/lit/ - Literature

well its true

That's lil bane

>>14681387
*blocks your path*
*retroactively refutes you*

>>14681387
>dude of course we do lmao

>dude we know nothing
>dude we can discover true morality through reason itself
which is it

>>14681387
It's true

>>14681387
based

>>14681774
>dude we know nothing

>anyway here's the foundations for objective physical sciences and objective morality
Professors should stop teaching the phaenomena-noumena distinction to non-Kant readers. They never get it anyway

>>14682973
>objective morality

LMAO

>>14681387
he didn't say that.

>>14682987
Have you read his second critique? What part of it irks you?

>>14681387
at least read an author before talking about them. in better days people would be ashamed to post such an embarrassing post.

>>14681387
Terrible post.

>>14681394
Kek

>>14681387
If he knew nothing, why did he write about it lmfao

>>14681387
To be fair, he was just pointing out the unavoidable ontological skepticism borne of having limited perception (which wasn't a new insight, but he did flesh it out). It can be viewed for the most part as a 'technicality', without much pragmatic significance (other than prescribing that we keep open minds). I do disagree with the notion that no noumenal knowledge is possible though; some minimal degree of ontological truth must be conveyed in appearances.

>>14682973
Universal morality is an absurd spook. Smart fellow, but he really jumped the tracks with that one.

>>14683114
>gets it all
Kant was just a hylic deluded by maya.
>>14681395
Based.

Read What Is Kantian Ethics? by Allen Wood.

Also ignore the idiots in this thread who don't understand him, but spout stupid memes.

>>14683130
>I do disagree with the notion that no noumenal knowledge is possible though; some minimal degree of ontological truth must be conveyed in appearances
Can you expand on this? This seems wrong

>>14683130
>Universal morality is an absurd spook. Smart fellow, but he really jumped the tracks with that one.
What part of his argument contained in the first chapter of the second critique does not convince you?

>>14683406
No matter how jumbled up and limited the information emanated by the noumenal becomes in our apperception, there remains a causal link between things-in-themselves and their appearances. We aren't omniscient, so the synthesis of our experience still requires a component of external data. In other words, there isn't a hard boundary between the noumenal and phenomenal — so the possiblity of 'decoding' some filtered information remains.

>>14683411
The entire notion begins with faulty assumptions. Values do not precede valuing agents, rather they are consequences of our natures (natures which are not universal).

>>14683659
Haven't I already explained to you what the Refutation of Idealism actually argues? It is true that there is a causal link, but this is all we can know. We have no determinate concept of the cause of a phenomenon, we just know it exists.
>The entire notion begins with faulty assumptions. Values do not precede valuing agents, rather they are consequences of our natures (natures which are not universal
Can you expand on it, referencing Kant's argument?

>>14681774
Ahhhhh you fucking idiot, read the Critique.

>>14683659
>noumenal
What does this word mean

>>14683759
You shouldn't be in this thread is what it means.

>>14683659
>The entire notion begins with faulty assumptions. Values do not precede valuing agents, rather they are consequences of our natures (natures which are not universal).

This

>>14683727
If there is a causal link, then there is necessarily information being transmitted as a consequence of that continuity. Which means some degree of knowledge of objective reality is embedded in appearances (e.g. law of non-contradiction). Knowledge is not an all-or-nothing proposition.

>Can you expand on it, referencing Kant's argument?
-assumes the existence of free will
-assumes a real dichotomy between form and content (he's fond of doing this)
-assumes the primacy of reason (but we only reason about things because we first feel some way about them... there's no such thing as pure reason)
-often relies upon examples of 'common sense' recognition of imperatives by moral agents (which is anecdotal, rhetorical, and can be more adequately explained by overlapping natures as opposed to vague and axiomatic universal forms)
-assumes the existence of universals (he didn't demonstrate the existence of such, nor has demonstration been forthcoming to this day)

His argument starts off as a good delineation of the reasons universal morality is logically unworkable, around which he weaves an entirely hypothetical veil of 'forms'. But it's full of holes.

