854

>>17562860
>Yes, but [abstraction]
>Things-in-themselves are...

>>17562863
time and space are the a priori predicates of phenomena. they are empty forms without an object by themselves.
there is no way to know how an object conforms to time and space sperate from your understanding.

>>17562863
Space and time do not cause phenomena. >>17562860 >>17562834
Space and time are not things, nor do they exist outside of us. They are just our subjective forms for our intuitions. Maybe if I repeat it for the third fucking time you'll get it

>>17562889
>greentexting instead of formulating actual coherent objections
Am I supposed to read your mind?

>>17562898
>time and space are the a priori predicates of phenomena.
Yeah, except time and space do not exist separately from phenomena.
>they are empty forms without an object by themselves.
Wasn’t this BTFO by Einstein?

>>17562924
>Wasn’t this BTFO by Einstein?
he formulated his work on matter conforming to time not time by itself.

>>17562945
It’s almost like time does not exist separately from phenomena

>>17562860
>(non-actualized) forms of intuition

what is a non actualized form of intuition?

>>17562959
yes

>>17562593
>Does Kant think that time and space exist separately from the objects of phenomena in some abstract faculty of the mind?
No, that'd be the representations of time and space.

>>17562966
Based.

>>17562969
>No, that'd be the representations of time and space.
Is there a secret time and space?

>>17562989
you cant know.

>>17562999
>you just can’t know
Well, at least I can know that I can’t know.

>>17562989
There is a time and space that is derived from the form of the apperance and serves as inputs to our sensibility, so I don't think that'd count as being "in some abstract faculty of the mind" in Kant's philosophy of the mind. But the representations, yes.

>>17563014
>There is a time and space that is derived from the form of the apperance and serves as inputs to our sensibility,
>but there’s also this other time and space
You are making me doubt G- I mean the thing-in-itself.

>>17563044
Well, Kant thought he proved the thing-in-itself exists but only in the second edition of CPR and many people were not convinced including Schopenhauer. I also thought his "Refutation of Idealism" didn't make any sense, so I was relived to find out it wasn't in his first edition but only added it after he was charged of supporting Berkeley's idealism.

>>17563082
>many people were not convinced including Schopenhauer. I also thought his "Refutation of Idealism" didn't make any sense, so I was relived to find out it wasn't in his first edition but only added it after he was charged of supporting Berkeley's idealism.
Holy based

>>17562969

>>17563164
I had an updated diagram where I tried to integrate his concept of transcendental object to allow for radical idealism, but I gave up on the diagram halfway through the book because I just used it to get used with his words. I know people like to use the "negative noumena" definition from his second edition, but for me noumena is a cognition that does not have empirical content and we cannot know if it exists.

>>17563082
>but only in the second edition of CPR
As far as I know he never claimed that he didn't prove their existence in the first edition, in fact he explicitly states in the Preface (iirc) that the two editions do not differ in content but only in presentation. What's your source on that?

>>17563082
Also why doesn't the Refutation of Idealism convince you?

>>17563330
The second edition has a section called "Refutation of Idealism" where he does that. The first edition doesn't have any of the sorts. The second edition also has the "negative definition" of noumena while the first one has only the "positive definition".

>>17563338
These are my notes from when I read it few years ago:

- "My own existence in time can first be determined only through this peristent thing"
-- No, your consciousness of your existence can be determined by the persistent thing
- "This persistent thing cannot be something in me"
-- It can be your existence, which is different from your consciousness of your existence

>>17562593

Why did the artist decide to paint Kant from this angle?

>>17563370
>It can be your existence, which is different from your consciousness of your existence
Yes.

