/lit/ - Literature

>>20525879
In 1905 Husserl adds a few definitions at the end of Urteilstheorie Vorlesung.
> 1) Pure logic is the science of truth and objectivity in general (mathesis universalis)
> 2) The theory of knowledge is the science of the relations between (truth and objectivity) and (judging and knowing truth and objectivity).
> 3) Material metaphysics is the science of being both in the general sense and in the specific sense of specific sciences.
> 4) Phenomenology of knowledge, the *descriptive* practice of exploration of the essence of thought, which is the only ground of resolution for the problems paused by the theory of knowledge.
> and 5) Formal metaphysics, being the reunion of 1) and 2), which is a special part of metaphysics that operates without presuppositions of being at all, which predicts Husserl's milestone commitment to transcendental idealism later.

>>20428431
>'To say that things exist means grasping at their permanence
No. Certain things exists permanently, certain things don't, saying they exist doesn't qualify them, it only gives the minimum grounding necessary to further qualifications.
>To say they don’t exist implies the notion of annihilation.
No, negation and annihilation are different processes. Negation is a eidetic function available to us at any doxatic act. Annihilation is an empirically founded process based on subjective local perception and limits sets by the observer (an object is considered annihilated past a certain degree of destruction of its components at the local level, not necessarily at every level).
>Thus the wise should not remain
>In “this exists” or “this does not exist.”
Correct. Existence is not that particularly useful.
>Something that exists by its intrinsic being,
>Since it cannot not exist, is permanent.
Wrong. Autopoietic systems are prone to failure with time.
I guess higher idealities kinda "exists by its intrinsic being".
>Annihilation does not apply to what happens to a liberated person after death, because there has never been any entity to cease in the first place.
Non sequitur.

>>20379329
So can you.
The punch doesn't kill you, you go blank and limp and you break your neck hitting the floor. All it takes is one good punch to your temple and you not bracing for it. Admittedly easier to do with a manlet, but it can happen to pretty much anyone.
>>20379288
As for you OP, Sartre here refuses Husserl's positioning that essence and existence are, in fact, fundamentally separated. For Husserl, the transcendental thesis of God, why He can never be reduced away, is specifically that existence is different, fuller, personalized than what it is in essence.
Sartre's claim is in filiation with Heidi, he takes living (human) existence as a special case of being in that your determinations are never settled, and their very determination is the general form of our existence (the constant determination of our determinations means our existence is "caring").
This honestly just boils down to a bad ontology. So many existential "problems" are resolved simply by accepting that some objects have an historical essence in a different way than others.
This is incidentally why YWNBAW is an eidetic truth.

>>20292826
Ok, let's try again.
A motivation is something you encounter in the course of your natural attitude, it is an object which we all use in order to make rough sense of each other's actions. In the same way that we all have a Theory of Consciousness, in the way cognitive science hears it, we have a Theory of Psychology, of which "motivation" is the main representation.
As representations motivations can be said to be part of consciousness. They cannot have value outside of representation however, and thus cannot have value outside of consciousness.
Your quip about materialism reveals how memetic your understanding of the problem is. A very large number of our mental entities are "constructs", or perhaps more accurately syntheses, and it is absolutely not incompatible with idealism to believe that our physical makeup participates in our handling of these entities.
Additionally, motivations as tools for rule making are only occasionally valid, and not by essence. Being accidental is a feature of the material realm, while ideal entities are related by pure necessity.
A specific psychological consciousness is a field populated by entities synthesized from both material and ideal "presentations". This is why phenomenology teaches that, if you want to reach the sphere of pure ideas and further to the transcendental realm you have affect a reduction on your own consciousness, and you have to train hard at it otherwise you'll fall back into psychologism, you can't just start doing introspective psychology as a pure logic and have it produce anything else than nonsense.

>>20215181
>Kant
No way, he was a fucking normie who hosted dinner parties all the time. I really think that this type of sociable character harms the universality of his philosophy because he was so immersed in the particular culture of his time. Only the solitary are able to grasp things in themselves whilst the normie is forever trapped in the world of appearences.

>>19981013
> "For a defence of the Scholastic credentials of Brentano’s account of intentionality in PES, see Ausiono Marras, ‘Scholastic Roots of Brentano’s Conceptions of Intentionality’, in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by Linda L. McAlister, pp. 128–39. What Marras successfully defends in his paper, however, is the Scholastic account, and not Brentano’s account. Thus, the major conceptual discrepancies between the Scholastic account and Brentano’s ‘new’ thesis of intentionality are neither noted nor addressed in his paper. A similar absence is present in a more recent article, written by Dale Jacquette, ‘Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality’, in The Cambridge Guide to Brentano, ed. by Dale Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 98–130. Jacquette seems to approve of Marras’ treatment of Brentano’s thesis (cf. p. 125, n. 5) thus the actual modification of the scholastic meaning of intentionality does not feature in his paper either. For an examination of the historical origins of the meanings of various versions of the Scholastic concept of intentionality that Brentano’s terminological use of the term in
PES (1874) points back to, in particular to late medieval Scholasticism, see Klaus Hedwig’s ‘Intention: Outlines for a History of a Phenomenological Concept’,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 39 (1979) pp. 326–40. In PES, however, it is quite clear that Brentano deviates considerably from the meanings of the Scholastic concept noted by Hedwig (cf., esp., pp. 328–30). Given that ‘there is no evidence’, as Hedwig points out, ‘that Husserl himself studied the Greek and scholastic sources from which the concept of intention derived’ (p. 333), we can see why Husserl is correct in his own self-evaluation to maintain that he begins philosophizing in the aftermath of the descriptive-psychological modification of the Scholastic concept of intentionality by Brentano. Cf., also, Klaus Hedwig, ‘Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano’, in Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos
, eds R. M. Chisholm and R. Haller, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978) pp. 67–82, and P. Englehardt ‘Intentio’, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 4 (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt,1976), pp. 466–74"
https://www.academia.edu/26698962/Brentanos_Revaluation_of_the_Scholastic_Concept_of_Intentionality_into_a_Root_Concept_of_Descriptive_Psychology
p.126, note 6.

>>19964126
What you can also do is take a peek at Ideen I, Third Section, Chapter 2, you can skip to [72], and just push through it.
As a new science, Phenomenology had to be circumscribed, defined and justified prior to be genuinely developed. We have a fraction of what Husserl and his students wrote, and what you'll find published is nearly all the preparatory work to Phenomenology itself. You'll have hundred of pages talking about the various reductions, but not a single actual, properly delineated example of an eidetic reduction on paper.
We 100% know Husserl and his students practiced reductions, wrote then down and had a journal of them. If I'm not mistaken there are untranslated hard copies in Leuven. But they won't be published anytime soon, and despite having taken course on Husserl with 3 different teachers specialized on him, they have never presented an actual example of reduction, or asked of us to operate any.

>>19135180
>I've been reading him for about 17 years now,
what the fuck