>>14681774
>>dude we can discover true morality through reason itself
Kant didn't believe that

>>14683759
The Kantian version is: the category of unknowable objects of thought

2 days ago i dreamed i was Kants servant and he was very nasty to me. then i think i shot him or something. was very unsettling

>>14684094
Okay, since you're missing the point, let's try to reverse engineer this whole ordeal. What information can you cognize about the noumenon that is producing the phenomenic computer in front of you? (or the smartphone in front of you, if you're a phoneposter)
What can you tell me about it?
>>14684094
>assumes the existence of free will
He doesn't! That's literally the conclusion of the argument
In fact I don't even know if I should bother about the rest of your post. He literally assumes none of those things, he literally spend hundreds of pages to reach those conclusions. Are you sure you've actually read Kant, or good summaries of his main arguments?

>>14684971
I'm not missing the point, you're just a smug idiot who can't process the inconsistencies of his adopted gospel. I can cognize that the noumenon producing this phenomenon is of a fluctuating nature, as variation in appearances can only be a result of of variation in the source. It can work as a nexus for a broader scope of data than would be available to my senses in the absence of its phenomenal manifestation (the computer).

>literally literally literally
He literally does. Free will isn't a demonstrated conclusion of his argument, it's an axiom of it. Nor does he adequately address that the concept of 'freedom' is entirely relative.

Have you actually read Kant? How about instead of being passive aggressive, you make the (abridged) arguments yourself — since you're so well versed in them.

>>14686008
>variation in appearances can only be a result of of variation in the source
not him but you fucked up here and made a positive knowledge claim about noumena. obviously we have no proof of this claim as it lays outside our understanding

>>14686008
I agree with the sentiments of your argument against Kant but this anon is right >>14686070 at least in the way you seem to be putting it. What do you mean that you take this noumena to be fluctuating? What could that possibly mean? Are you going for something Hegel might say?

>>14686070
It's apodictically true. There's no other possible accounting for experienced variation.

>>14686008
>I'm not missing the point, you're just a smug idiot who can't process the inconsistencies of his adopted gospel. I can cognize that the noumenon producing this phenomenon is of a fluctuating nature, as variation in appearances can only be a result of of variation in the source. It can work as a nexus for a broader scope of data than would be available to my senses in the absence of its phenomenal manifestation (the computer).
Again, is there anything concrete you can tell me about this noumenon, apart from telling me that it exists? Any positive claim whatsoever? If this is the only thing you can tell me, that it exists, then you're agreeing with Kant.
>He literally does. Free will isn't a demonstrated conclusion of his argument, it's an axiom of it. Nor does he adequately address that the concept of 'freedom' is entirely relative.
First you tell me that I'm being pretentious, then you tell me objectively false things about what Kant said. So, literally (yes, literally) the entire first chapter (out of three) of the first section of the second critique (the section in which Kant gives all the foundations for practical philosophy) is devoted to provinf that freedom is possible. It's not assumed, it takes him 30 pages to even put it in the picture. I'm now sure you haven't read these arguments, nor you have read any summary of them: you don't even know they exist! That's like saying that Euclid just assumed that you can inscribe a triangle in a circle.
>Have you actually read Kant? How about instead of being passive aggressive, you make the (abridged) arguments yourself — since you're so well versed in them.
Are you sure I'm the passive aggressive one? You're the one blatantly lying about knowing what you're talking about, while insulting everyone who calls you out.

>>14686238
Yes, I made two claims there about its nature beyond mere acknowledgment of existence. Your reading comprehension must be quite poor.

Will is axiomatic to his arguments (yes, I have read them), not demonstrated. Furthermore, freedom is not a possible state in itself, it is a relative contrast between limitations. What is painfully obvious here is the amount of effort you're expending to do anything but pose the actual arguments (or your own informed logical demonstrations). Why is that, I wonder?

I've only insulted you, because you deserve it.

