/lit/ - Literature

There can only possibly be seven planets.

>>19465891
Sort of, it also fused with nationalism. See >>19465917

>>19465894


I disagree. The powerful people always remain powerful due to state capture and inequality. Someone like Obama, the mixed race child of a single mom was never powerful until he won a national election and became a charismatic candidate to run.

>>19465917
To continue:

But Fukuyama missed how much economics drive the Last Man problem. 40+ years of stagnant real median wages, declining wages for the bottom 50%, declining life expectancy, soaring inequality- these all help undermine feelings of recognition. Being replaced by more desperate third worlders hits support or socialism and identity. The collapse of churches, labor unions, and civic organizations obviously plays a role here.

The problem is that the new radical ideologies are full of worse contradictions. Take the new Right in the US. The focus on property rights directly undermines the goals for reducing globalization. Corporations have every incentive to use migrant labor and off shore production. Protecting their rights is in contradiction with the goal of slowing globalization. A carbon tax would include the externalities of offshoring to heavy polluting nations, and the cost of trans-Pacific shipping and would drastically reduce offshoring, but the new Right would never allow it because admitting global warming and restricting corporate rights is anathema.

A way forward probably involves more global forms of identity and socialism. Protect identity by massively curbing migration and allowing time for migration. But then to stave off migration, you need to send way more aid to poor countries, something likely akin to Cold War level defense spending, because otherwise you will keep getting massive waves. Then, you also need a new source of legitimacy outside self determination.

Greater equality helps the Last Man problem, but you still need intentional efforts and identity building. New Left multiculturalism directly contradicts assimilation though.

The dialectical is in full swing. Something is coming.

>>19395348
I chased that for a long time but realized it's essentially obscurantist to cover the fact that it doesn't have any essential answers.

I did, however, find another guy who did a decent job attempting to explain reality from the ground up (pic related).

Part of me thinks he discovered deep truths about the nature of being, and a true description of the progression of knowledge in his dialectical (also his "truth is the whole" coherence formulation of truth makes way more sense than correspondence or pr*gmatism).

But then part of me fears he is just 250 IQ giga cope. He saw materialism and what would become eliminative materialism and epiphenomenalism approaching and constructed a grand palace of abstraction, an endless labyrinth of thought, as a giant cope to occupy the mind and trick it into feelings of revelation.

How do I know which is which? Working through the Phenomenology with a collection of secondary sources has already taken me over 1,000 pages, a notebook full of notes, and most of a year and I'm not even half way.

Is this going to bottom out like my studies into Gnosticism?

Truth as defined by correspondence, e.g. "Thesis is standing," is true if he is indeed standing, false if he is sitting, is useful from a pragmatic perspective, but it not a complete system of epistemology.

Knowledge comes on multiple levels. A mechanic can correctly explain how an engine works, but a chemist can explain it on another level. "The truth is the whole."

This bastard tried to disguise retardness of hist ideas in thousand way and still failed.

1. Reality only occurs in the space on conciousness. It is meaningless to talk to being, of the differentiation and definition of things themselves, outside a mind, i.e idealism, i.e. Parmenides what is known is.

2. However, Plato's elevation of the universal over the particular doesn't hold. The universal it the motive force in the particular, what drives it to be, to be known.

3. Negativity, what a thing is not, is what defines it

4. Gnosticism deals with the problem of evil but has to do so by misrepresenting the role of the universal in the world. Orthodox Christians inherited a Platonic Form of the Good as their God and stumble as well in dealing with evil. The fact is God is being, "I am that I am." It is immanent. It has darkness because light cannot be known except through darkness. So to, God evolves as Truth evolves. Truth is not a mere correspondence of statements to brute facts, the Truth is the Whole. Understanding builds on understanding and one must know all to know absolutely. Partial truths are synthetic.

5. These truths are best represented in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and address the problems of both Gnosticism and Orthodox Christianity

Do I have to read him to understand philosophy?

Every secondary source calls his super influential, "without a doubt the most influential of the 19th century," in From Decartes to Derrida, or ranking him with Plato and Aristotle, but I also found the start of the Phenomenology of Spirit absolutely incomprehensible.

