/lit/ - Literature

>>14996109
>e quasi-instantaneous (ie sufficient enough for an effect to bear fruit), but why must cause and effect become 'simultaneous' at the interface?
This is you trying to have your cake and eat it too, something is either instantaneous or not instantaneous, "quasi-instantaneous" is a fake made-up category with nothing corresponding to it in reality that you are trying to slip under the door unnoticed, Instantaneous and non-instantaneous are mutually contradictory categories which cannot be combined like light and darkness (the absence of light), hence 'quasi-instantaneous' isn't a real thing, that's incredibly sloppy thinking; if momentariness is correct then objects have only a momentary and instantaneous existence, if they exist for more than one moment such as they would if they were "quasi-instantaneous" then by virtue of them abiding for more than that one moment they are neither instantaneous nor momentary. As has already been explained in order for there to be some sort of relationship of cause and effect between two objects both objects have to exist at the same moment because if the object acting as the cause doesn't exist at the moment the relationship takes place then qua being non-existent it cannot impart its effect unto the cause, and correspondingly if the object acting as the effect does not exist when the cause does it cannot be affected by that cause because it doesn't exist yet; non-existent objects cannot affect anything or be effected by anything. This is some very basic logic that you seem to be going to absurd lengths to avoid facing head on.
>It seems to me that if a sequence exists, then an interaction of some kind must also exist.
impossible for the reasons explained above
>Furthermore it seems like a logical fallacy to say you could only have either momentariness or causation when its certainly not illogical that both can be the case.
You have not pointed out what the logical fallacy is and merely insinuated that there is one and have failed to address the underlying contradiction in the Buddhist premise, i.e. how objects in a cause and effect relation are supposed to affect one another if one doesn't exist at the same time as the other.

>: past and future dharmas have capability (samarthya) of functioning, while present dharmas also exert a distinctive activity (karitra).
Objects which were momentary and which existed in the past or which will come to exist in the future but which don't exist in the moment cannot have activity of any sort in the moment because of their non-existence, this is nonsensical