>>14686400
>Yes, I made two claims there about its nature beyond mere acknowledgment of existence. Your reading comprehension must be quite poor
Maybe it is. What positive claims are you making about the specific noumenon associated with the phaenomenon of your computer? I can't find them!
>Will is axiomatic to his arguments (yes, I have read them), not demonstrated
I don't get what you're trying to demostrate by lying on this. Seriously, I'm puzzled. Like, everyone who has read even just the first 15 pages of the first chapter, or even a summary of it, can tell you're lying. Why are you invested in pretending that these arguments don't exist? Hell, if they don't, what the fuck is the Analytics section of the second critique about? This makes no sense.
>What is painfully obvious here is the amount of effort you're expending to do anything but pose the actual arguments (or your own informed logical demonstrations). Why is that, I wonder?
Because you don't read these posts anyway, like the long one I've written days ago about the Refutation of Idealism? Why would I write two 3000characters posts for a guy who a) will lie at every occasion to win the argument and b) won't actually read what you've wrote?
At this point I'd rather work with what you know (basically nothing), so that other anons won't mistakenly accept your parodizations.

>I've only insulted you, because you deserve it.
Okay? You're still a liar who can't be bothered to not even read a summary before spouting your bullshit.

>>14681387
>Ah, it appears, mr. Kant, that you have not read Molyneux's "The Art of the Argument", otherwise you would have noticed that such a claim falls under the "self-detonating" class. Indeed, it asserts its own negation, which is a contradiction as I'm sure you're aware.

>Kant
>Fichte
>Goethe
>Schopenhauer
>Nietzsche
all put action over contemplation
what the fuck is wrong with the germans?

>>14686643
French Revolution n shit

>>14686643
Germans have been a blight upon this world as far back as when they destroyed the Roman Empire, it should be no surprise that they continue to ruin things as much as possible.

>>14686531
It shouldn't take 6000 characters to post the crux of how will isn't axiomatic to his argument (unless it is). A few sentences should suffice (you are welcome to extensively abbreviate, as I am familiar with his themes and terminology).

I'm relatively certain you'll just keep ducking though.

>>14686008
>>14686238
Guys let me tell ya. Noumena is definitely capable of allowing itself to be disclosed. That's why we have to remove knowledge to make room for faith. Faith is sex with the noumena. (A boobjob, actually.) It is a flasher, noumena sends ya nudes at 3 a.m., while ur high, putting those categories ontop of imaginatively reproduced sensation, playing w/ its cracks. Fuck, I saw me in those crakcs. We are pure noumena boiiiiiis. (That's the whole point of the basic ontic duality we are)

>>14686730
Based

>>14686695
>It shouldn't take 6000 characters to post the crux of how will isn't axiomatic to his argument (unless it is). A few sentences should suffice (you are welcome to extensively abbreviate, as I am familiar with his themes and terminology
First of all, you are not familiar with anything Kant-related.
Secondly, Kant starts the first section by questioning both our freedom and the possibility of a moral law. By the end of the first section we have the conditions of possibility for both, but we still don't know if we, or any other rational agent if that matter, can possibly satisfy those requirements.
In the second section Kant deals with the concievability of a moral law (without which, we can't claim to be free, as argued extensively in the first section). If we can't either think or apply the CI, we can't act according to it either.
In the third section Kant deals with the motives of moral law, since it is still to be established wether I can follow it not out of an empirical desire, but out of respect for the moral law. If the former case is true, then my adherence to the moral law would be only nominal, and I could not claim freedom.
This is an EXTREME summary of the questions treated in those three section, as you can see neither freedom nor the moral law are just assumed. Kant can claim that human beings are free only at the end of the third section, 150 pages into the second critique. Freedom isn't an axiom, quite the opposite in fact: it is the conclusion.
Now, why did you lie so much about knowing what those 3 sections were about?

Also will you answer my question about noumena?

>>14684962
Was the circus ever in town?

>>14683659
>values do not precede valuing agents, rather they are consequences of our natures (natures which are not universal).

Are you saying that there isn't anything in being a valuing agent that may suggest values? There doesn't need to be nor can there be identity among valuing agents in order for us to understand that they may have some "nature" in common (for instance, agency--freedom) that could provide a ground for some sort of norms.