Also, I notice a very high correlation of schizoposting and him, although that's true for Plato too but Plato is still worthwhile IMHO.

>>18808335
Yes.

>As to mathematical truths, we should be still less inclined to consider anyone a geometer who had got Euclid’s theorems by heart (auswendig) without knowing the proofs, without, if we may say so by way of contrast, getting them into his head (inwendig). Similarly, if anyone came to know by measuring many right-angled triangles that their sides are related in the way everybody knows, we should regard knowledge so obtained as unsatisfactory. All the same, while proof is essential in the case of mathematical knowledge, it still does not have the significance and nature of being a moment in the result itself; the proof is over when we get the result, and has disappeared. Qua result the theorem is, no doubt, one that is seen to be true. But this eventuality has nothing to do with its content, but only with its relation to the knowing subject. The process of mathematical proof does not belong to the object; it is a function that takes place outside the matter in hand. Thus, the nature of a right-angled triangle does not break itself up into factors in the manner set forth in the mathematical construction which is required to prove the proposition expressing the relation of its parts. The entire process of producing the result is an affair of knowledge which takes its own way of going about it. In philosophical knowledge, too, the way existence, qua existence, comes about (Werden) is different from that whereby the essence or inner nature of the fact comes into being. But philosophical knowledge, for one thing, contains both, while mathematical knowledge sets forth merely the way an existence comes about, i.e. the way the nature of the fact gets to be in the sphere of knowledge as such. For another thing, too, philosophical knowledge unites both these particular movements. The inward rising into being, the process of substance, is an unbroken transition into outwardness, into existence or being for another; and conversely, the coming of existence into being is withdrawal into the inner essence. The movement is the twofold process in which the whole comes to be, and is such that each at the same time posits the other, and each on that account has in it both as its two aspects. Together they make the whole, through their resolving each other, and making themselves into moments of the whole.

>obtains the Absolute
>sets in motion ideologies that define human life for the coming centuries
>absolutely outclasses the mortal intellects arrayed against him
Was he a Dunyain? Could he defeat Khellus?

Hegel looks like my gramma

How did he consider himself an orthodox Lutheran when he thought God was just a historical process and great men can't sin?

>>16123384

Our exploration of three central texts, Mukerji’s The Nature of Self (1943), Raju’s Thought and reality: Hegelianism and Advaita (1937), and Shrivastava’s Śaṁkara and Bradley: A Comparative and Critical Study (1968), will indicate that these philosophical currents formed a dense network stretched across three vertices: Hegel himself; the receptions and the reconfigurations of Hegel in a wide range of British idealists, from Green to Caird to Bradley; and the Indian philosophical interrogations, from the perspectives of modernized Advaita, of both Hegel himself and the British idealists who incorporated aspects of Hegelianism into their own metaphysical systems. While ‘British Idealism’, which emerged from around 1870, was not a singular movement but a group of somewhat divergent philosophical standpoints, D. Boucher and A. Vincent highlight a few shared themes. First, according to British idealism, there are no isolated entities or processes, and everything has to be understood in terms of their relationships within an internally differentiated whole. Second, the world is dependent on mind, not in the sense that it owes its very existence to mind but that it derives its intelligibility from mind. The claim is not that, for instance, a table ceases to exist once it is taken away from an observer, but that carpenters, scientists, and artists could see three different types of tables, where these differences are dependent on mind (Boucher and Vincent 2012: 39).

These themes were critically received by the British idealists from the philosophical projects of German idealists who sought to respond to the critical idealism of Kant, variously by searching for an unconditional first principle of knowledge (Fichte), a philosophy of identity (Schelling), the absolute knowing which overcomes all subject–object dualisms (Hegel), and so on (Dudley 2007). Mukerji, Raju, Shrivastava, and others, as we will see, critically appropriated specific aspects of the ‘holism’ of the Hegelian Absolute, and also the post-Kantian critique of Berkeleyean idealism, as they reformulated, for the purpose of their philosophical conversations with Hegelianisms, some of the metaphysical themes of Advaita Vedānta. The Absolute of Advaita, it turns out, is not to be understood as the ‘subjective idealism’ of Berkeley, but not quite as the ‘absolute idealism’ of Hegel either, though it is conceptually much nearer the latter standpoint than the former.