/lit/ - Literature

>>14182707
In short, no
>An agent's cognition and behaviour is not reducible to lower level talk of physical processes in the brain. Because these two domains are seperate, physical determinism being true does not rule out agential indeterminism. Higher level indeterminism arises as an emergent by product of lower level determinism. Let's consider a deterministic system which is governed by laws. In this system, the initial state determines all subsequent states. In this system, the same macro state (psychological level state, for example) can be instantiated by different micro level states (microphysical level states, like particles and forces, for example). Take this graphic I have posted. The initial state (t=1), determines all subsequent states, as I described earlier. The dots represent the state of the system at a given time (t). If two dots land in the same cell, that means the same outcome was achieved on the macroscopic level. Now let's broaden things even more. Let's say at t=1, the 6 possible physical states correspond to only 2 possible psychological states—one on the left and one the right. Now, if we redescribe the system in these higher level terms, we actually end up with an indeterministic system. The next picture I am going to post shows the graphic of the indeterministic higher level system. The indeterminism is indicated by the branching. In conclusion, this shows that lower level determinism can give rise to emergent higher level indeterminism and that lower level determinism is compatible with higher level indeterminism. The opposite—higher level determinism with lower level indeterminism—is also compatible; however, that would take another post to describe. This shows that physical determinism in the universe is compatible with agential indeterminism.

>>14170361
Truly an imbecilic response. Neuroscience has yet to disprove agential indeterminism—if ever. You sound like every science worshipping STEMbug, you hope that one day neuroscience will finally confirm your intuition that free will is non-existent. Neuroscience can't tell us about human behaviour and cognition because they are higher level phenomena that must be explained using higher level descriptions, like psychological theories. You, again, seem to be conflating the higher level and lower level domains. An agent's cognition and behaviour is not reducible to lower level talk of physical processes in the brain. Because these two domains are seperate, physical determinism being true does not rule out agential indeterminism. Higher level indeterminism arises as an emergent by product of lower level determinism. Let's consider a deterministic system which is governed by laws. In this system, the initial state determines all subsequent states. In this system, the same macro state (psychological level state, for example) can be instantiated by different micro level states (microphysical level states, like particles and forces, for example). Take this graphic I have posted. The initial state (t=1), determines all subsequent states, as I described earlier. The dots represent the state of the system at a given time (t). If two dots land in the same cell, that means the same outcome was achieved on the macroscopic level. Now let's broaden things even more. Let's say at t=1, the 6 possible physical states correspond to only 2 possible psychological states—one on the left and one the right. Now, if we redescribe the system in these higher level terms, we actually end up with an indeterministic system. The next picture I am going to post shows the graphic of the indeterministic higher level system. The indeterminism is indicated by the branching. In conclusion, this shows that lower level determinism can give rise to emergent higher level indeterminism and that lower level determinism is compatible with higher level indeterminism. The opposite—higher level determinism with lower level indeterminism—is also compatible; however, that would take another post to describe. This shows that physical determinism in the universe is compatible with agential indeterminism.