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>> No.17876664 [View]
File: 151 KB, 707x376, Śrīharṣa.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] [report]

retroactively refuted by Śrīharṣa (pbuh) in his work The Sweets of Refutation (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍanakhādya)

>> No.16123503 [View]
File: 151 KB, 707x376, Sri Harsha.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] [report]


On the other hand, however, Śaṁkara and Bradley disagree over the nature of this supra-relational Absolute: for Śaṁkara, the Absolute is indivisible, undifferentiated, and one, such that differences are superimposed on it only through ignorance (avidyā), whereas for Bradley the Absolute is a ‘concrete individual’ which is a unity of sameness and difference. Shrivastava argues that Bradley’s position is similar to the bhedābheda Vedantic doctrine, according to which identity-in-difference is the proper characterization of the relation between the substantially real world and the Absolute, so that the critiques of Advaitins such as Śrī Harṣa against the bhedābheda also apply to Bradley’s understanding of the Absolute (SB, 7). As the reference to bhedābheda suggests, Shrivastava’s engagement with Bradley proceeds through a critical examination of Bradley’s attempt to affirm, on the one hand, that every appearance is real, although to different degrees, and, on the other hand, that every appearance has to be ‘transmuted’, through mutual supplementation and rearrangement, into the Absolute (Bradley 1893: 489).

Thus, Bradley argues: ‘[I]n the Absolute no appearance can be lost. Each one contributes and is essential to the unity of the whole … Every element however subordinate, is preserved in that relative whole in which its character is taken up and merged’ (Bradley 1893: 456–457). Therefore, while it is a half-truth that no individual appearance is the perfection of the Absolute, it is also a half-truth that ‘[t]he Absolute is its appearances, it really is all and every one of them’ (Bradley 1893: 431). Seeking to preserve the reality of the appearances in the Absolute, Bradley argues in this manner: ‘The Absolute … has no assets beyond appearance; and again, with appearances alone to its credit, the Absolute would be bankrupt’ (Bradley 1893: 489). Shrivastava seizes on these statements and argues that Bradley’s position involves the contradiction of stating that ‘an appearance retains its individuality’ in the Absolute and ‘an appearance is transmuted’ in the Absolute (SB, 85). When Bradley claims that ‘[e]verything in the Absolute is still that which it is for itself. Its private character remains, and is but neutralized by complement and addition’ (Bradley 1893: 511), Shrivastava responds that a finite appearance cannot undergo such a transformation while simultaneously maintaining its specificity. However, Bradley’s position can be rendered consistent through Śaṁkara’s understanding of reality in terms of the supra-relational one which appears, through avidyā, in the diversities of a phenomenal word (SB, 7).

>> No.15943694 [View]
File: 151 KB, 707x376, Sriharsha.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] [report]

>*anticipates the Gettier problem and refutes common objections against it 800 years before Gettier*

nothing personal mleccha


>> No.14918593 [View]
File: 151 KB, 707x376, Śrīharṣa.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google] [report]

While Guenon bemoans philosophical "idealism" Berkeley's idealism actually has many parallels with the Advaita Vedanta that Guenon bases himself in, the later British idealist FH Bradley is even closer to Vedanta, in fact Bradley on his own came up with and published an identical argument against the reality of causation that the Advaita philospher Sriharsa had already written about in the 12th century. Just be careful with the refutation posting and use a bit of nuance is all I'm saying

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