/lit/ - Literature

>>14541803
I don't believe you've read "most of what Kant wrote" because you seem to be a bit of an idiot. How do you take 'x is what makes a life worth living' to imply the absence of x is a legitimisation of suicide? Being a person who deserves a happiness is valued more, by Kant, than being happy simpliciter. This doesn't mean you can kill yourself if you aren't happy, for reasons you are giving, and I agree with. But I don't see how you can actually confuse a question on the purpose of life, on what makes life worth living, with the conditions of the moral permissibility of suicide. Mind you, this started because you said "Kant makes no mention of value" and accused me of making it up. Here's a quote from the Critique of Pure Reason, and pic related is a footnote from the Critique of Judgment:

>The practical law from the motive of happiness I call pragmatic (rule of prudence); but that which is such that it has no other motive than the worthiness to be happy I call moral (moral law). The first advises us what to do if we want to partake of happiness; the second commands how we should behave in order even to be worthy of happiness... Do that through which you will become worthy to be happy.