>>17563370
>The second edition has a section called "Refutation of Idealism" where he does that.
The Refutation of Idealism is not dedicate to the refutation of Berkeley's ideasm: the real target is Descartes, and the correspondence of phenomena to external noumena. The proof of the existence of things in themselves in general is already entailed by the trascendental deduction.
>The second edition also has the "negative definition" of noumena while the first one has only the "positive definition".
I'm not following how this would entail that the first edition had not already set up the arguments necessary to affirm that things-in-themselves exist. So, to be more clear, for Kant to claim that they exist, he only has to prove that the intellect is a synthetic faculty, since, at that point, an external source is required for the determination of sensibility, without which the intellect would remain empty and inactive. The trascendental deduction of the first edition already makes that initial claim, which means that the first critique is already incompatible with the non-existence of things-in-themselves (regardless of how Kant has been explicit on this point - he certainly has not been explicit enough, hence the added section and all the clarifications concerning the concept of "noumenon").

Regarding the notes, I must admit that I don't understand them (or at least, I wouldn't want to misrepresent them). Could you explain to me what you mean by them?

>>17563465
>So, to be more clear, for Kant to claim that they exist, he only has to prove that the intellect is a synthetic faculty, since, at that point, an external source is required for the determination of sensibility, without which the intellect would remain empty and inactive.
Are you the same guy I was arguing with in the other Kant thread?

>>17563491
Almost certainly, I always post in Kant threads

>>17563465
I don't agree with your interpretation that the TD requires the thing-in-itself; it just requires a transcendental object of which we know nothing and may be within ourselves but outside of our consciousness. That's external to our consciousness, sure, but not external to ourselves. This is also related to my notes about his refutation of idealism: Kant claims that he is conscious of his existence as determined in time, which requires a persistent thing outside of himself: if he means outside of his consciousness, sure, but he says outside of his existence, which he cannot know as we are only conscious of our existence as it exists in our consciousness.

Perhaps you don't believe unconscious exists or that it should be considered "ourselves" and that's why we disagree?

>>17563602
I would like to pose a question about the intellect itself. Does Kant think that it exists in some kind of vacuum separate from its entities (i.e., thoughts, ideas, etc.)? It seems to me like he is making the same mistake he does with time and space when positing that there is some kind of empty, absolute form that they adhere to, instead of time and space adhering to phenomena.

>>17563670
It's simple: the unknowable bound of our sensation is actually the Will, that can be known without mediation and intuitively to us through our own Will.

>>17563670
>Perhaps you don't believe unconscious exists or that it should be considered "ourselves" and that's why we disagree?
I was about to say exactly this.
Also, to say that there is something external to my consciousness, wether it is in "ourselves" (and I would contest that this expression has any meaning upon closer examination) or not, already disproves Berkeley's idealism: any existence that is external to my consciousnes is to be treated as a noumenon.

Furthermore it is unclear to me why you think the trascendental object (as it is meant in the first edition) could possibly play any active role in the determination of our sensibility. Notice that from it, all my determinate, non-imagined experience must arise (insofar as it is that trascendental object that, according to your interpretation, should determine my sensibility, leading to the formation of determinate intuitions). This causal link is not clear at a logical level either, since the TO is fully undetermined, and as such no specific order of determinations (such as the ones that lead to the formation of the intuitions I have experienced so far) can be inferred.

>>17563670
>Perhaps you don't believe unconscious exists
I do not believe that we have ever been unconscious. Cognitions of change already predicate consciousness—the rest is merely deductions based on time and a false identity, which have no affect on consciousness.

>>17563670
This >>17564010 is not the person you were responding to

>>17564037

>>17563931
>I was about to say exactly this.
That it doesn't exist or that it is not ourselves? Either way, glad we identified where we disagree. It's late in Europe so I will have to continue this another time probably in another thread. I do agree he didn't need his Refutation of Idealism to disprove Berkeley (and he agreed to that too) but his critics didn't so in his addition I believe he went further than his philosophy allowed him to.

>>17564084
I was going to sleep too. See ya, and goodnight

>>17563405
he was autistic, cant look eye to eye.

>>17562593
No, read the transcendental dialectic.

>>17564244
Transcendental cope

>>17562593
>Does Kant think that time and space exist separately from the objects of phenomena in some abstract faculty of the mind?
Yes.

