/lit/ - Literature

>>15594739
What the violations of bell inequalities show is that there is no locally realistic (by locality he means constraint of causality and by realism he means variables with definite properties) theory that can account for the strength of the correlations measured in nature by the bell experiments. It's not quantum mechanics that violates bell inequalities, it's nature, and any theory that might supersede QM, any final theory of physics, will have to incorporate that fact into its account of the world. The reason it's profound is because it says something about the nature of the world and not about what to expect from any particular theory. Maudlin is well within his rights to interpret this as a violation of locality, but interpretations of the results are not restricted to this. There are plenty of local intepretations of QM (Everett, transactional, etc.), but what is certain is that you will have to give up some intuitive "metaphysical" presumption about the world.

>>11753444
>>11754061
>>11754444
It doesn't even say this. What Bell's Theorem states is that quantum mechanics allows for correlations in nature that are stronger than any that can be accounted for by a classical theory. That's it. What this means depends on what classical intuitions about the way the world is you're comfortable with giving up.

>>11469015
In popularizations maybe, but the situation is far more nuanced than that and anyone who actually knows what they're talking about knows this. I don't think any physicist really cares to think about it too much. But action at a distance is only one possible interpretation. You can reject the possibility of unique outcomes to experiments and get many worlds, wavefunctions propagating backward in time, superdeterminism, etc.

>>9700013
Garbage.

>Quantum mechanics teaches us that objective reality, contrary to our common sense intuition, does not exist prior to measurement.

It does not. Operationally and mathematically, quantum mechanics tells us nothing about how the world is.

> In the standard Copengagen interpretation of quantum mechanics there exists a ‘Heisenberg cut’ – a boundary between the observer and the observed. Von Neumann argued that all material objects must be placed on the ‘observed’ side of the Heisenberg cut, and that only consciousness can be placed on the ‘observer’ side.

Neumann and Bohr's interpretations are vastly different. Copenhagen does not postulate consciousness as a necessary requirement for the collapse of the wave function nor is there even a consensus over what Bohr really meant, although his own statements point towards a belief in an objective reality underlying quantum phenomenon. Neumann's is usually ranked lower than other interpretations because there is no explicit mechanism by which consciousness might be said to cause collapse. Why pick this over Bohmian or Everettian mechanics? Everett's contribution towards the development of decoherence would at least point in the direction of Many Worlds as opposed to consciousness.

The saddest thing of all is that you completely overlook the one thing that could potentially support your point: Bell's Theorem. A rejection of counterfactual definiteness would entail a notion of scientific discovery that becomes nothing more than reading the pointer clicks on our instruments as opposed to acquiring privileged access to the external world. Only then might the moon not be there when no one is looking.