>>14686730

Can Kantbros help me understand his argument in favor of free will in the third Antinomy? I understand his argument against it, but I can't make sense of his argument in favor of it.

>>14686643
Schopenhauer doesn't, actually.

>>14687001
bruh treat ppl with dignity pls

>>14687001
It's not an argument for free will, rather it is an argument for its possibility in a deterministic framework.

>>14687141
does he say its likely in the end?

>>14687141
Regardless, I can't parse the argument. It's the most obscure sentence I've come across in the whole Prolegomena so far. Can you explain it to me?
>>14687161
I think he is saying that both sides could be successfully argued for logically, but since they are contradictory, we can't know for sure and this conflict is caused by extending arguments from experience to thing-in-itself.

>>14687229
oh shit principle of non contradiction ANNIHILATED

>>14687161
He think he proves its existence a priori in the second critique.
>>14687229
>but since they are contradictory, we can't know for sure and this conflict is caused by extending arguments from experience to thing-in-itself
The third and fourth antinomy are quite different from the first two. One of the main difference is that they do not necessarily lead to contradiction, so what you've said is not a correct interpretation of what Kant wrote.
The point is to understand wether free causes are possible in a deterministic framework. Kant think they are, but not in nature. If freedom is possible, it is possible only in the intelleggible realm.
In this case we could potentially have a rational agent whose body acts in accordance to the natural laws, and whose will doesn't. This would lead us to no contradiction, since we would be considering causality under two entirely different regards.
Of course that section does not deal with our freedom (or lack of it), it doesn't even give any positive criterion for freedom (the only one he gives, independence from empirical causes, is a negative criterion) it just establishes that freedom is not impossible under the principles treated after the Schematism section.

>>14687399
>The third and fourth antinomy are quite different from the first two. One of the main difference is that they do not necessarily lead to contradiction
Doesn't the word "antinomy" mean contradiction? Then why did he use the term?

>>14686207
according to Kant's definition of apodictic is most certainly cannot be said to be true. while it might sound like a reasonable assumption to work with, it still falls into the aim of Humean skepticism

>>14687418
Antinomies can be apparent too, where apparent means that they can be solved. In this case he explains the apparent antinomy between two seemingly contradictory statements by pointing out that they can be applied in different regards (one to the natural world, the other to the intelleggible world).
Anyway it seems obscure, but he goes over these things in the Critique of Pure Reason at lenght. The Prologomena just glosses over these things, so don't feel stupid if you don't immediatly get them.

>>14687581
Thanks, but can you explain what he means in this sentence:
>Now I may say without contradiction that all the actions of rational beings, so far as they are appearances (encountered in some experience), are subject to the necessity of nature; but the same actions, as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason, are free.
How does he think that a rational subject who acts according to reason has free will? This is the part that I don't understand.

Is he saying that acting according to reason is free will?

>>14687619
>How does he think that a rational subject who acts according to reason has free will?
Because he could act deliberately, regardless of all the empirical phaenomena, which would simply determine his will. A synonym for "mere reason" is "pure reason", reason taken by itself (therefore in absence of empirical phaenomena).
Keep in mind, wether this is possible or not still has to be proven, the whole first book of the second critique is devoted to it. To prove it is to prove that rational agents have a pure practical reason. If they don't, there's no intelleggible realm and no rational agent is free.

>>14687683
But isn't he saying that this freedom concerns the thing-in-itself?
>Nature and freedom therefore can without contradiction be attributed to the very same thing, but in different relations—on one side as an appearance, on the other as a thing in itself.
How does prove something which he attributes to the thing-in-itself?

>>14687702
>How does prove something which he attributes to the thing-in-itself?
In the first critique he doesn't, it is only left as a possibility.
In the second critique he goes again over the concept of freedom, he identifies a list of criteria and proves the fact that we can meet all of them. He uses the word "factum" because he doesn't prove our freedom by using a concept of our noumenical self, rather he proves it through the activity of said noumenical being (and we can intuite that activity through internal intuition): according to him we can formulate maxims that are adherent to the moral law, and follow them not out of pleasure, but out of rational duty. If this is the case I have a practical principle that is entirely devised by me, being therefore independent from other non-rational, empirical principles, like pleasure and pain. If that's the case I could have a source of my actions that is entirely internal and independent from the series of natural causes.

