/lit/ - Literature

>>16435272
the spectrum pleroma

>>15653857
>>15653868
Now in all these states, whoever lives justly obtains a better lot, and whoever lives unjustly, a worse. For each soul returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years; for it does not regain its wings before that time has elapsed, except the soul of him who has been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical lover; these, when for three successive periods of a thousand years they have chosen such a life, after the third period of a thousand years become winged in the three thousandth year and go their way; but the rest, when they have finished their first life, receive judgment, and after the judgment some go to the places of correction under the earth and pay their penalty, while the others, [249b] made light and raised up into a heavenly place by justice, live in a manner worthy of the life they led in human form. But in the thousandth year both come to draw lots and choose their second life, each choosing whatever it wishes. Then a human soul may pass into the life of a beast, and a soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into a man. For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form. For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity [249c] by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things the communion with which causes God to be divine.

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>>14409308
Clinias
How do you mean?

Athenian
Thus:—Since our King saw that all actions involve soul, and contain much good and much evil, and that body and soul are, when generated, indestructible but not eternal,2 as are the gods ordained by law (for if either soul or body had been destroyed, [904b] there would never have been generation of living creatures), and since He perceived that all soul that is good naturally tends always to benefit, but the bad to injure,—observing all this, He designed a location for each of the parts, wherein it might secure the victory of goodness in the Whole and the defeat of evil most completely, easily, and well. For this purpose He has designed the rule which prescribes what kind of character should be set to dwell in what kind of position and in what regions;3 but the causes of the generation of any special kind he left to the wills [904c] of each one of us men.4 For according to the trend of our desires and the nature of our souls, each one of us generally becomes of a corresponding character.

Clinias
That is certainly probable.

Athenian
All things that share in soul change, since they possess within themselves the cause of change, and in changing they move according to the law and order of destiny; the smaller the change of character, the less is the movement over surface in space, but when the change is great and towards great iniquity, [904d] then they move towards the deep and the so-called lower regions, regarding which—under the names of Hades and the like—men are haunted by most fearful imaginings, both when alive and when disparted from their bodies. And whenever the soul gets a specially large share of either virtue or vice, owing to the force of its own will and the influence of its intercourse growing strong, then, if it is in union with divine virtue, it becomes thereby eminently virtuous, and moves to an eminent region, being transported by a holy road to another and a better region; [904e] whereas, if the opposite is the case, it changes to the opposite the location of its life's abode.““This is the just decree of the gods who inhabit Olympus,”

”thou child and stripling who thinkest thou art neglected by the gods,—the decree that as thou becomest worse, thou goest to the company of the worse souls, and as thou becomest better, to the better souls; and that, alike in life and in every shape of death, thou both doest and sufferest what it is befitting that like should do towards like.

Now if particularity and quality must be removed from knowledge of the One, so too must the One be removed, since this is an aspect of all things; moreover, we must remove all things, since all things also consist in particular beings, since each one of all things is a particular, and thus collectively all things consist in particular beings. And yet if the One is known neither as the One nor as all things, what could it be? Leave off, my friend, and do not apply the question, “What is it?” to the One, since it is exactly this which prevents you from attaining to knowledge of it, in that you imagine that it can be called a particular being, whereas if you remove particularity and quality, what it is will be apparent to you insofar as it can be. For this is what it is: the not a particular being and the not a quality, but it is prior to these, and is that which is neither possible to say (for each name represents a particular being and refers to a particular being) nor easy to conceive. For every thought is a particular being and is of a qualified particular, and even if you gather all thoughts together simultaneously, then you have particular beings and qualities, for thoughts are of qualified particular beings. Consequently, too, in the case of intellect, insofar as intellect is that which contemplates particular qualified beings, it is in labor and struggles to bring forth a conception of that nature, nor can intellect produce that conception, but rather, just the opposite: it turns that labor within itself and directs it toward the most simple and that which is entirely without compass and completely unqualified with respect to any sort of quality that serves as a limiting condition in general for all things simultaneously and each thing in particular. And this is just what Plato and the Oracles urge us to do, if somehow we are able, that is, to forget entirely our own conceptions and to make the running leap toward these labor pains that have the capacity to be intimate with that principle, but report back to no one, except that they remove the obstruction that stands in the way of this projection and that obstacle is exactly the “what kind of thing is it?” and the “thinking of the One as something.”

I hear there was a debate between two Hegelians one accusing Pinkard of poor interpretation.
And that Inwood's is more readable (better prose), and that Pinkard has some weird unorthodox phrasing (he seems to have translated the words not their meaning, similarly to Miller).
But this is only what I've heard.