/lit/ - Literature

Has political “science” actually made any progress since Mill (PBUB)? We all know that fascism and communism are meme ideologies, and once you establish a liberal government any additional problems are due to things that politics can’t fix. I can’t stop feeling that liberalism is the completed political system. Are there any books that debunk this that aren’t just screeching about muh traditional values or muh evils of capitalism?

Last night I had a dream that I read on wikipedia that JS Mill once stated that he was the greatest genius of his generation. I thought that was weird because in his autobiography he states that he is not particularly intelligent.

I love Mill because he is the only one who doesn't cede any ground to the rationalist scum. You may think that empiricism was "irrevocably btfo" by hume and kant, but you simply lack the imagination to understand the many possible solutions, and you are ignorant of developments in empiricism. I will be an empiricist and a realist until the day I die and there is no amount of kantposting cope that will change my mind.

>If, as laid down in the two preceding chapters, the foundation of all sciences, even deductive or demonstrative sciences, is Induction; if every step in the ratiocinations even of geometry is an act of induction; and if a train of reasoning is but bringing many inductions to bear upon the same subject of inquiry, and drawing a case within one induction by means of another; wherein lies the peculiar certainty always ascribed to the sciences which are entirely, or almost entirely, deductive? Why are they called the Exact Sciences? Why are mathematical certainty, and the evidence of demonstration, common phrases to express the very highest degree of assurance attainable by reason? Why are mathematics by almost all philosophers, and (by some) even those branches of natural philosophy which, through the medium of mathematics, have been converted into deductive sciences, considered to be independent of the evidence of experience and observation, and characterized as systems of Necessary Truth?
>The answer I conceive to be, that this character of necessity, ascribed to the truths of mathematics, and (even with some reservations to be hereafter made) the peculiar certainty attributed to them, is an illusion; in order to sustain which, it is necessary to suppose that those truths relate to, and express the properties of, purely imaginary objects... Now we have pointed out that, from a definition as such, no proposition, unless it be one concerning the meaning of a word, can ever follow; and that what apparently follows from a definition, follows in reality from an implied assumption that there exists a real thing conformable thereto. This assumption, in the case of the definitions of geometry, is not strictly true: there exist no real things exactly conformable to the definitions. There exist no points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right. It will perhaps be said that the assumption does not extend to the actual, but only to the possible, existence of such things. I answer that, according to any test we have of possibility, they are not even possible... Their existence, so far as we can form any judgment, would seem to be inconsistent with the physical constitution of our planet at least, if not of the universe... The points, lines, circles, and squares which any one has in his mind, are (I apprehend) simply copies of the points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience. Our idea of a point, I apprehend to be simply our idea of the minimum visibile, the smallest portion of surface which we can see. A line, as defined by geometers, is wholly inconceivable...We can reason about a line as if it had no breadth; because we have... the power, when a perception is present to our senses... of attending to a part only of that perception or conception, instead of the whole.

>If, as laid down in the two preceding chapters, the foundation of all sciences, even deductive or demonstrative sciences, is Induction; if every step in the ratiocinations even of geometry is an act of induction; and if a train of reasoning is but bringing many inductions to bear upon the same subject of inquiry, and drawing a case within one induction by means of another; wherein lies the peculiar certainty always ascribed to the sciences which are entirely, or almost entirely, deductive? Why are they called the Exact Sciences? Why are mathematical certainty, and the evidence of demonstration, common phrases to express the very highest degree of assurance attainable by reason? Why are mathematics by almost all philosophers, and (by some) even those branches of natural philosophy which, through the medium of mathematics, have been converted into deductive sciences, considered to be independent of the evidence of experience and observation, and characterized as systems of Necessary Truth?
>The answer I conceive to be, that this character of necessity, ascribed to the truths of mathematics, and (even with some reservations to be hereafter made) the peculiar certainty attributed to them, is an illusion; in order to sustain which, it is necessary to suppose that those truths relate to, and express the properties of, purely imaginary objects... Now we have pointed out that, from a definition as such, no proposition, unless it be one concerning the meaning of a word, can ever follow; and that what apparently follows from a definition, follows in reality from an implied assumption that there exists a real thing conformable thereto. This assumption, in the case of the definitions of geometry, is not strictly true: there exist no real things exactly conformable to the definitions. There exist no points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right. It will perhaps be said that the assumption does not extend to the actual, but only to the possible, existence of such things. I answer that, according to any test we have of possibility, they are not even possible... Their existence, so far as we can form any judgment, would seem to be inconsistent with the physical constitution of our planet at least, if not of the universe... The points, lines, circles, and squares which any one has in his mind, are (I apprehend) simply copies of the points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience. Our idea of a point, I apprehend to be simply our idea of the minimum visibile, the smallest portion of surface which we can see. A line, as defined by geometers, is wholly inconceivable...We can reason about a line as if it had no breadth; because we have... the power, when a perception is present to our senses... of attending to a part only of that perception or conception, instead of the whole..
holy based... mill chads, I kneel.