>>14687784
Thank you for the explanations. Kant really is the most frustrating philosopher I've read so far.

>>14687793
No problem buddy

>>14686890
>Secondly, Kant starts the first section by questioning both our freedom and the possibility of a moral law.
Yet he doesn't sufficiently question the sensibility of the concept of freedom/will itself. If we do not experience the processes by which our thoughts & impulses arise (we don't), then on what basis can we aver a 'freedom' of choice/action? He doesn't consistently apply the same skepticism to this (axiomatic) concept as he does to its implementation 'downstream'.

Where is the identifiable boundary between an empirical desire and 'respect for moral law'?

I'd like to point out again that you aren't really bringing Kant's arguments to bear here, you're just saying "Yeah, he wrote a bunch about that stuff." That's fine, but it would be more instructive if you'd show his actual logic that you think demonstrates concepts like freedom/will, universals, and the primacy of reason.

I already have answered your question about noumena, and at least a couple of other anons identified my claims (even if they didn't agree with them), so I think you're just being obstinate.

>>14686942
We do not have a nature in common (that notion presupposes universals), we have overlapping natures. For example: We all exhibit preferences (the basis of values), but no instances of preferring are actually identical. The capacity for reasoning does not solve this because 1) reason does not impel us, it only employed after the fact of having been moved by feeling (even in reflection) and 2) no two instances of reasoning are actually identical.

Now the overlap of our natures is considerable, and -that is- the ground for our norms, but those norms aren't universal.

>>14687784
How does he propose we distinguish between the activity of a being which has free will and one that just thinks it does?

>>14681387
That's not his point.

>>14688102
>I'd like to point out again that you aren't really bringing Kant's arguments to bear here, you're just saying "Yeah, he wrote a bunch about that stuff." That's fine, but it would be more instructive if you'd show his actual logic that you think demonstrates concepts like freedom/will, universals, and the primacy of reason.
Yes, because you've just asked me to show you why he doesn't take freedom of will as an axiom. As I've said earlier, since freedom of will is literally the conclusion of the Analytics part of the second critique, summarizing it to you would take multiple posts (you're basically asking for a summary of 150 extremely dense pages). As you've seen in other posts of mine, I'm absolutely willing to discuss its finer points with people who are even only slightly familiar with it.
Secondly, with that post I've proven that you literally don't know what Kant's argues for. So, when you say
>Yet he doesn't sufficiently question the sensibility of the concept of freedom/will itself. If we do not experience the processes by which our thoughts & impulses arise (we don't), then on what basis can we aver a 'freedom' of choice/action?
why should I keep taking you seriously? Kant consider all of these things, and I know you haven't read what he had to say about it, nor any summary on his ideas. You're just making shit up for polemical purposes, and at the same time asking me to take you seriously, even demanding from me entire lectures on the entirety of Kant's second critique, NOT because you disagree with some of his points, but because you're not willing to admit that you don't know what he said. As if when you say this
>Where is the identifiable boundary between an empirical desire and 'respect for moral law'?
I should pretend, as I've already told you, that it wasn't dealt with in the third section of the second critique (60 pages in, so you can't even use the lenght of these works as an excuse). And if I point out that he actually explicitly considered all these matters in his foundational works, I suddenly become pretentious/dogmatic/passive aggressive/etc. It's ridicolous. It's like arguing with someone who says that in his Elements Euclid assumes that we can inscribe triangles into circles to conclude that parallel lines never meet. It's not even a matter of interpretation.

