/lit/ - Literature

>>14542283
>The problem here is that Kant doesn't treat time as a "thing".
Spengler does though.

>Kant believed that he had decided the great question of whether this a priori element was pre-existent or obtained by experience, by his celebrated formula that Space is the form of perception which underlies all world impressions. But the "world" of the careless child and the dreamer undeniably possess this form in an insecure and hesitant way, and it is only the tense, practical, technical treatment of the world-around — imposed on the free-moving being which, unlike the lilies of the fields, must care for its life — that lets sensuous self-extension stiffen into rational tridimensionality.

>There is no manner of doubt that the "space" which Kant saw all around him with such unconditional certainty when he was thinking out his theory, did not exist in anything like so rigorous a form for his Carolingian ancestors. Kant's greatness consists in his having created the idea of a "form a priori", but not in the application that he gave it. We have already seen that Time is not a "form of perception" nor for that matter a form at all — forms exist only in the extended — and that there is no possibility of defining it except as a counter- concept to Space.