>>17562814
>time and space are the root cause of the phenomena.
No. They are only the form of inner and outer sensibility.

>>17562834
>Space and time are just subjective forms of intuition, they do not exist outside of us.
Yes.

>>17562836
>Do time and space exist without phenomena?
Yes, intuitively.

and so on...

>>17563299
agreed.
>The Verstand therefore limits the sensibility, without expanding its own field, and by warning it, that it doesn't try to refer to things-in-themselves, but only to appearances, it thinks a Gegenstand in itself, but only as transcendental object, that is the cause of appearance (without itself being appearance), and can neither be thought as quantity, nor reality, nor substance etc. (because these concepts always need sensual forms, in which they determine a Gegenstand); so that it is completely unknown, whether it can be met within us or without us too, if it will be removed together with the Sinnlichkeit, or still be left. If we want to call this object Noumenon, because our Vorstellung (representation) of it is not sensual, we can go ahead. But because we can not use any of our Verstandesbegriffe (concepts of understanding) on it, this Vorstellung is empty for us, and can't be used for anything but to draw the limits of our sensual knowledge, and to leave a room that we can neither fill with possible experience nor through the pure Verstand.
this is even in the A-version and I think it illustrates pretty well that the accusation that Kant used the category of causality on the Noumenon is unfounded. Notice how he says that the Verstand thinks an object as the cause of appearances, not that they actually are, but because it does so by itself, he has to introduce the limiting factor of Noumena

>>17564352
>yes
Are there any other philosophers that deal in meaningless abstractions as well as Kant?

>>17564415
>meaningless abstraction
For all we know, the universe could contain an infinite number of dimensions rolled into one, the only means we have of experiencing it as being 3-dimensional creatures constituted by stable matter. Time could be a single unity, and our degenerate forms are the only way in which gravity, electromagnetism, etc, can break this unity and give the illusion of causality. I would think his "abstractions" are anything but meaningless.

>>17562945
yes but his work also proved an objective spacetime. kants just a retard

>>17562902
space and time would exist without us

>>17564492
>objective spacetime
>through a priori synthetic judgement
No, according to Kant, Einstein just constructed another mathematical formalism which happens to be consistent with our sensibility.

>>17562593
>transcendental idealism

>>17564440
>For all we know, the universe could contain an infinite number of dimensions rolled into one, the only means we have of experiencing it as being 3-dimensional creatures constituted by stable matter. Time could be a single unity, and our degenerate forms are the only way in which gravity, electromagnetism, etc, can break this unity and give the illusion of causality. I would think his "abstractions" are anything but meaningless.

>>17564492
>his work also proved an objective spacetime.
how? I genuinely want to know. And do you mean objective in the realist sense or in the sense Kant means it?

>>17564523
>>For all we know, the universe could contain an infinite number of dimensions rolled into one, the only means we have of experiencing it as being 3-dimensional creatures constituted by stable matter. Time could be a single unity, and our degenerate forms are the only way in which gravity, electromagnetism, etc, can break this unity and give the illusion of causality. I would think his "abstractions" are anything but meaningless.

>>17564529
To be fair, you have to have a very high IQ to understand Rick and Morty. The humour is extremely subtle, and without a solid grasp of theoretical physics most of the jokes will go over a typical viewer's head. There's also Rick's nihilistic outlook, which is deftly woven into his characterisation- his personal philosophy draws heavily from Narodnaya Volya literature, for instance. The fans understand this stuff; they have the intellectual capacity to truly appreciate the depths of these jokes, to realise that they're not just funny- they say something deep about LIFE. As a consequence people who dislike Rick & Morty truly ARE idiots- of course they wouldn't appreciate, for instance, the humour in Rick's existential catchphrase "Wubba Lubba Dub Dub," which itself is a cryptic reference to Turgenev's Russian epic Fathers and Sons. I'm smirking right now just imagining one of those addlepated simpletons scratching their heads in confusion as Dan Harmon's genius wit unfolds itself on their television screens. What fools.. how I pity them.