has anyone read this dudes bio before? WTF
>Mill was a notably precocious child. He describes his education in his autobiography. At the age of three he was taught Greek.[18] By the age of eight, he had read Aesop's Fables, Xenophon's Anabasis,[18] and the whole of Herodotus,[18] and was acquainted with Lucian, Diogenes Laërtius, Isocrates and six dialogues of Plato.[18] He had also read a great deal of history in English and had been taught arithmetic, physics and astronomy.

>At the age of eight, Mill began studying Latin, the works of Euclid, and algebra, and was appointed schoolmaster to the younger children of the family. His main reading was still history, but he went through all the commonly taught Latin and Greek authors and by the age of ten could read Plato and Demosthenes with ease. His father also thought that it was important for Mill to study and compose poetry. One of his earliest poetic compositions was a continuation of the Iliad. In his spare time he also enjoyed reading about natural sciences and popular novels, such as Don Quixote and Robinson Crusoe.

you are all pseudoaesthetes. there is only one correct answer. you cannot be any uglier than this nigga

>>19120681
The Subjugation of Women by John Stuart Mill.

i be crying if i look like that too bruh thats fucked up what they be doin' to y'all i ain't even gon' hold you bro. i be sayin thats fucked up like bruh you probably had the full wash and set your shit be fire probably if they aint cut yo shit. fuck it though bro its your life

>>18625248
(2/5)

John Stuart Mill

- Notable ideas and contributions:
Public/private sphere
>Mill believed that public action required different values from private life and that those in public office, as well as voters, had a responsibility to act on behalf of public interests rather than “private partialities.”
Social liberty
>It meant for Mill putting limits on the ruler's power so that he would not be able to use that power to further his own wishes and thus make decisions that could harm society.
Harm principle
>"That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." However he believed that it only could be applied in a civilized society with free speech where harmful arguments could be publically debated discarded.

- Notable works: On Liberty

>>18603180
We had a thread about this several months ago but it was pretty well agreed that pic related is the bugman philosopher, with many anons expressing disgust with his writing.

What is the most brainlet branch of philosophy and why is it ethics?

Is there an ethical system more cucked than utilitarianism?

It only works for simple and local situations. If you try and apply it to society it just becomes a minefield of exceptions where it ends up completely unravelling.

He probably didn't even write On Liberty

How should we treat groups and members in society whose ideas don't pose any direct physical harm, but may nonetheless harm society in less direct ways such as undermining values?

Just read On Liberty. While I agree with the general argument about how the free marketplace of ideas is generally healthy for a society, I don't think he addressed how we should approach groups with subversive ideas. He argues throughout that the individual or groups should be given as much leniency in the expression of their ideas as is possible so long as they do not endanger others well being. How should we approach groups who might be posing a less direct danger to society? For example, it could be argued that gays undermine traditional values, which hurts society, and by extension the individuals of a society directly. Alternatively, most people don't think nazis were a boon to the german society, and want to block their free speech.
So if we have a reasonable suspicion that an individual or groups ideas may be harmful to society, (especially after we've already had a discussion with them about our disagreements. It's not like discussion readily changes most people's minds) why should we allow their ideas to persist?

what was with all the lumps?

>the highest aim is to increase happiness
>you don’t have to calculate the best possible action, or worry about society as a whole, just use common sense!

This is what happens when brainlets are educated as if they’re geniuses.

>>11191140
the man has js mill lumps, what a fucking beta. also, the sun also rises was a fucking shit book.

>free of expression is like really essential my dudes
>woah did you just incite violence? not cool

If we ought to do whatever will cause the greatest increase in happiness for the greatest number of people, shouldn't we kill off all of the depressed people, since they are bringing down the overall amount of happiness?

what philosophical/political writers were opposed to people like John Stuart Mill's view of liberty? specifically ones that have works showing said opposition. I don't care so much about utilitarianism, just the liberty aspect

>>10663629
>Enlightenment
>Objective knowledge is possible.

>mfw

>>10586749
Yes, and a wonderful writer.

>>10587181
Good post.