Regarding the noumena question
>I already have answered your question about noumena, and at least a couple of other anons identified my claims (even if they didn't agree with them), so I think you're just being obstinate
I already told you I have not understood your answer. Maybe I'm stupid, I don't know. Can you make it more explicit? What positive determinations can you make about the noumenon correlated to your phenomenical computer? What can you say about it, specifically? And if you don't have the tools to make such a specific claim, can you at least tell me what your answer could potentially look like, given the means to answer it?

Why does Kant cause so much asshurt?

>>14688335
You're being hysterical. If Kant has — as you merely assert — already proven the existence (or even established a strong probability) of free will / universals / primacy of reason, then it should be a trivial matter for you to pose the logical crux of any one of those demonstrations in a short paragraph. Only saying that Kant considered these issues does not speak to how he considered them, and I maintain that those considerations relied heavily upon hypothetical arrangements and axiomatically applied concepts. Your analogy with Elements is a poor one (or perhaps ironically apt), because geometry and Euclidean space are inherently axiomatic systems (they are idealized approximations of the concrete). In contrast, an argument for 'free will' is a claim for the existence for a concrete thing.

Regarding the noumena question
>1) I can cognize that the noumenon producing this phenomenon is of a fluctuating nature, as variation in appearances can only be a result of of variation in the source. 2) It can work as a nexus for a broader scope of data than would be available to my senses in the absence of its phenomenal manifestation (the computer).

>>14683659
>Values do not precede valuing agents
God have mercy on you

>>14688338
I think because his adherents want to have their cake and eat it too. They want to be good empircists while still preserving their sacred cows (like free will, god, universals), and Kant provides them a (dubious) framework for doing so. People tend to get prickly when you threaten their sacred cows.

Also, right or wrong he's been massively influential upon western philosophy. Debating Kant is like debating continental canon — the stakes are high.

>>14688821
Thank you, I appreciate the kind sentiment.

>>14688753
>If Kant has — as you merely assert — already proven the existence (or even established a strong probability) of free will / universals / primacy of reason, then it should be a trivial matter for you to pose the logical crux of any one of those demonstrations in a short paragraph
No it isn't lol. You're asking me to summarize in less than 3000 characters 150 pages of dense argumentations. Also earlier on you've just asked to prove that Kant didn't use free will as an axiom, which I did by pointin out that the entire book deals with proving the point. You didn't read it, nor you've read any summary in the last 12 hours: you literally didn't know that Kant did not just assume these things as axioms.
>and I maintain that those considerations relied heavily upon hypothetical arrangements and axiomatically applied concepts
Since you don't know anything about Kant's actual arguments, you also literally don't know wether what you've just said is true (you've tried to give some examples earlier, and none of them were taken axiomatically, in fact they were the conclusions of ENTIRE sections). You don't know what those axiomatic premises are. At this point I just want to see if you're capable of seeing how ridicolous and childish you've been during this conversation.
>In contrast, an argument for 'free will' is a claim for the existence for a concrete thing.
Which is why the analogy is apt: free will is not taken as an axiom, it has to be proven. At this point I'm quoting the first paragraph of the introduction. You haven't even gone that far.

Regarding noumena
>>1) I can cognize that the noumenon producing this phenomenon is of a fluctuating nature,
Can you claim anything positive about this fluctuating nature? What are some of the attributes of the fluctuating nature of your noumenal computer? If you can't name any, how would you study and identify them?
>as variation in appearances can only be a result of of variation in the source.
This is still a negative determination, derived entirely from the phaenomenon. The phenomenon changes, and that change might correspond to a noumenal change: through a negative determination I still don't know what that change consists of, I only know that it happened.
>2) It can work as a nexus for a broader scope of data than would be available to my senses in the absence of its phenomenal manifestation (the computer).
And Kant argues for exactly this point in the First Analogy of Experience, the one dedicated to substance and permanence. Too bad this is still a negative determination derived entirely from the phenomenical computer. At no point you've proven to me that you know anything specific about the noumenon, apart from its necessary existence in correlation with a phenomenon.
>>14688338
That's just me, I find it hard to tolerate pathological liars

