/lit/ - Literature

Aristotle's Organon, Ethics, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, Physics, On Generation and Corruption, On the Heavens, On the Soul, Metaphysics.
Plato's First Alcibiades, Ion, Laches, Protagoras, Clitophon, Euthydemus, "Last Days of Socrates", Gorgias, Minos-Laws-Epinomis, Cratylus, Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman, Hippias Minor, Meno, Republic, Charmides, Phaedrus, Symposium, Lysis, Philebus, Parmenides, Timaeus-Critias.

the only way to be omniscient is to be everything
since only by being me can truly you know what it is like to be me, or anyone

>>16196084
the otherway around
retain Nietzsche's ""optimism"" with his early Platonism (BoT) and Schopenhauer's 'metaphysics' (vorstellung and der wille), even fusing Nietszches will and Schopenhauer...
Hol' up, this is just neo-Neoplatonism.

Shankara seems to have autism and afraid to look into my eyes.
While Ramanuja pierces the depths of my soul through his image.
Seems obvious which one is correct, iconographers are also always inspired.

>there's only dualism or monism

read plotinus

>>15893384
>there is no sufficient evidence to believe in anything tangibly spiritual
there's no evidence that you're not the sole existent either

there's nothing but consciousness

>>15140207
“Then do you see, Socrates, how great the difficulty is if one marks things off as forms, themselves by themselves?”
“Quite clearly.”
“I assure you, that you do not yet, if I may put it so, have an inkling of how great the difficulty is if you are going to posit one form in each case every time you make a distinction among things.”
“How so?”
“There are many other reasons, but the main one is this: suppose someone were to say that if the forms are such as we claim they must be, they cannot even be known. If anyone should raise that objection, you wouldn’t be able to show him that he is wrong, unless the objector happened to be widely experienced and not ungifted, and consented to pay attention while in your effort to show him you dealt with many distant considerations. Otherwise, the person who insists that they are necessarily unknowable would remain unconvinced.”
“Why is that, Parmenides?”
“Because I think that you, Socrates, and anyone else who posits that there is for each thing some being, itself by itself, would agree, to begin with, that none of those beings is in us.”
“Yes – how could it still be itself by itself?”
“Very good. And so all the characters that are what they are in relation to each other have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. And whether one posits the latter as likenesses or in some other way, it is by partaking of them that we come to be called by their various names. These things that belong to us, although they have the same names as the forms, are in their turn what they are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this way are of themselves but not of the forms.”
“What do you mean?”
“Take an example. If one of us is somebody’s master or somebody’s slave, he is surely not a slave of master itself – of what a master is – nor is the master a master of slave itself – of what a slave is. On the contrary, being a human being, he is a master or slave of a human being. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself; and, in the same way, slavery itself is slavery of mastery itself. Things in us do not have their power in relation to forms, nor do they have theirs in relation to us; but, I repeat, forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what they are in relation to themselves. You do understand what I mean?”
“Certainly, I understand.”
“So too, knowledge itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth itself, which is what truth is?”
“Certainly.”
“Furthermore, each particular knowledge, what it is, would be knowledge of some particular thing, of what that thing is. Isn’t that so?”
“Yes.”

Buddha never said there's no soul.
He said: THIS is not my soul.

>>15114389
>>15114295
and everyone who met him who call themselves Platonist conformed themselves to him, and he single-handedly made "pure Aristotelianism" obsolete (nobody called themselves peripatetic after him), and every Platonist and "Aristotelian" after him thought thrice before critiquing or revising his thought. And Proclus, ironically the most famous Neoplatonist, was the least Plotinian among them, yet it is Proclus who called Plotinus the GREATEST exegete of Plato; and the savior of the tradition, since Middle Platonism and Gnosticism was a disorganized brawl lacking all cohesion or sense: while Plotinus heralded 400 years of scholarly Unity (most exemplified in his elimination of the false dichotomy of Aristotle and Plato).

and how do you think "meditiation" works? or of what it even is?

>>15008166
and this is the great error of scholasticism.
the lack of emanation theology, since to be filled by the Good should transfigure our soul into become a shining torch of divine light ourselves and this is always expressed as Act, by being filled with divinity we ourselves would overflow with creativity and creation and beauty. Participators of Divinity, deified. Heaven is not finitude.

no idea
then they accuse us of saying the same thing

yes exactly

*invents the empty set*

>>13904433
Theaetetus
That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.
>Stranger
>But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?
Theaetetus
How can we?
>Stranger
>But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?
Theaetetus
But how else can it possess them?
>Stranger
>Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable? [249b]
Theaetetus
All those things seem to me absurd.
>>Stranger
And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.
Theaetetus
Of course.
>Stranger
>Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.
Theaetetus
Exactly.
>Stranger
>And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.
Theaetetus
How so?
>Stranger
>Do you think that sameness of quality or nature [249c] or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?
Theaetetus
Not at all.
>Stranger
>What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?
Theaetetus
By no means.
>Stranger
>And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.
Theaetetus
Certainly.
>Stranger
>Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honor to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, [249d] and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal motion; he must quote the children's prayer,1 “all things immovable and in motion,” and must say that being and the universe consist of both.
Theaetetus
Very true.
>Stranger
>Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?
Theaetetus
Certainly.

Stop reading the texts of 'fumbling-20th-century-backtracking-so-called-perennials', when all their truths was fully revealed by year 600.
Read: Schelling, Schopenhauer, Pierce, Santayana, Solovyov, Bergson, Vernadsky, Cassirer, Scheler, Heidegger, Berdyaev, Buber, Gabriel Marcel, Blumenberg, Roger Penrose; if you want stuff from the actual tradition.

because it's retarded