>>14689191
I have a specific question. I get that causal interaction is needed as a principle taken from a category in order to make sense of intuition through controlled imagination. Thus I have an object defined as necessary effect of the cause. But I don't understand how this differs from the third analogy of community. Kant talks about substances that define each other reciprocally and thus become cognizable. But it seems to me that he said before that substance there can be only one, because time relations are cognized as states of the changes in that substance. And if I take, for example, the moon as a substance and the earth as a substance and cognize them through their simultaneous reciprocity, I actually would see that they are both just states of the same substance in communal interaction (this substance being, I think, the form/portion of time that I take to englobe both objects). So I basically don't understand why Kant uses the term substance when talking about communal interaction. Isn't it just two objects defining each other reciprocally within the same substance?

>>14689191
Fine, I'll do it for you. We'll stick with free will, since you've ignored my other objections.
Problem: Free will is impossible if agents are bound by empirical causality
Kant's 'solution': Oh hey, let's just suppose that agents are (partially? wholly?) atemporal noumenon and therefore intelligible causes unto themselves!

Objections: How is this bifurcation of causality (empirical vs. intelligible) ontologically indicated? If human action isn't affected by empirical causality, then Kant's entire empirical framework is severely undermined (Kant very well knew that empiricism is our only conduit to knowledge). If human action is affected by empirical causality, then we must ask a) on what basis can we establish a certain boundary between human action and natural necessity b) how can we assert the primacy of one mode of causation over the other c) how temporal empirical causes and atemporal intelligible causes of human action coexist? If the moral agent is noumenal, how are we apprehending knowledge of his mode of causation?

Perhaps you're now starting to get an inkling of how heavily his argument relies upon assumption, its formidable density nothwithstanding. If not, this salient quote from Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals may help:
> “freedom is only an idea of reason, the objective reality of which is doubtful” GMS, 4: 455
So now I ask you, if Kant was that doubtful about the ontological status of the parent concept of 'freedom' itself, then how could he make a case for the concrete reality of 'free will'? *gasp* Could it be that his argument is actually AXIOMATIC?!

>The phenomenon changes, and that change might correspond to a noumenal change
No, variation in appearances -necessarily- corresponds to variation in the noumenal, otherwise appearances would also be things-in-themselves and we could just dispense with the whole noumenon/phaenomenon distinction. It is true that we can't isomorphically map one kind of variation to the other, but we can make logical inferences from our positive experiences. All determinations are ultimately derived from phaenomenon btw, so if that is your standard for what constitutes a negative claim you're jumping off the epistemological cliff of radical skepticism.
Both this and the 'nexus' example are instances of knowledge pertaining to the noumenon more specific than 'it exists' (which you've now amended to: "necessary existence in correlation with a phenomenon") which have been logically inferred from what is positively experienced.

>>14681395
please use g**non in your post so my filter gets you

bump for time to post

>>14689751
substance is 'that which lies beneath' all change, or the remainder when you abstract from all predication. for both aristotle and kant, 'substance' designates matter, the 'stuff' of which everything else is 'made'. it is also the term by which change can be made intelligible, precisely because it is that which is predicated of any other term; it 'inheres' in every thing. said another way, it is a generalization of the possibility of assigning qualities to things.
a change in the relation of two or more objects--or, more precisely, a proposition regarding such a change--will necessarily involve substance if it is to be intelligible. no substance, no predication ('change'). no predication, no judgment.
>>14689803
your question is valid, but you're being very loosey goosey with the terminology and it is a complex and subtle argument kant is making. i am going to work now, but if this thread is up when i get home later i'll try and answer you as best i can.

>>14691062
>no predication ('change')
should read (e.g. 'change')
did not mean to imply predication and change were synonymous

>>14681387

>>14691979
>>14691988
>>14691991
sad but also good work

>>14683659
>there remains causal link between noumena and phenomena
>causation, a category of the understanding for synthesizing the ordering of appearances is somehow something that "remains" from noumena, despite a transcendental deduction of it being possible

real retard hours here

Kantians are such dorks lmao at least Kant understood his own arguments but you're like a bunch of parrots!

>>14681397
I get it because I'm smart
Very funny

bump